In Re: Brendan Joseph McLeod

CourtKentucky Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 26, 2024
Docket2024-SC-0330
StatusUnpublished

This text of In Re: Brendan Joseph McLeod (In Re: Brendan Joseph McLeod) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Kentucky Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re: Brendan Joseph McLeod, (Ky. 2024).

Opinion

TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2024-SC-0330-KB

IN RE: BRENDAN JOSEPH MCLEOD

IN SUPREME COURT

OPINION AND ORDER

On July 17, 2024, Brendan Joseph McLeod (“McLeod”), moved this Court

for entry of an order suspending him from the practice of law for thirty days,

probated for one year with conditions, for violations of the Rules of the

Supreme Court (“SCR”) as charged in Kentucky Bar Association (“KBA”) Files

18-DIS-0214 and 21-DIS-0074. These files were consolidated by the KBA

pursuant to SCR 3.260(1). Thereafter, the KBA filed a response stating it had

no objection to the order as requested. For the following reasons, the motion is

granted, and the following sanctions imposed.

I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND

McLeod was admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of

Kentucky on October 10, 2001. His KBA membership number is 88994, and

his bar roster address is 2403 Windsor Forest Drive, Louisville, Kentucky

40272. File 18-DIS-0214

McLeod represented Jodie Cecil (“Cecil”) in a criminal matter in which

she and her co-defendant, Bryan Greenwell (“Greenwell”), were charged with

murder, attempted murder, and several other crimes. In November 2017,

McLeod sought to discuss the case with Greenwell and asked Greenwell’s

counsel, public defender Heather Erskine (“Erskine”), for permission to do so.

Erskine declined McLeod’s repeated requests and even wrote McLeod a letter

reiterating her denial of permission.

Cecil and Greenwell’s trial began on May 21, 2018. On the morning of

May 24, 2018, McLeod visited Louisville Metro Department of Corrections and

spoke with Greenwell about substantive issues in the case. McLeod admits to

knowingly violating SCR 3.130(4.2) (communicating with represented litigant

without permission of the court or litigant’s counsel). However, he maintains

that he thought it was necessary to speak with Greenwell to ensure the parties

were united in their defense.

Later that day, McLeod informed Erskine of the visit. Erskine brought the

matter to the circuit court’s attention, and the court held ex parte proceedings

regarding McLeod’s conversations with Greenwell. These proceedings were

conducted in closed sessions and were designated as “private” on the

videotape. Only the defendants and their counsel were present. McLeod and

Cecil were excused from the courtroom when Greenwell was questioned.

McLeod then posted clips of the hearings on YouTube and invited viewers to

comment.

2 Erskine filed a bar complaint against McLeod, and on September 30,

2021, the KBA Inquiry Commission charged McLeod with violations of SCR

3.130(3.4)(c) (knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal)

and SCR 3.130(4.2) (knowingly communicating with individual represented by

another attorney about subject of representation).

File 21-DIS-0074

In November 2018, McLeod represented Robert Ingram (“Ingram”).

Ingram was charged with murder, burglary, and terroristic threatening in the

third degree, but was ultimately only found guilty of terroristic threatening. In

January 2019, Ingram was sentenced to 120 days in jail.

McLeod filed a notice of appeal on Ingram’s behalf in February 2019, but

then failed to timely file a brief. As a result, the Court of Appeals issued four

orders (dated August 22, 2019; September 16, 2019; November 14, 2019; and

February 19, 2020) requiring McLeod to show cause why the case should not

be dismissed. McLeod did not respond to any of the orders, and Ingram’s

appeal was eventually dismissed on May 21, 2020.

McLeod claims that Ingram had failed to pay $15,000 in attorney’s fees,

advanced no money for the appeal, and even expressed that he no longer

wanted to pursue the appeal because he had already served his jail time.

However, McLeod took no action to directly dismiss the appeal.

Following the dismissal of Ingram’s appeal, the Court of Appeals referred

McLeod to the KBA. On January 5, 2022, the KBA Inquiry Commission charged

3 McLeod with violation of SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) (knowingly disobeying an obligation

under the rules of a tribunal).

McLeod admits to violating SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) and SCR 3.130(4.2) in

relation to his representation of Cecil (18-DIS-0214) and SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) in

relation to his representation of Ingram (21-DIS-0074). McLeod requests that

this Court impose a thirty-day suspension, probated for one year subject to

conditions, including successful completion of the Ethics and Professionalism

Enhancement Program (“EPEP”).

II. ANALYSIS

Pursuant to SCR 3.480(2), the parties have agreed to the imposition of a

thirty-day suspension, probated for one year subject to conditions, including

successful completion of EPEP. Regardless of such agreement, acceptance of

the proposed negotiated sanction still falls within the discretion of the Court:

“The Court may approve the sanction agreed to by the parties, or may remand

the case for hearing or other proceedings specified in the order of remand.”

SCR 3.480(2).

Preliminarily, we acknowledge that McLeod’s disciplinary history

includes one private admonition in October 2020 for violation of SCR

3.130(1.4)(a)(2) and (3) (failure to consult with client about means of

accomplishing client’s objectives and failure to keep client informed of status of

matter), and SCR 3.130(1.16)(d) (failure to take reasonable steps to protect

client’s interests following termination of representation).

4 In Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Quesinberry, 203 S.W.3d 137 (Ky. 2006), this

Court imposed a thirty-day suspension from the practice of law probated for

one year on the condition of attendance of ethical trainings for an attorney’s

violation of the following Rules of Professional Conduct: SCR 3.130(1.3)

(diligence); SCR 1.4(a) (communication); and SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) (disobeying

obligations to a tribunal). There, the respondent filed a proper notice of appeal

to the court of appeals but then failed to timely file a brief. Id. at 138. As a

result, the opposing party filed a motion to dismiss to which the respondent did

not respond. Id. The case was then dismissed, and the court of appeals ordered

the KBA be notified of its proceedings. Id. at 139. In its decision to impose a

thirty-day sanction, this Court also considered the fact that the respondent

had previously received a private admonition for similar conduct. Id.

In Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Justice, 198 S.W.3d 583 (Ky. 2006), this Court

imposed a thirty-day suspension for violations of the Rules of Professional

Conduct similar to those at issue here. In Justice, the attorney failed to

respond to a motion to dismiss, resulting in the dismissal of his client’s case.

Id. at 584. The attorney then neglected to inform his clients of the status of

their case for six months, and only did so because the clients appeared at his

office to pick up their files. Id. Finally, the attorney also failed to refund any

unearned portion of his fee until he was served with a bar complaint. Id.

Where an attorney only violates SCR 3.130(4.2), this Court’s typical

sanction is a public reprimand. Inquiry Commission v.

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Related

Kentucky Bar Association v. Quesinberry
203 S.W.3d 137 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2006)
KENTUCKY BAR ASS'N v. Justice
198 S.W.3d 583 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2006)
Sipes v. KENTUCKY BAR ASS'N
290 S.W.3d 650 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2009)

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In Re: Brendan Joseph McLeod, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-brendan-joseph-mcleod-ky-2024.