In re C.E.

2025 Ohio 5641

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 10, 2025
• Docket: 25CA4134
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re C.E., 2025-Ohio-5641.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SCIOTO COUNTY

IN RE: C.E. JR. : E.E. L.E. : Case No. 25CA4134 P.E. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Adjudicated Neglected/ Dependent Children.

_______________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Alana Van Gundy, Bellbrook, Ohio, for appellant.1

Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and S. Andrew Sturgill, Scioto County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee. ________________________________________________________________ CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION DATE JOURNALIZED:12-10-25 Abele, J.

{¶1} This is an appeal from a Scioto County Common Pleas

Court, Juvenile Division, judgment that granted Scioto County

Children Services, appellee herein, permanent custody of C.E.,

Jr., E.E., L.E., and P.E.

{¶2} Appellant, the children’s biological mother, raises

the following assignments of error for review:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AGENCY MADE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT

1 Different counsel represented appellant during the trial court proceedings. SCIOTO, 25CA4134 2

THE REMOVAL OF THE CHILDREN AND TO REUNIFY THE FAMILY, DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL AND UNJUSTIFIED DELAYS AND OMISSIONS IN SERVICE PROVISION, AND WHERE THE AGENCY CASEWORKER RELIED ON A SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT THAT THE MOTHER WAS MERELY CHECKING BOXES RATHER THAN DEMONSTRATING BEHAVIORAL CHANGE.” SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PERMANENT CUSTODY WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN, WHEN THAT FINDING WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

{¶3} Appellee has been involved with the family since

January 2021, when the oldest child, C.E., Jr., was close to two

years of age, and the three younger children had yet to be born.

At the time, appellee’s primary concerns involved the home

environment. An agency caseworker reported that the home was

not sanitary and that C.E., Jr. had bite marks or rashes on his

extremities and face.

{¶4} Appellee subsequently filed a complaint that alleged

that C.E., Jr. was a “neglected/dependent child.” The complaint

requested the trial court to place the child in appellee’s

temporary custody. Appellee also asked the court for an

emergency ex parte order placing the child in its temporary

custody, which the trial court granted.

{¶5} The trial court later adjudicated C.E., Jr. a

“neglected/dependent” child.

{¶6} Shortly thereafter, on March 2, 2021, appellant gave SCIOTO, 25CA4134 3

birth to E.E. Two days later, appellee filed a complaint that

alleged E.E. was a “neglected/dependent child.” Appellee

alleged that, when appellant was admitted to the hospital to

give birth, she tested positive for marijuana. Appellee further

stated that the living conditions of appellant’s home had

remained unchanged since C.E., Jr.’s removal. Appellee asked

the court to place E.E. in its temporary custody. The court

subsequently placed E.E. in appellee’s temporary custody pending

adjudication and disposition.

{¶7} Approximately two months later, the trial court

adjudicated E.E. a “neglected/dependent child.”

{¶8} On May 25, 2021, the court entered a dispositional

order that placed C.E., Jr. and E.E. in appellee’s temporary

custody. The court found that appellee had “made all reasonable

efforts to prevent” the children’s continued removal from the

home.

{¶9} In January 2022, the court held an annual review

hearing. The court found that appellee had used reasonable

efforts to implement the plan to return the children to the

parents’ custody and continued the children in appellee’s

temporary custody for six months.

{¶10} In March 2022, appellant gave birth to twins, L.E. and

P.E. The twins remained in the parents’ home while the two

older children’s cases progressed. SCIOTO, 25CA4134 4

{¶11} By June 2022, the two older children had been visiting

the parents without any reported problems. The goal at that

point was to begin unsupervised visits at the family’s home, and

if those visits went well, appellee planned to allow the

children to be placed on an extended home visit.

{¶12} At the end of December 2022, appellee placed C.E., Jr.

and E.E. with the parents for a trial visit.

{¶13} On January 30, 2023, after an annual review hearing,

the court continued the children in appellee’s temporary

custody. The court stated that the children had been placed

with the parents for a trial home placement and indicated that

additional time was “needed to ensure placement is appropriate.”

The court further stated that “[b]arring a change of

circumstances, it is not [appellee]’s intention to file a Motion

for Permanent Custody.” The court found that appellee had used

reasonable efforts to return the children to the parents’

custody.

{¶14} The next day appellee filed complaints that alleged

that the twins were neglected and dependent children. The

complaint alleged that, on January 31, 2023, appellee learned

that the twins’ older sibling, E.E., tested positive for

marijuana and required emergency medical treatment. Appellee

requested the trial court to place the twins in its temporary

custody. The court subsequently entered an ex parte emergency SCIOTO, 25CA4134 5

order that placed the children in appellee’s temporary custody.

