In re CLAUDE DENNIS WILKES

Opinion

U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT SS NG NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA □□□□ 1 Signed and Filed: January 22, 2026 □□□□ Oe 2 ! ah 4 5 DENNISMONTALL | U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 6 7 g UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT ) Bankruptcy Case 10 JIn re ) No. 11-51135-DM ) 11 CLAUDE DENNIS WILKES, ) Chapter 13 ) 12 ) Ss ) 613 Debtor. ) ) 14 )

° 17 On December 9, 2025, the court held a hearing on several

18 |}motions. Appearances were made on the record. At the end of 19 ithe hearing, the court instructed the parties to submit 20 }supplemental briefing as to why the previous Order Granting 21 }Motion to Extend Time to Revoke Discharge (“Extension Order”) 22 } (Dkt. 151) should not be vacated. The parties submitted their 23 ibriefs by January 5, 2026. 24 Having reviewed the pleadings and for the reasons more fully 25 istated below, the court will VACATE its Extension Order (Dkt. 26 }}151). The DeForest Building Condo. Owners Assoc.’s (“HOA”) 27 jattempt to revoke Debtor’s discharge in this case is untimely 28 [and Debtor has not waived his defense regarding timeliness.

As such, the court will GRANT Debtor’s Motion to Strike (Dkt. 132) and his Motion to Strike AP in Adversary Proceeding, A.P. No. 25-05044. Because the time to file a complaint to revoke discharge in this case has elapsed, the court will also DISMISS that Adversary Proceeding. Background Claude D. Wilkes (“Debtor”) initially petitioned for relief under Chapter 131 (Dkt. 1) on February 7, 2011, thereby beginning a journey that has lasted nearly fifteen years. Debtor’s Third Amended Plan (the “Plan”) (Dkt. 53) was confirmed on December 20, 2012. On October 13, 2016, the Chapter 13 Trustee (“Trustee”) provided the court with a Notice of Plan Completion (Dkt. 92) indicating that all Plan payments to be made to the Trustee and/or otherwise provided for under the Plan had been made. However, the Trustee sought closure of the case without discharge because (1) Debtor had not completed an instructional course concerning personal financial management described in § 111 or did not file a statement regarding completion of the course prior to making the last Plan payment; and (2) Debtor had not filed a declaration regarding the status of the loan modification as required by the Plan. 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and code references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. All “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and all “Bankruptcy Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. “Civil L.R.” and “B.L.R.” references refer to the applicable Civil Local Rules and Bankruptcy Local Rules. In light of the Trustee’s Notice of Plan Completion, the court entered a Final Decree (Dkt. 93) and closed the case without a discharge (Dkt. 94) on November 23, 2016. Over seven years later, Debtor returned to court and filed an Ex Parte Application to Re-Open Bankruptcy Case (Dkt. 98) on January 18, 2024, requesting that this case be re-opened so that he could file his outstanding Certificate of Debtor Education and declaration regarding the loan modification to obtain his discharge. On the same day, Debtor lodged with the court a copy of his Certificate of Debtor Education (Dkt. 100) which reflects he completed the required course on financial management on October 16, 2016. Upon review of the application, the court entered an order on January 23, 2024 (Dkt. 101) reopening this case. A few weeks later, on February 7, 2024, Debtor filed a Declaration Regarding Loan Modification (Dkt. 103) as required under the confirmed Plan. On February 8, 2024, Debtor filed a Debtor’s Certification in Support of Discharge (“Original Certification”) (Dkt. 104). The Original Certification is a form certification which instructs the debtor to “mark one choice for each numbered section.” Section 2 of the Original Certification provides two options: “I HAVE NOT been required to pay a domestic support obligation as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) by any order of a court or administrative agency or by any statute,” or alternatively, “I HAVE paid all domestic support obligations as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) that have become due on or before the date of this certification (including amounts due before the petition was filed, but only to the extent provided for by the plan) under any order of a court or administrative agency or under any statute.” Debtor did not select either of the options under Section 2. The Original Certification was signed under penalty of perjury. Approximately two months later, Debtor filed an Amended Debtor’s Certification in Support of Discharge (“Amended Certification”) (Dkt. 108). This time, Debtor marked the first choice under Section 2 stating that he had not been required to pay a domestic support obligation (“DSO”). On April 