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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 24-BG-0090
IN RE CRAIG A. BUTLER, RESPONDENT.
A Suspended Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Bar Registration No. 451320)
On Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility
(BDN: 22-BD-003; DDN: 2018-D024, etc.)
(Argued January 7, 2025 Decided August 7, 2025)
(Amended August 25, 2025*) *
Johnny M. Howard for respondent.
Theodore (Jack) Metzler, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Hamilton P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, Julia L. Porter, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, and Sean O’Brien, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, were on the brief, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
Before BECKWITH, EASTERLY, and MCLEESE, Associate Judges.
* This amended opinion grants Petitioner Disciplinary Counsel’s Motion to Amend the Court’s opinion issued on August 7, 2025. The change noted is regarding the date that respondent’s suspension will begin to run for reinstatement purposes. No further changes were made to the original opinion. 2
PER CURIAM: The Board on Professional Responsibility has concluded that
respondent Craig M. Butler committed numerous violations of the rules of
professional conduct and recommends that Mr. Butler be suspended from the
practice of law for six months with reinstatement conditioned upon a showing of
fitness. We agree with the Board’s conclusions and adopt the Board’s recommended
sanction.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Charges
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) charged Mr. Butler in three counts.
Count I involved a bankruptcy matter in which his client, Mr. Robinson, hired Mr.
Butler to assist with saving Mr. Robinson’s house from foreclosure. ODC charged
that Mr. Butler violated D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.1(a) (competence), 1.1(b) (skill and
care), 1.3(a) (diligence and zeal), 1.3(c) (reasonable promptness), and 1.4(a)
(communication), by knowingly ignoring his client’s bankruptcy deficiency; failing
to respond to the opposing party’s motion to terminate his client’s bankruptcy stay;
failing to tell his client about the motion despite several calls, texts, and emails from
his client; and purposely withholding information from his client. 3
Count II involved six additional bankruptcy cases for five clients. In pertinent
part, ODC charged that Mr. Butler violated D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.1(a), 1.1(b),
1.3(c), and 8.4(d) (serious interference with the administration of justice) by, among
other things, failing to address multiple dispositive motions, including motions for
summary judgment and for dismissal; failing to file motions to extend bankruptcy
stays; failing to respond to multiple court orders and notices; and failing to appear
at multiple court-ordered hearings.
Count III involved a personal-injury case Mr. Butler filed in Maryland on
behalf of his client, Mr. Clayton. ODC charged that Mr. Butler violated Maryland
Rules 19-301.1 (competence), 19-301.3 (diligence), and 19-308.4(d) (conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice). See D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 8.5(b)(1) (for
conduct in connection with matter pending before tribunal, rules of jurisdiction in
which tribunal sits are applied, unless rules of tribunal provide otherwise).
Specifically, ODC alleged that, over the course of almost a year, Mr. Butler “never
obtained a proper summons from the clerk; failed to comply with the court’s rules
and procedures; failed to keep his court contact information updated; failed to appear
for at least three show[-]cause hearings; and failed to respond to many court orders
and warnings, causing the court to dismiss the case.” 4
B. The Hearing Committee’s Report and Recommendation
After an evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Committee made detailed factual
findings, under a clear-and-convincing evidence standard, that included the
following.
1. Count I
Mr. Robinson hired Mr. Butler to help Mr. Robinson save his home from
foreclosure by filing for bankruptcy. Mr. Butler thereafter filed a bankruptcy
petition on behalf of Mr. Robinson, which triggered an automatic stay that prevented
the mortgage-holding bank from foreclosing on Mr. Robinson’s home. During the
period of the stay, Mr. Robinson was required to make monthly payments to the
bank. Due to a misunderstanding, Mr. Robinson initially failed to make such
payments. Mr. Butler assured Mr. Robinson that the late payments would likely not
be a problem but then submitted an amended bankruptcy plan that did not address
the overdue payments. Mr. Robinson started making payments to the bank going
forward, but Mr. Butler did not follow up about the overdue payments and had
minimal communication with Mr. Robinson.
