NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250893-U NOTICE Decision filed 03/25/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0893 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re BRANDI C., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Champaign County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 23-JA-91 ) Kelly S., ) Honorable ) Robert E. Jacobson, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hackett and Clarke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County that found the respondent mother unfit and terminated her parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and therefore, this court affirms the judgment.
¶2 The respondent, Kelly S. (Mother), contends the circuit court of Champaign County erred
when it entered a judgment that terminated Mother’s parental rights to the minor child, Brandi C.
(the minor), who was born in April of 2023. Specifically, Mother contests the circuit court’s
finding that Mother was unfit. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 23, 2023, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship (petition),
wherein it alleged that the minor was neglected because (1) she was “a newborn infant whose 1 blood, urine, or meconium contained any amount of a controlled substance or a metabolite of a
controlled substance, the presence of which was not the result of medical treatment administered
to” Mother or to the minor (count I) and (2) the minor’s environment was injurious to her welfare
when she was allowed to reside with Mother because the minor was exposed “to substance abuse”
(count II). Also on August 23, 2023, a shelter care hearing was held, 1 after which the circuit court
entered a temporary custody order in which it found there was probable cause to believe the minor
was neglected, and in which it noted that Mother appeared at the hearing with counsel and
stipulated to temporary custody being placed with the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS). The order admonished Mother to cooperate with DCFS.
¶5 On October 18, 2023, the circuit court entered an adjudicatory order in which it found the
minor was neglected because she was “exposed to illicit drugs.” The order stated that Mother
appeared in court and “knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily” admitted and stipulated to
count I of the petition. The order summarized the factual basis for its finding as follows: “The
minor was born [in April of 2023] and tested positive for cocaine, which was not the result of
medical treatment.” The order dismissed count II of the petition.
¶6 On November 14, 2023, the circuit court entered a dispositional order in which it found the
minor to be neglected, made her a ward of the court, and placed her in the custody and care of
DCFS. The court found Mother had “a long history of substance abuse and unsuccessful attempts
to address it.” The court further found Mother was “working on recovery,” but needed “time to
demonstrate a lasting commitment to that process.”
1 The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of this hearing, or of any other hearing prior to the adjudicatory/fitness hearing that began on July 14, 2025. 2 ¶7 On February 21, 2024, the circuit court entered a permanency order in which it selected a
permanency goal of the minor returning home within 12 months, and in which it found Mother
had made both reasonable efforts toward the return of the minor, and reasonable and substantial
progress toward the return of the minor. The order directed Mother to engage in “visitation,
maintain sobriety and maintain communication with the caseworker.” Custody and care of the
minor was continued with DCFS.
¶8 On May 16, 2024, the circuit court entered a permanency order in which it continued the
permanency goal of the minor returning home within 12 months, and in which it again found
Mother had made both reasonable efforts toward the return of the minor, and reasonable and
substantial progress toward the return of the minor. The order again directed Mother to engage in
“visitation, maintain sobriety and maintain communication with the caseworker.” Custody and
care of the minor was continued with DCFS. On August 16, 2024, the circuit court entered a
permanency order that was substantially similar to the previous two orders, again finding Mother
had made both reasonable efforts toward the return of the minor, and reasonable and substantial
progress toward the return of the minor.
¶9 On November 15, 2024, the circuit court entered a permanency order in which it continued
the permanency goal of the minor returning home within 12 months. However, the order declined
to make findings regarding Mother’s efforts or progress “due to filing of motion.” The motion in
question was the State’s motion seeking a finding of unfitness and termination of Mother’s parental
rights to the minor (motion), which was file stamped November 14, 2024, but which appears in
the record on appeal after the court’s November 15, 2024, permanency order. In the motion, the
State alleged Mother was unfit because she failed to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the
conditions that were the basis for the removal of the minor during the nine-month period following
3 the adjudication of neglect, which encompassed February 8, 2024, to November 8, 2024, and
(2) make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor during the same nine-month period.
¶ 10 A status hearing set for January 16, 2025, was continued to March 5, 2025. A docket entry
dated March 5, 2025, stated that “by agreement” the motion was “continued generally,” and the
cause was set for another permanency hearing on April 17, 2025. On April 17, 2025, the circuit
court entered a permanency order in which it continued the permanency goal of the minor returning
home within 12 months. The order found Mother had made reasonable efforts toward the return of
the minor, but had not made reasonable and substantial progress toward the return of the minor.
