In Re Brickell

292 B.R. 705, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 107, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 415
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.
DecidedApril 10, 2003
Docket13-35811
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 292 B.R. 705 (In Re Brickell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Brickell, 292 B.R. 705, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 107, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 415 (Fla. 2003).

Opinion

ORDER AUTHORIZING TRUSTEE TO DISBURSE FUNDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH GARNISHMENTS

BARRY S. SCHERMER, Bankruptcy Judge.

On January 6, 2003, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued its Order Vacating Orders of Bankruptcy Court and Remanding for Further Proceedings (“Remand Order”). In the Remand Order, the District Court directed this Court to address the following issues:

1. Whether a chapter 7 trustee holding property of the estate for distribution to creditors is subject to garnishment by persons who are themselves creditors of a creditor;
2. Whether final garnishment judgments should be treated differently where they were issued by different courts, one by a state court and the other by this Court; and
3. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to enter orders on the garnishors’ motions for relief.
Factual Background
1. On December 2, 1997, Norman Brickell (“Debtor”) filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
2. Marcia Dunn (“Trustee”) was appointed the Trustee of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate.
*707 3. Ms. Brickell is a creditor and former spouse of the Debtor.
4. Ms. Brickell retained Markowitz, Davis, Ringel & Trusty, PA (the “Firm”) to represent her in connection with the Debtor’s bankruptcy case. On May 11, 1998, this Court granted the Firm’s motion for leave to withdraw as Ms. Brickell’s counsel.
5. On February 1, 2000, the Firm obtained a judgment against Ms. Bric-kell from the Miami-Dade County Court (the “State Court”) for unpaid fees in the amount of $9,736.04. The judgment is final and non-appeal-able.
6. On September 20, 2000, the Firm filed a writ of garnishment in the State Court against the Trustee to collect any disbursement due Ms. Brickell from the Debtor’s estate. On March 28, 2001, the State Court issued a Final Garnishment Judgment (the “Firm’s Garnishment Judgment”) against the Trustee in favor of the Firm in the amount of $11,045.80. The Firm’s Garnishment Judgment is final and non-appealable.
7. On August 8, 2001, the Firm served the Garnishment Judgment on the Trustee. The Trustee filed a motion with this Court seeking authorization to disburse to the Firm funds due to Ms. Brickell in accordance with the Garnishment Judgment. On August 15, 2001, this Court entered its order granting the Trustee’s motion to disburse funds to the Firm (“Disbursal Order”).
8. On April 23, 2001, this Court entered its judgment for sanctions against Ms. Brickell in favor of the Debtor in the amount of $14,341.82 (the “Sanctions Judgment”). The Sanctions Judgment is final and non-appealable.
9. This Court entered its Garnishment Judgment (the “Debtor’s Garnishment Judgment”) against the Trustee in favor of the Debtor in connection with Ms. Brickell’s liability to the Debtor pursuant to the Sanctions Judgment. The Debtor’s Garnishment Judgment is final and non-appealable.
10. Pursuant to the Trustee’s Final Report, which was filed on March 24, 2001, Ms. Brickell was entitled to a distribution from the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate in the amount of $19,898.06.
11. As a result of the Firm’s Garnishment Judgment, the Disbursal Order, and the Debtor’s Garnishment Judgment, the funds due to Ms. Brickell from the bankruptcy estate were redirected first to the Firm and then to the Debtor.
12. Ms. Brickell filed a motion to vacate the Disbursal Order which this Court denied.
13. Ms. Brickell appealed from the Disbursal Order and the order denying her motion to vacate the Disbursal Order.
14. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued the Remand Order in response to Ms. Briekell’s appeal.
15. On February 4, 2003, Ms. Brickell filed a Motion to Allow Parties to Brief Issues raised in the Remand Order (the “Briefing Motion”).
16. On February 13, 2003, this Court issued its order granting Ms. Bric-kell’s Briefing Motion and giving the parties until March 20, 2003, to *708 file briefs addressing the issues on remand. 1
17. Each party submitted a brief on the issues raised in the Remand Order. Without leave of court, Ms. Brickell also submitted a reply brief. The Court has reviewed the Remand Order, all briefs and the reply brief.

Discussion

A. A Bankruptcy Trustee is Subject to Garnishment

The Bankruptcy Code is silent on whether a trustee is subject to garnishment. Likewise, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide no guidance. Bankruptcy Rule 7069 addresses the method by which the holder of a judgment issued by the bankruptcy court may enforce the judgment but does not address the issue sub judice. Furthermore, no controlling case law dictates the outcome of this dispute. Consequently, this Court looks to the limited case law from other jurisdictions for guidance.

Most case law predates the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and is split. Compare Priestly v. Hilliard & Tabor (In re Argonaut Shoe Co.), 187 F. 784 (9th Cir.1911)(disallowing garnishment) with In re Kranich, 182 F. 849 (E.D.Pa.1910)(allowing garnishment). For a discussion of early cases addressing garnishment, see Grant v. Burns (In re Am. Elec. Tel. Co.), 211 F. 88 (7th Cir.1914).

The cases refusing to allow garnishment focused on the impediment to efficiency which would result from the introduction of garnishment into the bankruptcy process. For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “to aid a state court attachment by withholding the payment to the creditor gives entrance to a parasite upon the bankruptcy proceedings which may seriously affect the efficiency of the [bankruptcy] act.” In re Am. Elec. Tel. Co., 211 F. at 91. At the time, garnishment was used as a pre-judgment remedy. Therefore, there was no guarantee that the rights of the bankruptcy estate creditor vis-a-vis the creditor’s creditor would be adjudicated at the time the bankruptcy trustee was ready to make distributions. Consequently, a pre-judgment garnishment against a bankruptcy trustee could seriously delay the distribution of estate assets and prevent the trustee from completing his or her duties and closing the bankruptcy estate.

On the other hand, where no impediment to the bankruptcy process was perceived, garnishment was allowed.

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Bluebook (online)
292 B.R. 705, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 107, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 415, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-brickell-flsb-2003.