SUMMARY ORDER
ORDER OF GRIEVANCE PANEL
Gaspar Castillo was admitted to the New York State bar in 1981, and to this Court’s bar in 1983.
I. Prior Order Imposing Private Reprimand
In June 2014, we privately reprimanded Gaspar Castillo for his conduct in
United, States v. Morgan,
12-3231, and his failure to properly respond to our order to show cause why he should not be disciplined for that conduct. In that case, Castillo represented Steven Ray Morgan in his appeal from a criminal judgment sentencing him to,
inter alia,
240 months’ imprisonment. By defaulting on numerous occasions in that appeal, Castillo put his client at serious risk of prejudice, wasted the time of Court employees and judges, delayed the processing of other appellants’ cases, and caused unnecessary expense to the public.
II. Present Proceeding
In October 2015, Castillo was again ordered to show cause why he should not be disciplined for his misconduct in this Court. The new order was based on his conduct in
United States v. Morales,
15-438, in which he represents Hector Morales in his appeal from a criminal judgment sentencing him to,
inter alia,
360 months’ imprisonment. Similar to his misconduct in
Morgan,
Castillo has defaulted on a number of occasions in
Morales,
and failed to respond to multiple telephone calls from the Clerk’s Office concerning his defaults.
Castillo’s response to the October 2015 order was due by November 4, 2015. It was filed on November 19, 2015, and only after a Court employee inquired as to its status. He did not request an extension of time or explain his delay.
In his response, Castillo acknowledged his defaults in
Morales,
and stated that he accepted responsibility, had no excuse, and was extremely remorseful.
See
Response at 2 ¶ e. While he stated that he was not “technologically sa[v]vy,”
id,,
he did not identify the technological issues or explain how they caused or contributed to his defaults. Similarly, while he also stated that he has had, “over the last couple of years, personal issues that have caused [him] significant stress and distractions,”
id.,
he did not provide any further description of those issues or explain the effect they have had on his practice. Finally, Castillo asserted,
inter alia,
that he is “in the pror cess of hiring an assistant to assist [him] with filing,” and he is “in the process of securing a time management program.”
Id.
No further details are provided con
cerning any of the corrective measures mentioned by Castillo.
Conspicuously absent from Castillo’s response is any assurance that he has cured, or will cure, the long-standing default noted in our October 2015 order. In fact, he has not done so. Over five months have passed since entry of that order, but the last default in
Morales
remains uncured and prevents the appeal from proceeding. The Clerk’s Office left four voicemail messages for Castillo between June and September 2015 concerning that default; Castillo also was reminded of the default in October 2015, when our order was served on him, and in November 2015, when he was informed that a response to that order was overdue. An additional attempt to remind Castillo of the default was made this month, but Castillo’s telephone went unanswered and the call was not forwarded to voicemail.
Castillo’s corrective measures also appear to have been ineffective in
United States v. Riglioni (Nelson),
15-517, in which he represents Barkel Nelson in his appeal from a criminal judgment sentencing him to,
inter alia,
70 months’ imprisonment. By order filed in April 2015, the Court informed Castillo that the appeal was in default and would be dismissed if he failed to file a required form by April 20, 2015. The docket does not reflect any response from Castillo. Fortunately for his client, the appeal was not dismissed; instead, in May through July 2015, the Clerk’s Office left three voicemail messages for Castillo about the default. The docket reflects no further activity until January 2016, when Castillo returned the telephone calls and filed the required document. On March 1, 2016, Castillo was informed by telephone of another default, and he stated he would cure the default the next day. After he failed to do so, two more telephone calls were made, but Castillo’s telephone went unanswered without being forwarded to voicemail. Castillo filed the required document on March 30, 2016.
III. Disposition
A. Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
We first conclude that Castillo has not presented any cognizable mitigating factors. His assertions about technology and personal issues that have caused stress and distraction are conclusory and entitled to no weight.
Castillo’s response also suggests, in con-clusory fashion, that he may have been overwhelmed by his other obligations. As we stated in our June 2014 order, the cure for that was fairly obvious — he could have, with little investment of time, sought extensions of time, a stay of proceedings, temporary withdrawal of any appeal that could not proceed, leave to withdraw as counsel, or guidance from the Court. Ignoring this Court’s orders and requests, and assuming the Court will forgive all defaults, is not an option.