¶ 11 An adjudicatory/fitness hearing began on July 14, 2025. A transcript of the hearing is
included in the record on appeal. Detective Jim Kerner testified that he was employed by the
Urbana police department, and had been for approximately 18 years. He testified that on March
19, 2024, he assisted in the execution of a search warrant at a residence as part of “an investigation
into the sale of drugs.” Detective Kerner testified that he believed one of the residents of the home
was Mother’s paramour, who is the natural father of the minor in this case (Father). We note that
Father is not a party to this appeal, and we discuss him only as necessary for an understanding of
the issues raised by Mother on appeal. Detective Kerner testified that when he spoke with Father,
Father reported that he had “been using heroin for numerous years, consume[ed] the substance
daily, also use[d] crystal methamphetamine and cocaine occasionally.” Detective Kerner testified
that Father stated he had “been selling heroin for the past couple of months” and that Father “use[d]
the proceeds from selling heroin to pay his bills and to fund his own heroin habit.” He testified
that the search of the residence led to the discovery of “five lorazepam pills, which is a controlled
substance,” and to the discovery of “a couple of smoking devices for crack cocaine,” but “nothing
4 else to do with the sale of narcotics.” He agreed on cross-examination that no heroin was found,
and that tobacco or marijuana also could be smoked using the devices that were found.
¶ 12 Tracy Conroy testified that she was a clinical therapist at the Center for Youth and Family
Solutions, and that Mother was one of her clients. She testified that she began counseling Mother
in March of 2024 and continued through November of 2024. Conroy testified that the counseling
sessions were held in person and on a weekly basis. She testified that “[o]verall,” Mother attended
the sessions, not missing any in March, then missing one in April and two in May. Conroy testified
that she believed two sessions were canceled in June, one by her and the other by Mother. She
testified that Mother did not attend any sessions in July. She testified that Mother “missed a couple
sessions” during August, September, and October.
¶ 13 Conroy testified that during the sessions Mother attended, Mother engaged with Conroy
and was cooperative, and that Conroy did not have any concerns about Mother’s “treatment with
[Conroy].” Conroy testified that she developed concerns about domestic violence in Mother’s
relationship with Father. Conroy testified that she learned from Mother “[o]ver time” that there
was “psychological, financial, and physical” violence in the relationship. She testified that she
believed that Mother was not always forthcoming about her relationship with Father, which she
testified was not uncommon for victims of domestic abuse. She testified that she discussed with
Mother the possibility of Mother regaining custody of the minor, and that Mother “admitted that
she was also concerned for her daughter’s safety and she was making a plan to leave and then did
leave.”
¶ 14 Conroy testified that Mother left Father on November 8, 2024. She testified that Mother
told her that Father had lied to Mother about drug activity going on in the home they shared, but
that Mother did not learn of the lie until “[m]onths later,” when Mother was attending a court
5 hearing. Conroy testified that during the months she counseled Mother, “[t]here would be
occasions if [Mother] was struggling with something she would reach out to” Conroy between
their regular sessions. She testified that she discussed with Mother options that DCFS could
provide for “housing, employment assistance, things like that.”
¶ 15 On cross-examination, Conroy testified that Mother lived with Father from February 8,
2024, to November 8, 2024, the time period in question. She testified that she was concerned about
Mother’s sobriety during that time. Conroy testified that Mother told her that Father forced Mother
to lie to police about someone else who was staying in the home, that Mother “was not allowed to
answer the door while she lived” in the home, and that Father forced Mother to give him money
she earned from her job. Conroy testified that she informed Mother that she believed living with
Father “would hurt her ability to have her daughter return home,” and also jeopardized Mother’s
safety. She testified that Mother acknowledged that if returned, the minor “would be in harm’s
way.” She testified that “multiple times across multiple sessions” she encouraged Mother to leave
Father, and that Mother seemed to understand Conroy’s concerns. Conroy testified that she told
Mother that she could not recommend that the circuit court return the minor to Mother’s custody
while Mother was living with Father because she did not believe that was safe.
¶ 16 Conroy agreed that victims of domestic violence often take a long time to leave their
partners, if they leave them at all, and that it is not uncommon “for a victim of domestic violence
to take several months to even comprehend that they are in a violent relationship.” Conroy testified
that Mother had “made significant progress” in her mental health during the course of their
sessions, leading up to November 8, 2024. She testified that Mother had built her confidence, and
that beginning “[a]round October” of 2024, Conroy began to see signs that Mother was going to
leave Father, which Mother did on November 8, 2024.