{¶15} In April 2023, the GAL filed a report and

recommendation in which he noted that, after the parents

apparently had satisfied the case plan requirements set forth in

C.E., Jr.’s and E.E.’s cases, appellee had placed the two

children in the home for a trial visit. The GAL pointed out,

however, that the trial visit “failed miserably.” He

recommended that the court place the children in appellee’s

temporary custody.

{¶16} After E.E.’s medical emergency, appellee developed a

new case plan. This case plan stated that the parents needed to

demonstrate the ability to properly supervise the children and

to understand the necessity of keeping drugs and alcohol out of

the house. The case plan required the parents to complete

parenting classes, a drug and alcohol assessment and any

recommended treatment, a mental health assessment, and

individual counseling.

{¶17} On May 12, 2023, the court adjudicated the twins

dependent. Shortly thereafter, the court entered a

dispositional order that placed the twins in appellee’s

{¶18} On December 20, 2023, appellee filed a motion to

modify the disposition to permanent custody. Appellee asserted

that the two older children had been in its temporary custody SCIOTO, 25CA4134 6

for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. The

agency further alleged that the four children could not be

placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not

be placed with either parent.

{¶19} A few months later, the agency filed an amended motion

to modify the disposition to permanent custody. The agency

alleged that the twins now had been in its temporary custody for

12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. The agency

further alleged that the children cannot be placed with either

parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with

either parent.

{¶20} On July 15, 2024, the court held a hearing to consider

appellee’s permanent custody motion. Dr. Matthew Suer testified

that, on January 31, 2023, E.E. presented to the emergency

department at Nationwide Children’s Hospital with “severe

neurologic depression” and required intubation. Dr. Suer

explained that the child “was so sedated there were concerns

that he could not protect his airway.” The medical team

determined that the child had ingested and overdosed on

marijuana.

{¶21} The family’s caseworker, Jennifer Conley, testified

that she had worked with the family since March 2023. C.E., Jr.

was removed because the home environment was infested with

roaches and otherwise was unsanitary, and E.E. was removed at SCIOTO, 25CA4134 7

birth due to the same concerns. Additionally, appellant had

tested positive for THC upon E.E.’s birth, and E.E.’s cord blood

tested positive for THC.

{¶22} In March 2022, when the twins were born, appellee did

not remove them from the parents. Instead, the twins remained

at the parents’ home, and appellee continued its efforts to

reunify C.E., Jr. and E.E. with the parents.

{¶23} In line with those efforts, at the end of December

2022, appellee placed C.E., Jr. and E.E. in the parents’ home

for a trial visit. About one month later, E.E. overdosed on

marijuana. As a result, appellee terminated the trial visit and

removed the twins from the parents’ custody. The children have

remained in appellee’s temporary custody since that time.

{¶24} Given E.E.’s overdose, appellee determined that the

parents would need to essentially start from the beginning and

“redo much of the things that they had to do in their previous

case plan,” such as mental health and drug and alcohol

assessments. Both parents initially completed assessments, and

appellant remained drug free for a large part of the case.

Appellant did not, however, immediately engage in mental health

treatment.

{¶25} In August 2023, Conley met with the parents to discuss

the case plan and appellee’s concerns. Appellant “was very

upset with the way that her case had been handled up to that SCIOTO, 25CA4134 8

point. She was very confrontational, [and] somewhat aggressive

towards [Conley].” After the August 2023 meeting, however,

appellant “became more receptive to listening to” appellee’s

concerns. Conley explained that, during this August 2023

meeting, she had advised appellant that she needed to seek

treatment for her mental health issues.

{¶26} Conley did not believe that either appellant or the

children’s father had taken responsibility for their actions or

recognized that their improper supervision caused E.E.’s

overdose. Conley expressed concerns that the parents “were

completing the services on the case plan in an effort to check

off the box, rather than to utilize the service to try to change

the behaviors that we had encountered that prompted [appellee]

to remove the children from their care.” As an example, she

stated that, when appellee developed a case plan, appellee

expected the parents to complete a mental health assessment and

then follow any recommended treatment. The parents completed

assessments, but they did not follow through with treatment

recommendations. Appellant later reported to Conley that she

started taking mental health medications, but appellant

indicated that she started taking the medication “to make

[Conley] happy.”