There are at least two significant aggravating factors. First, our June 2014 private reprimand Castillo put him on notice of the Court’s concerns, and he has failed to alter his behavior. Although he stated in his response to the October 2015 order that he is “in the process” of implementing corrective measures, he did not explain what measures were taken after our June
2014 order or why any such measures failed.
Second, the fact that Castillo’s misconduct occurred in criminal appeals, where important liberty interests are at stake, is also a significant aggravating factor.
See In re Aranda,
789 F.3d 48, 59 (2d Cir.2015). Morales was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment; Nelson to 70 months’ imprisonment. Castillo’s defaults put his clients at serious risk of severe prejudice, . “specifically, the substantial risk that the appeals] could have been dismissed.”
Id.
at 51;
see also In re De-Mell,
589 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir.2009) (“[A] reasonable attorney with thirty years’ experience ... clearly would know that defaulting on a client’s case leaves open the possibility of severe prejudice.”).
B.Disciplinary Measures
Castillo’s response to our October 2015 order, and his continued misconduct after our June 2014 reprimand, leave us without assurance that he will be able to conform to this Court’s rules and orders in future cases.
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SUMMARY ORDER
ORDER OF GRIEVANCE PANEL
Gaspar Castillo was admitted to the New York State bar in 1981, and to this Court’s bar in 1983.
I. Prior Order Imposing Private Reprimand
In June 2014, we privately reprimanded Gaspar Castillo for his conduct in
United, States v. Morgan,
12-3231, and his failure to properly respond to our order to show cause why he should not be disciplined for that conduct. In that case, Castillo represented Steven Ray Morgan in his appeal from a criminal judgment sentencing him to,
inter alia,
240 months’ imprisonment. By defaulting on numerous occasions in that appeal, Castillo put his client at serious risk of prejudice, wasted the time of Court employees and judges, delayed the processing of other appellants’ cases, and caused unnecessary expense to the public.
II. Present Proceeding
In October 2015, Castillo was again ordered to show cause why he should not be disciplined for his misconduct in this Court. The new order was based on his conduct in
United States v. Morales,
15-438, in which he represents Hector Morales in his appeal from a criminal judgment sentencing him to,
inter alia,
360 months’ imprisonment. Similar to his misconduct in
Morgan,
Castillo has defaulted on a number of occasions in
Morales,
and failed to respond to multiple telephone calls from the Clerk’s Office concerning his defaults.
Castillo’s response to the October 2015 order was due by November 4, 2015. It was filed on November 19, 2015, and only after a Court employee inquired as to its status. He did not request an extension of time or explain his delay.
In his response, Castillo acknowledged his defaults in
Morales,
and stated that he accepted responsibility, had no excuse, and was extremely remorseful.
See
Response at 2 ¶ e. While he stated that he was not “technologically sa[v]vy,”
id,,
he did not identify the technological issues or explain how they caused or contributed to his defaults. Similarly, while he also stated that he has had, “over the last couple of years, personal issues that have caused [him] significant stress and distractions,”
id.,
he did not provide any further description of those issues or explain the effect they have had on his practice. Finally, Castillo asserted,
inter alia,
that he is “in the pror cess of hiring an assistant to assist [him] with filing,” and he is “in the process of securing a time management program.”
Id.
No further details are provided con
cerning any of the corrective measures mentioned by Castillo.
Conspicuously absent from Castillo’s response is any assurance that he has cured, or will cure, the long-standing default noted in our October 2015 order. In fact, he has not done so. Over five months have passed since entry of that order, but the last default in
Morales
remains uncured and prevents the appeal from proceeding. The Clerk’s Office left four voicemail messages for Castillo between June and September 2015 concerning that default; Castillo also was reminded of the default in October 2015, when our order was served on him, and in November 2015, when he was informed that a response to that order was overdue. An additional attempt to remind Castillo of the default was made this month, but Castillo’s telephone went unanswered and the call was not forwarded to voicemail.
