In re Carleton

D. Massachusetts

In re Carleton

131 F. 146, 1904 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts

DecidedJune 21, 1904

DocketNo. 8,359

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 131 F. 146 (In re Carleton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Carleton, 131 F. 146, 1904 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191 (D. Mass. 1904).

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Opinion

LOWELL, District Judge.

Carleton was adjudged bankrupt upon a petition which he filed as member of a firm composed of himself and one Freeman. On October 28, 1902, he received his discharge. On December 10, 1903, he was again adjudged bankrupt upon his individual voluntary petition, and now seeks for a discharge thereunder. The only objection made thereto is that founded upon section 4 of the Ray bill (Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, 32 Stat. 798 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1903, p. 411]), which forbids discharge if the bankrupt has “(5) in voluntary proceedings been granted a discharge in bankruptcy within six years.”

Counsel for the bankrupt has suggested that the first adjudication was not had in voluntary proceedings; but, so far as the present bankrupt is concerned, the partnership proceedings must be deemed voluntary. He contends chiefly that to deny the bankrupt a discharge in this case would be to give to the Ray bill a retroactive effect; but this is not true. The original bankrupt act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]), indeed, did not forbid successive petitions in bankruptcy and successive discharges thereunder, but it conferred upon a bankrupt no vested right to file successive petitions and to receive successive discharges which is impaired by the Ray bill. That statute is not retroactive. It creates no new offense and imposes no penalty, but only fixes new conditions of discharge in case of petitions filed after its passage. Its language is plain, and, in accordance therewith, the discharge is here refused.

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LOWELL, District Judge.

Carleton was adjudged bankrupt upon a petition which he filed as member of a firm composed of himself and one Freeman. On October 28, 1902, he received his discharge. On December 10, 1903, he was again adjudged bankrupt upon his individual voluntary petition, and now seeks for a discharge thereunder. The only objection made thereto is that founded upon section 4 of the Ray bill (Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, 32 Stat. 798 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1903, p. 411]), which forbids discharge if the bankrupt has “(5) in voluntary proceedings been granted a discharge in bankruptcy within six years.”

Counsel for the bankrupt has suggested that the first adjudication was not had in voluntary proceedings; but, so far as the present bankrupt is concerned, the partnership proceedings must be deemed voluntary. He contends chiefly that to deny the bankrupt a discharge in this case would be to give to the Ray bill a retroactive effect; but this is not true. The original bankrupt act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]), indeed, did not forbid successive petitions in bankruptcy and successive discharges thereunder, but it conferred upon a bankrupt no vested right to file successive petitions and to receive successive discharges which is impaired by the Ray bill. That statute is not retroactive. It creates no new offense and imposes no penalty, but only fixes new conditions of discharge in case of petitions filed after its passage. Its language is plain, and, in accordance therewith, the discharge is here refused.

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131 F. 146, 1904 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-carleton-mad-1904.

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