{¶27} Conley also indicated that the parents did not

consistently maintain a clean home. She stated that the SCIOTO, 25CA4134 9

caseworkers would visit the home on one occasion, and it would

be clean; but on subsequent visits, the home would not be clean.

Conley suggested that appellee was looking for a sustained

behavioral change rather than returning to the home and

observing the same concerns: “animal feces on the floor . . .,

trash all over the place . . ., [and] clothes all over the

place. . . .”

{¶28} Conley stated that she talked to the parents about

obtaining a lockbox for their THC products and attempted to

obtain funds to help them with the purchase of a lockbox. She

was unable to obtain approval for the purchase, however.

{¶29} Conley explained that she also had reviewed the

family’s case file. In doing so, she noticed that, in June

2019, the parents previously had another child, A.E., placed in

appellee’s permanent custody.

{¶30} In November 2023, caseworkers visited the parents at

their home. During the visit, appellant and the father tested

positive for THC. Up until that time, appellant had been drug

free. After the visit, appellee decided to seek permanent

custody of the children.

{¶31} Conley explained that appellee decided to seek

permanent custody of the children for some of the following

reasons: (1) both C.E., Jr. and E.E. had been in appellee’s

temporary custody for more than two years; (2) the parents only SCIOTO, 25CA4134 10

recently started to display efforts to indicate “some kind of

sustained change that would make it so that their children would

remain safe when they are in their care”; and (3) appellee had

concerns about the “previous substantiated neglect and physical

abuse incidents” and whether these issues would recur without

appellee’s involvement.

{¶32} Conley stated that, before seeking permanent custody,

appellee had been attempting to reunify the two older children

with the parents and had placed them on a trial home visit for

that purpose. She explained that if E.E. had not overdosed on

marijuana, then appellee would have continued its attempt to

reunify the family. Instead, because E.E.’s overdose was

serious, appellee removed the twins from the home. The incident

caused appellee to become “very, very cautious about risking the

children’s safety further.” Appellee additionally had concerns

that the parents did not have any logical explanation for the

incident.

{¶33} The four children currently are placed in the same

foster home and are bonded to one another. The children are

“doing very well” and “thriving” in the foster home. The foster

family is interested in adopting the children.

{¶34} The children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that

he did not believe that appellee had used reasonable efforts

earlier in the case to reunify the two older children with the SCIOTO, 25CA4134 11

parents. The GAL did not think that returning the children to

the parents at the time of the permanent custody hearing would

be in their best interest, but he also did not believe that the

court should place the children in appellee’s permanent custody.

The GAL instead opined that appellee should work on reunifying

the family. In the meantime, he indicated that the children

should remain with the foster family.

{¶35} On April 23, 2025, the trial court granted appellee

permanent custody of the children. The court found that the

children had been in appellee’s temporary custody for 12 or more

months of a consecutive 22-month period. The court also

determined that the children cannot be placed with either parent

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either

parent.

{¶36} The trial court noted that appellee attempted to

reunify the parents and the two older children, but appellee

terminated reunification efforts after E.E. overdosed on

marijuana during the trial home visit. The court also noted

that the parents had their parental rights terminated with

respect to the children’s older sibling. The court recognized

that the parents had made “some improvements and case plan

progress.” The court, however, shared the caseworker’s concern

that “the parents have demonstrated only a desire to complete

services, not long-term behavior changes.” The court concluded SCIOTO, 25CA4134 12

that “the parents have failed to provide clear and convincing

evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination”

of their parental rights with respect to the children’s sibling,

they “can provide a legally secure permanent placement and

adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the

child[ren], pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).”

{¶37} The trial court next considered the children’s best

interest. The court stated that the parents’ relationship with

the children had “been partly maintained” through visitations.

The court further observed that the two older children had been

in appellee’s temporary custody for over three years and

remained in the same foster home for the majority of that time.

The twins have been in appellee’s temporary custody for more

than one year and have been placed in the same foster home with

their older siblings. The foster provider has been a

“consistent caretaker” for the children, and the children appear

“well-bonded with their foster parents and siblings outside of

their parents’ home.” The court additionally found that

maintaining the bond between the children is in their best

interest.

{¶38} The trial court noted that the GAL’s report had not

expressed the children’s wishes. The court further observed

that the children were under the age of five “and may be too

young to express their wishes.” The court nonetheless stated SCIOTO, 25CA4134 13

that it had “considered the testimony in evaluating the

child[ren]’s wishes.”

