Filed 11/26/25 In re B.W. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re B.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E086048
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPSW2500078)
v. OPINION
BYRON W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie Jarvi, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 Appellant Byron W. (father) challenges the findings and orders made during the
contested jurisdiction hearing held on May 1, 2025. He contends the juvenile court
(1) erred in asserting dependency jurisdiction because the evidence is insufficient to find
his daughter, B.W., was at substantial risk of harm (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 300,
subd. (b)(1)), and (2) erred in removing her from his care or finding a reasonable means
by which she could be protected without removal (§ 361, subds. (c)(1), (d)). We agree
there was insufficient evidence as to one of the jurisdiction allegations. We also agree
that the evidence fails to support the finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent
or eliminate the need for B.W.’s removal from father’s custody. We reverse the
disposition order and remand for a new disposition hearing in compliance with section
361 and the views expressed in this opinion.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
A. Referral and Investigation.
On January 22, 2025, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the
Department) received a referral for general neglect regarding the children, K.F. and B.W.
(born 2024).2 K.F. had 23 absences and 42 tardies to school, and she said mother could
not wake up at times to take her to school. On January 17, 2025, when mother picked up
K.F. from school she hid her face, which was swollen and her eyes were red and swollen
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 This appeal only involves B.W. K.F. will be referred to only as necessary.
2 shut. Mother failed to return multiple calls from the school and K.F. has been absent
since January 17th.
On January 29, 2025, K.F. told the social worker that she was living with mother,
her baby sister, and “her uncle dad,” who she refers to as “‘Bizz.’” K.F. denied any
domestic violence against her mother, claimed mother’s eyes were tired because she does
not sleep from watching B.W., and stated mother was injured in November 2024 when
she crashed into another vehicle because she had been drinking. When the police arrived
at the car accident, K.F., B.W. and mother hid at an aunt’s house.
During a home visit on February 4, 2025, the social worker spoke with mother
who stated that she lives only with her two children, father helps her care for them, and
she denied substance abuse. Mother called father via FaceTime. He confirmed his
criminal history and his probation status and stated that he was no longer “in that
lifestyle” after being shot in the head in 2016. Father denied domestic violence, child
welfare history, and substance and alcohol abuse. He confirmed mother’s arrest for a
DUI but claimed she informed him that she tested below the legal limit; he bailed her out
around 3:00 a.m. He did not believe he needed services because the current referral was
regarding mother, not him. The social worker provided mother with a resource packet,
and mother said she was in the process of addressing the criminal matter relating to her
DUI arrest.
According to the police report from mother’s August 2024 DUI, a male (M.J.) and
female (mother) were assaulting each other in a vehicle while a newborn was in an
unsecured car seat. Mother was in the driver’s seat, there was an empty tequila bottle on
3 the rear driver’s side floorboard of the vehicle, and mother was “insulting, loud, her
speech was rapid, her eyes were bloodshot and watery, her balance was unsteady, and she
had a moderate alcohol odor emitting from her breath.” She was arrested for child
endangerment; blood draw test results indicated her blood alcohol content of 0.192
percent at the time of arrest. In February 2025, the social worker attempted to engage
mother in services; however, she became upset and yelled, “Why does the Department
keep insisting this and pushing the matter! I do not have an alcohol abuse problem.”
On March 7, 2025, the social worker was informed that mother had committed
battery on a woman who was pregnant with father’s child. On March 3, Mother went to
the father’s home, made threats, “‘beat up’” the woman, and fled the scene before law
enforcement arrived. Four days later, the social worker left a message for father at his
last known number; he did not respond. Police service calls for father’s address revealed
that on March 3, 2025, a call was received that mother broke the window to the father’s
home, climbed through the window, and proceeded to assault the seven-month pregnant
woman. The woman’s other children and their grandmother were present. Mother fled
the scene before law enforcement arrived. The woman declined to press charges. The
social worker verified that the front window of father’s home was broken out.
B. Detention.
On March 17, 2025, the Department initiated dependency proceedings for B.W.
pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1).3 According to the detention report filed that
3 At the jurisdictional hearing, dependency as to K.F. was terminated following the juvenile court’s award of sole physical custody to K.F.’s father.
