In re Chung Fat

96 F. 202, 1899 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 321
CourtDistrict Court, D. Washington
DecidedAugust 18, 1899
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 96 F. 202 (In re Chung Fat) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Chung Fat, 96 F. 202, 1899 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 321 (washd 1899).

Opinion

HANFORD, District Judge.

The petitioners are Chinese seamen, who were hired on the 26th day of June, 1899, at Hong Kong, to serve as part of the crew of the steamship Victoria, the vessel then being engaged in general commerce as a carrier of passengers and freight between Hong Kong and other ports in China and Japan, and Tacoma and -other Pacific coast ports of the United States and British Columbia. Tbe shipping articles which they signed describe the voyage and term of service for which they were engaged as follows : “From said port of Hong Kong to Tacoma, Wash., U. S. A., via China 'and Japan ports, or to any other ports or places in any part of the world, as the master may direct. Final-port of discharge to be Hong Kong, and term of agreement not supposed to exceed six [203]*203months.” The Victoria is a foreign-built steamship, which, by an. act of congress approved June Hi, 1898, was granted the privilege of being registered as a vessel of the United States. The privilege of being so registered was presumably granted in contemplation of She use which our government expected to make; of her as a transport ship or auxiliary cruiser during the war between the United states and Spain. On her arrival at Tacoma with the petitioners on board, the government did engage said vessel as a transport to carry troops, horses, munitions of war, and provisions Cor the army, from Puget Sound to Manilla, and she is now being fitted for that service. The petitioners consider that the service for which the ship has been engaged since her last arrival at Tacoma is entirely different from the service contemplated at the time they signed the shipping articles, and that, if they are required to go to Manilla as seamen on a vessel in the service of the United States, while that country is under military government, there is probability of their being exposed to dangers of an unusual character, and detained in the service of the ship beyond the term of their engagement, and for these reasons the new employment; of the ship is a departure from the terms of their contract sijecified iu the shipping articles, which' entitles them to be discharged, and they allege that they are unwilling to continue in the service of the ship under present conditions, and yet the captain will not discharge them, but requires them to continue to perform duty against their will, and this, they allege amounts to subjecting (hem t.o involuntary servitude, iu violation of the thirteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and upon these grounds they have applied to this court, for a writ of habeas corpus that they may be released from unlawful detention on hoard of the vessel, and returned to Hong Kong, where they belong. The writ having been issued as prayed for, the captain has. made a return setting forth the shipping articles, and denying that the petitioners are unlawfully imprisoned or detained on board said \essel, and alleging that by their contract the petitioners are bound to serve as seamen on said vessel on the contemplated voyage to. Manilla; and further alleging that it is his purpose, if the vessel shall he kept in the service of the government after -her arrival at Manilla, to provide for the return of the Chinese seamen now in the ship to Hong Kong, and to pay their-wages until the time of their arrival there». The United States attorney for this district has intervened in behalf of the United States, alleging that the discharge» of the petitioners from their engagement to serve as seamen at this time may interfere with the plans of the government for speedy dispatch of the vessel on the voyage contemplated, and on the further grerand that the petitioners, being Chinese laborers, cannot lawfully be permit ted to be landed in this country.

The case presents a number of novel and serious questions. Iri the first pla.ee, the respondent claims that, whatever may be the rights of the petitioners, the writ of habeas corpus is not available as a, practicable remedy for their relief. I consider, however, that if, in fact, tire petitioners are being coerced to labor on board an American vessel against their will, without having previously vol[204]*204untarily entered into a contract binding them to such service, tbey are being subjected to involuntary servitude within the United States, in violation of the thirteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and to be delivered from such involuntary servitude by means of the writ of habeas corpus is a right which cannot be denied; therefore this objection to the form of the proceeding cannot stand in the way of a full inquiry into the merits of the controversy.

The evidence introduced upon the hearing shows that this vessel has been employed carrying passengers and freight between Tacoma and Hong Kong via other Oriental ports during the past six years, during all of which time part of her crew has been composed of Chinese seamen, shipped at Hong Kong under contracts similar, with respect to the nature and term of service, to the contract under consideration in this case, and that in practice the Chinese seamen have always been paid off on each return of the vessel to Hong Kong, and, although each round trip requires but little more than two months’ time, and the contract of the seamen fixes the limit of the term of service at six months, each contract has been deemed to have been terminated with the performance of each voyage ending at Hong Kong. The petitioners have shown by their evidence that at the time of signing the shipping articles they had no knowledge of the contents thereof, except as they were informed through an interpreter, ,and that the agreement which they entered into, as it was explained to them, required them to make the voyage from Hong Kong to Tacoma and return to Hong Kong, touching only at convenient ports on the coast of China and Japan and at Victoria in British Columbia. This evidence shows that the contracts between the captain, representing the owners, and the Chinese seamen, have been heretofore construed in practice consistently with what I deem to be a fair interpretation of the words in the contract itself, and that a fair interpretation of the contract does not bind the seamen necessarily to a term of six months; nor, on the other hand, does it bind the ship td return from Tacoma to Hong Kong direct. The contract fixes alternative limitations upon the obligation of the Chinese seamen to remain in the ship. One is the return of the vessel to Hong Kong, the port of final discharge; the other is the expiration of the six months from the date of their engagement within which time it is the duty of the captain to return them to the port of final discharge. The captain is given an option to make a voyage from Tacoma to any other port for which the ship may be employed, provided he returns to Hong .Kong within six months, and, in case of the vessel being employed for such additional voyage, the seamen are bound by the letter of their contract to continue in the service of the ship until the expiration of the term of six months, unless the vessel should return to Hong Kong within that time. It is practicable for this ship to make the contemplated trip to Manilla, and proceed thence to Hong Kong within the time stipulated, and, in case the exigencies of the service should require the detention of the vessel for a longer time, it is practicable to send the Chinese seamen from Manilla, or any place in the Philippine Islands to Hong [205]*205Kong, without violating the letter of the contract.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Walker v. Pointer
304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Texas, 1969)
Williams
126 F. 590 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1903)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
96 F. 202, 1899 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 321, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-chung-fat-washd-1899.