{¶39} The trial court considered the children’s custodial

history and found that all four children had been in appellee’s

temporary custody for 12 or more months of 22-month period. The

court pointed out that C.E., Jr. has been in appellee’s

temporary custody since he was two years of age, and E.E. has

been in appellee’s temporary custody “his entire life.”

{¶40} The trial court also concluded that the children need

a legally secure permanent placement and that they cannot

achieve this type of placement without granting appellee

permanent custody. The court found that even though the

children have been in the agency’s temporary custody for a

significant period of time, the parents “have not prioritized

changing their own behavior and cannot demonstrate their ability

to care for all the children without [appellee’s] involvement.”

{¶41} The trial court noted that the foster provider “has

shown a willingness to adopt the children” and pointed out that

the children have experienced “the most stability together”

while in the foster home. The court acknowledged the GAL’s

recommendation but determined that the children could not be

returned to their parents. The court thus determined that

placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody would serve

their best interest. SCIOTO, 25CA4134 14

{¶42} The trial court also concluded that R.C.

2151.414(D)(2) applied to the two older children. The court

stated that in accordance with that provision, it “must find

that permanent custody” is in their best interest. The court

therefore granted appellee permanent custody of the children.

This appeal followed.

I

{¶43} In her first assignment of error, appellant asserts

that the trial court erred by finding that appellee used

reasonable efforts to prevent the children’s removal and to

reunify the family. She contends that appellee did not

“initiate visitation between the child[ren] and the parents for

more than a year.” She states that appellee filed C.E., Jr.’s

complaint in January 2021, and E.E.’s complaint in March 2021,

yet as of April 27, 2022, visits still had not occurred.

Appellant argues that failing to permit visitation deprived her

“of critical opportunities to bond with the children, comply

with visitation objectives, and demonstrate parenting capacity.”

{¶44} Appellant additionally contends that the caseworker

“dismissed [her] progress as simply ‘checking the boxes’” and

did not believe that appellant had made “meaningful behavioral

changes.” Appellant argues that she “completed her case plan

multiple times and some components of the case plan—four times.”

She states that she (1) “had housing at multiple times,” (2) SCIOTO, 25CA4134 15

“completed four assessments,” (3) “began taking her medicine,”

(4) “completed parenting classes,” (5) held a steady job, and

(6) “regularly attended visitation.” Appellant asserts that

appellee’s “failures to set up visitation in a timely manner

combined with a subjective, unsupported conclusion that

[appellant]’s efforts lacked sincerity do not satisfy the legal

requirement of reasonable efforts.”

{¶45} Appellant also faults appellee for failing “to provide

the parents with a drug lockbox.”

{¶46} When a trial court “removes a child from the child’s

home or continues the removal of a child from the child’s home,”

R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) requires a trial court to determine whether

a children services agency “made reasonable efforts to prevent

the removal of the child from the child’s home, to eliminate the

continued removal of the child from the child's home, or to make

it possible for the child to return safely home.” “In

determining whether reasonable efforts were made, the child’s

health and safety shall be paramount.” R.C. 2151.419(A)(1).

The agency bears the burden to prove that it has made reasonable

efforts. R.C. 2151.419(A)(1).

{¶47} However, R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) applies only at

“adjudicatory, emergency, detention, and temporary-disposition

hearings, and dispositional hearings for abused, neglected, or

dependent children . . . .” In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 41; SCIOTO, 25CA4134 16

accord In re C.B.C., 2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 72 (4th Dist.). Thus,

“‘[b]y its plain terms, the statute does not apply to motions

for permanent custody brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.413, or to

hearings held on such motions pursuant to R.C. 2151.414.’” C.F.

at ¶ 41, quoting In re A.C., 2004-Ohio-5531, ¶ 30 (12th Dist.).

Nonetheless, “[t]his does not mean that the agency is relieved

of the duty to make reasonable efforts” before seeking permanent

custody. Id. at ¶ 42. Instead, at prior “stages of the child-

custody proceeding, the agency may be required under other

statutes to prove that it has made reasonable efforts toward

family reunification.” Id. Additionally, “[if] the agency has

not established that reasonable efforts have been made prior to

the hearing on a motion for permanent custody, then it must

demonstrate such efforts at that time.” Id. at ¶ 43.