6 ¶ 17 Ashler Uebele testified that she was a child welfare specialist with DCFS. She testified that
she became Mother’s caseworker in October of 2023 and remained so as of the date of the hearing.
Uebele testified that Mother and Father lived together in two different homes from February 8,
2024, to November 8, 2024. She testified that on two occasions, Mother denied Uebele access to
the first of the homes to conduct a safety check, once “as a result of still being in boxes,” and the
second time because “of the carpeting being in an unseemly state.” When Mother and Father
moved to a mobile home in April of 2024, Uebele inspected the home and submitted “an
application for housing advocacy” on behalf of Mother and Father, to help them afford a better
residence.
¶ 18 Uebele testified that from December of 2023 to October of 2024, Mother had supervised
visitation with the minor for two hours twice a week. She testified that in October of 2024,
visitation was still supervised but “progressed into the community” for two hours twice a week.
She testified that visitation did not take place in Mother’s home, and Mother never progressed
beyond supervised visits. She testified that the minor was sometimes given gifts at visits, but that
she did not know if the gifts came from Mother or Father or both. Uebele testified that Mother was
more cooperative than Father with regard to completing the services in her DCFS service plan,
and that because Mother and Father lived together during the time in question, Uebele had
discussions with Mother about Father’s lack of progress “holding her back or *** being imputed
onto her.” Uebele testified that “around October of 2024,” Conroy told Uebele about the domestic
violence issues, and that Uebele discussed them with Mother.
¶ 19 Uebele testified that Mother cooperated with “drug drops” following a substance abuse
assessment. She testified that Mother was “able to be reached” and stayed in contact with Uebele,
and reiterated that Mother participated in visits with the minor. She testified that Mother never
7 progressed beyond supervised visits during the time period of February 8, 2024, to November 8,
2024, because of the “ongoing concerns regarding [Father’s] engagement with his services and the
ongoing drug concerns with [Father].” She added that it was also because Mother and Father
“continued to be a single parental unit through being in a continued romantic relationship,” and so
DCFS “continued having their visitation be together.” She testified that she discussed this with
Mother, but she could not remember when that discussion occurred.
¶ 20 Uebele testified that during a meeting in August of 2024 about a pending possible eviction
of Mother and Father, “we started a discussion about the fact that they were linked as a single
parental unit and that *** [Father’s] lack of engagement in his services meant that there was
potential that they could have their parental rights terminated together without a separation in the
relationship.” She testified that in addition to Mother’s visitation with the minor, “[t]here was quite
a bit of friendly communication between [Mother] and the foster parents that [took place] through
the form of a notebook and sometime cards and gifts in a backpack that went—stayed with [the
minor] to and from her day-care.” When asked if there was ever a time that DCFS was “close” to
returning the minor to Mother’s care, Uebele testified, “No.” When asked why not, she answered,
“Due to the ongoing concerns with the lack of engagement in services and the ongoing drug usage
by [Father] and the fact that they continued to be in a romantic relationship, they were considered
a single parental unit.”
¶ 21 On cross-examination, Uebele testified that her concerns about the first residence she
inspected, where Mother and Father lived until they moved to the mobile home, included a “strong
smell of tobacco residue as a result of multiple years of smoking cigarettes within the home ***
as well as clutter and overall upkeep of the home.” She testified that the minor could not have been
returned to that residence. She testified that her concerns about the mobile home again included “a
8 strong smell as a result of consistent tobacco smoking within the home *** as well as some issues
of clutter and residue.” She testified that based on the possible eviction she learned about in August
of 2024, she had concerns about Mother and Father having stable housing for the return of the
minor.
¶ 22 Uebele testified that prior to November 8, 2024, she had multiple conversations with
Mother, informing Mother of the possible consequences if Mother did not separate from Father.
She testified that she and Mother discussed “a plan” for Mother to leave Father, and that Uebele
told Mother about agencies that could provide support for her. She testified that Mother still lived
with Father “by November 8, 2024,” and that as of that date, Mother and Father did not “have safe
and stable housing for [the minor] to return home.” She testified that the fact that Mother and
Father still lived “together as of November 8, 2024,” impeded Mother’s “progress towards herself
achieving the return home goal.”
