In Re: Cesar Perez v. Tiffany Carroll
This text of In Re: Cesar Perez v. Tiffany Carroll (In Re: Cesar Perez v. Tiffany Carroll) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 7 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: CESAR MONTIEL PEREZ, No. 22-60047
Debtor, BAP No. 21-1173
------------------------------ MEMORANDUM* MAURICE GRAYTON,
Appellant,
v.
TIFFANY L. CARROLL, United States Trustee, San Diego,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Lafferty III, Brand, and Faris, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted July 18, 2023**
Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Maurice Grayton appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s
(“BAP”) judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment imposing
fines and damages under 11 U.S.C. § 110 in an adversary proceeding filed by the
United States Trustee against Grayton. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions and apply the same standard of
review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s rulings. Boyajian v. New
Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment because Grayton
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he complied with the
disclosure requirements and practice prohibitions for bankruptcy petition preparers
under 11 U.S.C. § 110. See Frlekin v. Apple, Inc., 979 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir.
2020) (“A grant of summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” (citation omitted)). We reject as unpersuasive Grayton’s contention that the
bankruptcy court erred in awarding $2,990 in fines and damages. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(l)(1) (authorizing a fine of up to $500 for each failure “to comply with any
provision of subsection (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), or (h).”).
The bankruptcy court properly denied Grayton’s demand for a jury trial
because there is no right to a jury trial in adversary proceedings brought under 11
U.S.C. § 110. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53–54 (1989)
2 22-60047 (“[I]f Congress may assign the adjudication of a statutory cause of action to a non-
Article III tribunal, then the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the
adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.”).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 22-60047
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
In Re: Cesar Perez v. Tiffany Carroll, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-cesar-perez-v-tiffany-carroll-ca9-2023.