In re Chaffee

513 B.R. 215, 2014 WL 3449522, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3043
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. New York
DecidedJuly 1, 2014
DocketNo. 13-10086 B
StatusPublished

This text of 513 B.R. 215 (In re Chaffee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Chaffee, 513 B.R. 215, 2014 WL 3449522, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3043 (N.Y. 2014).

Opinion

DECISION & ORDER

CARL L. BUCKI, Chief Judge.

The debtor in this Chapter 13 proceeding has objected to the amount of arrears that a mortgagee has claimed as due in its proof of claim. The central issue is whether a “simple daily interest” method of calculation violates the limitations on late charges in section 254-b of the New York Real Property Law.

Kelly J. Chaffee filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 14, 2013. The debtor concedes that at the time of filing, she had defaulted in making various payments owing to Beneficial Homeowner Service Corporation on a note that was secured by a mortgage on her residence in the Town of Hinsdale, New York. Consequently, the debtor proposed a plan that would require regular payments to a trustee in an amount sufficient to cure these accumulated mortgage arrears and to effect a distribution to other secured and unsecured creditors. Meanwhile, the plan further contemplated that Chaffee would resume direct payment of obligations that would became due post-petition under the note that she had given to Beneficial.

On April 9, 2013, Beneficial Homeowner Service Corporation filed a proof of secured claim which asserted that the debtor owed a principal obligation of $24,842.64, together with outstanding pre-petition interest in the amount of $7,450.97. The claim further stated that the same sum of $7,450.97 was the amount needed to cure the debtor’s default as of the petition date. Then on April 23, 2013, the debtor duly served the present objection to the claim. In her objection, Chaffee contends that she had defaulted in making only six pre-petition payments, and that her arrears totaled only $1,964.81 as of the date of bankruptcy filing. When Beneficial failed to respond to the objection, this court sustained the debtor’s position and granted an order setting arrears in the amount that the debtor had proposed. Meanwhile, however, at a time subsequent to the debt- or’s service of the objection, Beneficial transferred its claim to Springcastle American Funding Trust. As servicing agent for Springcastle, HSBC then filed a motion for reconsideration of the order setting the amount of arrears.

Section 502(j) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[a] claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause,” and that “[a] reconsidered [217]*217claim may be allowed or disallowed according to the equities of the case.” In the present instance, reconsideration of the claim will not unduly prejudice the debtor. HSBC filed its motion for reconsideration prior to confirmation of the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan. Consequently, when the plan was confirmed on January 30, 2014, this court assessed feasibility with a recognition of the possibility that the claim of Springcastle might be allowed for the amount that Beneficial had originally asserted. On the other hand, by seeking to revisit this court’s prior order, HSBC opens the door to a fresh review of the entire claim. For these reasons, the court grants the request for reconsideration, but upon reconsideration will reassess all aspects of the creditor’s entitlement.

Discussion

On July 10, 2002, Kelly J. Chaffee borrowed the sum of $34,700.09 from Beneficial Homeowner Service Corporation. Pursuant to a Loan Repayment and Security Agreement, Chaffee agreed to repay the principal with interest at the contract rate under terms discussed in the following paragraph:

PAYMENT. In return for this loan, you agree to pay us the Principal ... plus Interest in monthly payments as stated on page one, computed by the simple interest method on the unpaid balances of Principal at the Contract Rate (shown on page one) plus any monthly insurance premium, if elected, until fully paid. Payments are applied in the following order: late charges, interest at the Contract Rate for the actual time outstanding, principal, and insurance. For any past due amounts, payments will be applied to the most delinquent monthly installment first, in the same order shown above, until all past due monthly installments are paid in full.

The referenced statement on page one indicates a contract interest rate of 16.496%, a repayment term of 180 months, and monthly payments of $521.69. This sum represents the exact amount needed to amortize the original obligation at the stated rate of interest over the loan’s term. Elsewhere in the agreement, the borrower promised that she would “also pay 2% of the unpaid amount” of any payment that she failed to pay “in full within 15 days after it’s due.”

HSBC directs the court’s attention to the language authorizing it to collect interest “computed by the simple interest method on the unpaid balances of Principal at the Contract Rate.” In its view, this text allows the lender to charge interest on the unpaid principal for every day prior to receipt of payment. HSBC contends that when payment is delayed from the due date, additional interest accrues daily on the unpaid principal. Later, when payment is received, the servicer will apply that payment first to the increased amount of accumulated interest. This application then has the exacerbating effect of lessening the anticipated reduction- of principal, so that even more interest will accrue on the current principal balance. Thus, delay in payment will negate the accuracy of any amortization that the parties may have originally anticipated. To address this inaccuracy, HSBC has included additional deferred interest into its proof of claim.

The debtor argues that the loan agreements compel the lender to honor the schedule of fully amortizing payments. Under this interpretation, each payment would be deemed to satisfy the oldest outstanding monthly obligation. Late charges would accrue on any payment made more than fifteen days after its due date, but payments would otherwise fulfill the obligation for repayment of principal and interest.

[218]*218As between the methodologies suggested by borrower and lender, the difference in outcome is dramatic. Calculations are here somewhat complicated by the fact that the lender and Chaffee agreed to an interest rate modification during the course of the loan. Nonetheless, the parties concede that Chaffee defaulted in making six monthly payments totaling $1,565.10. Even if every payment through the date of bankruptcy filing was delinquent by more than 15 days, late charges of two percent would have accumulated to $1,100.56. Thus, under the approach suggested by the debtor, the total arrears as of the date of bankruptcy filing could total no more than $2,665.66. In contrast, HSBC advocates a “simple daily interest” approach that yields arrears in the amount of $7,450.97.1

In its approach to calculating arrears, the mortgage servicer relies upon that portion of the Loan Repayment and Security Agreement which states that interest is “computed by the simple interest method on the unpaid balances of Principal at the Contract Rate.” However, this interpretation overlooks the further requirement that Chaffee was “to pay us the Principal ... plus Interest in monthly payments as stated on page one” (emphasis added). Because the loan agreement mandated that the debtor make specific monthly payments, those monthly payments are subject to the requirements of New York Real Property Law § 254 — b(l).

Section 254 — b(l) of the Real Property Law states in relevant part as follows:

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Related

§ 254
New York RPP § 254

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
513 B.R. 215, 2014 WL 3449522, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3043, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-chaffee-nywb-2014.