26, 2024, the Trustee filed an Amended Final Report (Dkt. 110) requesting that the court enter a discharge pursuant to § 1328, and on April 29, 2024, the court entered its Order of Discharge (Dkt. 111). The case was closed yet again on May 31, 2024. Almost one year later, Debtor came back to court and filed another motion to re-open his Chapter 13 case (Dkt. 116), this time for the purpose of initiating an adversary complaint against the HOA for alleged violation of the discharge injunction. The HOA opposed reopening the case (Dkt. 122) and a hearing was held on the matter on May 6, 2025. After the hearing, the court entered an order reopening the case (Dkt. 125) on May 8, 2025. Soon thereafter, Debtor filed an adversary complaint (Adv. No. 25-05016) against the HOA. On August 13, 2025, the HOA filed a Motion to Extend Time to Revoke Discharge (Dkt. 130). Debtor filed a Motion to Strike in opposition (“Motion to Strike”) (Dkt. 132). In his Motion to Strike, Debtor argues that the HOA has had the Amended Certification on file since April 2024 and formal notice of the discharge since June 21, 2024, but has only moved to revoke the discharge over a year later.2 As such, Debtor asks the court to strike the HOA’s request to extend the deadline pursuant to Civil Rule 12(f), made applicable by Bankruptcy Rule 7012. The court held a hearing on that motion on August 28, 2025. The motion was granted on the record and the Extension Order (Dkt. 151) was entered by the court on September 3, 2025. Promptly thereafter, the HOA filed the Complaint to Revoke Discharge (“Complaint”) (Dkt. 1, A.P. No. 25-05044) on September 16, 2025, seeking to revoke Debtor’s discharge for fraud pursuant to § 727(c)(d) and (e). The gist of the HOA’s argument is that Debtor checked the box on his Amended Certification stating that he had not been required to pay a DSO despite the fact that he received a Consent Judgment in the State of Louisiana in December 1999 requiring Debtor to pay child support; that he did so falsely and knowingly; that but for this alleged fraud, a 2 In his Motion to Strike, Debtor cites to Rules 4004(b)(1) and (2). Rule 4004(b)(1) applies before a debtor has actually obtained a discharge, which is not relevant here. Debtor’s characterization of Rule 4004(b)(2) in his Motion to Strike is similarly inaccurate. Rule 4004(b)(2) does not mention anything about fraud. Instead, it provides that “[a]fter the time to object has expired and before a discharge is granted, a party in interest may file a motion to extend the time if: (A) the objection is based on facts that, if learned after the discharge is granted, would provide a basis for revocation under § 727(d); (B) the movant did not know those facts in time to object; and (C) the movant files the motion promptly after learning about them.” discharge would not have bene entered; and the HOA was unaware of this alleged fraud until after the discharge had been granted. Only four weeks later, Debtor filed his Motion to Strike Adversary Complaint to Revoke Discharge Under FRBP 7012(f) and 11 U.S.C 1328(e) (“Motion to Strike AP”) (Dkt. 7, A.P. No. 25- 05044). He contended, inter alia, that the HOA had brought the present action eighteen months after the discharge was entered which fails to satisfy the statutory requirements of § 1328(e). After a reassignment of this bankruptcy case, this court held a scheduling conference on December 9, 2025. At that conference, the court directed the parties to file simultaneous briefs as to whether an extension of time beyond the statutory deadline of § 1328(e) was permitted under Bankruptcy Rule 9006. Each party timely submitted their supplemental briefs. Discussion A. The court may vacate its Extension Order Civil Rule 60(b)(1), incorporated by Bankruptcy Rule 9024, provides that “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for…reasons [of] mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect…The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and…not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Courts may exercise their inherent equitable powers to vacate or modify an interlocutory order where it is in the interest of justice. Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Filipiak, 406 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2005); see also, A & A Sign Co. v. Maughan, 419 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 1969). “The major grounds justifying reconsideration of interlocutory orders are an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Filipiak, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1076 (citations omitted). This inherent power to modify previously entered orders is subject, however, to some limitations. In re Sawtelle Partners, LLC, BAP No. CC-18-1032-TaLS, 2019 WL 2855786, at *9 (9th Cir. BAP Jul. 1, 2019). Specifically, bankruptcy court “have the power to reconsider, modify or vacate their previous orders so long as no intervening rights