Filed 8/19/26 In re C.B. CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re C.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, A173046 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Del Norte County Super. Ct.
v. No. JDSQ 23-6097) C.B., Defendant and Appellant.
In this juvenile wardship proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the juvenile court found that C.B. committed the offenses of battery with injury on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)), battery on a (second) peace officer (id., § 243, subd. (b)), and resisting an executive officer (as to both) (id., § 69). C.B. appeals, contending that insufficient evidence supports the findings. She also contends that the juvenile court improperly excluded evidence that a third officer induced her cooperation without using force. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I.
In 2021, when C.B. was 12 years old, the Del Norte County Juvenile Court asserted dependency jurisdiction over her, sustaining allegations of
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physical and sexual abuse by her father. In 2023, the juvenile court declared C.B. a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) After initially detaining her from both parents, the court returned C.B. to her mother’s home for about six months, until her mother became too ill to care for her. Thereafter she lived in foster homes, a short-term residential therapeutic program, for a short time back with her mother, and juvenile halls.
C.B. struggled with mental health. A psychologist diagnosed her with depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and unspecified alcohol- and cannabis-related disorder.
C.B. also struggled with behavior. The record discloses physical and verbal aggression toward, and resistance to directions from, probation and other officers; physical and verbal aggression toward social workers; physical and verbal aggression toward peers and staff at school and in residences; and vandalism at school, residences, and county offices.
In one example, C.B. admitted battering a staff member at a residential program. She head-butted the staff member; punched, pinched, and kicked her legs; punched her face and back; threw kitchen items at her; and threw a three-foot plywood sign at her face.
In another example, C.B. admitted battering and resisting a juvenile corrections officer, and resisting two other officers. She yelled, used foul language, and talked over people during a courtroom hearing. At the hearing’s end, she did not follow directions to exit. Two bailiffs attempted to guide her out verbally and physically. When the bailiffs placed her in control holds to compel her compliance, she dead-weighted her legs, causing the bailiffs to lower her to the floor. A probation officer and a juvenile corrections officer attempted to physically assist while also telling C.B. to stop resisting and kicking at them. She kicked one of the officers in the groin.
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II.
In 2024, when she was 15 years old, C.B. resided in custody in Shasta County Juvenile Hall. The Del Norte County Juvenile Court retained jurisdiction over her, and the Del Norte County Probation Department retained lead agency responsibility for her placement and care.
C.B. asked the juvenile court to allow her to visit her mother’s Del Norte County home. The proposed visit was unusual; the probation department generally did not take wards in custody to unsecured locations for family visits. But the juvenile court granted the request, presumably because the mother’s illness prevented her from leaving her bed.
The chief probation officer arranged for a 30-minute visit on a day that C.B. would be in Del Norte County for a court appearance. He directed that the visit was subject to C.B.’s behavior and to safety and security concerns. He also directed that C.B. be restrained because she was in custody, and because of her history of assaulting officers, the unsecured location, and an attempt she had made to escape during transport. The escape attempt had involved C.B. slipping her hand out of her cuffs, reaching through a partially open car window while the car was moving, and opening the car door from the outside.
III.
On the day of the visit, C.B. traveled from Shasta County to the Del Norte County Youth Opportunity Center (Youth Center). Multiple staff advised her that the visit with her mother would be supervised and that she would remain in restraints. Officer Robert Arriola drove her from the Youth Center to her mother’s house, which was three minutes away. Before they left, she used the bathroom.
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On the visit, she wore handcuffs, a belly chain, and leg shackles. The restraints limited how far she could move her arms from side to side, so that she could not grab things. The leg shackles were loose enough to allow her to walk.
Supervising Deputy Probation Officer Kory Rosentrater oversaw the visit. Arriola remained on site because the chief probation officer was concerned about how C.B. might behave. The two officers wore body cameras.
About five minutes into the visit, C.B. asked Rosentrater to seek permission from the chief probation officer to remove her handcuffs. When he declined, she asked, “You want me to stay in handcuffs?” He told her, “You know this—we’ve already discussed it. Handcuffs stay on.” She asked, “What if I have to go to the bathroom?” Rosentrater told her that she would need to wait until they returned to the Youth Center because there was no female officer present. C.B. insisted that she needed to use the bathroom and argued when Rosentrater refused. Rosentrater tried to redirect her attention toward the visit. C.B. became increasingly agitated. Ultimately, she clenched her fist and yelled, “I need to really pee or I’m gonna literally pee myself.”
At that point, Rosentrater decided to return C.B. to the Youth Center.
He said to Arriola, “Let’s take her back . . . .” To C.B. he said “move” and “[l]et’s go.” The officers put their hands by the back of her elbows and walked her out the front door toward the car in the driveway.
IV.
