MEMORANDUM DECISION ON (1) MOTION TO DISMISS CHAPTER 11 CASE OF TKG EUROPE LP; (2) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DENIAL OF MOTION FOR SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION AND TENTATIVE ORDER DISMISSING TKG EUROPE LP CASE; AND (3) MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
DENNIS MONTALI, Bankruptcy Judge.
I.
Introduction
On November 15, 2002, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“Lehman”) filed a Motion To Dismiss (“Motion To Dismiss”) the Chapter 11 case of TKG Europe LP (“TKGE”). On November 18, 2002, Central European Industrial Development Company, LLC d/b/a Ceidco (“Ceidco”), TKGE and The Kontrabecki Group LP (“TKG”, and together with TKGE and Ceidco, “Debtors”) filed a Motion For Substantive Consolidation of their Chapter 11 cases (“Motion To Consolidate”). On December 4, 2002, during a telephone conference with counsel, the court indicated on the record by way of tentative rulings that it would grant the Motion To Dismiss and deny the Motion To Consolidate.
The court held a hearing on December 6, 2002, on the two motions and on Decern
ber 12, 2002, entered an order denying the Motion To Consolidate (“Order Denying Consolidation”). Debtors timely filed a Notice Of Appeal of that order.
On December 13, 2002, Debtors filed a motion for a stay (“Motion For Stay”) of the Order Denying Consolidation and of the (still tentative) order granting the Motion To Dismiss.
Lehman has opposed that motion. On December 19, 2002, Debtors moved for an order shortening time on their motion for reconsideration of the Order Denying Consolidation and of the (still tentative) order granting the Motion To Dismiss (“Motion For Reconsideration”). On December 20, 2002, the court heard arguments of counsel concerning the request for shortened time and other matters.
The positions and legal theories of the parties are well known to the court and no purpose would be served by any further hearings on these matters.
Accordingly, the request for shortened time for a hearing on the Motion For Reconsideration will be denied as moot. For the reasons summarized below, the court will grant the Motion To Dismiss, stay the dismissal for ten days and deny the Motion For Reconsideration.
II.
Discussion
In its tentative ruling on the Motion To Dismiss the court noted that a debtor with only one creditor could not confirm a plan without the vote of that creditor, assuming it was impaired under the plan. No contrary argument convinces the court to depart from the tentative.
Debtors attempt to get around this problem in two ways. First, they seek substantive consolidation, so that Lehman would no longer be the only creditor of TKG. Second, Debtors suggest that they could propose a plan that would leave Lehman unimpaired. Neither tactic convinces the court to reconsider its tentative ruling or to stay dismissal beyond a short, ten-day period.
A.
Substantive
Consolidation
Debtors argue that consolidation is proper on the facts presented by this record. They rely heavily on
Bruce Energy Centre Ltd. v. Orfa Corp. of America (In re Orfa Corp. of Philadelphia),
129 B.R. 404 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991). In that case, however, it was not the debtors who sought consolidation of their three related entities; consolidation was sought by other plan proponents. Other creditors objected to consolidation via a plan and those objections were overruled. It is important to note that the court said that consolidation in the plan process places the issue before all debtors’ creditors for a vote, a more democratic process than deciding by motion. 129 B.R. at 416.
As noted by this court during the tentative ruling on the Motion To Consoli
date, substantive consolidation via a plan would require the affirmative vote of each class of each of debtors’ creditors, counted
before
consolidation. As Lehman is the only creditor of TKGE, there could be no affirmative vote for such consolidation in view of its adamant opposition to Debtors’ efforts in these cases. Stated otherwise, the democratic process found to be so critical by the court in Orfa
Corp.
dooms Debtors’ theories here.
This court is bound to follow
Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham),
229 F.3d 750 (9th Cir.2000). In that case the court noted that the primary purpose of substantive consolidation is to “insure the equitable treatment of all creditors.” 229 F.3d at 764 (citing
Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.),
860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir.1988)). The court also noted two broad themes that have emerged in ordering substantive consolidation, namely that bankruptcy courts have been directed (1) to consider whether there is a disregard of corporate formalities and a commingling of assets of various entities; and (2) to balance the benefits that substantive consolidation would bring against the harms that it would cause.
