In re City Homes III LLC

564 B.R. 827, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 106
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland
DecidedJanuary 13, 2017
DocketCase No: 13-25370, Case No: 13-25371, Case No: 13-25372, Case No: 13-25373, Case No: 13-25376, Case No: 13-25377, Case No: 13-25378, Case No: 13-25379, Case No: 13-25380, Case No: 13-25381, Case No: 13-25382, Case No: 13-25383; Jointly Administered under Case No. 13-25370-RAG
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 564 B.R. 827 (In re City Homes III LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re City Homes III LLC, 564 B.R. 827, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 106 (Md. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING CONFIRMATION, VACATING ORDERS AND REQUIRING THE APPOINTMENT OF A TRUSTEE

“It is not necessary to accept everything as true, one must only accept it as necessary.

- ‘The Trial’ Franz Kafka

ROBERT A. GORDON, U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

I. Preliminary Statement

The central question to be answered by this Opinion is whether individuals affiliated with the Debtors who are not themselves in bankruptcy should forevermore be protected by an injunction and release of liability (Release) buried in the proposed Final Plan that is intended to nullify the rights of unknown, unaware and unrepresented claimants, none of whom agreed to the permanent impediment of the Release or likely had actual notice of, or an opportunity to either object to, or vote upon, the same.1 The burden is squarely upon the Plan Proponents to justify the Release but the evidence they marshal falls far short of the criteria set forth in Behrmann v. National Heritage Foundation, Inc., 663 F.3d 704 (4th Cir. 2011) (NHF I) and National Heritage Foundation, Inc. v. Highbourne Foundation, 760 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2014) (NHF II). Therefore, this Court is left with no alternative but to reject the Release. And because the proponents present the plan as their absolute best offering, an un-sev-erable, “all or nothing” proposition, the rejection of the Release in this three years old case necessarily leads to the denial of confirmation and the appointment of a trustee.

The Debtors, the Committee and the United States Trustee (UST) unanimously support approval of the Release and confirmation of the Final Plan as is.2 They assert that the Release is vital, fair and in everyone’s best interest. Applying Kafka’s [829]*829construct, they would have the Court accept the “necessary” over the “true”, to pound the square pegs of the facts into the round holes of the Fourth Circuit’s analytical framework. The question of whether to approve a non-debtor, third-party release is at bottom a matter of equity and a matter of equity is a matter conscience. The Court’s conscience is greatly troubled by the Plan Proponents’ strategy because the unrepresented and unknown parties targeted by the Release—post-1999 tenants of the Debtors who potentially have been poisoned by exposure to lead paint but whose claims are likely not covered by the Debtors’ liability insurance (Uninsured Claimants)—have had no say in the grand legal strategy set to nullify their state law rights against the putative, non-debtor beneficiaries of the Release.

The Final Plan is a simple liquidating plan and, with modifications, the Court would likely, eventually, confirm it without the Release. But confirmation of the Final Plan with the Release is a different question altogether and to do so would be the antithesis of equity; if a non-debtor release should be approved in this Chapter 11 case then such releases should be approved in every Chapter 11 case, merely for the asking. Because neither the facts nor the law justify that result, and the Final Plan must be viewed as the Plan Proponents’ absolute best effort, there is no alternative but to appoint a trustee to wind up the Debtors’ affairs and proceed to a managed liquidation.

11. Case History

(a) The First Fifteen Months

The Debtors each filed their voluntary Chapter 11 Petitions on September 10, 2013 (Petition Date). Three “first day” motions were also filed. One was a Motion for an Order Directing Joint Administration of their Related Chapter 11 Cases (Dkt. No. 5), with an amended version (Joint Administration Motion) filed on September 11, 2013 (Dkt. No. 10). The Joint Administration Motion explained the basic organizational relationship between CHI and the other Debtors, namely that CHI is the sole trustee of the two business trusts and is the sole member of the remaining limited liability entities.3 The other Debtors were described as “affiliates” with “common ownership through CHI” and because of this interconnectedness, the Joint Administration Motion was granted on September 12, 2013 and the cases have since been collectively administered through the portal of City Homes Ill’s Docket.4 The corporate Debtor, CHI, does not own any real estate. See Case No. 13-25371, Dkt. No. 33 at pg. 3 (Schedule A). Instead, the improved real estate assets, which the Debtors have used to conduct their longstanding landlord-tenant business, are all titled in the other Debtors and spread among them. See Appendix I.

The Affidavit of Barry Mankowitz in Support of Firsi>-Day Motions (First Man-kowitz Affidavit) (Dkt. No. 8) provided the first day motions’ evidentiary backbone.5 Mr. Mankowitz affirmed that the Debtors’ [830]*830decades’ long business model has been to provide housing for very low income tenants in Baltimore City.6 He also summarized the Debtors’ history, management, functionality and the steep problems— higher operating costs due to the Debtors’ aging rental units, slower rent increases in “mostly troubled neighborhoods” and “the growing volume of pending lead-related lawsuits”—that pushed the- Debtors into Chapter 11. (First Mankowitz Affid. at ¶ 16). At Paragraphs 23 through 25 Mr. Mankowitz affirmed that:

The [Debtors] have diligently strived to provide affordable and safe homes for their residents. Nevertheless, in recent years, lead paint litigation suits brought by current and former tenants have dramatically escalated, and there are now more than 70 active cases against the [Debtors], and many more are anticipated. This has increased the [Debtors’] legal expenses and contributed to operating losses.
Furthermore, although the [Debtors] have liability insurance covering incidents of alleged exposure up to August 1999, since then, the [Debtors] (and to the best of their knowledge all other rental property owners in Baltimore) have been unable to obtain liability insurance that includes full lead-related coverage.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in its October 24, 2011 decision known as Jackson v. Dackman, struck down the “immunity provision” in the state’s lead law, the 1994 Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act, which had limited landlords’ liability to $17,000 if they otherwise complied with the law. This decision greatly increased the likelihood of additional lawsuits against the [Debtors] that allege exposure to lead substances, even though the [Debtors] continue to comply with the 1994 law.7

The creditor body reflects the prime cause for the Debtors’ resort to bankruptcy. Four attorneys make up the Committee membership but the real parties-in-interest are their clients: Charles Blount, Brandon Foster, Demetre Quick and Ly-nell Watson, Mother and Next Friend of Robert Miller, a minor. See Proofs of Claim (POC) Nos. 2, 7 and 28, Dkt. No. 58 (Debtors’ Schedule “F”), Dkt. No. 69 (Notice of Appointment of Creditors’ Committee) and Dkt. No. 85 (Supplemental Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors). Messrs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
564 B.R. 827, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-city-homes-iii-llc-mdb-2017.