J-S15003-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF J.L.G., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: ANGEL DAVID : GALARZA : : : : No. 1716 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 26, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at No(s): CI-22-03851
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JULY 25, 2023
Angel David Galarza (“Father”) appeals pro se from the decree granting
the petition filed by J.S. (“Mother”) to change the name of their minor
daughter, J.L.G., born in 2017. We affirm.
Mother and Father initially listed Father’s surname on J.L.G.’s birth
certificate. The same year as the child’s birth, Father absconded from police
after being charged with felony drug offenses at three criminal dockets. The
resulting news reports outlined Father’s criminal acts and referred to him as a
fugitive. Months later, Father was apprehended, convicted, and sentenced to
an aggregate term of eight to twenty years of imprisonment.
In 2022, when J.L.G. was approximately five years old and eligible to
register for primary school, Mother filed a petition to change the child’s name
from J.L.G. to J.L.S., requesting that the child share her surname. During the J-S15003-23
ensuing trial, Mother testified that her relationship with Father ended in 2018
and that the last contact between Father and J.L.G. occurred in that same
year while Father was actively evading arrest. She stated that her daughter
had used Mother’s surname informally since Father’s incarceration, recognized
Mother’s surname as her own, and, when questioned, would indicate that she
shared Mother’s surname. Mother added that J.L.G. wished to formally
maintain that name for the purpose of her school registration to avoid
confusion and the stigma associated with Father’s criminal history. Mother
also argued that, while incarceration did not qualify as a basis for the name
change, Father’s incarceration demonstrated that he has been absent for most
of his daughter’s life and therefore had no bond with the child.
Father, who appeared pro se from prison via video conference,
contested Mother’s assertion that he had not had contact with his daughter
since 2018. In support of this contention, he testified that his most recent
physical contact with J.L.G. occurred in 2019 and that he spoke with her on
the telephone as recently as 2020. Father also claimed that his incarceration
had no impact on the child’s best interests. Significantly, however, Father did
not request that the trial court interview J.L.G. or present her as a witness to
determine her preference or her understanding of the name-change
proceeding.
Following the hearing, the trial court concluded that the child’s name
should be changed due to her need for consistency and a lack of confusion.
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The court was not moved by the fact of Father’s incarceration or the disputed
date of his last contact with J.L.G, two considerations that it believed were
better suited for a custody determination. See N.T., 1/26/23, at 27. Instead,
the court reasoned that the name change served the child’s best interests
because it provided her stability, consistency, and clarity. Id. It expressed its
rationale in open court as follows:
It seems to me that the nub of this matter is the fact that this child has gone by the name of [S.] in her lifetime and that it is the name she knows and the name that she shares with her custodial parent.
....
To me, a child of this age needs to have consistency and lack of confusion in knowing her name and knowing [that the] name she has at school is the same name that she goes by at home. And those are the things that are in her best interest, that she have clarity of who she is, and she knows herself as [S.]. And I am satisfied and I believe that testimony that that is what she has gone by.
Therefore, I find that it is in the best interest of the minor petitioner, [J.L.G.] to share the name of her biological mother, [J.S.].
Id. at 27-28. The court concluded by observing that Father’s sentimental
reasons for objecting to the name change did not outweigh his daughter’s best
interests and by finding that the name change would not result in fraud,
confusion, or detriment to any third party. Id. at 28.
Father timely filed a notice of appeal. The trial court did not order Father
to file a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), but the court issued
a brief Rule 1925(a) opinion outlining the foregoing statement of rationale.
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Father raises the following issues for our consideration:
I. Did trial court below abuse discretion by failing to interview minor child to determine (a) whether she understood what a surname is, (b) did she know or ever hear the surname on her birth certificate, (c) did she understand the difference between [M]other’s surname and [F]ather’s surname, (d) what surname did she recognize and answered to in kindergarten and whether she was confused, and (e) whose surname she wanted to use?
II. Did the trial court below abuse discretion by failing to suggest retaining [F]ather’s surname as a middle name or use a hyphenated combination?
Father’s brief at v (cleaned up).1
We begin our consideration of Father’s questions with a review of the
applicable law. “Our standard of review involving a petition for change of
name, regardless of the age of the petitioner, is whether there was an abuse
of discretion.” T.W. v. D.A., 127 A.3d 826, 827 (Pa.Super. 2015). “An abuse
of discretion exists if the trial court has overridden or misapplied the law, or
if the evidence is insufficient to sustain the order.” Id.
In Pennsylvania a name change requires the filing of “a [detailed]
petition in the court of common pleas of the county in which the individual
resides.” 54 Pa.C.S. § 701(a.1)(1). The petition must include a statement of
the intention to change the petitioner’s name, the reason for the name
change, the current residence of petitioner, and any residence of the petitioner
____________________________________________
1 To the extent that the argument section of Father’s brief includes additional claims that were neither included in the statement of questions presented nor “fairly suggested thereby,” they are waived and will not be considered herein. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”).
