In Re CHAPMAN

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedMay 11, 2020
Docket19-1895
StatusUnpublished

This text of In Re CHAPMAN (In Re CHAPMAN) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re CHAPMAN, (Fed. Cir. 2020).

Opinion

Case: 19-1895 Document: 35 Page: 1 Filed: 05/11/2020

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________

IN RE: KAREN CHAPMAN, Appellant ______________________

2019-1895 ______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 14/675,320. ______________________

Decided: May 11, 2020 ______________________

CLIFFORD JAY MASS, Ladas & Parry LLP, New York, NY, for appellant.

KAKOLI CAPRIHAN, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for appellee Andrei Iancu. Also represented by THOMAS W. KRAUSE, FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED, PETER JOHN SAWERT. ______________________

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and STOLL, Circuit Judges. LOURIE, Circuit Judge. Karen Chapman appeals from the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”) affirming the examiner’s rejection of all pending claims of U.S. Patent Application Case: 19-1895 Document: 35 Page: 2 Filed: 05/11/2020

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14/675,320 (“the ’320 application”). Ex parte Chapman¸ No. 2018-007101 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 15, 2019) (“Decision”). For the reasons stated below, we affirm. BACKGROUND Chapman applied for a patent on methods and systems for streaming live events. According to the specification of the ’320 application, a fixed video camera or multiple fixed- position cameras are used to capture images from a single perspective. The system allows the user to view the images or video and manipulate them (i.e., by zooming in and out and panning the camera). In this appeal, the parties argue about the three inde- pendent claims in the application, claims 1, 9, and 21. Claim 1 recites “[a] method for viewing an event which con- sists essentially of receiving a stream of images by a re- ceiver comprising a display screen, wherein the stream of images is captured by” either a “single camera” with a “fixed perspective at a wide angle” or a “plurality of cam- eras,” which also provide a “single fixed perspective at a wide angle.” J.A. 284. A “receiver” is “connected to a sep- arate touchplate, wherein said touchplate is adapted to control . . . and to move” the viewed images or video without “changing the fixed perspective” of the camera feed. Id. Claim 9 recites a “system” for viewing an event consisting essentially of a camera and a receiver connected to a touch- plate operating in the manner as described in claim 1. J.A. 285. Claim 21 recites a “method” similar to claim 1, but with the transitional phrase “comprising” instead of “consisting essentially of.” J.A. 286. The examiner rejected these independent claims as ob- vious over Choi 1 in view of Aman 2 and Franko. 3 Choi

1 U.S. Patent App. Pub. 2011/0265118. 2 U.S. Patent App. Pub. 2007/0279494. 3 U.S. Patent App. Pub. 2008/0136839. Case: 19-1895 Document: 35 Page: 3 Filed: 05/11/2020

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teaches an apparatus to display streamed video, which can include an external camera for capturing images. Choi ¶ 199. Choi’s apparatus includes a remote controller with a touchpad that can control the images on the display. Id. at ¶ 281. Aman teaches capturing a stream of images from a single, fixed perspective at a wide angle to produce a dis- play having a 3D appearance. Aman ¶ 41. Franko teaches moving video images on a display to pan across the image without altering a fixed perspective. Franko ¶ 40. As rel- evant here, in analyzing claims 1 and 9, the examiner as- signed no patentable weight to the “consisting essentially of” transitional phrase because it is part of the preambles in claims 1 and 9. Chapman appealed to the Board, and the Board agreed with the examiner’s factfinding regarding the references, explaining that a skilled artisan would have been moti- vated to combine the teachings of the references using known methods and yielding predictable results. Decision, slip op. at 8. The Board deviated, however, from the exam- iner’s analysis of the “consisting essentially of” language of claims 1 and 9. According to the Board, the “consisting es- sentially of” language limits the scope of the claims to spec- ified materials or steps and those that do not materially affect the basic and novel properties of the invention. Chapman argued that the basic and novel property of the invention is the use of a camera or cameras that provide images to a viewer from a single, fixed perspective only to replicate the experience of a viewer when he or she attends a live performance in person. Id. at 10. But the Board found this property to be merely “a generalized intended benefit of the invention” and not sufficiently clear or defi- nite in scope to limit the claims. Id. The Board further found that, even if the basic and novel property were to be considered, Aman disclosed it by teaching filming a sport- ing event from a single, fixed perspective that would stim- ulate the experience of viewing the event in person from a vantage point above the event. Id. at 10–11. Case: 19-1895 Document: 35 Page: 4 Filed: 05/11/2020

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Chapman appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(a). DISCUSSION We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo, In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and its fact findings for substantial evidence, In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A finding is supported by sub- stantial evidence if a reasonable mind might accept the ev- idence as sufficient to support the finding. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). Chapman argues that the Board erred in its interpre- tation of the claim language and in its overall obviousness analysis. Specifically, contrary to the Board’s opinion, Chapman argues that the preambles are limiting and should be construed to limit the invention to streaming en- tire “events,” that the basic and novel property of the in- vention narrows the prior art that is relevant to the claims, that the Board relied on a different ground of rejection than the examiner, and that the claims would not have been ob- vious under either the Board’s or the examiner’s analysis. We disagree. As a preliminary matter, Chapman did not argue that the term “event” required construction, so this argument is waived on appeal. See In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (first citing In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2008); then citing In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Chapman’s argument that the Board relied on a different ground of rejection than the examiner is also waived be- cause Chapman failed to raise it below. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(c) (2011) (requiring petitioners to raise the Board’s failure to designate a new ground of rejection in a timely request for rehearing). On appeal, Chapman provides a new formulation of the basic and novel properties of the invention, arguing that there are two: (1) provision of a stream of images of an Case: 19-1895 Document: 35 Page: 5 Filed: 05/11/2020

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Related

In Re DBC
545 F.3d 1373 (Federal Circuit, 2008)
In Re Robert J. Gartside and Richard C. Norton
203 F.3d 1305 (Federal Circuit, 2000)
In Re Lavaughn F. Watts, Jr
354 F.3d 1362 (Federal Circuit, 2004)
In Re Wilhelm Elsner. In Re Keith W. Zary
381 F.3d 1125 (Federal Circuit, 2004)
In Re Baxter International, Inc.
678 F.3d 1357 (Federal Circuit, 2012)

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