When they were within a few feet of the car, C.B. started yelling and resisted further progress by dropping her weight toward the ground. She dug in her heels, straightened and stiffened her legs, and pushed her weight
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backwards. The officers transitioned to a control hold to prevent her from falling or bringing the officers down. They were able to move her to the car’s back passenger door.
There, she dropped all the way to the ground and kicked and flailed her legs. Rosentrater testified that one of her kicks connected with his shin. He directed her to stand up. Rosentrater determined that he could not maneuver her into a standing position without harming her. Instead he used a pressure point technique with both hands for a few seconds to cause her to stand by her own power. The technique hurt her while he used it. But there is no evidence that C.B. continued to experience pain after Rosentrater stopped or that he continued to use the technique after she stood. There is also no evidence that it injured her.
C.B. continued to struggle, and Rosentrater continued to tell her to stop. The officers moved her part way into the car, but Rosentrater lost his grip. C.B. slid from partially lying on her back on the backseat to a seated position on the ground just outside the door. Rosentrater directed her to stand up, turn around, and get in the car. She did not. As Rosentrater tried to lift her, he perceived that she was trying to bite his hand. He yanked his hand back, and she kicked him in the leg. She obstructed the officers’ efforts to grip her and used abusive language. The officers told her several times to stand up or they would use pepper spray. Rosentrater told her, “You just tried to bite me and you kicked me. Stand up.”
She partially stood, but then she dropped down again and “turtl[ed].”
Turtling means compressing low to the ground and locking in a position. Rosentrater testified that probation officers “see it a lot with individuals trying to prevent [officers from] gaining control of their hands or feet.”
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Rosentrater looked for a way to get his hands under C.B.’s arms, but he did not see one. So with one hand he used his thumb on a pressure point near her ear. He gave half a push in, causing her right arm to pop out and allowing him to get his hand under her armpit. The officers pulled C.B. to a standing position facing the car seat and attempted to move her in. C.B. was bent forward toward the seat.
According to C.B., Rosentrater at that point had two hands on her neck and again used his thumbs on pressure points. Rosentrater’s version differs. He did not testify to using the pressure point technique while C.B. was standing. Instead, he maintained that he had his left hand on the back of her sweatshirt while his right arm slid forward to push her in the vehicle, and his right hand came near enough to her mouth that she was able to reach down to bite it.
C.B. bit Rosentrater’s right ring finger above the first knuckle, clenching her jaws and grinding her teeth. He screamed. He believed he would sustain serious or permanent injury. Using his free left hand, he hit her repeatedly with a hammer fist on the trapezius area of her shoulder and neck. The hammer fist technique uses the flat side of the fist, as opposed the knuckle bones, to strike a target. It is department approved. He stopped as soon as she released his finger.
Rosentrater identified other options for freeing his finger, but they would have involved more force. Had he used his baton in a downward strike, he testified, it would have injured C.B. He also feasibly could have used a knee strike, an elbow strike, or his firearm. He could not have reached his pepper spray and, in any event, he was too close to use it effectively.
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Rosentrater described the severity of the bite as 9 out of 10. It caused pain, bruising, swelling, three months of numbness, and scarring. He lost his fingernail.
After C.B. released his finger, Rosentrater tried to push her into the car onto her stomach, while Arriola went to the other side of the car and tried to pull her across. Once on her stomach, C.B. repeatedly kicked Rosentrater in the chest, groin, and lower legs. Both officers instructed her to stop, but she did not. She bit Arriola’s left hand, causing bruising and swelling.
When the officers nearly had C.B. contained in the car lying on her stomach lengthwise across the backseat, Rosentrater grabbed the chain connecting the cuffs around her ankles and pulled her backwards toward him so that Arriola could shut the door on his side of the car without smashing her head. C.B. then locked her leg in a straight position such that Rosentrater could not put it fully in the car and shut the door. He manipulated her legs into a “figure-four leg lock” to keep them within the car. But when he tried to shut the door, she kicked her legs out, and her foot got caught between the door and the doorframe. Rosentrater pushed against the resistance, thinking that she was pushing on the interior of the door with her feet. When he realized her foot was caught, he repositioned her legs so that they were inside the car, and he successfully closed the door. Her ankle sustained swelling and a large bruise.
Inside the car, C.B. kicked the windows and the doors, yelled, and swore. When Arriola drove her back to the Youth Center, she yelled that she would fight the officers when she got out and that she should have bitten Rosentrater’s finger off.
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V.
The district attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging that C.B. committed the following offenses: battery with injury against a peace officer (Rosentrater) (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)); battery against a peace officer (Arriola) (id., § 243, subd. (b)); and two counts of resisting an executive officer (Rosentrater and Arriola, respectively) with the use of force or violence (id., § 69).
The juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing at which the fact witnesses included Rosentrater, Arriola, C.B., and the chief probation officer.