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for the five years prior to the date of the petition. Id. at (a.1)(2)(i-v). As we
detail infra, if the individual whose name will be changed is a minor, the court
must also determine whether the change is in the child’s best interests. See
In re Change of Name of Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes to Zachary
Thomas Grimes-Palaia, 609 A2d 158, 161 (Pa. 1992) (hereafter “Grimes”).
After the completion of a trial at which any persons with lawful objections are
permitted to appear and be heard, and the petitioner provides documentation
of residence and the absence of judgments or decrees of record against the
petitioner, “[t]he court may enter a decree changing the name as petitioned
if the court is satisfied after the hearing that there is no lawful objection to
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J-S15003-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF J.L.G., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: ANGEL DAVID : GALARZA : : : : No. 1716 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 26, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at No(s): CI-22-03851
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JULY 25, 2023
Angel David Galarza (“Father”) appeals pro se from the decree granting
the petition filed by J.S. (“Mother”) to change the name of their minor
daughter, J.L.G., born in 2017. We affirm.
Mother and Father initially listed Father’s surname on J.L.G.’s birth
certificate. The same year as the child’s birth, Father absconded from police
after being charged with felony drug offenses at three criminal dockets. The
resulting news reports outlined Father’s criminal acts and referred to him as a
fugitive. Months later, Father was apprehended, convicted, and sentenced to
an aggregate term of eight to twenty years of imprisonment.
In 2022, when J.L.G. was approximately five years old and eligible to
register for primary school, Mother filed a petition to change the child’s name
from J.L.G. to J.L.S., requesting that the child share her surname. During the J-S15003-23
ensuing trial, Mother testified that her relationship with Father ended in 2018
and that the last contact between Father and J.L.G. occurred in that same
year while Father was actively evading arrest. She stated that her daughter
had used Mother’s surname informally since Father’s incarceration, recognized
Mother’s surname as her own, and, when questioned, would indicate that she
shared Mother’s surname. Mother added that J.L.G. wished to formally
maintain that name for the purpose of her school registration to avoid
confusion and the stigma associated with Father’s criminal history. Mother
also argued that, while incarceration did not qualify as a basis for the name
change, Father’s incarceration demonstrated that he has been absent for most
of his daughter’s life and therefore had no bond with the child.
Father, who appeared pro se from prison via video conference,
contested Mother’s assertion that he had not had contact with his daughter
since 2018. In support of this contention, he testified that his most recent
physical contact with J.L.G. occurred in 2019 and that he spoke with her on
the telephone as recently as 2020. Father also claimed that his incarceration
had no impact on the child’s best interests. Significantly, however, Father did
not request that the trial court interview J.L.G. or present her as a witness to
determine her preference or her understanding of the name-change
proceeding.
Following the hearing, the trial court concluded that the child’s name
should be changed due to her need for consistency and a lack of confusion.
-2- J-S15003-23
The court was not moved by the fact of Father’s incarceration or the disputed
date of his last contact with J.L.G, two considerations that it believed were
better suited for a custody determination. See N.T., 1/26/23, at 27. Instead,
the court reasoned that the name change served the child’s best interests
because it provided her stability, consistency, and clarity. Id. It expressed its
rationale in open court as follows:
It seems to me that the nub of this matter is the fact that this child has gone by the name of [S.] in her lifetime and that it is the name she knows and the name that she shares with her custodial parent.
....
To me, a child of this age needs to have consistency and lack of confusion in knowing her name and knowing [that the] name she has at school is the same name that she goes by at home. And those are the things that are in her best interest, that she have clarity of who she is, and she knows herself as [S.]. And I am satisfied and I believe that testimony that that is what she has gone by.
Therefore, I find that it is in the best interest of the minor petitioner, [J.L.G.] to share the name of her biological mother, [J.S.].
Id. at 27-28. The court concluded by observing that Father’s sentimental
reasons for objecting to the name change did not outweigh his daughter’s best
interests and by finding that the name change would not result in fraud,
confusion, or detriment to any third party. Id. at 28.
Father timely filed a notice of appeal. The trial court did not order Father
to file a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), but the court issued
a brief Rule 1925(a) opinion outlining the foregoing statement of rationale.
-3- J-S15003-23
Father raises the following issues for our consideration:
I. Did trial court below abuse discretion by failing to interview minor child to determine (a) whether she understood what a surname is, (b) did she know or ever hear the surname on her birth certificate, (c) did she understand the difference between [M]other’s surname and [F]ather’s surname, (d) what surname did she recognize and answered to in kindergarten and whether she was confused, and (e) whose surname she wanted to use?
II. Did the trial court below abuse discretion by failing to suggest retaining [F]ather’s surname as a middle name or use a hyphenated combination?
Father’s brief at v (cleaned up).1
We begin our consideration of Father’s questions with a review of the
applicable law. “Our standard of review involving a petition for change of
name, regardless of the age of the petitioner, is whether there was an abuse
of discretion.” T.W. v. D.A., 127 A.3d 826, 827 (Pa.Super. 2015). “An abuse
of discretion exists if the trial court has overridden or misapplied the law, or
if the evidence is insufficient to sustain the order.” Id.