4 same day, on March 13, the social worker attempted to take the children into protective
custody with Riverside County Sheriff deputies. The social worker called mother, and
she refused to make herself and the children available. Father got on the phone. He was
aware of the Department’s open investigation but stated, “Well, was it my job to keep in
contact with the Department?” Mother refused to allow the social worker to bring the
children to the agency’s office to comply with the court orders. Father said that B.W. was
with him but refused to provide the address. The parents were verbally (and via text
message) notified of the detention hearing set for March 18, 2025, at 8:00 a.m., and
advised to bring the children to court that day. The social worker connected her
supervisor to the phone call. When mother was informed of the reasons why the
Department had concerns for the children being in her care, she was belligerent and
combative. Likewise, when father was advised that he was not forthcoming about
mother’s assault on his pregnant girlfriend, he started to become loud and argumentative.
The call was disconnected when he would not allow the social worker or supervisor to
speak.
The report noted father’s criminal history. In May 2017, he was convicted of
being a felon in possession of carrying a loaded firearm; he was sentenced to state prison
for 48 months. (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 25850, subd. (c)(6).) In 2014, he was
convicted of the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle without the owner’s consent.
(Veh. Code, § 10851.) In 2012, he was convicted of second degree burglary, receiving
stolen property, and having a prior felony conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 496, subd. (a),
5 667, subds. (c), (e)(1).) In 2009, he was convicted of driving under the influence. (Veh.
Code, § 23152, subd. (b).)
At the initial detention hearing on March 18, 2025, father argued there is nothing
in the report “that [he] has done wrong” except for the Department being “upset about his
reaction to them coming to pick up the children for protective custody warrant.” He
faulted the Department for failing to “continuously contact” or interview him during its
investigation, assess his home, or analyze him for any potential predetermined services.
He asserted he had 50/50 custody, and there is no showing of “any possibility of”
substantial harm from him. The hearing was continued to March 20; the court removed
B.W. from parents’ custody, set a contested hearing for March 26, and ordered supervised
visitation.
The Department filed an amended petition alleging mother neglects the health,
safety, and wellbeing of B.W., and father knew or reasonably should have known of the
mother’s concerning behaviors (specifically assaulting the mother of his other children at
his home) but failed to intervene and ensure that B.W. was provided with adequate
supervision, care, and protection, and has a significant criminal history. At the hearing,
father again asserted the “only allegations against [him are] that he knew or should have
reasonably known that mother has concerning behaviors” and he has a criminal history,
both of which fail to demonstrate a substantial risk of harm. The juvenile court detained
B.W. and ordered supervised visitation for father twice a week for two hours, liberalized
as deemed appropriate and set a contested jurisdiction hearing.
6 C. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report, Addendum Report, and Hearings.
According to the jurisdiction/disposition report filed April 14, 2025, the
Department recommended the juvenile court find the allegations concerning B.W. true,
declare her a dependent of the court, and provide family maintenance services to both
parents. The Department was not granted permission to interview father regarding the
allegations in the petition. As of March 31, he was not enrolled in services, but indicated
he would enroll in counseling and parenting education. He wanted the child returned to
his care, but if that was not possible then he wanted her placed in the care of the paternal
aunt, paternal uncle, or mother. According to the Department, the child was at continued
risk of abuse and neglect due to mother’s history of alcohol abuse and father’s failure to
protect her by allowing her to remain in mother’s care. On April 17, 2025, the juvenile
court conducted a hearing to determine whether to place B.W. with a paternal aunt. The
paternal aunt testified about her previous child welfare history, and about a time when a
former partner assaulted her at a grocery store. The court placed B.W. with her
godmother and continued the jurisdiction hearing. A second amended petition was filed
that same day.
In its addendum report filed April 28, 2025, the Department advised that it had
received a new referral on April 21 with allegations of general neglect when the mother
of father’s other children gave birth at 37 weeks gestation and tested positive for THC.
She admitted to using THC during her pregnancy, and she has a history of cocaine use.
The baby was admitted to the NICU due to its gestational age. The Department opined
that “[u]ntil the parents recognize the dangers associated with alcohol abuse, violent acts
7 and not providing appropriate care to the children, the supervision of the Court and
Department is believed to be vital to ensure the children’s safety and protection. Services
such as domestic violence services, mental health services, substance abuse services and
parenting education will need to be in place and the parents will need to avail themselves
to the orders and services and the parents will need to demonstrate they can suitably keep
a safe home for the children. The parents are in need of the Department’s supervision,
coaching, and re-direction to ensure the threats and risk factors are mitigated, and the
children can be safely returned to a safe environment.”
