In re B.V.

2025 Ohio 971

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 20, 2025
• Docket: 114421
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re B.V., 2025-Ohio-971.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE B.V., ET AL. : No. 114421 Minor Children :

[Appeal by J.T., Mother] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 20, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. AD-22902627 and AD-22902625

Appearances:

Rachel A. Kopec, for appellant.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

Appellant J.T. (“mother”) appeals from the judgment entries of the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court”), that

awarded permanent custody of her children, B.V. and A.V., to the Cuyahoga County

Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”) and terminated her parental rights.1 After a careful review of the record, we affirm the

juvenile court’s decisions.

On March 15, 2022, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging the children

to be abused (A.V.) and dependent (A.V. and B.V.) and requesting temporary

custody to the agency.2 The children were committed to the predispositional

temporary custody of CCDCFS on March 16, 2022. An amended complaint was

filed, which included allegations, among others, that mother engaged in a physical

altercation with the children’s older sibling while A.V. and B.V. were home, that

mother has mental-health issues and displays erratic behaviors, that mother may

have a substance-abuse problem, and that mother lacks appropriate judgment and

parenting skills to provide a safe home for the children. The amended complaint

also included allegations against B.V.’s alleged father, who did not establish

paternity or communicate with the child, and A.V.’s father, who was alleged to be in

a halfway house and unable to provide care for the child. During the course of the

proceedings, the juvenile court adjudicated the children as dependent and

committed the children to the temporary custody of CCDCFS. The juvenile court

found that “[m]other needs to address her anger issues, erratic behaviors, and

mental health concerns in order to provide a safe home for the [children].” Case-

1 An appeal by A.V.’s father also was filed with this court.

2 The complaint included a third child who since became emancipated and is not

involved in this appeal. plan services were provided, and the juvenile court granted an extension of

temporary custody.

On February 27, 2024, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary

custody to permanent custody in each child’s case. After multiple continuances, trial

was set for August 30, 2024. On the day of trial, mother failed to appear. The

juvenile court denied an oral motion for continuance made by mother’s trial counsel.

The juvenile court also denied a request for continuance made by counsel for the

father of A.V., whose client was incarcerated. During trial, the juvenile court heard

testimony provided by the CCDCFS caseworker. The juvenile court also heard from

the children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”), who recommended that permanent

custody to CCDCFS is in the children’s best interest. On September 4, 2024, the

juvenile court journalized a judgment entry in each child’s case. In its decisions, the

juvenile court granted CCDCFS’s motion, committed each child to the permanent

custody of the agency, and terminated the parents’ parental rights. Mother timely

appealed.

Under her first assignment of error, mother claims the juvenile court

erred by denying her trial counsel’s motion for continuance, which was made the

morning of trial after mother failed to appear.

Although courts must ensure that due process is provided in parental-

rights proceedings, a parent does not have an absolute right to be present at a

permanent-custody hearing. See In re J.H., 2024-Ohio-5102, ¶ 56 (8th Dist.), citing

In re M.W., 2016-Ohio-2948, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). Generally, the decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and

will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65,

67 (1981), citing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964).

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(A)(2), the juvenile court is to hold the

permanent-custody hearing no later than 120 days after the agency files its motion

for permanent custody, “except that for good cause shown,” the court may grant a

reasonable continuance, and the court is supposed to dispose of the motion for

permanent custody not later than 200 days after the agency files its motion.

Furthermore, pursuant to Juv.R. 23, “[c]ontinuances shall be granted only when

imperative to secure fair treatment for the parties” and pursuant to Loc.R. 35(C) of

the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, “[n]o case will be

continued on the day of trial or hearing except for good cause shown, which cause

was not known to the party or counsel prior to the date of trial or hearing . . . .”

Here, mother argues that although she did not appear for trial, her

trial counsel offered reasons that warranted a short continuance, including that she

had historically come to court and that she had medical issues that included some

short-term memory loss. Mother’s trial counsel also indicated to the juvenile court

that he spoke with mother two days before trial and that she was planning to be

there, though he did not actually know why she failed to appear, and mother had not

contacted him or the court to explain her absence. Thus, the actual reason for

mother’s absence was unknown and good cause was not shown. Counsel for

CCDCFS objected to the request for a continuance to secure mother’s presence, noting that the trial date had been continued multiple times and that mother had

proper notice of the trial date. Further, the record shows that the agency was

prepared to go forward with its case, the children’s GAL and the caseworker were

present, mother’s counsel was able to represent mother’s interests, and a

continuance was not imperative to secure fair treatment for the parties. As the

juvenile court recognized, the case was “well beyond the two years,” the motion for

permanent custody had been pending since February 2024, and it was not in the

children’s best interest to continue the matter. After examining the circumstances

presented in this case, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the requested continuance. Accordingly, the first assignment

of error is overruled.

Under her second assignment of error, mother claims the juvenile

court’s decisions granting permanent custody of the minor children to CCDCFS are

against the manifest weight of the evidence. “When reviewing for manifest weight,

the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider

the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”

In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 14, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20.

Although it is well established that the right to parent one’s child is a

fundamental right, the government has broad authority to intervene to protect a

child’s health or safety. In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28, citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); R.C. 2151.01. Ultimately, the natural rights of a parent are

always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the controlling principle

to be observed. In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶ 20, citing In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio

St.2d 100, 106 (1979).

“Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent

custody of a child to the agency that moved for permanent custody if the court

determines, ‘by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the

child’ to do so and that one of five factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)

through (e) applies.” In re Z.C., at ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). “‘Clear and

convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere

“preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is

required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established.’” Id., quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph

three of the syllabus.

In each child’s case herein, the juvenile court made each of the

statutory determinations and engaged in the requisite analysis. Mother does not

challenge the juvenile court’s determination under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) that the

children have been in the temporary custody of the agency for twelve or more

months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, which is supported by the record

herein. Instead, mother’s challenge focuses on the juvenile court’s determination

that permanent custody to CCDCFS is in the children’s best interest. “[T]he best interests of the child are paramount in any custody

case[,]” and courts are to liberally interpret the statutes under R.C. Ch. 2151 “to

provide for the care and protection of the child . . . .” In re A.B., 2006-Ohio-4359,

¶ 32, citing R.C. 2151.01(A). R.C. 2151.414(D) sets forth the factors a juvenile court

is to consider in determining the best interest of a child in a permanent-custody

hearing. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), in determining the best interest of a child

at a permanent-custody hearing, a juvenile court “shall consider all relevant factors,

including, but not limited to,” the factors listed thereunder. “There is not one

element that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In re

Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56. R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) instructs that if all of the

factors thereunder apply, “permanent custody is in the best interest of the child, and

the court shall commit the child to the permanent custody” of the agency.

(Emphasis added.)

Here, in each child’s case, the juvenile court’s decision reflects that it

considered all relevant best-interest factors, including the enumerated factors under

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e), which are specifically set forth in the court’s decision. As

applicable to those factors, the juvenile court included findings, among others, for

each child that “[t]he child has been with the same caregiver for over 2 years and

[the child] has a strong bond with the caregiver and [the child’s] sibling, who are

also in the caregiver’s home”; “[t]he [child’s] GAL recommends permanent

custody”; “[t]he child has been in CCDCFS custody since March 2022”; and “[t]he

child deserves a safe and stable home environment where [the child’s] needs can be met[,]” which could not be achieved without a grant of permanent custody. As the

juvenile court observed, “Mother has continuously failed to engage in, complete, and

benefit from case plan services and she currently does not have an appropriate home

in which to care for the child.”

Additionally, the juvenile court found all the factors under R.C.

2151.414(D)(2) applied, in which case the statute requires the court to commit the

child to the permanent custody of the agency.3 In each child’s case, the juvenile court

included a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that “the child cannot be

placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be

placed with either parent, pursuant to O.R.C. 2151.414(E)” and found multiple

factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) applied.

Ultimately, in each child’s case, the juvenile court determined “by

clear and convincing evidence” pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and (D)(2) that “it

is in the best interest of the child to be placed in the Permanent Custody of CCDCFS.”

Mother does not even mention R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) in her brief. Nevertheless, the

record supports the trial court’s best-interest determination under both provisions.

Although mother maintains she substantially complied with case-

plan services and challenges some of the testimony and evidence provided, the

juvenile court properly weighed all relevant factors in rendering its disposition. The

record shows that although mother had completed case-plan services for parenting

3 The R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) factors are set forth in the juvenile court’s judgment

entries. and anger management, she did not consistently engage in services for mental

health and substance abuse. The caseworker testified that mother tested positive

for marijuana in March, April, and May 2024, she did not submit for a drug screen

in June or July 2024, and she admitted to the caseworker that she was still using

marijuana. Also, mother was arrested in June 2024, she was charged with a felony-

burglary offense and related offenses that were still pending, and she was fitted with

ankle monitors for drugs and alcohol. Mother was provided weekly supervised

visitation with the children. However, she was not always consistent, and she

admitted to cancelling some visits because she had been using marijuana. Though

mother and the children enjoyed their time with each other, there were times when

mother displayed outbursts and inappropriate behavior in front of the children.

Further, mother did not have suitable housing for the children. The testimony and

evidence in the matter showed that mother had not benefitted from the services

provided or changed her behavior so as to permit reunification with the children.

Additionally, B.V.’s alleged father did not establish paternity and was

not involved in the case. The caseworker testified that A.V.’s father was in jail, had

not completed case-plan services, and was not able to care for his child. The

caseworker did not believe it was in the children’s best interest to be returned to

either of their parents. The caseworker testified that the children were placed

together in a licensed foster home, were doing well in the foster home, were bonded

with their caregiver, and their needs were being met. The GAL for the children recommended permanent custody to CCDCFS, indicating a variety of compelling

reasons.

Insofar as mother challenges the agency’s efforts to investigate

certain relatives, the record shows several potential relative placements were

investigated, but no suitable relatives were found. Furthermore, the agency was not

required to exhaust all possible placements before requesting permanent custody,

and “[R.C. 2151.414] does not make the availability of a placement that would not

require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor.” In re Schaefer,

2006-Ohio-5513, at ¶ 64.

As the trial court determined, at the time of trial, the children had

been in the custody of CCDCFS for over two years and they were in need of a safe

and stable home environment. The juvenile court properly determined in

accordance with R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and (2) that an award of permanent custody to

the agency was in their best interest.

After carefully reviewing the entire record, we do not find the juvenile

court clearly lost its way or committed a manifest miscarriage of justice by

terminating the parents’ parental rights and awarding permanent custody of the

children to CCDCFS. We are not persuaded by mother’s arguments otherwise. We

conclude that in each child’s case, the juvenile court’s judgment is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, mother’s second assignment of error

is overruled.

Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_______________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR