In Re CHRISTUS Health Southeast Texas v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
• Decided: March 12, 2026
• Docket: 09-26-00099-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-26-00099-CV __________________

IN RE CHRISTUS HEALTH SOUTHEAST TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________

Original Proceeding 136th District Court of Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 25-DC-CV-1411 __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

By petition for a writ of mandamus, Relator CHRISTUS Health Southeast

Texas (“Christus”) seeks relief from an order striking its Petition in Intervention. We

deny mandamus relief.

Anesthesia Associates Group, PLLC d/b/a Anesthesia Associates (AA) sued

Chad R. Dubois, Kenneth D. Simmons III, Monica Bentzen, and Lance T. Mendoza

for breach of contract after the four Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists

(CRNAs) left AA for another anesthesia group. At the time, AA had written

employment contracts with each of the CRNAs which had certain noncompetition

1 provisions. Christus and AA previously had a contractual arrangement in place

wherein AA provided CRNAs to Christus. That contract expired and was not

renewed and Christus decided to expand its relationship with a competitor of AA,

EmergencHealth PLLC, EmergencHealth Services PLLC, and EH Management

Company LLC (collectively “EmergencHealth”). EmergencHealth then hired four

of AA’s CRNAs to work for EmergencHealth at Christus in Beaumont, Texas. AA

joined the new employer and its affiliated companies as defendants in the lawsuit

AA filed against the CRNAs, asserting claims against EmergencHealth for tortious

interference with contract and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. Trial

Cause Number 25-DC-CV-1589, Anesthesia Associates v. Jared Martinez, et al., is

a separate lawsuit against three additional CRNAs who left AA for EmergencHealth,

and it has also been consolidated with Trial Cause Number 25-DC-CV-1411 for

discovery purposes only.

AA obtained temporary injunctions prohibiting the CRNA defendants from

providing anesthesia services within twenty miles of Beaumont, including at St.

Elizabeth Hospital, pursuant to the written employment contracts the CRNAs had

with AA.1 In its trial court pleadings, AA seeks to enforce a covenant not to compete

1 The CRNAs’ accelerated appeals are currently before the Court in Appeal Number 09-25-00345-CV, Dubois v. Anesthesia Associates, and Appeal Number 09-25-00400-CV, Martinez v. Anesthesia Associates. In both accelerated appeals, the Court received briefs from Christus as amicus curiae. 2 within a twenty-mile radius for three years. Christus filed a petition in intervention

seeking a declaratory judgment that the covenant not to compete is void and

unenforceable and that it does not prevent the CRNAs from providing services at

Christus’s facilities in and around Beaumont.

In its motion to strike Christus’s petition in intervention, AA argued Christus

is not a party to the non-compete agreements, the CRNAs are not Christus

employees, Christus did not assert that it would hire the CRNAs but for the non-

compete agreements, there was no dispute between AA and Christus, and there was

no competent evidence that surgeries were cancelled at St. Elizabeth Hospital due to

the absence of the CRNAs. AA argued the continued involvement of Christus in the

case has only served to increase the burden of litigation on the parties because there

are three sets of lawyers instead of two, the CRNAs are completely aligned with

Christus, and the CRNAs have competent counsel.

In its response to the motion to strike, Christus argues the injunction hinders

Christus’s ability to provide for its patients using otherwise capable and available

Beaumont-based CRNAs and its economic interest in its contract with

EmergencHealth is directly and negatively affected because it is paying hundreds of

thousands of dollars each month in supplemental payments to EmergencHealth due

to the increased costs of bringing in CRNAs from outside of Beaumont. Christus

argues the real dispute is how the non-compete agreement should be interpreted, it

3 quickly brought its declaratory judgment action regarding AAs’ injunctive claim,

and striking the declaratory judgment action creates a real risk that Christus will

never be truly heard on the contract interpretation issue that has created substantial

inconvenience and cost Christus hundreds of thousands of dollars.

“Any party may intervene by filing a pleading, subject to being stricken out

by the court for sufficient cause on the motion of any party.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 60. A

party with a justiciable interest in a pending suit may intervene in the suit as a matter

of right. In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d 152, 154 (Tex. 2008) (orig.

proceeding). A party opposing the petition in intervention has the burden to

challenge it by filing a motion to strike. Id. If a motion to strike is filed, the intervenor

has the burden to respond to the grounds stated in the motion to strike by showing

that it possesses a justiciable interest in the suit. Id. at 155; see also Nghiem v. Sajib,

567 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex. 2019). A justiciable interest must be such that if the

original action had never been commenced and the intervenor had brought the action

as the sole plaintiff, it would have been entitled to recover in its own name to the

extent at least of a part of the relief sought in the original suit. In re Union Carbide

Corp., 273 S.W.3d at 155. It is an abuse of discretion to strike a petition in

intervention when the intervenor has a justiciable interest, and allowing the

intervention “will not complicate the case by an excessive multiplication of the

issues,” and “the intervention is almost essential to effectively protect the

4 intervenor’s interest.” Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793

S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. 1990).

We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by

the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A trial

court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and

unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Walker, 827

S.W.2d at 839 (internal quotations omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion

if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, because a trial court has no discretion

in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See Prudential,

148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.

We determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the benefits

of mandamus review against the detriments, considering whether extending

mandamus relief will preserve important substantive and procedural rights from

impairment or loss. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig.

proceeding).

Having reviewed the petition for a writ of mandamus and the record submitted

with the petition, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in striking the

intervention, and we conclude that the Relator has not shown that it is entitled to

5 mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. See

Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

PETITION DENIED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on March 11, 2026 Opinion Delivered March 12, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.