In re C.D.L.

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: 25CA37 & 25CA38
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re C.D.L., 2026-Ohio-1254.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WASHINGTON COUNTY : In re C.D.L., et al., : : Case Nos. 25CA37 Adjudicated Dependent Children. : 25CA38 : : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY : RELEASED: 03/30/2026 ________________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES:

Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for appellant.

Kelsey R. Riffle, Washington County Assistant Prosecutor, Marietta, Ohio, for appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Wilkin, J.

{¶1} Appellant, the children’s mother, appeals the judgments of the

Washington County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that granted

Washington County Department of Job and Family Services (“the agency”),

permanent custody of her two children: 13-year-old C.D.L., and 12-year-old

J.N.L.

{¶2} Appellant raises one assignment of error that asserts that she did not

receive the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record and

the applicable law, we do not find any merit to appellant’s assignment of error.

Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶3} In early January 2024, the agency became aware of “repeated

allegations of the children being left unsupervised, and with relatives with no

contact for days at a time, chronic truancy, missed appointments with providers, Washington App. Nos. 25CA37 and 25CA38 2

and continued contact with” an individual who had a history or physically abusing

one of the children and appellant. The agency decided to remove the children in

order to assess the risk. To that end, the agency sought and received ex parte

orders that placed the children in its emergency, temporary custody.

{¶4} The next day, the agency filed complaints that alleged the children

were dependent children and that requested temporary custody of the children.

{¶5} On March 1, 2024, the trial court adjudicated the children dependent.

The court later entered dispositional orders that placed the children in the

agency’s temporary custody.

{¶6} On May 27, 2025, the agency filed motions that asked the court to

place the children in its permanent custody. The agency alleged that (1) the

children had been in its temporary custody for 12 or more months of a

consecutive 22-month period and (2) placing the children in its permanent

custody would be in their best interest.

{¶7} On August 14, 2025, the trial court held a hearing to consider the

agency’s permanent custody motions. Caseworker Alisha Riddle testified as

follows. During an approximately six-month period before the agency sought to

remove the children from the home, the agency had been attempting to work with

the family due to concerns regarding domestic violence between appellant and

the children’s father,1 substance abuse, lack of supervision, and “housing

concerns.” In January 2024, the agency removed the children from the home

due to these unresolved concerns.

The children’s father had little involvement in the case, and the trial court found that he 1

had abandoned the children. Washington App. Nos. 25CA37 and 25CA38 3

{¶8} The agency developed a case plan that required appellant to, in part,

(1) obtain and maintain safe and stable housing, (2) obtain and maintain stable

employment or otherwise have the ability to meet the children’s needs, (3)

complete a mental health assessment and follow any treatment

recommendations, (4) provide clean drug screens, and (5) complete a drug and

alcohol assessment and follow any treatment recommendations.

{¶9} Appellant did not successfully complete any of these five

requirements. At the time of the permanent custody hearing, appellant had not

provided the agency with an address where she was residing. Appellant claimed

that she had been living with a friend who recently had been released on parole,

but the agency was unable to verify appellant’s residence.

{¶10} Appellant also had not maintained stable employment or

demonstrated an ability to provide for the children’s needs. She reportedly

obtained a job working at a hotel, but that job apparently did not last. Appellant

later indicated that she was working at a restaurant, but the agency was unable

to verify appellant’s employment.

{¶11} Appellant completed a mental health assessment, but she did not

follow treatment recommendations. Throughout the life of the case, appellant did

not return any clean drug screens. Appellant attempted to engage in services for

her substance abuse, but she did not complete the services. Additionally,

appellant did not consistently visit the children. She attended only 24 of 71 visits

available to her. Washington App. Nos. 25CA37 and 25CA38 4

{¶12} The children’s foster care caseworker testified that the children have

been in the same foster home since their removal and are doing well in the foster

home.

{¶13} The foster mother testified that the children are “very happy” in her

home, but she agreed that their first choice would be to live with appellant. The

foster mother stated that she is willing to keep the children in her home until the

agency finds a permanent placement.

{¶14} After the foster mother’s testimony, the court took a recess. After

the recess, appellant’s counsel indicated that, during the recess, he had spoken

with appellant about testifying. Counsel stated that he did not believe that

appellant was emotionally prepared to testify and asked if he would be permitted

to read appellant’s prepared statement into evidence. The court allowed counsel

to read appellant’s statement into evidence.

{¶15} Appellant’s statement advised the court that she “want[ed] to

change” and that she will “never give up on [her] kids.” She asked the court to

give her “more time to get [her] life together.”

{¶16} The children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) testified next and reported

that the children love appellant and would like to return home. However, she did

not recommend returning the children to the home due to the concerns regarding

substance abuse. The GAL believed that placing the children in the agency’s

permanent custody would be in their best interest.