The bank subsequently moved to lift the stay, arguing among other things that
Mr. Robinson had missed payments for five months. In fact, Mr. Robinson had made 5
payments in four of those five months. Also, although the bank argued that the
house’s value was less than $300,000, Mr. Butler was aware of information
suggesting that the house’s value was over $400,000.
Although Mr. Butler received the bank’s motion and a number of other related
filing notices, Mr. Butler did not timely inform Mr. Robinson about the motion or
file an opposition by the filing deadline. The court granted the bank’s motion, and
Mr. Robinson’s home was sold at a foreclosure auction. Throughout this process,
Mr. Butler repeatedly ignored Mr. Robinson’s calls and did not keep him informed
of the matter, even though Mr. Butler had specifically agreed to do so given that Mr.
Robinson was unfamiliar with bankruptcy law.
Mr. Butler had arguments he could have raised in response to the motion to
lift the stay, and Mr. Butler’s failure to file an opposition to that motion deprived
Mr. Robinson of the opportunity to negotiate with the bank or seek an order from
the court preventing the lifting of the bankruptcy stay.
The Hearing Committee concluded that Mr. Butler’s handling of Mr.
Robinson’s matter lacked competence and skill, in violation of D.C. R. Pro.
Conduct 1.1(a) and (b); lacked diligence and zeal, in violation of D.C. R. Pro.
Conduct 1.3(a); lacked reasonable promptness, in violation of D.C. R. Pro. 6
Conduct 1.3(c); and reflected inadequate communication with his client, in violation
of D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.4(a).
2. Count II
The Hearing Committee described Mr. Butler’s behavior in the six cases
underlying Count II as follows. At various times, Mr. Butler failed to respond, or
timely respond, to electronically received motions for summary judgment and
motions to dismiss; failed to comply with filing requirements and local rules; and
failed to comply with court notices and orders. In addition, Mr. Butler repeatedly
delayed filing motions and repeatedly failed to appear at court-ordered hearings.
To illustrate in somewhat greater detail with respect to the foreclosure case of
Mr. Butler’s client, Mr. Jones, Mr. Butler failed to oppose the foreclosing party’s
motion for summary judgment, leaving the court to grant the motion for summary
judgment by default. Mr. Jones only learned of this by checking the case docket
himself; Mr. Butler had never informed Mr. Jones of the motion for summary
judgment or Mr. Butler’s failure to respond. Mr. Jones filed pro se motions to vacate
default and an opposition to the motion for summary judgment and appeared pro se
at a post-judgment hearing to defend his case. Mr. Butler then appeared in court at
a subsequent hearing and claimed that an imposter, not Mr. Jones, had been the one 7
to file and appear; the court expressed skepticism about Mr. Butler’s assertion.
Although the court vacated the summary-judgment order following Mr. Jones’s pro
se filings and appearance, Mr. Butler did not supplement Mr. Jones’s pro se
opposition, even though the court had warned Mr. Butler that the opposition did not
present any cognizable defenses. As a result, the court granted summary judgment
a second time.
The Hearing Committee determined that the evidence before it showed that in
Mr. Jones’s case, Mr. Butler (1) failed to oppose the creditor’s motion for summary
judgment, (2) failed to appear for a hearing in Mr. Jones’s case, (3) failed to make
any attempt to avoid the entry of summary judgment against his client, and (4) was
wholly unprepared when appearing at a subsequent hearing. As a result, the Hearing
Committee concluded in pertinent part that Mr. Butler did not represent Mr. Jones
with competence, zeal, or diligence.
