In Re: Braxton
This text of In Re: Braxton (In Re: Braxton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
In Re: Asbestos Litigation ) ) ) C.A. No: N23C-02-129 ASB LADONNA SUE BRAXTON, ) Individually and as Independent ) Executrix of the Estate of MARVIN ) JERRY BRAXTON, JR., deceased, ) ) )
Submitted: October 24, 2021 Decided: December 17, 2024
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF MEMORY RETENTION EXPERT CHARLES WEAVING, III, PHD.
GRANTED
Michael C. Smith, Esquire, Balick & Balick, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Paul D. Sunshine, Esquire, Reger Rizzo & Darnall, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant
Jones, J. On October 9, 2024, Plaintiff Ladonna Sue Braxton (“Braxton”) filed a
Motion in Limine seeking to exclude the testimony of Dr. Charles Weaver (“Dr.
Weaver”) as an expert witness to describe and explain to the jury various factors that
have been demonstrated scientifically to compromise the reliability of eyewitness
memory. Braxton proffers that Dr. Weaver will apply such scientific factors to the
testimony of decedent Marvin Braxton.
Whether Dr. Weaver’s expert testimony should be admitted turns on whether
such testimony is relevant and reliable in assisting the trier of fact. Under RULE 702
OF THE DELAWARE RULES OF EVIDENCE, if scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education may testify if the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 1 When an
expert’s opinion is challenged, the trial judge acts as the gatekeeper and must
determine whether the expert testimony is both relevant and reliable. 2
JMM contends that Dr. Weaver’s testimony is admissible because it will assist
the jury to better understand the scientific principles that influence human memory
and guide the jury to apply such principles to Braxton’s testimony. JMM points to
1 D.R.E. 702. 2 Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582, 588 (Del.2000) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). 2 the fact that Dr. Weaver has been admitted to testify on similar principles in
approximately thirty-five (35) other cases.
Plaintiff counters that Dr. Weaver’s expert memory testimony is inadmissible
because it would not assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact at issue. Plaintiff notes that Dr. Weaver’s testimony goes to the credibility of
the witness—a question for the jury to determine at trial.
JMM asserts that Dr. Weaver will not comment on the credibility of
Braxton’s testimony but will instead provide the jury with an accurate framework
with which to evaluate Braxton’s memory. However, the framework JMM seeks to
provide through Dr. Weaver directly attacks Braxton’s ability to remember events
that occurred 30 to 40 years ago. In doing so, the framework attacks Braxton’s
ability to testify truthfully on such events, and thus undermines his credibility.
According to JMM, Dr. Weaver’s testimony will explain factors that impact the
reliability and accuracy of such memories and then relate these factors to Braxton’s
testimony.
“[E]xpert testimony impermissibly invades the province of the jury if it
embraces matters in which ‘the jury is just as competent as the expert to consider
and weigh the evidence and draw necessary conclusions.’”3 This Court has
previously precluded Dr. Weaver from testifying as an expert witness on memory,
3 Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 272–73 (Del.1987) (citing IBN–TAMAS v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632 (D.C. 1979)) (quoting Lampkins v. United States, 401 A.2d 966, 969 (D.C. 1979)). 3 finding that the testimony was “sufficiently within the common knowledge and
experience of the jury.” 4 Here, the testimony JMM proffers is the exact testimony
previously rejected by this Court on two prior occasions as invading the province of
the jury in considering and weighing the evidence.5 The Court again finds this
evidence is not relevant in assisting the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact at issue.
It is the jury’s role to assess a witness’ credibility. JMM may certainly attack
Braxton’s memory on cross examination and discuss evidence produced at trial
relating to this issue during closing argument; however, it may not use an expert
witness to do so.
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED.
/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr. Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge cc: File&ServeXpress
4 See in re: Asbestos Litigation, No. 032010JR Trial Grp., at 88 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2010) (p.88); CNH Indus. America LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2015 5145523 (Del. Super. 2015). 5 Id. 4
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