¶ 23 When cross-examined by Mother’s counsel, Uebele agreed that although Mother missed a
drug drop on August 30, 2024, Mother had completed three negative drug drops prior to that, and
then completed seven negative drug drops after that. She thereafter agreed that Mother “never had
a positive drop the entire relevant time period.” She clarified that her ongoing concerns about drug
use in the home related only to Father, not to Mother. She agreed that as of November 8, 2024,
Mother “was essentially geared up to be successfully discharged from substance abuse
[treatment],” had completed her parenting education requirements, was completing random drug
drops, and showed “[n]o outward signs of use, no erratic behavior.” She further agreed that Mother
had been in counseling continuously since March of 2024, never missed visits with the minor, and
had positive interactions with the minor during visits. Uebele agreed that visits could have taken
place in Mother’s home if that “home had been appropriate and there were no other parties within
9 the home that [DCFS] had concerns about.” Following Uebele’s testimony, the State rested. The
hearing was recessed after being scheduled to resume on August 25, 2025.
¶ 24 When the hearing resumed on August 25, 2025, the remaining parties declined to present
evidence, and the case proceeded to arguments. Mother’s counsel argued that she agreed that
Father was unfit, but that his unfitness should not be imputed to Mother, because the circuit court
was required to “make individualized determinations.” Counsel also argued that Mother left Father
on November 8, 2024, the final day of the reporting period in question, which showed “substantial
progress” toward the return of the minor. Counsel added that she believed Mother’s
“acknowledgement of the underlying violence that was in her relationship that she just was not
aware of until she processed it with Ms. Conroy shows drastic understanding of the issues and
shows drastic responsibility assumption, all of which is progress in this case.” She argued that even
if Mother was not “close” to regaining custody of the minor on November 8, 2024, Mother did
leave Father that day, and therefore Mother regaining custody of the minor “could have been a
possibility shortly thereafter.”
¶ 25 At the conclusion of the arguments, the circuit court stated that it found that “[t]his case
came into existence because [the minor] *** tested positive for cocaine at the time of her birth,”
which meant that “there were issues right from the start in terms of substance abuse issues by
[Mother and Father], their relationship with each other and everything that that entailed.” The court
found Mother made reasonable efforts toward the return of the minor, but did not make reasonable
progress during the nine-month time frame. The court noted that Mother’s efforts were all made
“in the context of continuing to live with someone who was still using drugs *** somebody who
clearly wasn’t providing financial stability, somebody who wasn’t being a supportive co-parent in
terms of visits with” the minor.
10 ¶ 26 The court found that with regard to reasonable progress, “that’s not a subjective standard.
It’s an objective standard.” The court noted that Mother’s counsel “correctly pointed out that the
court should make individualized findings. So, it’s not a matter of because one parent is unfit,
therefore the other parent is unfit.” The court stated that it was required to look at the nine-month
period alleged in the motion, which was February 8, 2024, to November 8, 2024, and that the court
could not “take into account *** a few months after that.” The court stated that “certainly in the
early parts of that nine-month period,” Mother’s “attendance at counseling was very sporadic.”
The court posited that if Mother “had been much more engaged and consistent in counseling right
from the start, maybe she would have been able to come to some realizations about domestic
violence and [Father] sooner than what she did, maybe much earlier in the nine-month period.”
The court added that “[m]aybe she would have moved out, separated from him much earlier,
realized that she couldn’t ever be in a spot to co-parent with him, at least based on the lack of
efforts and progress he was making.” The court noted that it did not know if that would have made
a difference, but added that “despite some of the realizations she was making” in counseling,
Mother did not move out until November 8, 2024.
¶ 27 The circuit court stated that because of that, Mother “was never in a residence in that 9-
month period where [DCFS] felt like it would be safe for [the minor] to even have visits at the
residence *** let alone to return [the minor] to her care.” The court added that, “as a result,
[Mother] was in a position where visits could never even progress beyond supervised visits, again,
during that nine-month period.” The court reiterated that “it’s absolutely true that just because one
parent is found unfit, doesn’t mean that the other parent is found unfit.” The court also reiterated,
however, that the fact that Mother chose to stay with Father and did not move out until the last day
of the nine-month period “directly relates to the progress that can be made or an impediment to
11 that progress that can be made.” The court thereafter found Mother unfit for failure to make
reasonable progress toward the return home of the child.