have become vested in reliance on the order.” In re Lenox, 902 F.2d 737, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1990). Upon de novo review, the court finds sufficient legal justification for vacating the Extension Order. First, the applicable order is not a final order, but interlocutory. Therefore, the typical Civil Rule 60 factors for relief do not apply. Second, although the controlling law has not changed during the pendency of this case, nor has any new evidence been brought to the attention of the court that would change, the court finds that manifest injustice will be done if its previous order is not vacated because the Extension Order was erroneous as a matter of law; the applicable time limit is statutory, not rule-based, and the time had already run when the Extension Order was issued. No intervening rights of the HOA have vested. B. The one-year deadline is a strict statute of limitation At the heart of the dispute here is whether Rule 9024 conflicts with § 1328(e), and if so, whether the Rule must yield to the statute. The time limit to file a complaint to revoke a discharge order is governed by § 1328(e), which states that: “[o]n request of a party in interest before one year after discharge under this section is granted, and after notice and a hearing, the court may revoke such discharge only if—(1) such discharge was obtained by the debtor through fraud; and (2) the requesting party did not know of such fraud until after such discharge was granted.” A plain-text interpretation of the statute indicates that the period to challenge a discharge is one-year from discharge. However, Rule 9006(b)(1)(B) generally allows for a bankruptcy court to extend the time to act if “on motion made after made after the specified period expires, the failure to act within that period resulted from excusable neglect[.]” The question is whether Rule 9006(b)(1)(B) modifies § 1328(e)’s one- year limit such that the HOA could move for an extension of time in this case. Neither party disputes that the Discharge Objection was filed outside the one-year limit proscribed by § 1328(e). The discharge order was entered on April 29, 2024, and the Complaint was filed on September 16, 2025. Debtor argues that § 1328(e) sets a strict deadline, whereas the HOA argues that despite the explicit one-year deadline, the court may nevertheless exercise its Rule 9006(b)(1)(B) powers to extend the time period due to the HOA’s excusable neglect because it was not aware of the alleged fraud in this case. The HOA points to Rule 9006(b)(2) which states “[t]he court must not extend the time to act under Rules 1007(d), 2003(a) and (d), 7052, 9023, and 9024.” Rule 9024 provides that Civil Rule 60 applies in a bankruptcy case except that “a complaint to revoke a discharge in a Chapter 7 case must be filed within the time allowed by § 727(e)[.]” Employing the common law principle of “the inclusion one thing is the exclusion of the other,” the HOA argues that because Congress specifically mentioned Chapter 7 cases, but not Chapter 13 cases, no restrictions are placed on § 1328(e). Therefore, according to the HOA, the Rules and statute do not clash, and the court may still use its Rule 9006 powers to extend the time to revoke discharge in this case. The court is not persuaded by the HOA’s arguments. “The time limitations with respect to the commencement of an action to revoke a discharge must be strictly construed.” In re Ocasio Serrano, Case No. 17-03257 (ESL), 2021 WL 1287679, at *3 (Bankr. D.P.R. Apr. 6, 2021). Equitable considerations do not allow a bankruptcy court to contravene express provisions of the Code. Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 420-24 (2014). Here, there is a clear statutory provision governing the time limitations to file a complaint to revoke a discharge. The statute controls over conflicting rule provisions. The HOA relies on In re Cisneros for the proposition that a bankruptcy court may flex its equitable muscles to fashion relief under Rule 9024 where such relief would not otherwise be possible under § 1328(e). In re Cisneros, 994 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1993). If so, according to the HOA’s logic, it would follow that the bankruptcy court would be able to utilize Rule 9006’s excusable neglect standard to extend the time period beyond one year here. The court cannot agree with the HOA’s analysis. The court does not interpret Cisneros as being so broad as to allow bankruptcy courts to ignore the dictates of the Code. Rather Cisneros is limited to the specific facts of that case. The debtors in Cisneros had a Chapter 13 plan confirmed which provided monthly payments to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Cisneros, 994 F.2d at 1464. Although the IRS filed a proof of claim in Cisneros, the Chapter 13 Trustee did not receive notice of it, and therefore failed to remit monthly payments to the IRS. Id. Sixteen months after confirmation of