In re City of New York

186 Misc. 603, 62 N.Y.S.2d 303, 1946 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2224
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 20, 1946
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 186 Misc. 603 (In re City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re City of New York, 186 Misc. 603, 62 N.Y.S.2d 303, 1946 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2224 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1946).

Opinion

Lockwood, J.

Twenty-one, years ago, the president and sole stockholder of the petitioner, Par Eastern Manufacturing Co., Inc., an importer and processor of cocoanuts, purchased, and adapted for the exclusive use of his company, part of the Williams Drop Forge Works, the old four-story and basement building containing 24,000 square feet of floor space, known as Nos. 9-15 Richards Street, near Hamilton Avenue, Brooklyn.

Title to this and adjacent properties required for the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel Plaza was duly vested in the City of New York on December 13, 1945, after which the occupants became tenants at will of the City, pursuant to section B15-37.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, which reads: “ Vesting of title; effect of, upon real property contracts.— a. Where the Avhole of any lot or parcel of real property, under lease or other contract, shall be taken, all the covenants, contracts and engagements between landlord and tenant or any other contracting parties touching the same, or any part thereof, upon the vesting of title in the city, shall cease and determine and be absolutely discharged. * * * b. All tenants in possession of such premises at the time of the vesting of title thereto in the' city, where the real property affected Avas acquired in a capital project proceeding, shall become tenants at will of such city unless within ten days after the vesting of title they shall elect to vacate and give up their respective holdings.” ..

The Par Eastern Company was notified to vacate, as the building is on the part of the site which must now be cleared, if work on the tunnel project is to go forward.

On March 4, 1946, two months and nineteen days after vesting, and more than five years after work on the tunnel started AAÚthin a feAV hundred feet of its factory, and four months after tunnel Avork AATas resumed, it instituted this proceeding to enjoin the city, its agents or authorities, from removing it as the tenant of said building.

Petitioner concedes that the city would have the right to possession under section B15-36.0 of the Administrative Code: “ Vesting of title; date of; seizin; .possession. * * * c. The city or any person acting under its authority, or the agency Avhich upon the acquisition of title to such real property will have jurisdiction thereof, shall immediately or any time thereafter take possession of such property without suit or other [606]*606judicial proceedings ”, except for the provisions of the Commercial Bent Law (L. 1945, ch; 3, as amd. by L. 1945, ch. 315, and as amd. by L. 1945, ch. 433) which provide: “ § 8. So long as the tenant continues to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled * * * no tenant shall be removed from any commercial space, by action or proceeding to evict or to recover possession * * * unless: * * * (<}) * * * possession is sought by a person who acquires title to the building subsequent to January twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred forty-five, and who likewise seeks in good faith to recover possession of the commercial space for his immediate and personal use; provided, however, that in either such event such person shall have an equity in the property of not less than twenty-five per centum of the purchase price; and provided, further, that nothing in this subdivision contained shall authorize the dispossession of a tenant during the term of his lease by his landlord or by any such subsequent purchaser unless by the terms of the lease the privilege is reserved to terminate the lease upon sale of the building; and provided further that no landlord shall be entitled to invoke the provisions of this subdivision unless he shall possess an interest of not less than fifty per centum of the whole investment in the business which he proposes to carry on in such space. * * * (f) The tenant occupies commercial space in a building required to be demolished in order to carry out a housing or rehabilitation project instituted under the public housing law, the redevelopment companies law, or section eighty-four of the insurance law, or instituted by a corporation organized under any law of this state for housing project purposes, the stock and obligations of which are owned by savings banks pursuant to subdivision twenty-one of section two hundred thirty-five of the banking law * * *.”

Thus, the power to acquire and possess real property for a public use by the right of eminent domain is sought to be nullified by the provisions of a statute enacted in the exercise of the police power.

Petitioner argues that under the Commercial Bent Law (§ 8, quoted above), so long as it continues to pay the rent which the city is entitled to, under the provisions of the act, it may not be removed.

Further, to the extent that the provisions of the act are inconsistent with any general, specific or local law or charter provision, the act shall be controlling: “ § 14. To the extent that the provisions of this act are inconsistent with the provisions of any general, special or local law or charter provisions, the provi[607]*607sions of this act shall be controlling. * * * If any provisions of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid the remainder of the act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. ’ ’

Counsel concedes that the act includes special exceptions permitting the acquisition of property by the city for housing projects (§ 8, subd. [f]) but claims that it is silent concerning the rights of the city to acquire a building for the construction of a street plaza, tunnel purposes or any other kind of public project.

If petitioner’s position were correct, it would mean that all public projects and improvements including those on which work was suspended during the war, except housing developments, would be held up during the emergency declared by the Commercial Bent Law, now to continue until July 1, 1946, but which will probably be extended at the present session of the Legislature.

The Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel is no new project. The congestions of commercial and pleasure vehicular traffic along the main streets of Brooklyn and to and along the water front with its many piers and thousands of manufacturing plants and other industries, and over the three existing bridges, reached the saturation point years ago.

This problem threatened the industrial life and prestige of our borough and the authorities, in 1929, directed their attention to its solution. Industries were moving or threatening to move to other States, which meant vacant buildings and employees moving away or becoming unemployed.

An over-all plan was adopted of which the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel is the main link to Manhattan and via express highways there, to upper New York State, Connecticut and New England.

Chapter 1 of the Laws of 1936 authorized the construction of this tunnel. In 1939 the Legislature permitted the substitution of a bridge but it was disapproved by the War Department which veto was sustained by the President.

In May, 1940, money was appropriated and an agreement made to complete the tunnel and acquire lands for approaches and connections which specifically includes the parcel occupied by petitioner.

The Beconstruction Finance Corporation executed a contract with the New York City Tunnel Authority June 28, 1940, to advance a loan of not more than $57,000,000, on condition that the work progress without delay.

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Bluebook (online)
186 Misc. 603, 62 N.Y.S.2d 303, 1946 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2224, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-city-of-new-york-nysupct-1946.