¶ 28 On October 29, 2025, a best interest hearing was held. Because Mother does not challenge
the best interest findings, we do not describe the hearing in detail. We note, however, that
testimony adduced at the hearing indicated that the minor had special needs that were “both
developmental and medical,” and that those needs were being met in the minor’s foster home
setting. We note as well that testimony was adduced about contact, in March or April of 2025,
between Mother and Father after Mother left Father on November 8, 2024. After hearing testimony
and argument, the circuit court stated that it had considered the requisite statutory factors, which
the court discussed in extensive detail in relation to Mother and in relation to the minor’s foster
family. In response to argument from the parties, the court stated that it did “not believe that if
[Mother’s] parental rights were not terminated today that a return home for [the minor] to [Mother]
would be imminent.” The court added that it believed some of Mother’s behaviors were still
“problematic,” including the fact that she did not disclose the contact she had with Father after
November 8, 2024, until “after the fact,” and the fact that in a recent psychological examination in
preparation for the hearing, Mother continued to “minimiz[e] how this case came into existence;
minimiz[e] what, why the case is still at this point, or how it got to this point ***; minimiz[e] past
legal issues; [and] minimiz[e] past drug use.”
¶ 29 The circuit court related these observations to the best interest factor of permanence, and
added that the court did not “believe that [Mother] would be in a position to provide permanence
for [the minor] at any point that could be considered imminent by any *** definition.” The court
added that Mother’s present situation was “such a huge contrast with what the foster parents are
able to provide, what they have provided, what they’ve expressed that they’re willing to provide.”
12 Thereafter, the circuit court found that the State had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that it was in the minor’s best interests for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. This timely
appeal followed.
¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 31 Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their
children. See, e.g., In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 363 (2004). The involuntary termination of parental
rights under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2024)) is a two-step
process. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20. The State must first prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent is unfit under any of the discrete and independent grounds listed in section
1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)). In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20; In re
C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 217 (2002) (“the grounds set forth in section 1(D) each provide a discrete
basis for a finding of unfitness.”). Although the State may rely on several grounds in its motion to
terminate parental rights, a finding adverse to the parent on any single ground is sufficient to
support a subsequent termination of parental rights. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 217. In other words,
“only one ground of [parental] unfitness need be proved to find a parent unfit.” In re J.P., 261 Ill.
App. 3d 165, 174 (1994).
¶ 32 If the circuit court finds that a parent is unfit, the matter proceeds to a second hearing, at
which the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interests of the
minor children to terminate parental rights. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 352, 366. At this stage of the
proceedings, the court’s focus necessarily shifts to the best interests of the children and away from
the rights of the parent. In re P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027, ¶ 30. “The parent’s interest in
maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home
life” (In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364), because a prompt, just, and final resolution of a child’s status,
13 as opposed to having that status remain in limbo, is in the child’s interests. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d
1, 13 (2000).
¶ 33 On appeal, this court accords great deference to the circuit court’s decisions in termination
proceedings because the circuit court is in a better position to observe witnesses and to judge their
credibility. In re Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53. This court does not reweigh the evidence
or reassess the credibility of witnesses. In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391 (2001). Unless the
circuit court’s findings of parental unfitness or the child’s best interest are against the manifest
weight of the evidence, this court will not disturb the circuit court’s findings. In re A.W., 231 Ill.
2d 92, 104 (2008). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite
conclusion is clearly apparent or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the
evidence presented. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498 (2002).
¶ 34 In this case, one of the alleged statutory grounds of unfitness was Mother’s failure to make
“reasonable progress” toward the return of the child during any nine-month period following the
adjudication of neglect. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024). “Reasonable progress” is judged
by an objective standard focused on the goal of returning the child to the parent. In re D.D., 309
Ill. App. 3d 581, 589 (2000). The “benchmark” for measuring reasonable progress includes
“compliance with the service plans and the court’s directives, in light of the condition which gave
rise to the removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which later become known and
which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.” In re C.N., 196
Ill. 2d 181, 216-17 (2001). “At a minimum, reasonable progress requires measurable or
demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052,
1067 (2006). A parent has made reasonable progress when the circuit court, “in the near future,
14 will be able to order the child returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis in original.) In re L.L.S.,
218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461 (1991).