{¶48} In the case sub judice, appellant’s appeal does not

originate from one of the types of hearings specifically listed

in R.C. 2151.419(A): “adjudicatory, emergency, detention, and

temporary-disposition hearings, and dispositional hearings for

abused, neglected, or dependent children.” Appellee, therefore,

did not have the burden to prove at the permanent custody

hearing that it used reasonable efforts to reunify the family,

unless it had not previously done so. Here, our review of the

record reflects that the trial court made multiple reasonable

efforts findings before the agency filed its permanent custody SCIOTO, 25CA4134 17

motion. Thus, the court did not need to again find that the

agency used reasonable efforts before it could grant the agency

permanent custody of the children. E.g., In re M.H.–L.T., 2017-

Ohio-7825, ¶ 64 (4th Dist.); In re S.S., 2017-Ohio-2938, ¶ 168

(4th Dist.).

{¶49} Moreover, to the extent that appellant disagrees with

any of the trial court’s reasonable efforts findings made after

adjudication or disposition, we point out that she could have

appealed those findings when the trial court entered final

orders. Her failure to timely appeal the findings contained in

those orders means that they now are res judicata. See In re

Bil.I., 2023-Ohio-434, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.) (failing to timely

appeal reasonable efforts findings prevented parents from later

challenging those findings on appeal from permanent custody

judgment); In re B.F., 2021-Ohio-4251, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.) (“because

[the parents] could have raised their challenges to the trial

court’s first four reasonable-efforts findings on appeal from

[the child]’s adjudication and initial disposition, res judicata

now precludes [the parents] from making these arguments”); see

also In re L.S., 2020-Ohio-5516, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.) (res judicata

barred parents from challenging reasonable-efforts findings in

the trial court’s shelter-care order because “the parents could

have raised the issue in a direct appeal from the court’s

dispositional order”). SCIOTO, 25CA4134 18

{¶50} We also observe that the evidence shows that appellant

had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to

a sibling of the children. Thus, R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(e)

relieved appellee of the duty to use reasonable efforts “to

prevent the removal of the child[ren] from [their] home,

eliminate the continued removal of the child[ren] from [their]

home, and return the child[ren] to [their] home.” See In re

C.J., 2017-Ohio-5782, ¶ 49 (4th Dist.).

{¶51} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.

II

{¶52} In her second assignment of error, appellant asserts

that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support

the trial court’s finding that permanent custody is in the

children’s best interest and that its finding is against the

manifest weight of the evidence. She does not contest the

court’s finding that the children had been in the agency’s

temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-

month period. Instead, appellant challenges the trial court’s

best interest finding. She argues that she completed her case

plan, had adequate housing, was employed, was receiving mental

health treatment, and “was willing to continue her medication.”

Appellant asserts that appellee failed to establish that she

“could not parent her [c]hildren” and “did not produce evidence SCIOTO, 25CA4134 19

that [her] children continued to be at risk.”

A

{¶53} Generally, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial

court’s permanent custody judgment unless the judgment is

against the manifest weight of the evidence. E.g., In re B.E.,

2014-Ohio-3178, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.); In re R.S., 2013-Ohio-5569, ¶

29 (4th Dist.); accord In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 1.

“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.’”

Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12, quoting State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).

{¶54} When an appellate court reviews whether a trial

court’s permanent custody decision is against the manifest

weight of the evidence, the court “‘“weighs the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses

and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence,

the [fact-finder] clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be

reversed and a new trial ordered.”’” Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179, SCIOTO, 25CA4134 20

at ¶ 20, quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115

(9th Dist. 2001), quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.

1983); accord In re Pittman, 2002-Ohio-2208, ¶ 23-24 (9th

Dist.). We further observe, however, that issues that relate to

the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the

evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. As the court

explained in Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80

(1984):

The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.

Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility

is “crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much

evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not

translate to the record well.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio

St.3d 415, 419 (1997); accord In re Christian, 2004-Ohio-3146, ¶

7 (4th Dist.).

{¶55} The question that an appellate court must resolve when

reviewing a permanent custody decision under the manifest weight

of the evidence standard is “whether the juvenile court’s

findings ... were supported by clear and convincing evidence.”

In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 43. “Clear and convincing SCIOTO, 25CA4134 21

evidence” is

the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal.

In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103-04 (1986). In

determining whether a trial court based its decision upon clear

and convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the

record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient

evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.”

State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990); accord In re

Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985), citing Cross v. Ledford,

161 Ohio St. 469 (1954) (“Once the clear and convincing standard

has been met to the satisfaction of the [trial] court, the

reviewing court must examine the record and determine if the

trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this

burden of proof.”); In re Adoption of Lay, 25 Ohio St.3d 41, 42-

43 (1986); compare In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163,

165 (1986) (whether a fact has been “proven by clear and

convincing evidence in a particular case is a determination for

the [trial] court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless

such determination is against the manifest weight of the

evidence”).