{¶17} After the GAL’s testimony, the parties and the GAL presented short

closing statements. The agency argued that appellant had not made sufficient Washington App. Nos. 25CA37 and 25CA38 5

progress to allow the children to be returned to her custody. Appellant’s counsel

stated, “we know the Court will take this matter under advisement, and we trust

the process.” The GAL recognized that the children love appellant but asserted

her belief that appellant’s substance abuse poses “a safety issue.”

{¶18} On September 24, 2025, the trial court granted the agency

permanent custody of the two children. The trial court found that the children had

been in the agency’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive

22-month period and that placing them in the agency’s permanent custody is in

their best interest. The court thus granted the agency permanent custody of the

children. These appeals followed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE MOTHER-APPELLANT WAS DENIED HER GUARANTEED RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

{¶19} In her sole assignment of error, appellant argues that she did not

receive the effective assistance of counsel. She contends that trial counsel

performed deficiently because he did not “present or argue any case consistent

with [her] stated desire to seek denial” of the agency’s permanent custody

motion. Appellant further asserts that trial counsel entirely failed to subject the

agency’s case to meaningful adversarial testing and that she thus is entitled to a

presumption of prejudice. She states that trial counsel completely failed to

“present an opening statement, call witnesses, enter exhibits, or offer closing

statement.” Appellant claims that counsel did nothing to subject the agency’s

case “to meaningful adversarial testing.” Washington App. Nos. 25CA37 and 25CA38 6

{¶20} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

criminal defendants the right to “the Assistance of Counsel for [their] defence.”

U.S. Const., amend. VI. This right to the assistance of counsel includes “ ‘the

right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ ” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 686 (1984), quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14

(1970). Importantly, however, “the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the

right to perfect counsel; it promises only the right to effective assistance . . . .”

Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 24 (2013). Moreover, given that “[a]n ineffective-

assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture

and raise issues not presented at trial,” courts must apply “the Strickland

standard . . . with scrupulous care, lest ‘intrusive post-trial inquiry’ threaten the

integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.”

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

690; accord State v. Rogers, 2025-Ohio-4794, ¶ 35.

{¶21} Parents facing the permanent termination of their parental rights are

guaranteed the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., In re S.W.,

2023-Ohio-793, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.). In determining whether a parent in a permanent

custody proceeding received the effective assistance of counsel, courts apply the

same test for ineffective assistance of counsel used in criminal cases. See, e.g.,

In re K.A., 2024-Ohio-5430, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.); In re Wingo, 143 Ohio App.3d 652,

666 (4th Dist.), quoting In re Heston, 129 Ohio App.3d 825, 827 (1st Dist. 1998).

Thus, to establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in a

permanent custody proceeding, a parent must show “ ‘(1) deficient performance Washington App. Nos. 25CA37 and 25CA38 7

by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard of reasonable

representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, the proceeding's result would have been different.’ ” S.W.,

2023-Ohio-793, at ¶ 53 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Madison, 2020-Ohio-3735, ¶

202; see e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Powell, 2012-Ohio-2577, ¶ 85.

“Failure to establish either element is fatal to the claim.” State v. Jones, 2008-

Ohio-968, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.); accord Rogers, 2025-Ohio-4794, at ¶ 25 (“Both the

deficient-performance and prejudice prongs must be met for a successful

ineffective-assistance claim; neither is individually sufficient.”).

{¶22} When considering whether counsel’s performance was deficient,

“appellate courts must be ‘highly deferential’ to trial counsel’s performance.”

Rogers, 2025-Ohio-4794, at ¶ 35, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. “The

question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence

under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from best practices

or most common custom.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 690. In assessing an attorney’s compliance with prevailing professional

norms, “ ‘a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ ” State v. Walters,

2014-Ohio-4966, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The

challenging party bears the burden to “ ‘overcome the presumption that, under

the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial

strategy.’ ” State v. Jarrell, 2017-Ohio-520, ¶ 49 (4th Dist.), quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689. Washington App. Nos. 25CA37 and 25CA38 8

{¶23} Additionally, courts should not allow hindsight “to distort the

assessment of what was reasonable in light of counsel’s perspective at the time.”

State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524-25 (1992). Evaluating trial counsel’s

conduct with the benefit of hindsight is inappropriate because “[u]nlike a later

reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of

materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing

counsel, and with the judge.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. Indeed, “[t]he Sixth

Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged

with the benefit of hindsight.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).

{¶24} To establish prejudice, the challenging party must demonstrate that

a reasonable probability exists that “ ‘but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Hinton v.

Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 275 (2014), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; e.g.,

State v. Short, 2011-Ohio-3641, ¶ 113; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136

(1989), paragraph three of the syllabus. Furthermore, courts ordinarily may not

simply presume the existence of prejudice but must require the challenging party

to affirmatively establish prejudice. E.g., State v. Clark, 2003-Ohio-1707, ¶ 22

(4th Dist.). As we have repeatedly recognized, speculation is insufficient to

demonstrate the prejudice component of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim. E.g., State v. Jenkins, 2014-Ohio-3123, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.); State v.

Simmons, 2013-Ohio-2890, ¶ 25 (4th Dist.); State v. Halley, 2012-Ohio-1625, ¶

25 (4th Dist.); State v. Leonard, 2009-Ohio-6191, ¶ 68 (4th Dist.); accord State v. Washington App. Nos. 25CA37 and 25CA38 9

Powell, 2012-Ohio-2577, ¶ 86 (an argument that is purely speculative cannot

serve as the basis for an ineffectiveness claim).

{¶25} However, in limited circumstances, courts may presume prejudice.

See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004) (noting that prejudice may be

presumed in narrow circumstances); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.

648, 658-59 (1984); Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 237 (2019). For example,

“the complete denial of counsel” is “so likely to prejudice the accused that the

cost of litigating [its] effect in a particular case is unjustified.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at

658-59. This complete-denial-of-counsel prejudice presumption typically applies

if an “accused is denied counsel at a critical stage” of the proceedings. Id.

Likewise, the prejudice presumption may apply “if counsel entirely fails to subject

the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Id.

{¶26} A defendant who asserts that the presumption applies because

counsel failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing

must show that “the attorney’s failure [was] complete.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 697 (2002). Thus, a defendant is not entitled to the presumption if the

defendant merely asserts that counsel failed to oppose the prosecution’s case “at

specific points.” Id. A defendant’s challenge to counsel’s failure to oppose the

prosecution’s case “at specific points” is “plainly of the same ilk as other specific

attorney errors” that are “subject to Strickland’s performance and prejudice

components.” Id. at 697-698, citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 788 (1987),

and Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 (1986). Washington App. Nos. 25CA37 and 25CA38 10

{¶27} This court has considered the prejudice presumption in the context

of a juvenile delinquency proceeding and determined that “[c]ounsel’s decision

not to present evidence at the dispositional hearing does not equate to a finding

that counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful

adversarial testing.” (Emphasis sic.) In re A.C., 2023-Ohio-902, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.).

In A.C., the juvenile faulted counsel for failing to present evidence at the

dispositional hearing to support her request for probation. She argued that

counsel did not conduct any discovery during the dispositional phase and

asserted that merely presenting a closing argument did not subject the State’s

case to meaningful adversarial testing. We disagreed with the juvenile and

observed that her argument contradicted “Bell’s emphatic reminder that the

presumption applies when ‘ “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s

case to meaningful adversarial testing.” ’ ” (Emphasis in original.) A.C., 2023-

Ohio-902, at ¶ 18, quoting Bell, 535 U.S. at 697, quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.

{¶28} In the case before us, presuming for the sake of argument that the

prejudice presumption would apply in the context of a permanent custody

proceeding, we do not believe that appellant has established that trial counsel

entirely failed to subject the agency’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. As

appellant recognizes in her brief, trial counsel participated in the permanent

custody hearing by cross-examining the agency caseworker and the foster care

caseworker. Additionally, although appellant was too emotional to testify at the

hearing, counsel read her statement into evidence. In her statement, appellant

asked the court to give her additional time to straighten out her life so that the Washington App. Nos. 25CA37 and 25CA38 11

children could be returned to her. Thus, contrary to appellant’s assertion, trial

counsel did not entirely fail to subject the agency’s case to meaningful

adversarial testing. Therefore, we do not agree with appellant that the

presumed-prejudice standard applies to her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim. Consequently, appellant must establish the Strickland prejudice standard,

i.e., a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel’s alleged deficient

performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

{¶29} Appellant has not specifically argued, however, that she can

establish the Strickland prejudice standard. Instead, she relies solely upon the

presumed-prejudice standard. Given that appellant has not presented an

argument regarding the Strickland prejudice standard, we will not create one for

her. E.g., A.C., 2023-Ohio-902, at ¶ 19 (4th Dist.). We simply note that, even if

counsel performed deficiently, nothing suggests that the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different if counsel had employed each tactic

appellant now claims counsel should have employed.

{¶30} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule

appellant’s sole assignment of error.

CONCLUSION

{¶31} Having overruled appellant’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the

trial court’s judgments.

JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED. Washington App. Nos. 25CA37 and 25CA38 12

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENTS ARE AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the costs.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

BY: ____________________________ Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.