More generally, in the remaining five cases involved in Count II, the Hearing
Committee concluded in pertinent part that Mr. Butler in various respects failed to
serve his clients with competence, skill, zeal, and diligence when he (1) failed to
oppose motions to dismiss a client’s bankruptcy case and the stay protecting the
client’s property, (2) filed a delayed motion to extend a bankruptcy stay, (3) failed
to appear at court-ordered hearings, (4) filed a defective motion to extend a client’s 8
bankruptcy stay and failed to cure the defect before the stay’s expiration, (5) filed a
defective bankruptcy petition and then failed to respond to the court’s order to show
cause why the petition should not be dismissed due to the defect, and (6) failed to
file mandatory notices or to cure his error despite a court order. The Hearing
Committee further concluded that Mr. Butler seriously interfered with the
administration of justice while representing three of the clients at issue by failing to
respond to filings and court orders and failing to appear at court hearings.
During the hearing before the Hearing Committee, Mr. Butler claimed that his
omissions could be excused as “inadvertent” or blamed on his staff’s failures.
3. Count III
Regarding Mr. Butler’s actions during his client Mr. Clayton’s personal-injury
case, the Hearing Committee found that Mr. Butler (1) failed to file required
documents with the complaint despite repeated extensions and reminders from the
court; (2) failed to serve a required summons on the defendant in the case; (3) failed
to correct both of these errors despite a court order instructing him to do so; (4) failed
to respond to two show-cause orders from the court; and (5) failed to appear at four
court-ordered show-cause hearings. 9
Mr. Butler claimed that these problems were inadvertent and the result of his
staff’s errors, an incorrect address listed in PACER, a hacking incident, and an email
virus, although this last only occurred after the first show-cause order. Mr. Butler
repeatedly informed the court he had corrected his contact information, but he had
not, and he continued to miss hearings and failed to respond to orders as a result.
Mr. Clayton’s case was ultimately dismissed, and because Mr. Butler had not filed
the case until the last day of the statute of limitations period, Mr. Clayton was left
with no recourse.
The Hearing Committee concluded that Mr. Butler’s handling of Mr.
Clayton’s matter lacked competence and diligence and interfered with the
administration of justice.
4. Sanction
On the issue of sanction, the Hearing Committee concluded that Mr. Butler’s
conduct (1) was serious and often jeopardized his clients’ ability to keep their homes
or properties during bankruptcy; (2) was very prejudicial to his clients; (3) was not
knowingly dishonest, nor was Mr. Butler’s testimony knowingly dishonest; and
(4) violated many rules in several matters for different clients over the course of
several years. In addition, the Hearing Committee noted that Mr. Butler’s consistent 10
provision of excuses, lack of accountability, and inability to correct mistakes
weighed against imposing a short suspension. The Hearing Committee noted that
Mr. Butler had no previous disciplinary history and explained that it saw no other
mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
The Hearing Committee recommended that Mr. Butler be suspended for six
months with ninety days stayed in favor of a one-year period of probation with
conditions. If Mr. Butler violated those conditions, the Hearing Committee
recommended a showing of fitness before he could resume the practice of law. The
Hearing Committee did not otherwise recommend a fitness requirement.
C. The Board’s Report and Recommendation
The Board adopted all of the Hearing Committee’s findings of fact and
concluded that the Rule violations discussed above were supported by clear and
convincing evidence.
On the issue of sanction, the Board agreed with the Hearing Committee that
Mr. Butler’s repeated misconduct involving multiple clients “over a period of three
years warrants a lengthy suspension.” The Board recommended against a stay of the
suspension, however, explaining that Mr. Butler’s conduct did not appear to be a
deviation from his typical legal practice. The Board further found several 11
aggravating factors: Mr. Butler neglected his clients and responsibilities to the court
for an extended period of three years; Mr. Butler’s conduct did not improve despite
being aware of Disciplinary Counsel’s investigation; and Mr. Butler’s clients had
“known vulnerabilities.” The Board found no mitigating circumstances other than
Mr. Butler’s lack of prior disciplinary history.