¶ 35 As explained above, the circuit court in this case found that Mother was unfit due to her
failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor during the nine-month time
period of February 8, 2024, to November 8, 2024. On appeal, Mother contends the circuit court’s
finding that she was unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Mother
contends the circuit court erred because she “undeniably made reasonable progress toward
reunification” during the nine-month period. She argues that “[s]he progressed from captivity in a
domestically violent relationship, through awakening to its existence and significance for both her
and [the minor], to escape from it, all while maintaining a regular and positive relationship with
her daughter, completion or near-completion of services, maintenance of sobriety, and consistent
and cooperative relationships with both counselor and caseworker.” Mother notes some of the
evidence, and the circuit court’s observations regarding it, and posits that the circuit court’s
analysis indicates “the application of a subjective standard for the measurement of progress:
whether or not a parent might have made more or faster progress had she only done this or that
differently” rather than the required objective standard. She argues that when an objective standard
is employed, she “clearly made” measurable or demonstrable movement toward reunification with
the minor.
¶ 36 We do not agree that the circuit court’s finding that Mother was unfit was in error. As the
State aptly notes, Mother was required by her service plans, among other things, to obtain and keep
appropriate housing for the minor, which Mother did not do during the nine-month period. Indeed,
Uebele testified that Mother still lived with Father “by November 8, 2024,” and that as of that date,
Mother and Father did not “have safe and stable housing for [the minor] to return home.” The
15 circuit court made a specific finding that because Mother did not move out of the residence she
shared with Father until the last day of the time period in question, Mother “was never in a
residence in that nine-month period where [DCFS] felt like it would be safe for [the minor] to even
have visits at the residence *** let alone to return [the minor] to her care.”
¶ 37 Uebele also testified that Mother never progressed beyond supervised visits during the time
period of February 8, 2024, to November 8, 2024, because of the “ongoing concerns regarding
[Father’s] engagement with his services and the ongoing drug concerns with [Father].” The circuit
court also made a specific finding about this issue, noting that because Mother remained in a live-
in relationship with Father, Mother “was in a position where visits could never even progress
beyond supervised visits, again, during that nine-month period.” The court reiterated that “it’s
absolutely true that just because one parent is found unfit, doesn’t mean that the other parent is
found unfit,” but also reiterated that the fact that Mother chose to continue to live with Father and
did not move out until the last day of the nine-month period “directly relates to the progress that
can be made or an impediment to that progress that can be made.”
¶ 38 We also do not agree that the circuit court utilized a subjective standard when evaluating
Mother’s progress. First, the circuit court specifically stated that the proper standard was an
objective one, which was correct, and we presume that the circuit court not only knows the law,
but also that it follows the law, unless the record indicates otherwise. See, e.g., In re Alexander R.,
377 Ill. App. 3d 553, 556 (2007) (appellate court presumes circuit court knows and follows the
law unless the record indicates otherwise). Second, the circuit court specifically stated that it did
not know if things would have been different if Mother had left Father sooner, only that possibly
they could have been. This statement was not inappropriate, particularly when it came, as it did in
16 this case, moments after the circuit court stated that it was required to look at the nine-month period
alleged in the motion, and could not “take into account *** a few months after that.”
¶ 39 We note as well that at the outset of its ruling, the circuit court stated that it found that
“[t]his case came into existence because [the minor] *** tested positive for cocaine at the time of
her birth,” which meant that “there were issues right from the start in terms of substance abuse
issues by [Mother and Father], their relationship with each other and everything that that entailed.”
This was an accurate statement, and provided the context for the court’s findings and rulings that
followed, because as long as Mother continued to live with Father—and as long as Father
continued his drug use and his inactivity with regard to his own service plans—there would be
tremendous obstacles to the return of the minor. Taken as a whole, the foregoing evidence
demonstrates that despite Mother leaving Father on the final day of the nine-month period, “in the
near future” the circuit court would not be able to order the minor returned to Mother’s custody,
and thus Mother failed to make reasonable progress. See In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461
(1991). In reaching this conclusion, we reiterate that the circuit court was in the best position to
judge the credibility of the witnesses (see In re Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53), and that
we will not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of those witnesses. In re M.A., 325 Ill.
App. 3d 387, 391 (2001). The opposite conclusion to that reached by the circuit court in this case
is not clearly apparent, and the circuit court’s determination is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or not
based on the evidence presented; accordingly, the circuit court’s finding is not against the manifest
weight of the evidence (see In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498 (2002)), and we will not disturb it.
In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 104 (2008). Because Mother does not challenge the best interest findings
in this case, we affirm those findings of the circuit court as well. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff.
17 Oct. 1, 2020) (points not argued in appellant’s opening brief are forfeited and may not be raised in
reply brief, oral argument, or on petition for rehearing).
¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 41 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign
County.
¶ 42 Affirmed.