In Pennsylvania a name change requires the filing of “a [detailed]
petition in the court of common pleas of the county in which the individual
resides.” 54 Pa.C.S. § 701(a.1)(1). The petition must include a statement of
the intention to change the petitioner’s name, the reason for the name
change, the current residence of petitioner, and any residence of the petitioner
____________________________________________
1 To the extent that the argument section of Father’s brief includes additional claims that were neither included in the statement of questions presented nor “fairly suggested thereby,” they are waived and will not be considered herein. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”).
-4- J-S15003-23
for the five years prior to the date of the petition. Id. at (a.1)(2)(i-v). As we
detail infra, if the individual whose name will be changed is a minor, the court
must also determine whether the change is in the child’s best interests. See
In re Change of Name of Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes to Zachary
Thomas Grimes-Palaia, 609 A2d 158, 161 (Pa. 1992) (hereafter “Grimes”).
After the completion of a trial at which any persons with lawful objections are
permitted to appear and be heard, and the petitioner provides documentation
of residence and the absence of judgments or decrees of record against the
petitioner, “[t]he court may enter a decree changing the name as petitioned
if the court is satisfied after the hearing that there is no lawful objection to
the granting of the petition.” 54 Pa.C.S. § 701(a.1)(5).
In reference to the best-interests element of a minor’s name change,
our Supreme Court explained:
General considerations should include the natural bonds between parent and child, the social stigma or respect afforded a particular name within the community, and, where the child is of sufficient age, whether the child intellectually and rationally understands the significance of changing his or her name.
Grimes, supra at 161.
Invoking the foregoing best-interests considerations, Father first
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to interview then-
five-year-old J.L.G. to ascertain her understanding and recognition of the
potential name change. See Father’s brief at 4. Mother, on the other hand,
asserts that the Grimes Court’s rationale does not compel a child interview
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and, even if that case mandates such an interview, Father’s contention is
waived, inter alia, because Father neglected to object to the omission during
trial. See Mother’s brief at 12.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 302(a) provides that “[i]ssues
not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Thus, Mother is correct in asserting that, in
failing to raise this issue at trial, Father waived this argument on appeal. If
Father wished to question the intention and understanding of the minor child,
he had the opportunity to call the child as a witness or ask the trial court judge
to conduct an interview. He did neither. Hence, this issue is waived.2
Father next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
suggest that J.L.G. retain Father’s surname as either a middle name or as part
of a hyphenated combination of the surnames of both parents. Father asserts
that due to the finality of a name change order and the totality of the present
circumstances, the court should have proffered an alternative resolution that
2 Even if Father had preserved the issue or the trial court rejected Father’s request to interview J.L.G., Father’s argument merits no relief. Contrary to Father’s assertion, the High Court in In re Change of Name of Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes to Zachary Thomas Grimes-Palaia, 609 A2d 158, 161 (Pa. 1992), did not hold that a child interview was an essential component of a name-change case. Instead, it merely observed “an interview with the child may have been helpful.” Id. at 162 (emphasis added). Critically, the Grimes Court concluded that no clear evidence was admitted in that case which indicated a name change was in the child’s best interests. Id. Thus, it is apparent that a trial court is not obliged to interview a minor child where, as here, the court can determine the child’s best interests based upon other evidence of record.
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preserved some aspect of Father’s surname. Mother contests that this
argument is also waived under Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), and to the extent that Father
argues that the Court should have presented an alternative solution sua
sponte, Father failed to develop that argument in his brief with citation to any
relevant authority. Again, we agree with Mother’s assertion of waiver.
As we previously discussed, an appellant is not permitted to raise issues
on appeal if they were not first raised in the lower court. See Pa.R.A.P.
302(a). Instantly, Father had ample opportunity to suggest an alternative
name change or petition the court to do so. As he failed to raise this issue
below, it is waived.
Moreover, Father failed to develop any argument in his brief. See
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (“Where an
appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to
relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion
capable of review, that claim is waived.”). As Father’s brief only refers to this
issue in a single sentence with no reference to relevant authority, the issue is
waived and cannot be raised on appeal.3
3 It is axiomatic that the trial court has no obligation to suggest alternative surname options where it finds that the name change serves the child’s best interest. Father’s apprehension regarding the finality of a name change is wholly misplaced. Pursuant to § 703 of the name change statute, “[a]ny minor child whose surname has been changed pursuant to subsection (a) upon attaining majority shall also be entitled to the benefits of section 702 (relating to change by order of court).” 54 Pa.C.S. § 703(b). Given this provision, it is clear that should J.L.G. attain majority and wish to use Father’s surname, she will be afforded the ability to petition the court to retake her former name.
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Father has raised no issue
meriting relief on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court decree that
grants the petition to change the minor’s name to J.L.S.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 07/25/2023
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