Finally, regarding the fitness requirement, the Board expressed serious doubt
about Mr. Butler’s ability to follow the ethical rules. The Board noted Mr. Butler’s
repeated misrepresentations that he had taken remedial actions to improve his
responsiveness to the courts. The Board also emphasized the gravity and pervasive
nature of Mr. Butler’s conduct. Considering all of the circumstances, the Board
recommended that Mr. Butler be suspended for six months with a requirement that
he demonstrate fitness before being reinstated.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
In considering a recommendation of the Board, this court will defer to the
Board’s findings of fact if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. In
re Haar, 270 A.3d 286, 294 (D.C. 2022). “The burden of proving disciplinary
charges rests with Bar Counsel, and the Board’s factual findings must be supported 12
by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Johnson, 275 A.3d 268, 280 (D.C. 2022)
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Board must defer to the
findings of fact made by a Hearing Committee, unless the Hearing Committee’s
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 275. We owe no deference
to the determination of legal issues by either the Board or the Hearing Committee.
In re Krame, 284 A.3d 745, 752-55 (D.C. 2022).
In determining what sanction to impose for violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, this court “shall adopt the recommended disposition of the
Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for
comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1).
“[A] sanction recommendation from the Board comes to us with a strong
presumption in favor of its imposition.” In re Baber, 106 A.3d 1072, 1076 (D.C.
2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In general, if the Board’s
recommended sanction falls within a wide range of acceptable outcomes, it will be
adopted and imposed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately,
however, the system of attorney discipline, including the imposition of sanctions, is
the responsibility and duty of this court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 13
B. Procedural Objections
Mr. Butler raises three procedural objections. First, he argues that the Hearing
Committee was required to conduct separate hearings with respect to Counts I and
II. We disagree. This court has regularly permitted the consolidation of separately
docketed matters involving different incidents for decision by a single hearing
committee. See, e.g., In re Hines, 482 A.2d 378, 383 (D.C. 1984) (per curiam)
(“[T]he simultaneous consideration by one hearing committee of all the charges
brought against respondent was well within the committee’s power. . . . It is not
unusual for a single committee to weigh at one time charges against an attorney
stemming from his dealings with more than one client; indeed, such cases are almost
routine.”). Moreover, Mr. Butler has made no plausible claim of prejudice.
Second, Mr. Butler suggests that the testimony of an expert was required to
demonstrate that his handling of some of his clients’ matters lacked competence.
We disagree. Rather, we hold that no special expertise was required to permit the
Hearing Committee and the Board to determine whether Mr. Butler’s conduct was
lacking in competence. Cf., e.g., In re Winstead, 69 A.3d 390, 397 n.9 (D.C. 2013)
(Bar Counsel was not required to call expert witness because whether respondent’s
communications were false or misleading did not “require[] technical or specialized
knowledge”); Liu v. Allen, 894 A.2d 453, 460 (D.C. 2006) (“[A]n attorney’s 14
negligence sometimes may be so clear, even if an explanation is attempted, that
expert testimony is superfluous and the attorney even may be found negligent as a
matter of law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Third, Mr. Butler suggests in passing that an opinion rendered by one of the
bankruptcy judges was hearsay. Mr. Butler does not actually present an argument
as to why the evidence at issue was inadmissible in a disciplinary proceeding. See
generally, e.g., In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 603 (D.C. 1992) (per curiam)
(“Disciplinary hearings are not governed by strict rules of evidence.”). Because Mr.
Butler has not presented an argument on this point, we decline to consider the point.
See generally, e.g., Miller v. United States, 209 A.3d 75, 80 (D.C. 2019) (declining
to address issue that was not adequately briefed on appeal).
C. Violations
Essentially for the reasons stated in the thorough and careful reports of the
Hearing Committee and the Board, we accept the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions with respect to the violations that the Board concluded had been
established. We are not persuaded by Mr. Butler’s arguments to the contrary.