At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, mother asked the juvenile court
to dismiss the petition, arguing she was never charged for the alleged battery against
father’s girlfriend and her nine-month-old arrest for DUI no longer indicated a risk of
harm to B.W. Father again challenged the allegations in the petition by arguing (1) his
criminal history “shows absolutely nothing as to a current risk of substantial risk of harm
to the children,” (2) he knew of mother’s DUI but since she told him she was under the
legal limit there is no reason for him to have known or reasonably known that B.W. was
at any risk of harm, (3) mother’s assault on his pregnant girlfriend did not happen, (4) the
Department has failed in its duty to provide services to him, and (5) he has offered to get
a restraining order against mother. In response, the child’s counsel argued there is a
substantial danger to B.W.’s physical and/or mental health because father has seen a
pattern of anger with mother, but has done nothing to make sure his child is safe, he has
done nothing to assume custody of her, and he has stood up and said, “No, none of this
happened.”
8 The juvenile court considered the “totality of the circumstances and some of the
interconnection between” and stated that it would incorporate some of the arguments
made by the Department and B.W.’s counsel into its factual findings. The court faulted
the parents’ attorneys for focusing on the petition in a vacuum. It acknowledged that the
evidence surrounding mother’s DUI arrest was not as recent as in some cases, but noted
that she exhibited a pattern of alcohol abuse and dangerous behavior. It also found that
father “knew she was driving with the DUI, and he did nothing about it.” The court
analogized mother’s situation to a daycare provider accused of child molestation,
explaining that most parents would not send their child to that daycare anymore, adding,
“Now, this is not the same thing as child molestation.” Regarding mother’s alleged
break-in at father’s home, the court reasoned the absence of criminal charges or a
restraining order was “not controlling.” On the topic of removal, the court found “clear
and convincing evidence of circumstances in Section 361 as to both parents.” The court
sustained the petition as pled, ordered B.W. removed from parental custody, and ordered
reunification services for both mother and father. Following this ruling, mother uttered
multiple expletives and father said, “They really just do whatever they want.” A six-
month review hearing was scheduled for November 5, 2025. Father appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdictional Findings.
Father contends the juvenile court erred in asserting dependency jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1), because his ignorance of mother’s “concerning
9 behaviors,” failure to “intervene,” and criminal history did not constitute a substantial
risk of harm. We are not persuaded.
“‘The purpose of California’s dependency law is “to provide maximum safety and
protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally
abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and
physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.” [Citation.]
In its effort to achieve this overarching goal, the law balances a number of vital interests:
children’s interests in safe and stable homes; parents’ interests in raising their children;
families’ shared interests in each other’s companionship; and the state’s interest in
protecting society’s most vulnerable members.’ [Citation.]
“‘Dependency proceedings span up to four stages: jurisdiction, disposition,
reunification, and permanency. [Citations.] At the jurisdictional stage, the juvenile court
determines whether to declare a child a dependent of the court because the child is
suffering, or at risk of suffering, significant harm.’ [Citation.] ‘“A dependency
adjudication is a preliminary step that allows the juvenile court, within specified limits, to
assert supervision over the endangered child’s care.” [Citation.] After the juvenile court
takes that preliminary step, the court may impose limitations on parental authority as
necessary to protect the child. [Citations.] It may also order that the child be removed
from a parent’s physical custody if there is clear and convincing evidence that removal is
necessary to protect the child from a substantial risk of harm. [Citations.] In some cases,
a dependency adjudication may lead to termination of parental rights.’ [Citation.]”
(In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 537, italics added.)
10 Relevant to this case, the juvenile court may adjudge a child to be a dependent of
the court under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) if “there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness . . . [¶] . . . [by t]he failure or inability
of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child,” or (b)(1)(B) if
“there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] [by t]he willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent . . . to adequately . . .
protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left.” A
jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires the social services
agency to demonstrate the following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) neglectful conduct, failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and (3) serious
physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness. (In re
Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561; see In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 624.)
These elements must be established as of the time of the jurisdictional hearing. (In re
J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) “[P]revious acts . . . standing alone, do not
establish a substantial risk of future harm; there must be some reason beyond mere
speculation to believe they will reoccur.” (In re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, 15.)
We apply the substantial evidence test to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. (In
re G.Z. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 857, 876; In re J.N., at p. 1022.)
1. B-4 allegations.
B-4 alleged that father “knew or reasonably should have known the mother has
concerning behaviors, to include assaulting the mother of his other children at his home,
and he has failed to intervene and ensure his child, [B.W.], was provided with adequate
11 supervision, care and protection; such conditions place the child at risk of physical and/or
emotional harm.” In sustaining this allegation, the juvenile court found that father knew
or reasonably should have known about mother’s “concerning behaviors” and failed to
“intervene” to protect B.W. He disagrees.