{¶56} Thus, if a children services agency presented SCIOTO, 25CA4134 22

competent and credible evidence upon which the trier of fact

reasonably could have formed a firm belief that permanent

custody is warranted, the court’s decision is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588, ¶

62 (4th Dist.); see also In re R.L., 2012-Ohio-6049, ¶ 17 (2d

Dist.), quoting In re A.U., 2008-Ohio-187, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.) (“A

reviewing court will not overturn a court's grant of permanent

custody to the state as being contrary to the manifest weight of

the evidence ‘if the record contains competent, credible

evidence by which the court could have formed a firm belief or

conviction that the essential statutory elements . . . have been

established.’”).

{¶57} Once a reviewing court finishes its examination, the

judgment may be reversed only if it appears that the fact-

finder, when resolving the conflicts in evidence, “‘clearly lost

its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that

the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d

at 175. A reviewing court should find a trial court’s permanent

custody judgment against the manifest weight of the evidence

only in the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the [decision].’” Id., quoting Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d at 175; see Black’s (12th ed. 2024) (the phrase “manifest

weight of the evidence” “denotes a deferential standard of SCIOTO, 25CA4134 23

review under which a verdict will be reversed or disregarded

only if another outcome is obviously correct and the verdict is

clearly unsupported by the evidence”).

{¶58} A reviewing court also may reverse a trial court’s

permanent custody judgment if the record does not contain

sufficient evidence to support it. See Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at

¶ 1. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our

inquiry focuses primarily upon the adequacy of the evidence;

that is, whether “the evidence is legally sufficient to support

the [judgment] as a matter of law.” See Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d at 386. Additionally, as we have stated in previous

cases, a finding that a judgment is supported by the manifest

weight of the evidence is “also dispositive of the issue of

sufficiency.” State v. Waller, 2018-Ohio-2014, ¶ 30 (4th

Dist.); e.g., State v. McKinney, 2024-Ohio-4642, ¶ 63 (4th

Dist.) (“a determination that the weight of the evidence

supports a conviction also is dispositive of an insufficient-

evidence claim”). We therefore first consider the potentially

dispositive issue: whether the weight of the evidence supports

the trial court’s judgment.

B

{¶59} Courts must recognize that “parents’ interest in the

care, custody, and control of their children ‘is perhaps the

oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e SCIOTO, 25CA4134 24

United States Supreme] Court.’” In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶

19, quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).

Indeed, “the right to raise one’s children is an ‘essential’ and

‘basic’ civil right.” In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157

(1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972);

accord In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997); see Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“natural parents have a

fundamental right to the care and custody of their children”).

Thus, “parents who are ‘suitable’ have a ‘paramount’ right to

the custody of their children.” B.C. at ¶ 19, quoting In re

Perales, 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 97 (1977), citing Clark v. Bayer, 32

Ohio St. 299, 310 (1877); Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d at 157.

{¶60} A parent’s rights, however, are not absolute. In re

D.A., 2007-Ohio-1105, ¶ 11. Rather, “‘it is plain that the

natural rights of a parent . . . are always subject to the

ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or

controlling principle to be observed.’” In re Cunningham, 59

Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979), quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54,

58 (Fla. App. 1974). Thus, the State may terminate parental

rights when a child’s best interest demands such termination.

D.A. at ¶ 11.

{¶61} Before a court may award a children services agency

permanent custody of a child, R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) requires the

court to hold a hearing. The primary purpose of the hearing is SCIOTO, 25CA4134 25

to allow the court to determine whether the child’s best

interests would be served by permanently terminating the

parental relationship and by awarding permanent custody to the

agency. Id. Additionally, when considering whether to grant a

children services agency permanent custody, a trial court should

consider the underlying purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151: “to care

for and protect children, ‘whenever possible, in a family

environment, separating the child from the child’s parents only

when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interests of

public safety.’” In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 29, quoting R.C.

2151.01(A).

C

{¶62} A children services agency may obtain permanent

custody of a child by (1) requesting it in the abuse, neglect,

or dependency complaint under R.C. 2151.353, or (2) filing a

motion under R.C. 2151.413 after obtaining temporary custody.

In this case, appellee sought permanent custody by filing a

motion under R.C. 2151.413. When an agency files a permanent

custody motion under R.C. 2151.413, R.C. 2151.414 applies. R.C.

2151.414(A).

