In Re Campbell

160 B.R. 198, 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 267, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1498, 72 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6226, 1993 WL 418374
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedSeptember 16, 1993
DocketBankruptcy 92-3022-8P3
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 160 B.R. 198 (In Re Campbell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Campbell, 160 B.R. 198, 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 267, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1498, 72 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6226, 1993 WL 418374 (Fla. 1993).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTION TO VACATE ORDER GRANTING DEBTORS’ MOTION TO COMPEL INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE TO RELEASE LIEN

ALEXANDER L. PASKAY, Chief Judge.

THIS IS a Chapter 13 case and the matter under consideration is a Motion filed by the United States of America/Internal Revenue Service (Government). The Motion under consideration is directed to a previous Order by this Court which was entered on July 7, 1993 and granted the Motion of James W. and Mary Jo Campbell (Debtors) compelling the Government to release a tax lien. In order to put the matter under consideration into proper context, it should be helpful to briefly review the procedural background of the matter under consideration.

On July 7, 1992, the Government filed a claim for unpaid taxes in the total amount of $76,945.31 in this Chapter 13 case. This claim was composed of a secured claim asserted in the amount of $63,244.31 and an unsecured priority claim in the amount of $13,701.00. An amended claim of the Government was filed on December 9, 1992. It was filed in the identical amount but the composition of the claim was changed to the extent that it asserted a secured claim in the amount of $20,000.00, an unsecured § 507(a)(7) priority claim in the amount of $47,676.94 and a general unsecured claim in the amount of $9,268.37. On October 13, 1992, the Debtors filed an objection to the first Proof of Claim of the Government, which was addressed to the secured portion of the claim, contending that the Debtors had no free assets to which a tax claim could attach and, therefore, the Government did not have an allowable secured claim. After proper service, the Debtors refiled their objection which was again based on the same allegation that the Government did not have an allowable secured claim. On December 11, 1993, this Court entered an Order and disallowed the first claim of the Government on the basis that it was superseded by the second claim. On February 25, 1993, the Debtors filed their objection to the second claim of the Government in which they contended that the properties to which the Government’s tax lien attached should be limited to the value of a 1987 Ford pick-up truck and to the Debtors’ equity in a mobile home stated to be $500.00.

*200 Based on the foregoing, the Debtors contend that the allowable secured claim of the Government should be limited to secure a tax liability in the amount of $2,500.00 and the balance of the claim shall be merely an unsecured priority claim in part and a general unsecured claim in part. On April 20, 1993, this Court entered an Order and determined that the secured claim of the Government shall be limited to $3,725.00, the interest of the Debtors in the properties to which the tax lien attached.

On May 27, 1993, the Debtors filed a Motion and sought an order to compel the Government to release the tax lien. This Motion was based on the contention that the allowed secured claim of the Government was paid in full under the confirmed Chapter 13 Plan and, therefore, there is no longer an underlying obligation which is validly secured by the tax hen. Therefore, by virtue of § 1327 of the Code, the Debtors contend that all their properties are vested back to them free and clear of any claim of interest of any creditor provided for by the Plan.

The Debtors’ Motion was duly scheduled for hearing but it appears that no one appeared on behalf of the Government. On July 7,1993, this Court entered an Order and granted the Debtors’ Motion and directed the Government to file a release of its notice of federal tax lien. This is the Order which is now sought to be set aside by the Government by its Motion filed on July 23, 1993, in which the Government contends that it did not receive notice of the hearing; that this Court had no jurisdiction over the Government; that the procedure is improper in that the issue raised requires an adversary proceeding; and that the Government was denied due process because it had no opportunity to present its position.

Based on the foregoing, the Government contends that pursuant to P.R.C.P. 60, as adopted by F.R.B.P. 9024, the Government is entitled to be relieved from the July 7, 1993 Order. In its Motion, the Government also contends that it has a valid and substantive defense which it was prevented to present and it should be given an opportunity to do so. On August 5,1993, this Court entered an Order granting the Government’s Motion and vacating the Order which directed the Government to release its tax lien, but rescheduled a hearing to consider the merits of the Government’s position.

These are the relevant events which occurred in this Chapter 13 case on which the Government contends that the Order which directed the Government to release its lien is improper notwithstanding the fact that it is ■without dispute that the allowed secured claim of the Government filed in this Chapter 13 case was paid in full. Particularly, it is the contention of the Government that while it concedes, as it must, that it no longer has an allowed secured claim in this Chapter 13 case, it having been satisfied, its tax lien must remain intact until the unsecured portion of the tax liability, including the § 507(a)(7) priority claim, is discharged pursuant to § 1328 of the Bankruptcy Code, or when the entire tax liability, represented by the priority tax claim, is satisfied in full. In opposition, the Debtors contend that since the allowed tax claim has been paid in full, there is no longer an underlying obligation which could support a lien and, therefore, the Debtors are entitled to an Order directing the Government to release the tax lien.

Ordinarily, the issue raised would not be difficult to resolve for the simple reason that it is axiomatic that in order to have a secured claim the claim must be secured not only “de jure,” that is supported either by contract or by statute, but also “de facto” in that the property claimed to stand as security equals or exceeds the amount of the debt which the hen is supposed to secure. The Bankruptcy Code provides for the treatment of partially secured and partially unsecured claims in § 506, which applies to Chapter 13 cases by virtue of § 103, which provides that an allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest is less than the amount of such allowed claim.

The difficulty stems from the fact that the lien under consideration is not a contractual lien, but is based on the Internal Revenue Code which in 26 U.S.C. § 6325(a)(1) provides that the tax lien shall remain and shall not be released until the obligation of the taxpayer is paid in full or became unenforce *201 able. The Government concedes as it must, as noted earlier, that it no longer has an allowed secured claim in this Chapter 13 case but contends that the lien shall remain intact even though at this time there is no property to which the lien attaches. To accept the proposition urged by the Government presents some problems because it is difficult to conceptualize a lien in a vacuum that is a lien which does not encumber and attaches to a specific, identifiable property.

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Bluebook (online)
160 B.R. 198, 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 267, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1498, 72 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6226, 1993 WL 418374, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-campbell-flmb-1993.