In Re Brendan D. [Fn1] (Nov. 14, 2002)

2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 15330-z
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedNovember 14, 2002
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 15330-z (In Re Brendan D. [Fn1] (Nov. 14, 2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Brendan D. [Fn1] (Nov. 14, 2002), 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 15330-z (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITION
This case arises out of a petition filed with the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Willimantic on May 31, 2001, by the department of children and families (hereinafter referred to as the "petitioner" or "department") whereby the petitioner seeks the termination of the parental rights of Albert D. and Brenda D. to their now nine year old son, Brendan, who was born January 1993. Brendan's parents will be referred to herein as father or mother and collectively as the "respondents."

II. HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS

Court proceedings originated in Willimantic on May 16, 2000, when the department filed a petition against the respondents alleging that Brendan was a neglected child in that he was being denied proper care and attention physically, emotionally or morally and was being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to his well-being. General Statutes § 46b-120 (8)(B) and (C). On the day the neglect petition was filed, an order of temporary custody was issued by the court (Mack, J.) which was confirmed on May 30, 2000. Brendan was committed to the care and custody of the department on the grounds alleged in the petition on November 21, 2000 (Mack, J.) during a proceeding at which neither mother nor father appeared. Said commitment, which was initially for a period of one year, was ordered to be maintained until further order of the court on November 14, 2001 (Mack,J.), and on August 21, 2002 (Mack, J.). It remains in effect. On May 9, 2001, the court (Mack, J.) approved a permanency plan for Brendan consisting of termination of the parental rights of mother and father and adoption. The court made no finding as to whether continued efforts by the department to reunify Brendan with his parents were appropriate. On CT Page 15330-aa November 14, 2001, the court (Mack, J.) deferred such a finding.

Trial of the termination petition was held on September 5, 6 and 8, 2002. The court finds that mother and father have appeared and have court-appointed attorneys, as does the child. The court has jurisdiction in the matter. There is no proceeding pending elsewhere affecting the custody of Brendan. Respondents remain steadfastly opposed to the termination of their parental rights.

The petitioner has proceeded against the respondents on two of the statutory grounds provided in General Statutes § 17a-112 (j). The petitioner alleges that Brendan has been ~ found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected and the respondents have failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the respondents could assume a responsible position in the life of said child. General Statutes § 17a-112 (j)(3)(B)(i). Additionally, the petitioner alleges that Brendan has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being. General Statutes § 17a-112 (j)(3)(C).

During the trial, the court heard testimony from nine witnesses, to wit: an evaluating clinical psychologist, an evaluating psycho-therapist, a psycho-sexual evaluator, a domestic violence coordinator, a probation officer, the child's therapist, the department's caseworker, mother and father. Thirty-three exhibits were received in evidence, twenty-six from the petitioner, four from mother and three from father; the child's attorney offered no exhibits and called no witnesses.2 The court, after reading the termination petition and summary of adjudicatory facts filed herewith, reviewing each of the exhibits, considering the testimony of each of the witnesses, assessing the credibility of all witnesses and considering the arguments of counsel for each of the parties, does make the following findings.

III. FACTS:

A. Events Preceding Removal of Child
This family first came to the attention of the department on February 4, 2000, when Brendan's elementary school teacher reported seeing bruises on the child's cheek and arms alter an unexplained absence from school of one week. The child, who was then age seven, reported to the investigating caseworker and state police officer that the bruises were caused by his father hitting him and the absence was a result of the CT Page 15330-ab appearance and location of the bruises. The child further reported that father "hits him" and swears and yells at him and his mother. Father, who was not very cooperative with the investigation, referred to his son as "a little terror" (petitioner's Exhibit 10) and blamed the child for the department and law enforcement involvement. Father refused the department's request for home visits and both parents refused to sign a service agreement which, inter alia, provided that the parents would cooperate with the department, that mother would be the primary disciplinarian and that there would be no physical discipline of Brendan which would leave marks. As a result of this incident, father was arrested and charged with risk of injury to a minor and assault in the third degree.3 Abuse was substantiated by the department.

On February 16, 2000, as part of its ongoing investigation, the department received information from the state of Massachusetts as to the criminal record of the respondents in that state. Those records revealed that both mother and father were convicted sex offenders. In April, 1988, father was convicted of rape of a child and indecent assault and battery of a child and received a sentence of fifteen years, suspended after two years served, followed by a term of probation that ended September 13, 1993. On the same day father was sentenced, mother was sentenced to fifteen years suspended and two years probation as a result of her conviction for the same offenses. In September, 1990, father pled to and was convicted of rape of a child and incest and three counts of indecent assault and battery on a child and mother was convicted of three counts of indecent assault and battery on a child. Each received a suspended sentence of ten years, followed by three years probation. Father's past convictions also included malicious mischief and two separate convictions for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. Father refused to discuss his past offenses with the department investigator, stating that he no longer had to follow any court orders. Mother was also uncooperative on this issue.

On February 25, 2000, Brendan's school psychologist reported to the department that she observed a scratch on Brendan's face and multiple bruises on his body. The child had disclosed to the psychologist that father had squeezed him so hard that he couldn't breathe forcing Brendan to scratch his father which resulted in his father scratching him. Again, while the department and state police officers investigated the incident, father was uncooperative, became agitated and blamed the child for the incident. On March 9, 2000, a third call was made to the department from Brendan's school. The school social worker reported that she observed bruises on the child's arms, right knee and face and scratches on his neck. The child disclosed to her that his mother had hit him in retaliation of being hit by Brendan.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Presutti v. Presutti
436 A.2d 299 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1980)
Ridgeway v. Ridgeway
429 A.2d 801 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1980)
Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn.
368 A.2d 125 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1976)
In Re Passionique T.
695 A.2d 1107 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1996)
In Re Samantha B.
722 A.2d 300 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1997)
Juvenile Appeal v. Commissioner of Children & Youth Services
420 A.2d 875 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1979)
In re Luis C.
554 A.2d 722 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1989)
In re Bruce R.
662 A.2d 107 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1995)
Schult v. Schult
699 A.2d 134 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1997)
In re Eden F.
738 A.2d 141 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1999)
In re Tabitha
664 A.2d 1168 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1995)
In re Eden F.
710 A.2d 771 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1998)
In re Lauren R.
715 A.2d 822 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1998)
In re Samantha B.
721 A.2d 1255 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1998)
In re Danuael D.
724 A.2d 546 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1999)
In re Hector L.
730 A.2d 106 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1999)
In re Carissa K.
740 A.2d 896 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1999)
In re Shyliesh H.
743 A.2d 165 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1999)
In re Alissa N.
742 A.2d 415 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1999)
In re Shane P.
754 A.2d 169 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2000)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 15330-z, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-brendan-d-fn1-nov-14-2002-connsuperct-2002.