In Re Churchfield

277 B.R. 769, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 464, 39 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 147
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California
DecidedMay 3, 2002
Docket16-90957
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 277 B.R. 769 (In Re Churchfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Churchfield, 277 B.R. 769, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 464, 39 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 147 (Cal. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION RE MOTION TO COMPROMISE CLAIMS

W. RICHARD LEE, Bankruptcy Judge.

In this case the court addresses the question of whether the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, as amended in 1984 (7 U.S.C. § 499a, et seq.) (“PACA”) and specifically the statutory trust established by 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c) (“PACA Trust”) extend to monies which the chapter 7 trustee has recovered through his powers to avoid and recover preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 & 550. The issue arises in the context of a chapter 7 trustee’s motion to compromise a controversy involving the claims of two PACA Trust beneficiaries. The continued hearing on the trustee’s Motion to Compromise Claims (the “Motion to Compromise”) was heard before the *772 undersigned and taken under submission on March 7, 2002. D. Max Gardner, Esq. appeared for the chapter 7 trustee, Randell Parker (“Trustee”). There was no opposition and no other appearances were made. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A) & (0). This Memorandum Opinion contains the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052(a). In summary, the Trustee’s Motion to Compromise is denied because the Trustee has not made a prima facia showing of a real and substantial factual or legal controversy.

Background.

This bankruptcy was filed under chapter 7 on January 14, 1998. Prior to filing bankruptcy, Charles and Jamie Church-field (the “Debtors”) owned and operated Sparrow Industries Independent Transportation Services, a sole proprietorship, which involved the purchase of perishable agricultural commodities such that the Debtors were subject to the PACA regulations and licensing requirements. 1

In October 1999, the Trustee filed four adversary proceedings to recover preferential transfers made in September and October 1997, from third parties that had provided goods and services to the Debtor (the “Preference Defendants”). 2 Soon after the complaints were served, three of those adversary proceedings resulted in settlements which were approved by this court as compromises of controversies, the proceeds of which were paid to the Trustee. 3 The Trustee has collected a total of $16,000 from the adversary proceedings (the “Preference Recovery”) plus $440 from a workers’ compensation refund. With accrued interest, the assets of the estate at the time of the Motion to Compromise totaled $16,689.

After the adversary proceedings were settled, two creditors, Lamb-Weston, Inc. and J.R. Simplot Company (the “PACA Claimants”) asserted rights against the Preference Recovery as beneficiaries of a PACA Trust. 4 Based on the Trustee’s review of the PACA Claimants’ demands, *773 the Trustee conceded that the PACA Trust extended to the Preference Recovery, 5 but the Trustee asserted an offset for the “hard” cost of prosecuting the preference actions and collecting the Preference Recovery proceeds. The Trustee relied upon Bank of Los Angeles v. Official PACA Creditors’ Committee (In re Southland + Keystone), 132 B.R. 632 (9th Cir. BAP 1991) for the proposition that PACA Trust assets (prepetition accounts receivable) collected by a third party and disgorged to the PACA Trust beneficiaries, may be subject to “offset” to compensate the disgorging party for its “hard” collection costs “such as outside attorney’s fees and expenses that were necessary to the collection effort.” Southland + Keystone at 643.

In an effort to preserve some funds to cover the estate’s administrative expenses, the Trustee negotiated a compromise of the “offset” issue with the PACA Claimants whereby the sum of $13,810.37 (83% of the funds in the estate) would be surrendered to the PACA Claimants. The Trustee would retain $2,828.63 (17% of the funds in the estate), including the insurance refund, an amount insufficient to pay the estate’s administrative expenses. The Trustee elected to compromise the “offset” dispute with the PACA Claimants based on his analysis of the cases which hold that once a PACA Trust has been established, it is the Trustee who has the burden to prove which assets, if any, are not subject to the PACA Trust. In re Fresh Approach, Inc., 51 B.R. 412, 422 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1985). The Trustee acknowledged that he could not meet the burden of proof and show that the monies transferred to the Preference Defendants in 1997 were not traceable to a PACA Trust. Based thereon, the Trustee also concluded that the Preference Recovery was traceable to the PACA Trust and therefore was not an asset of the estate.

The Trustee Must Establish That There is a Real and Substantial Controversy to be Comprised Regarding Property of the Estate.

The Motion to Compromise involves a dispute over the Trustee’s right to offset administrative expenses against PACA Trust assets. However, at the root of the dispute lies a more fundamental question — whether the funds recovered through the Trustee’s avoiding powers are subject to the PACA Trust or whether they are property of the bankruptcy estate. Even though there may be a real controversy over the Trustee’s right of offset, that issue is not reached unless the Preference Recovery is actually subject to a PACA Trust, or unless the court can also find that there is a real and substantial controversy on the PACA Trust issue.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 gives the Trustee the express authority to compromise a controversy or settle a dispute affecting the administration of the estate, subject to court approval. While the opinion of the Trustee is entitled to great weight, the bankruptcy court has a duty to make an informed, independent judgment as to the reasonableness of the proposed compromise. Protective Committee for Independent *774 Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson (TMT Trailer Ferry), 390 U.S. 414, 424, 88 S.Ct. 1157, 20 L.Ed.2d 1 (1968). The burden of persuasion is on the Trustee. In re A & C Properties, 784 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th Cir.1986).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
277 B.R. 769, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 464, 39 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 147, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-churchfield-caeb-2002.