Alexander,
229 F.3d at 765. A proponent of substantive consolidation must satisfy one of
Alexander’s
two familiar tests: either (1) that creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and did not rely on the separate credit of each of the separate entities, or (2) that the operations of the entities were “excessively entangled” to the extent that consolidation would benefit all creditors.
Id.
at 766.
Debtors contend that since Lehman caused the corporate structure to be created and dealt with the Debtors as a single economic unit, substantive consolidation is exactly what it bargained for. But that is totally contrary to the uneseapable fact that Debtors and Lehman agreed to the structure and further, that plainly Lehman relied on the separation of the entities, notwithstanding their relationships with one another.
Debtors infer that the corporate structure insisted upon by Lehman somehow amounts to an attempt to create a “bankruptcy-remote” entity, an evil they would cure by substantive consolidation. Their theory is unavailing. First, even if one or more Debtors or their affiliates is “bankruptcy-remote”' — or at least “U.S. bankruptcy-remote” — Debtors have cited no law that would be violated by such a corporate structure. In any event, all three Debtors are eligible to be debtors in this court. Lehman’s motion to dismiss premised on a bad faith filing has already been rejected by the court.
Second, substantive consolidation is one of “the bankruptcy court’s general
equitable
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MEMORANDUM DECISION ON (1) MOTION TO DISMISS CHAPTER 11 CASE OF TKG EUROPE LP; (2) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DENIAL OF MOTION FOR SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION AND TENTATIVE ORDER DISMISSING TKG EUROPE LP CASE; AND (3) MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
DENNIS MONTALI, Bankruptcy Judge.
I.
Introduction
On November 15, 2002, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“Lehman”) filed a Motion To Dismiss (“Motion To Dismiss”) the Chapter 11 case of TKG Europe LP (“TKGE”). On November 18, 2002, Central European Industrial Development Company, LLC d/b/a Ceidco (“Ceidco”), TKGE and The Kontrabecki Group LP (“TKG”, and together with TKGE and Ceidco, “Debtors”) filed a Motion For Substantive Consolidation of their Chapter 11 cases (“Motion To Consolidate”). On December 4, 2002, during a telephone conference with counsel, the court indicated on the record by way of tentative rulings that it would grant the Motion To Dismiss and deny the Motion To Consolidate.
The court held a hearing on December 6, 2002, on the two motions and on Decern
ber 12, 2002, entered an order denying the Motion To Consolidate (“Order Denying Consolidation”). Debtors timely filed a Notice Of Appeal of that order.
On December 13, 2002, Debtors filed a motion for a stay (“Motion For Stay”) of the Order Denying Consolidation and of the (still tentative) order granting the Motion To Dismiss.
Lehman has opposed that motion. On December 19, 2002, Debtors moved for an order shortening time on their motion for reconsideration of the Order Denying Consolidation and of the (still tentative) order granting the Motion To Dismiss (“Motion For Reconsideration”). On December 20, 2002, the court heard arguments of counsel concerning the request for shortened time and other matters.
The positions and legal theories of the parties are well known to the court and no purpose would be served by any further hearings on these matters.
Accordingly, the request for shortened time for a hearing on the Motion For Reconsideration will be denied as moot. For the reasons summarized below, the court will grant the Motion To Dismiss, stay the dismissal for ten days and deny the Motion For Reconsideration.
II.
Discussion
In its tentative ruling on the Motion To Dismiss the court noted that a debtor with only one creditor could not confirm a plan without the vote of that creditor, assuming it was impaired under the plan. No contrary argument convinces the court to depart from the tentative.
Debtors attempt to get around this problem in two ways. First, they seek substantive consolidation, so that Lehman would no longer be the only creditor of TKG. Second, Debtors suggest that they could propose a plan that would leave Lehman unimpaired. Neither tactic convinces the court to reconsider its tentative ruling or to stay dismissal beyond a short, ten-day period.
A.
Substantive
Consolidation
Debtors argue that consolidation is proper on the facts presented by this record. They rely heavily on
Bruce Energy Centre Ltd. v. Orfa Corp. of America (In re Orfa Corp. of Philadelphia),
129 B.R. 404 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991). In that case, however, it was not the debtors who sought consolidation of their three related entities; consolidation was sought by other plan proponents. Other creditors objected to consolidation via a plan and those objections were overruled. It is important to note that the court said that consolidation in the plan process places the issue before all debtors’ creditors for a vote, a more democratic process than deciding by motion. 129 B.R. at 416.