First, Mr. Butler argues that some of his clients would have eventually lost
their cases no matter what Mr. Butler did or failed to do. A lawyer’s obligation to 15
provide competent representation, however, is not contingent on whether the client
will ultimately win the case. Rather, we have held that a lawyer’s incompetent
performance is sanctionable under D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.1 if the incompetence
“prejudices or could have prejudiced” a client. In re Yelverton, 105 A.3d 413, 422
(D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, as described above, the
reports of the Hearing Committee and the Board in this case carefully explained how
numerous of Mr. Butler’s omissions did prejudice or could have prejudiced his
clients.
Second, Mr. Butler also argues that he had a duty not to file frivolous
pleadings, which restricted his ability to represent his clients. That concern does not
justify many of Mr. Butler’s omissions. Moreover, as described above, the reports
of the Hearing Committee and the Board in this case detail numerous steps Mr.
Butler could appropriately have taken to protect his clients’ interests but failed to
take.
Third, Mr. Butler argues that his omissions were inadvertent. That is not a
defense to a charge of failure to act with the requisite competence. See, e.g., In re
Yelverton, 105 A.3d at 422 (D.C. R. Pro. Conduct 1.1 reaches conduct that is
negligent and prejudices or could have prejudiced a client). 16
D. Sanction
Essentially for the reasons stated by the Board, we adopt the Board’s
recommended sanction of a six-month suspension with a requirement of fitness
before reinstatement.
When determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction, we evaluate (1) the seriousness of the conduct, (2) prejudice to the client, (3) whether the conduct involved dishonesty, (4) violation of other disciplinary rules, (5) the attorney’s disciplinary history, (6) whether the attorney has acknowledged his or her wrongful conduct, and (7) mitigating circumstances . . . .
In re Blackwell, 299 A.3d 561, 573 (D.C. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We agree with the Board that Mr. Butler’s repeated misconduct, involving
eight matters over a period of three years, warrants an unstayed six-month
suspension. See, e.g., In re Lyles, 680 A.2d 408, 408-09 (D.C. 1996) (per curiam)
(imposing unstayed six-month suspension with fitness requirement based on
attorney’s lack of competence and neglect in four bankruptcy matters as reflected in
attached report and recommendation).
We also agree with the Board’s recommendation of a fitness requirement. “To
require proof of fitness as a condition of reinstatement after suspension, the record
in the disciplinary proceeding must contain clear and convincing evidence that casts 17
a serious doubt upon the attorney’s continuing fitness to practice law.” In re Peters,
149 A.3d 253, 260 (D.C. 2016) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
determining whether to impose a fitness requirement, we consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the misconduct; (2) whether the attorney recognizes the seriousness of the misconduct; (3) the attorney’s conduct since discipline was imposed, including the steps taken to remedy past wrongs and prevent future ones; (4) the attorney’s present character; and (5) the attorney’s present qualifications and competence to practice law.
In re Bailey, 283 A.3d 1199, 1211 (D.C. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Essentially for the reasons stated by the Board, we agree that those factors
support imposition of a fitness requirement in this case. Over a period of several
years, Mr. Butler repeatedly failed to keep his clients informed, respond to court
notices, file timely and proper documents, cure deficient filings, and attend
court-ordered appearances. That pattern of conduct prejudiced multiple clients and
leaves us with a serious doubt as to Mr. Butler’s fitness to continue practicing law.
See, e.g., In re Mintz, 626 A.2d 926, 927 (D.C. 1993) (per curiam) (citing cases in
which court imposed fitness requirement in cases involving “gross and persistent
negligence of client matters”).
Accordingly, respondent Craig Butler is hereby suspended from the practice
of law for six months, with reinstatement conditioned on a showing of fitness. The 18
period of suspension will begin to run when Mr. Butler files an affidavit that fully
complies with the requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14, governing the
responsibilities of suspended attorneys. E.g., In re Keller, 308 A.3d 201, 202 (D.C.
2024) (per curiam).
So ordered.