Father concedes the “reported evidence showed a pattern of alcohol abuse and
escalating dangerous behavior by mother that was sufficient to support dependency
jurisdiction even if some of the sustained language was factually incorrect.” He further
acknowledges that mother (1) was arrested for DUI in August 2024 while the children
were in her car and her blood-alcohol level was more than twice the legal limit,
(2) crashed into a parked car in November after drinking, again with the children in the
car, (3) was reported by school staff as having red, swollen eyes with K.F. repeatedly
missing school, (4) was involved in several domestic violence incidents with her male
companion, and (5) broke into father’s home in March 2025 and attacked his pregnant
girlfriend. Nonetheless, he contends that “vision in hindsight is 20/20” and the
Department failed to show that a reasonable parent in his position would have been
compelled to petition a family law court for sole physical custody of B.W. based on
knowledge of mother’s dangerous behavior.
According to father, there is no evidence that he was aware of mother’s car crash
in November, the school staff’s concerns, or the domestic violence between mother and
her male companion. Regarding her DUI, he asserts that he only knew what mother told
him, that she tested below the legal limit. Moreover, he maintains that it was reasonable
for him to rely on the Department’s decision not to seek restrictions on mother’s custody
12 and accept the parents’ agreement that she would not drive the children, and she would be
referred for services. We disagree.
Unlike father, the Department was unaware of mother’s 2024 DUI and car crash
until late January 2025. In contrast, he was aware of her DUI when it happened, and he
was or should have been aware of the car crash since he admitted to “often tak[ing] [K.F.]
to school even though she is not his biological child” because mother did not have a car.
Contrary to his assertion, mother’s attack on his pregnant girlfriend was not “a single
isolated incident” “that had only an attenuated connection to B.W.’s physical safety.” The
attack was one more incident where mother engaged in domestic violence, adding to a
pattern of concerning behaviors. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that father knew or reasonably should have known that mother’s concerning
behaviors presented a substantial risk that B.W. would suffer serious physical harm or
illness.
2. B-5 allegations.
B-5 alleged that father “has criminal history including a 2017 conviction as to
being a convicted felon or narcotics addict owning or possessing a firearm and carrying a
firearm while not listed on the DOJ.” Citing In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767 (J.N.),
father asserts the Department failed to present evidence connecting his past offenses to
any type of defined risk of harm to B.W. We agree.
In J.N., “the sole evidentiary basis for the jurisdictional finding as to [f]ather” was
“his incarceration and criminal record.” (J.N., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 775.) On
appeal, the father argued, and the appellate court agreed, that the record did not support
13 the jurisdictional findings that his incarceration and criminal history placed his child at
substantial risk of harm. (Ibid.) The court explained: “Nothing in the record suggests
any of [f]ather’s crimes were against children or involved children. The record also does
not support that [f]ather’s criminal conduct ever placed [the child] in danger during the
approximately two years he appears to have been involved in [the child]’s life. And
although [the Department] may be correct that [f]ather exposing [the child] to his
criminal ways could put [the child] at risk, the record does not provide any
nonspeculative basis for the court to conclude that [f]ather is likely to do so.” (Ibid.)
Notably, in J.N., the father “was not convicted of any crime involving domestic
violence.” Although there had been a single allegation of domestic violence in the past, it
was determined to be inconclusive. (Id. at p. 776.)
Here, none of father’s crimes were against children or involved children, nor is
there any evidence showing that his past criminal behavior ever endangered B.W.
Moreover, his criminal history is less violent and less serious than that of the father in
J.N. Unlike the offenses in J.N.—which included assault with a deadly weapon likely to
produce great bodily injury—father’s past offenses include being a felon in the
possession of a firearm, taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, second degree
burglary, and a 2009 DUI. (J.N., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 772-773.) Like our
colleagues in J.N., “we [do not] accept that a parent’s violent criminal record, without
more, necessarily establishes that a parent has a violent disposition sufficient to establish
the requisite risk of physical harm to a particular child.” (Id. at p. 776.) Since the record
14 does not contain substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional finding based on the b-
5 allegations, it must be reversed.
B. Disposition Order.
Father contends the removal order against him must be reversed because the
Department failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that there would be a
substantial danger to B.W. if she lived with him, and there were no reasonable means to
protect her without removal. (§ 361, subds. (c)(1), (d).)