As noted by this court during the tentative ruling on the Motion To Consoli
date, substantive consolidation via a plan would require the affirmative vote of each class of each of debtors’ creditors, counted
before
consolidation. As Lehman is the only creditor of TKGE, there could be no affirmative vote for such consolidation in view of its adamant opposition to Debtors’ efforts in these cases. Stated otherwise, the democratic process found to be so critical by the court in Orfa
Corp.
dooms Debtors’ theories here.
This court is bound to follow
Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham),
229 F.3d 750 (9th Cir.2000). In that case the court noted that the primary purpose of substantive consolidation is to “insure the equitable treatment of all creditors.” 229 F.3d at 764 (citing
Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.),
860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir.1988)). The court also noted two broad themes that have emerged in ordering substantive consolidation, namely that bankruptcy courts have been directed (1) to consider whether there is a disregard of corporate formalities and a commingling of assets of various entities; and (2) to balance the benefits that substantive consolidation would bring against the harms that it would cause.
Alexander,
229 F.3d at 765. A proponent of substantive consolidation must satisfy one of
Alexander’s
two familiar tests: either (1) that creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and did not rely on the separate credit of each of the separate entities, or (2) that the operations of the entities were “excessively entangled” to the extent that consolidation would benefit all creditors.
Id.
at 766.
Debtors contend that since Lehman caused the corporate structure to be created and dealt with the Debtors as a single economic unit, substantive consolidation is exactly what it bargained for. But that is totally contrary to the uneseapable fact that Debtors and Lehman agreed to the structure and further, that plainly Lehman relied on the separation of the entities, notwithstanding their relationships with one another.
Debtors infer that the corporate structure insisted upon by Lehman somehow amounts to an attempt to create a “bankruptcy-remote” entity, an evil they would cure by substantive consolidation. Their theory is unavailing. First, even if one or more Debtors or their affiliates is “bankruptcy-remote”' — or at least “U.S. bankruptcy-remote” — Debtors have cited no law that would be violated by such a corporate structure. In any event, all three Debtors are eligible to be debtors in this court. Lehman’s motion to dismiss premised on a bad faith filing has already been rejected by the court.
Second, substantive consolidation is one of “the bankruptcy court’s general
equitable
powers ...” (Alexander; 229 F.3d at 763, emphasis added) and it would not be equitable for this court to ignore the prepetition wishes of Lehman and the Debtors by disregarding the corporate structure the parties so carefully created by agreement. The fact that other unsecured creditors may lose their ability to be paid is neither equitable nor inequitable. It is the natural consequence of what might happen if Lehman successfully pursues the remedies set forth in Debtors’ dire predictions.
B.
Hypothetical Plan Leaving Lehman Unimpaired
Debtors rely on an as-yet nonexistent and unfiled plan, which they say will leave Lehman unimpaired such that a plan could be confirmed by TKGE without the vote of its only creditor. The court has been told that the plan will pay Lehman in full some day in the future after all the litigation is over and the claim is finally allowed. The plan would have an effective date sometime thereafter, so that Lehman could be paid in full on the effective date and therefore, allegedly, would be unimpaired.
The court is not convinced that this hypothetical plan — or a real one that might be filed next week that proposes to pay Lehman in full once its hotly contested claim is finally allowed — presents any reason to retain TKGE’s bankruptcy case. If the court were to confirm such a plan next week Lehman still would have to wait an indefinite time, possibly years, before the plan could become effective. The court cannot see how this would leave Lehman’s rights “unaltered” or would otherwise leave Lehman unimpaired under 11 U.S.C. § 1124. To begin with, the 1994 amendments to Section 1124 deleted the text that used to provide for payment on the effective date as one of the ways to leave a class unimpaired.
Moreover, even cases decided before the 1994 amendments refused to sanction an open-ended gap between confirmation and the effective date. As a leading case points out:
“The effective date of the plan” is expressly designated as the critical point for the major financial standards for confirmation.
See
§§ 1129(a)(7), 1129(a)(9), 1129(b). The valuations required by these sections are likely to be less accurate if the effective date is not close to the date of the hearing on confirmation.