Dr. Salma Kahn testified as an expert on C.B.’s behalf. Kahn was a licensed psychiatrist who had worked in California prisons since 2010. She had observed use-of-force scenarios and was part of a use-of-force team at San Quentin. The juvenile court accepted her as an expert in psychiatry and in psychological de-escalation techniques to avoid use of force.
In Kahn’s view, the probation department should have arranged and managed the visit differently. She would have expected a clear behavioral plan for an oppositional juvenile with mental health challenges known to be resistant to authority. The plan should have included guidelines communicated to C.B. about when she would be fed and when she could use a bathroom. The mother’s female caregiver should have stayed on site and C.B.’s female rape counselor also should have been present. Rosentrater should not have stood so close to C.B. and her mother during the visit and should not have spoken as much as he did.
Kahn testified that even under the actual visit conditions, the officers could have avoided using force. They could have allowed a “cooling down period” followed by negotiation and incentives. She did not see an emergency
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situation requiring the officers to force C.B. into the car. In her view, threatening, manhandling, and punching were not reasonable responses to C.B.’s bathroom request. The officers should have stopped to ask C.B. if she was hurting and to provide some measure of care and comfort.
The juvenile court found true that C.B. committed each alleged offense. As relates to the use of excessive force, the court concluded that it was lawful for the officers to use force to overcome C.B.’s resistance; the video disclosed no excessive force; there was no evidence that Rosentrater’s use of the pressure point technique amounted to excessive force; C.B.’s testimony about the events lacked credibility because it did not match the video; the video contradicted C.B.’s claim that Rosentrater had two hands on her neck when she bit him; C.B., not the officers, escalated the physical nature of the conflict; and the force that the officers used was reasonable.
As relates to C.B.’s claim of self-defense, the court found that C.B.
initiated the physical altercation by kicking when the officers first tried to put her in the car; she did not try to stop the fighting either by word or by conduct, such as by saying she would comply or by complying; neither officer used deadly force against her that would justify her own continued use of force; and when C.B. bit Rosentrater’s finger she may have been feeling pain but she was not under threat of life.
The court also found credible Kahn’s opinion that C.B. was emotionally disturbed.
DISCUSSION
I.
C.B. contends that insufficient evidence supports both the juvenile court’s finding that the officers used reasonable force and its finding that C.B. did not act in self-defense. We disagree.
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We review these contentions as we would in an adult criminal case, examining “ ‘the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide whether substantial evidence supports the conviction, so that a reasonable fact finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 653.) Substantial means reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.) We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 106.)
A.
Each of the alleged offenses requires that the officer was performing his or her duty when the incident occurred. (Pen. Code, §§ 243, subds. (b), (c)(2), 69, subd. (a).) When an officer uses excessive or unreasonable force, the officer is not acting lawfully and therefore is not performing his or her duty. (People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46; see also In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 815 [resisting an officer]; In re Joseph F. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 975, 982 [battery on an officer].) A finding that an officer used excessive force thus defeats all charges at issue.
A custodial officer may use reasonable force to restrain a person or to overcome resistance. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 524– 525.) To assess whether force rises to the impermissible level of “excessive,” courts ask “ ‘whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.’ ” (Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, Missouri (2021) 594 U.S. 464, 466–467.) Relevant considerations may include, for example, whether the person actively resisted, the relationship between the need for force and the amount used, the officer’s effort to temper the amount of force used, and the extent of the person’s injury. (Kingsley v. Hendrickson (2015) 576 U.S. 389, 397.)
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Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the officers’ use of force was reasonable. The officers attempted to use verbal commands throughout the incident, but C.B. did not comply with them. The officers testified, in accord with the video evidence, that she actively resisted their efforts to escort her into the car. Rosentrater testified that he chose to use low levels of force compared to alternatives available and stopped using force when he achieved his goals of causing C.B. to stand, to move her arm out of her “turtle” position, and to release his finger. Rosentrater further testified, consistent with the video evidence, that he pulled on C.B.’s leg shackles in order to prevent her head from getting smashed by Arriola closing the car door. Evidence also supports a conclusion that Rosentrater did not intend to close the car door on C.B.’s foot. He had tried to secure her legs in the car, but C.B. had kicked them out. Under these circumstances, C.B.’s bruised and swollen ankle does not undermine the juvenile court’s determination that the officers acted reasonably.
C.B. contends that the juvenile court impermissibly parsed the encounter into intervals instead of assessing the totality of the circumstances. (See Barnes v. Felix (2025) 605 U.S. 73, 76.) We are not persuaded. First, we disagree with C.B.’s characterization of the court’s method. We note that the court made wide-view observations in discussing its findings. In addition, we presume that the court correctly applied the law. (Evid. Code, § 664; People v. Woods (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1152.) Second, our own review of the five-minute sequence as a whole convinces us that substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusions as discussed above.