{¶63} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) permits a trial court to grant

permanent custody of a child to a children services agency if

the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

child’s best interest would be served by the award of permanent SCIOTO, 25CA4134 26

custody and that, as relevant in the case sub judice, “[t]he

child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public

children services agencies ... for twelve or more months of a

consecutive twenty-two-month period. . . .” R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(d).

{¶64} In the case at bar, the trial court found that the

children had been in appellee’s temporary custody for more than

12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. Appellant does not

challenge this finding on appeal. We therefore do not address

it.

D

{¶65} R.C. 2151.414(D) lists the factors that a trial court

considers when determining whether permanent custody will serve

a child’s best interest. The statute directs a trial court to

consider “all relevant factors,” as well as specific factors, to

determine whether a child’s best interest will be served by

granting a children services agency permanent custody. The

listed factors include: (1) the child’s interaction and

interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives,

foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person

who may significantly affect the child; (2) the child’s wishes,

as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s

guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child’s maturity; (3)

the child’s custodial history; (4) the child’s need for a SCIOTO, 25CA4134 27

legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of

placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody

to the agency; and (5) whether any factors listed under R.C.

2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply.

{¶66} Courts that must determine whether a grant of

permanent custody to a children services agency will promote a

child’s best interest must consider “all relevant [best

interest] factors,” as well as the “five enumerated statutory

factors.” C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 57, citing In re Schaefer,

2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56; accord In re C.G., 2008-Ohio-3773, ¶ 28

(9th Dist.); In re N.W., 2008-Ohio-297, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.).

However, none of the best interest factors is entitled to

“greater weight or heightened significance.” C.F. at ¶ 57.

Instead, the trial court considers the totality of the

circumstances when making its best interest determination. In

re K.M.S., 2017-Ohio-142, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.); In re A.C., 2014-

Ohio-4918, ¶ 46 (9th Dist.). In general, “[a] child’s best

interest is served by placing the child in a permanent situation

that fosters growth, stability, and security.” In re C.B.C.,

2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 66 (4th Dist.), citing In re Adoption of

Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324 (1991).

Children’s Interactions and Interrelationships

{¶67} The children are placed in the same foster home and

are bonded to one another. The foster family provides the SCIOTO, 25CA4134 28

children with all of their essential needs. By all accounts,

the children are thriving in the foster home.

{¶68} Appellee did not present any evidence to suggest that,

during visitation, the parents failed to interact appropriately

with the children. Moreover, appellee did not seek to remove

the twins from the parents’ custody. Thus, on the surface, the

evidence tends to show that the parents interacted appropriately

with the children.

{¶69} However, when appellee placed the two oldest children

in the parents’ home for a trial visit, E.E. overdosed on

marijuana. Neither parent had a logical explanation for the

overdose. The parents’ lack of explanation for the overdose

caused appellee to be wary of returning the children to the

parents’ home and to question appellant’s protective capacities.

Children’s Wishes

{¶70} The children’s GAL did not believe that appellee had

exercised reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that the

court should give appellee time to gradually reintroduce the

children into the parents’ household.

{¶71} At the time of the permanent custody hearing, all of

the children were under the age of six. The trial court

determined that the children lacked sufficient maturity to be

able to directly express their wishes.

Custodial History SCIOTO, 25CA4134 29

{¶72} C.E., Jr. lived with his parents until January 2021,

when he was almost two years of age. Since that time, he has

remained in appellee’s temporary custody. When appellee filed

its December 2023 permanent custody motion, C.E., Jr. had been

in appellee’s temporary custody for almost three years.

{¶73} Appellee removed E.E. from the parents’ custody in

March 2021, shortly after his birth. He since has remained in

appellee’s temporary custody. When appellee filed its December

2023 permanent custody motion, E.E. had been in appellee’s

temporary custody for almost three years.

{¶74} The twins lived with their parents for the first ten

months of their lives. After E.E.’s overdose, the twins were

removed from the parent’s custody and have remained in

appellee’s temporary custody since that time. When appellee

filed its amended 2024 permanent custody motion, the twins had

been in its temporary custody for more than 12 months.

