In Re Brunton

144 P.3d 606, 282 Kan. 423, 2006 Kan. LEXIS 659
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedOctober 27, 2006
Docket96,581
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 144 P.3d 606 (In Re Brunton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Brunton, 144 P.3d 606, 282 Kan. 423, 2006 Kan. LEXIS 659 (kan 2006).

Opinion

Per Curiam:

This is an original uncontested proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against respondent, Michael F. Brunton, an attorney licensed to practice law in Kansas since 1981. Respondent’s last registration address with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts of Kansas is in Topeka, Kansas.

The formal complaint charged respondent in Count I with violating Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 3.1 (2005 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 455) (meritorious claims and contentions) and KRPC 8.4(d) (2005 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 504) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice) and in Count II with violating 8.4(b) (2005 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 504) (engaging in criminal conduct involving dishonesty).

Respondent appeared in person and through counsel at his March 9,2006, disciplinary hearing. He stipulated to the violations.

“In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. [Citation omitted.] Any attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. [Citation omitted.]
“This court views the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations made by the disciplinary panel as advisory, but gives the final hearing report the same dignity as a special verdict by a jury or the findings of a trial court. Thus, the disciplinary panel’s report will be adopted where amply sustained by the evidence, but not where it is against the clear weight of the evidence. [Citations omitted.]” In re Lober, 276 Kan. 633, 636-37, 78 P.3d 442 (2003).

*424 The hearing panel made the following findings of fact regarding the two incidents that formed the basis for the complaint.

Representation of Janet L. Fisher

The respondent agreed to represent Janet L. Fisher in her Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. Before hiring respondent, Fisher had been convicted of embezzlement from Performance Tire and Wheel (PT&W), her former employer. As a result of the criminal case, Fisher was required to pay $40,000 in restitution.

On September 5, 2001, respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on Fisher s behalf. In her plan, Fisher proposed that $5,000 of the restitution be paid and the remainder discharged.

Title 11, Chapter 13, § 1328(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code (2000) provides that a bankruptcy court will grant a discharge of debt provided by a plan, “except any debt ... for restitution, or a criminal fine, included in a sentence on the debtor’s conviction of a crime.” The respondent included Fisher’s request to discharge all but $5,000 of the restitution in spite of this clear prohibition in the Code.

Respondent did not list PT&W as a creditor in the plan. Instead of sending notice to PT&W, the respondent sent notice to “SN County District Court.” As a result, PT&W did not receive notice of the plan and was not made aware of the filing of the bankruptcy.

On November 28, 2001, Fisher’s plan was confirmed. PT&W learned from another source of Fisher’s bankruptcy case, and PT&W’s president, Jerry Glasgow, called respondent about Fisher’s restitution obligation. Respondent did not amend the bankruptcy plan; he instead informed Glasgow that Glasgow needed to hire an attorney to resolve the matter.

In April 2002, Glasgow did so. PT&W’s attorney entered her appearance and wrote to respondent, requesting that he correct tire plan. Respondent refused. PT&W then filed a complaint to revoke confirmation of Fisher’s plan. Respondent filed an answer in which he stated that he provided adequate notice to PT&W.

The bankruptcy court subsequently ordered Fisher’s plan amended to strike all language purporting to discharge die criminal restitution.

*425 Following the court’s order, PT&W filed a motion for sanctions against respondent for attempting to discharge a large portion of debt not dischargeable and failing to remedy the situation. The bankruptcy court granted the motion for sanctions, concluding that respondent had no reasonable basis to include the discharge provision in the plan and that his attempt to discharge a nondischargeable debt was made in bad faith.

Upon respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, the bankruptcy court entered an order granting the motion in part and denying it in part. The court concluded:

“[PT&W’s attorney] attempted, by sending letters and making telephone calls, to persuade [Respondent] to undo what should never have been done in the first place (i.e., place the restitution discharge provision in the plan), but [Respondent] refused to simply remove the offending language, which by then even he admitted was incorrect. [Citation omitted.] Instead, he held hostage the admittedly required plan revision, in exchange for PT&W’s agreement to forgive its request for what was, at that time, a very modest attorney fee. This attempt to condition his compliance with the Bankruptcy Code on the forgiveness of attorney fees thus compounded his original problem, and that proved to be true over the next many months.”

In sum, the court determined that “[the Respondent’s] failure to file a one sentence amendment to the plan, stating drat the plan would not discharge the restitution obligation, resulted in considerable attorney fees for PT&W, and unnecessary litigation for the court.” The court ordered the respondent to pay sanctions in the amount of $1,000 pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code “and under this Court’s inherent power to sanction a party who has acted in bad faith or otherwise unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings.”

Respondent paid the sanctions.

Failure to File Income Tax Returns

On April 14, 2005, in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, the federal government charged the respondent with willfully failing to file income tax returns for 1998, 1999, and 2000. On August 1, 2005, respondent entered a plea of guilty to one count of willfully failing to file an income tax return. As part of his plea, respondent admitted that he knew he was required to *426 file tax returns; that he knowingly faded to file; that in the 1980s he had previously failed to file returns; and that this earlier failure had been handled civilly by the Internal Revenue Sendee.

At the time of his plea, respondent owed the federal government more than $100,000 in unpaid taxes. The district court sentenced respondent to 10 months of home detention, 150 days in a halfway house, and 5 years’ probation. As of the date of the hearing panel’s final report, respondent was still on home detention, had served a portion of the 150 days in the hallway house on weekends, and had filed his 2005 tax return. He continued to owe approximately $80,000 in taxes, interest, and penalties.

Panel’s Conclusions of Law

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Related

In the Matter of Brunton
221 P.3d 525 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2009)
In re Busch
194 P.3d 12 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2008)
In Re Comfort
159 P.3d 1011 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2007)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
144 P.3d 606, 282 Kan. 423, 2006 Kan. LEXIS 659, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-brunton-kan-2006.