We also disagree with C.B.’s contention that the options suggested by Kahn show that the officers used unreasonable force. Kahn’s alternative options fall into two categories.
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The first category includes suggestions aimed at making it less likely that C.B.’s behavior would cause a need for force in the first place—such as having neutral women present and presenting C.B. with clear guidelines at the outset. C.B. may be correct that such measures could have averted her resistance and thus the officers’ use of force. But she cites no authority for the proposition that the probation department or the officers had an affirmative duty to provide circumstances that would make C.B.’s cooperation more likely. Nor has she identified any authority for the proposition that whether the officers made such efforts is legally relevant to whether they used excessive force when they encountered resistance.
The second category of Kahn’s alternatives includes options for responding to the resistance that did, in fact, occur. Kahn suggests that the officers could have waited C.B. out, negotiated, and offered incentives. In other words, C.B. suggests that the officers’ decision to use any force at all, without first trying these strategies, was itself excessive. But C.B. cites no authority for the proposition that officers must employ alternative strategies before using force to overcome resistance. Indeed, the proposition is at odds with the rule that a custodial officer may use reasonable force to restrain a person, to overcome resistance, or in self-defense. (See People v. Gutierrez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 521–522, 524–525.) It is also at odds with the rule that “reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” (Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 396–397.) In this case, substantial evidence supported a finding that the officers’ decision to use force was reasonable under the circumstances. C.B. was in custody, she physically resisted the officers’
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instructions, and Rosentrater testified that he did not think sitting down and talking was a viable option given her resistance and the unsecure setting.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that neither officer used excessive force.
B.
C.B. also contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that she did not act in self-defense. On this issue, the prosecution bore the burden of proof. (People v. Saavedra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 571.) If the prosecution failed to carry its burden, the juvenile court could not find true that she committed the alleged offenses. (See People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340 [self-defense negates culpability for assaultive offenses].)
Generally, a claim of self-defense is not available to a person who initiated a physical altercation unless they tried to withdraw from the fight by words or conduct. (People v. Hernandez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 582, 587– 589.) C.B. does not contest that this rule applies to a juvenile in custody who physically resists or assaults a custodial officer, and she does not argue that she tried to withdraw from the fight. She argues only that she did not initiate the altercation.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that she did.
Rosentrater testified, and the video does not contradict, that C.B. kicked her legs, connecting with his shin, before he used the pressure point technique for the first time. The court reasonably could conclude that C.B. initiated a physical altercation at this point.
We disagree with C.B.’s contention that Rosentrater’s testimony suggests that the kick to his shin came after his use of the pressure point technique. When asked if he had been kicked beforehand, he answered, “She
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had kicked backwards. She connected with my shin.” He also testified that C.B. kicked him after he used the technique. To the extent the two statements created an ambiguity, the juvenile court was entitled to conclude that he was testifying about two separate kicks—one before he used the technique and one after. In any event, Rosentrater testified that C.B. was kicking her legs before he applied the pressure technique. This evidence also supports the juvenile court’s finding.
We are also unpersuaded by C.B.’s argument that the officers initiated the physical aggression by putting their hands on her elbows and escorting her out of the house toward the car. The juvenile court reasonably could find that those acts did not constitute the start of a physical fight.
Accordingly, C.B.’s self-defense claim fails. As a result, we need not and do not reach C.B.’s other self-defense arguments that she had reasonable beliefs that she was in imminent danger of suffering a battery and that the immediate use of force was necessary, and that she used no more force than reasonably appeared necessary to defend herself.
II.
C.B. contends that the juvenile court erred by excluding evidence that a third probation officer—back at the Youth Center, after the incident—had calmed C.B. down by talking to her and helping her out of the car. We disagree.
We generally review a ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266.) C.B. asserts that we review issues de novo when they raise constitutional concerns. But she does not explain the constitutional concern at issue or cite authority supporting application of the de novo standard in this context. We therefore apply the abuse of discretion standard, under which we uphold the juvenile
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court’s ruling unless it was arbitrary or capricious. (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1004.)
“ ‘[A] trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining the relevance of evidence . . . .’ ” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 904.) Evidence is relevant when it has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.)
Here, the court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the evidence was not relevant. The third probation officer acted in a context that differed significantly from that in which Rosentrater and Arriola acted. Time had passed since the confrontation. C.B. no longer faced the officers who had refused to let her use the restroom at her mother’s house and who had overcome her resistance to force her into a car. The juvenile court could conclude that how the third officer approached C.B. in this different context had no bearing on whether Rosentrater and Arriola acted reasonably in the circumstances they faced.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, Acting P. J. GORDON, J. *
*Judge of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.