In re Jones,
32 B.R. 951, 958 n. 13 (Bankr. D.Utah 1983).
In addition, Debtors’ delayed and uncertain payment would unacceptably place all the risk on Lehman. Debtors have offered nothing to protect Lehman if Debtors’ predictions are wrong — i.e., if Debtors cannot reduce Lehman’s claim and pay it in full.
See In re Yates Development, Inc.,
258 B.R. 36, 43 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2000) (refusing to confirm plan with delayed and contingent effective date, where creditor “is forced to bear all the risk of the delay”).
Cf. Financial Security Assurance, Inc. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship (In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship),
188 B.R. 799, 805 (E.D.La.1995) (where debtor would continue to make cash collateral payments there was no prejudice in delays to effective date arising from appeal),
aff'd,
116 F.3d 790 (5th Cir.1997).
Therefore, without Lehman’s consent, the court could not confirm a TKGE plan that would leave a substantial and indefinite delay between any confirmation hearing and the effective date.
See generally
Novikoff & Gerschwer,
Effective Date; Post-Confirmation Jurisdiction; Serial Filing,
SG108 ALI-ABA 553 (June 27-29, 2002) (the “ALI-ABA Article”).
In theory, Debtors might delay proposing their plan or seeking confirmation until they have reduced Lehman’s claim. For numerous reasons the court will not put TKGE’s case “on hold” indefinitely, until Debtors’ litigation with Lehman is concluded, probably in fora other than this court.
That course relies on too many contingencies. Debtors might not succeed in reducing Lehman’s claim. Alternatively, the Polish subsidiaries from which all of Debtors’ income derives might not do as well as Debtors expect. Alternatively, even if Debtors do reduce Lehman’s original claim and can afford to pay the reduced amount, that reduction might be more than offset by ongoing interest, fees, costs, and charges to which Lehman may be entitled under 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(c) or 1129(a)(7).
See Jones,
32 B.R. at 955 n. 6 (even if class is legally unimpaired, individual members of class who are factually harmed may have standing to object to confirmation on best interests grounds).
The court is aware of Debtors’ predictions that once TKGE’s bankruptcy case is dismissed Lehman will feel free to exercise control over Debtors’ equity interests, and will seek dismissal of the other bankruptcy cases, or other relief. Debtors have presented no reasons, however, why any of this makes TKGE’s bankruptcy case itself something other than a two-party dispute, nor why it would affect any of the other factors recited above. Moreover, the court has already reminded the parties that even if Lehman controls the two other Debtors it might not be able to dismiss their cases, and if the cases were converted to chapter 7 (and not re-converted to chapter 11) then Lehman might face ongoing litigation with the chapter 7 trustee.
See
11 U.S.C. § 1112.
For all of the above reasons, the court will adhere to its tentative decision to dismiss the TKGE bankruptcy case.
C.
Motion For Stay
The Motion For Stay is premised on the familiar notion that substantial harm will follow if TKGE is not allowed to remain in bankruptcy because of a parade of horribles that will follow if Lehman is permitted to proceed on its own. Nevertheless, the motion for stay fails to convince the court that there is a likelihood of prevailing on appeal, primarily because substantive consolidation is so subjective, analyzed on a case by case basis, and TKGE’s two-party dispute is a classic example of a case that does not belong in bankruptcy.
Nothing presented either initially or on the two latest motions even remotely resembles the facts of, or the legal requirements for substantive consolidation as described in
Alexander v. Compton, supra.
Absent substantive consolidation, TKGE’s bankruptcy case remains just a two-party dispute.
That being said, the court is mindful of the difficulty an aggrieved party has in convincing a judge who has ruled against it that that party might well be able to convince another judge or panel of judges to rule the other way. Given the importance of this issue to Debtors and the unlikelihood of prejudice to Lehman, the court will give TKGE ten days to seek a further stay pending appeal.
Since the order granting the Motion To Dismiss is being entered concurrently with this Memorandum Decision, the stay will be for ten days.
III.
Disposition
Concurrently with the issuance of this Memorandum Decision, the court is issuing orders which: (1) grant the Motion To Dismiss; (2) grant the Motion For Stay, but only as to the order dismissing TKGE’s Chapter 11 case and not as to the Order Denying Consolidation; and (3) deny the Motion For Reconsideration.