the plan, the Cisneros debtors received a full discharge under § 1328(a), with the IRS receiving no plan payments. Id. After the debtors contacted the IRS seeking an abatement on the grounds that their tax liabilities were discharged, the IRS refused their request and filed a motion with the bankruptcy court asking the court to reopen the Chapter 13 case and vacate its previous discharge order under § 1328(a). Id. Ultimately, the bankruptcy court granted the IRS’s motion. Id. at 1464. Both the BAP and the Ninth Circuit duly followed and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. Id. The court does not construe the holding of Cisneros to be as broad as the HOA reads it, nor does it control here. First, the issue in Cisneros was whether a bankruptcy court could revoke a discharge for a reason other than fraud; the IRS did not allege that it hadn’t been paid because of any fraudulent conduct, but rather due to the trustee’s mistake or inadvertence. Neither mistake nor inadvertence are included as a ground for revocation under § 1328(e). Yet, nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit found that “[t]he order of discharge was entered by the bankruptcy court under a misapprehension as to the facts of the case.” Id. at 1467. As such, the Ninth Circuit took the view that this was “precisely the sort of ‘mistake’ or ‘inadvertence’ that Rule 60(b) was intended to reach.” Id. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that it was appropriate for the bankruptcy court to utilize its equitable powers under Rule 9024. Id. at 1466 (“A Chapter 13 debtor’s right to have his discharge revoked only for fraud (and not on general equitable grounds or for some reason that would justify revocation of a Chapter 7 discharge) is in no way infringed when a court vacated an order of discharge entered by mistake”) (emphasis added). But the HOA here does not claim that Debtor obtained his discharge because of a mistake or inadvertence. In its Complaint, the HOA only alleged that Debtor obtained his discharge via fraud and sought relief under § 1328(e). Therefore, Cisneros does not apply, and the court will not circumvent § 1328’s clear statutory language. Second, in Cisneros, the debtors received their discharge despite not making the plan payments to the IRS. As such, the Ninth Circuit held that § 1328(e) did not even apply because “it [was] by no means apparent why the [debtors] should be permitted to invoke any rights established by section 1328(e) given that they never satisfied the statutory requirements for earning such rights.” Id. at 1465-66. “Section 1328(a) mandates the granting of a ‘full compliance’ discharge ‘after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan…” and the debtors in Cisneros had not “met this condition, and so cannot claim any right to the discharge granted them.” Id. at 1466. Here, though, Debtor completed all the payments under his Plan as evidenced by the Trustee’s Amended Final Report (Dkt. 110). Therefore, Debtor is entitled to invoke his rights under § 1328(e) since he earned them. It is well established in this circuit, as well as others, that the Bankruptcy Rules are subject to the limitation that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2075; In re Greene, 223 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000). To use Rule 9006 to modify § 1328(e) would abridge rights that Debtor gained under that statute. Finally, and perhaps the most important critical fact that distinguishes that case from this one, is that the IRS in Cisneros filed its motion to revoke discharge within one year from the date of discharge; the Cisneros court never directly addressed whether § 1328(e)’s time limit could be expanded via Rule 9024 because the moving party there was still within the statute of limitation. Id. at 1467. c. The Motion to Strike and Discharge Objection Section 1328(e) is a “non-jurisdictional time bar” that is “an affirmative defense that may be forfeited if not timely raised.” Weil v. Elliott, 859 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2017); see also, Ocasio Serrano, 2021 WL 1287679, at *3 (“The time limits in § 727(e) may not be jurisdictional but an affirmative defense that may be forfeited if not timely raised.”). In this case, the time limitation in § 1328(e) was timely raised by Debtor both in the main case via the Motion to Strike and later in the Adversary Proceeding via the Motion to Strike AP in opposition to the Revocation Objection. Therefore, the adversary proceeding was untimely and wrongly filed and must be dismissed. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the court will VACATE the court’s September 3, 2025 Order Granting Motion to Extend Time to Revoke Discharge (Dkt. 151), GRANT Debtor’s Motion to Strike (Dkt. 132) and DISMISS the related Adversary Proceeding. **END OF MEMORANDUM DECISION**

Via U.S. Mail: Claude D. Wilkes Jr. 4683 Flagstaff Dr. Folsom, CA 95630 Via ECF: All ECF Recipients