Castillo’s corrective measures also appear to have been ineffective in
United States v. Riglioni (Nelson),
15-517, in which he represents Barkel Nelson in his appeal from a criminal judgment sentencing him to,
inter alia,
70 months’ imprisonment. By order filed in April 2015, the Court informed Castillo that the appeal was in default and would be dismissed if he failed to file a required form by April 20, 2015. The docket does not reflect any response from Castillo. Fortunately for his client, the appeal was not dismissed; instead, in May through July 2015, the Clerk’s Office left three voicemail messages for Castillo about the default. The docket reflects no further activity until January 2016, when Castillo returned the telephone calls and filed the required document. On March 1, 2016, Castillo was informed by telephone of another default, and he stated he would cure the default the next day. After he failed to do so, two more telephone calls were made, but Castillo’s telephone went unanswered without being forwarded to voicemail. Castillo filed the required document on March 30, 2016.
III. Disposition
A. Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
We first conclude that Castillo has not presented any cognizable mitigating factors. His assertions about technology and personal issues that have caused stress and distraction are conclusory and entitled to no weight.
Castillo’s response also suggests, in con-clusory fashion, that he may have been overwhelmed by his other obligations. As we stated in our June 2014 order, the cure for that was fairly obvious — he could have, with little investment of time, sought extensions of time, a stay of proceedings, temporary withdrawal of any appeal that could not proceed, leave to withdraw as counsel, or guidance from the Court. Ignoring this Court’s orders and requests, and assuming the Court will forgive all defaults, is not an option.
There are at least two significant aggravating factors. First, our June 2014 private reprimand Castillo put him on notice of the Court’s concerns, and he has failed to alter his behavior. Although he stated in his response to the October 2015 order that he is “in the process” of implementing corrective measures, he did not explain what measures were taken after our June
2014 order or why any such measures failed.
Second, the fact that Castillo’s misconduct occurred in criminal appeals, where important liberty interests are at stake, is also a significant aggravating factor.
See In re Aranda,
789 F.3d 48, 59 (2d Cir.2015). Morales was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment; Nelson to 70 months’ imprisonment. Castillo’s defaults put his clients at serious risk of severe prejudice, . “specifically, the substantial risk that the appeals] could have been dismissed.”
Id.
at 51;
see also In re De-Mell,
589 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir.2009) (“[A] reasonable attorney with thirty years’ experience ... clearly would know that defaulting on a client’s case leaves open the possibility of severe prejudice.”).
B.Disciplinary Measures
Castillo’s response to our October 2015 order, and his continued misconduct after our June 2014 reprimand, leave us without assurance that he will be able to conform to this Court’s rules and orders in future cases. Upon due consideration, it is therefore hereby ORDERED that Castillo is PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED for the misconduct described in the October 2015 order, and BARRED from representing clients in this Court in his capacity as a CJA panelist for a two-year period commencing with the filing date of this order.
Since Castillo’s misconduct occurred in cases in which he represented clients pursuant to the CJA, we limit his suspension to such cases. The two-year bar on CJA representation in this Court applies regardless of the court making the CJA appointment. If Castillo is mistakenly continued as CJA counsel in a future case in this Court during that period, he must promptly notify this Court of the need for substitution. The present order does not bar Castillo from CJA representation of clients in the district courts and should not be perceived as requiring any particular form of reciprocal discipline by the district courts.
C.Representation in
Morales
and
Nelson
Castillo must, within fourteen days of the date of this decision, move to withdraw as counsel in both
Morales
and
Nelson.
Failure to comply with that, deadline will result in suspension from this Court’s bar. He must thereafter fully cooperate with new counsel, and is barred from requesting fees for these cases.
D.Notice to Public and Other Courts
The Clerk of Court is directed to release this decision to the public by posting it on this Court’s web site and providing copies to the public in the same manner as all other unpublished decisions of this Court. Copies are to be served on: Castillo; the
attorney disciplinary committee for the New York State Appellate Division, Third Department; the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (specifically, the judges chairing its attorney disciplinary and CJA committees); the judge chairing this Court’s CJA committee; and all other courts and jurisdictions to which this Court distributes disciplinary decisions in the ordinary course.