Where removal from a parent is at issue, the juvenile court must make findings
under section 361, subdivision (c). The court must find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the [child] if the [child] were returned
home,” that there are no reasonable means short of removal to protect the minor, and that
the social services agency made reasonable efforts to avoid removal. (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).) Subdivision (c)(1) identifies two alternatives for the court to consider “as a
reasonable means to protect the [child],” one of which, as relevant here, is “[a]llowing a
nonoffending parent . . . to retain physical custody as long as that parent . . . presents a
plan acceptable to the court demonstrating that they will be able to protect the child from
future harm.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)(B).) We review the court’s removal findings for
substantial evidence. (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.)
Repeating his prior claim that the “only jurisdictional findings sustained against
[him] were not supported by substantial evidence,” father argues removal of B.W. from
his custody was unwarranted, and the record shows no causal link between his
15 girlfriend’s marijuana use and any defined risk of harm to B.W. We are not persuaded.
The juvenile court removed B.W. pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1). The
evidence shows that father repeatedly represented that he had 50/50 custody of B.W. with
mother. He was active in mother’s home, assisting with both of her children. He was
aware of her DUI and the fact that she no longer had access to her car since he drove K.F.
to school. Given his “active” role in assisting mother, along with his shared custody of
B.W., father reasonably should have known what happened to mother’s car. Likewise, he
should have known that mother broke into his home and assaulted his pregnant girlfriend.
However, he claimed ignorance or denied mother’s action. Accordingly, substantial
evidence supports a removal order.
Nonetheless, father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
finding that there were no reasonable means by which B.W.’s physical health could be
protected without removal from his custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) He argues,
“Assuming that simply placing B.W. with [him] would pose a substantial danger, the
juvenile court could have protected her safety by (1) ordering a home assessment to
ensure the absence of any safety hazards in the home, (2) conditioning her release on
[his] continued participation in services, and (3) directing the [D]epartment to conduct
unannounced visits to the home.” He further asserts the Department failed to conduct a
home assessment and present it to the court, delayed providing referrals to him, supplied
inaccurate information to the service agencies, and never discussed any plan to maintain
B.W. with him. We agree.
16 The Department “has a duty to ensure that ‘reasonable efforts [are] made to
prevent or eliminate removal’ of the Children.” (In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944,
964.) “[R]easonable efforts, like reasonable services, need only be reasonable under the
circumstances, not perfect.” (In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 725.) Here, we
cannot say that the record, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Department, contains substantial evidence that it made reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal.
As discussed, the primary source of danger to B.W.’s well-being was mother.
There is no evidence the child was in danger while solely in father’s care. According to
the detention report, the Department’s “reasonable efforts” to prevent removal involved
mother only. As to father, it reported that he “could benefit from individual counseling
and parenting education, pending further investigation.” The jurisdiction/disposition
report notes that father “said he would like to have [B.W.] placed in his care” and was
willing to “enroll in counseling and parenting education in order to have [her] back in his
care.” When father was advised of concurrent planning, he stated “he would like the
child to be returned to his care.” There was no discussion as to whether reasonable
means were available to protect B.W. without removal from father’s custody. While
referrals on father’s behalf were sent to both counseling and SafeCare parenting
education on April 4, 2025, as of the time of the contested hearing he had not been
contacted. As father’s counsel argued, “[T]here are reasonable means to protect [B.W.’s]
physical health. Father has offered to get a restraining order.· Father has offered to
participate in services.· Father has offered to do anything that is being asked of him.· And
17 the Department has not utilized those things.· It seems that they simply made up their
mind, before the protective custody warrant was even issued, they were going to take the
child from the parent’s care over something that . . . allegedly happened in August.”
In short, although the Department may have referred father to a few services, it
does not appear on this record that it assisted him in any meaningful way to avoid B.W.’s
removal from his custody. Accordingly, we find no substantial evidence to support the
juvenile court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need
for removal. Under section 361, subdivision (e), the court may not order a child removed
from parental custody without finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal. Because we conclude the court’s finding in this regard is
not supported by substantial evidence, we reverse the disposition order and remand the
matter for a new disposition hearing. On remand, the court is to make its decision based
on the facts existing at the time of the new disposition hearing. (See In re Ashly F. (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 803, 811.)
18 III. DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction finding based on father’s criminal history (b-5) is reversed, the
finding based on father’s knowledge of mother’s concerning behaviors (b-4) is affirmed.
The disposition order is reversed and remanded for a new disposition hearing in
compliance with section 361 and the views expressed in this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
FIELDS J.