In re Byron D.

36 A.D.2d 742, 320 N.Y.S.2d 467, 1971 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4499

This text of 36 A.D.2d 742 (In re Byron D.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Byron D., 36 A.D.2d 742, 320 N.Y.S.2d 467, 1971 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4499 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1971).

Opinion

In our opinion, this determination was erroneous. In the ease of every sex offense, except sexual abuse in the third degree, corroboration of the victim’s testimony is required (Penal Law, § 130.15). That requirement applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings in the Family Court (Matter of Eric R., 34 A D 2d 402). Where the crime charged and proved is a sex offense requiring corroboration, the need for such corroboration cannot be evaded by a finding, unsupported by the evidence, that only the lesser crime of sexual abuse in the third degree was committed (cf. People v. Doyle, 31 A D 2d 490, affd. 26 N Y 2d 752). Munder, Acting P. J., Shapiro, Gulotta, Christ and Benjamin, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)
36 A.D.2d 742, 320 N.Y.S.2d 467, 1971 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4499, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-byron-d-nyappdiv-1971.