{¶75} The children’s custodial history thus shows that they

have spent the majority of their young lives in appellee’s

Legally Secure Permanent Placement

{¶76} “Although the Ohio Revised Code does not define the

term, ‘legally secure permanent placement,’ this court and

others have generally interpreted the phrase to mean a safe,

stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be SCIOTO, 25CA4134 30

met.” In re M.B., 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56 (4th Dist.), citing In re

Dyal, 2001 WL 925423, *9 (4th Dist. Aug. 9, 2001) (“legally

secure permanent placement” means a “stable, safe, and nurturing

environment”); see also In re K.M., 2015-Ohio-4682, ¶ 28 (10th

Dist.) (legally secure permanent placement requires more than a

stable home and income, but also requires an environment that

will provide for child’s needs); In re J.H., 2013-Ohio-1293, ¶

95 (11th Dist.) (mother was unable to provide legally secure

permanent placement when she lacked physical and emotional

stability and father was unable to do so when he lacked grasp of

parenting concepts); In re J.W., 2007-Ohio-2007, ¶ 34 (10th

Dist.) (Sadler, J., dissenting) (legally secure permanent

placement means “a placement that is stable and consistent”);

Black’s (6th Ed. 1990) (defining “secure” to mean, in part, “not

exposed to danger; safe; so strong, stable or firm as to insure

safety”); id. (defining “permanent” to mean, in part,

“[c]ontinuing or enduring in the same state, status, place, or

the like without fundamental or marked change, not subject to

fluctuation, or alteration, fixed or intended to be fixed;

lasting; abiding; stable; not temporary or transient”). Thus,

“[a] legally secure permanent placement is more than a house

with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable

environment where a child will live in safety with one or more

dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.” SCIOTO, 25CA4134 31

M.B., 2016-Ohio-793, at ¶ 56 (4th Dist.).

{¶77} In the case at bar, we believe that the evidence

adduced at the hearing supports the trial court’s finding that

the children need a legally secure permanent placement and that

they cannot achieve that type of placement without granting the

agency permanent custody. Despite years of appellee’s

involvement and case planning efforts, appellant did not

consistently demonstrate that she could provide the children

with a legally secure permanent placement. We recognize and

commend appellant for her efforts to improve her situation.

Unfortunately, when appellee attempted to return C.E., Jr. and

E.E. to the home, E.E. overdosed on marijuana. Appellant did

not have a logical explanation for the overdose. The trial

court could have reasonably determined that a home in which a

child has the ability to overdose on marijuana, without any

logical explanation, is not an environment in which a child will

live in safety.

{¶78} Furthermore, even though appellant may have engaged in

the services that appellee requested of her, case plan

compliance is not necessarily dispositive on the issue of

reunification and does not preclude a grant of permanent custody

to a children’s services agency. In re W.C.J., 2014-Ohio-5841,

¶ 46 (4th Dist.) (“[s]ubstantial compliance with a case plan is

not necessarily dispositive on the issue of reunification and SCIOTO, 25CA4134 32

does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a children’s

services agency.”); see In re M.H., 2017-Ohio-7365, ¶ 102 (4th

Dist.); In re S.S., 2017-Ohio-2938, ¶ 164 (4th Dist.); In re

M.B., 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 59 (4th Dist.); In re N.L., 2015-Ohio-

4165, ¶ 35 (9th Dist.) (stating that substantial compliance with

a case plan, in and of itself, does not establish that a grant

of permanent custody to an agency is erroneous”); In re S.C.,

2015-Ohio-2280, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.) (“Compliance with a case plan

is not, in and of itself, dispositive of the issue of

reunification.”); In re West, 2003-Ohio-6299, ¶ 19 (4th Dist.).

Indeed, because the trial court’s primary focus in a permanent

custody proceeding is the child’s best interest, “it is entirely

possible that a parent could complete all of his/her case plan

goals and the trial court still appropriately terminate his/her

parental rights.” In re Gomer, 2004-Ohio-1723, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.);

accord In re A.S., 2014-Ohio-3035, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.).

Consequently, even if appellant complied with all of the case

plan services, these actions do not necessarily demonstrate that

placing the children in her custody would serve the children’s

best interest.

R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11)

{¶79} The trial court found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(11)

applied. The evidence shows that appellant had her parental

rights involuntarily terminated with respect to one of the SCIOTO, 25CA4134 33

children’ siblings, and the trial court determined that

appellant “failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to

prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, [she] can

provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care

for the health, welfare, and safety of the child[ren].” As we

explained above, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding

that appellant cannot provide the children with a legally secure

permanent placement.

{¶80} For all of the foregoing reasons, we do not agree with

appellant that the trial court’s judgment granting appellee

permanent custody of the children is against the manifest weight

of the evidence. The trial court could have formed a firm

belief that placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody

was in their best interest. We thus also conclude that the

record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s

judgment.

{¶81} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s second assignment of error and affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. SCIOTO, 25CA4134 34

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that

appellee recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this

appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this

Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile

Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that

mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

For the Court

BY:__________________________ Peter B. Abele, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.