In Re Braderick Gerlmaine Tanner v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 31, 2025
• Docket: 13-25-00382-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-25-00382-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE BRADERICK GERLMAINE TANNER

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca1

Braderick Gerlmaine Tanner has filed a pro se pleading in this Court. Tanner’s

pleading is titled as a “Motion for Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment” and appears to allege error

regarding a motion to recuse, typographical errors, the alteration of a plea agreement,

and the duty to rule on a pending motion. In this pleading, Tanner seeks relief against the

trial judge and the district clerk.2 Tanner does not have a pending appeal in this Court

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions). 2 Tanner’s request for relief arises from trial court cause number 2101-10789 in the 24th District

Court of Jackson County, Texas. Tanner has already pursued a direct appeal from that cause number; and he does not reference a final judgment that is subject to appeal or a separately

appealable interlocutory order. Accordingly, we liberally construe his pro se pleading as

a petition for writ of mandamus. See generally Tex. R. App. P. 25.2 (governing the

perfection of appeal in criminal cases), 52 (describing the requirements for filing original

proceedings); In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 189 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. App.—Tyler

2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (“The function of the writ of mandamus is to

compel action by those who by virtue of their official or quasi-official positions are charged

with a positive duty to act.”). As construed, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus in

part and dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction in part.

In a criminal case, to be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must establish

both that the act sought to be compelled is a ministerial act not involving a discretionary

or judicial decision and that there is no adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged

harm. See In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (orig. proceeding);

In re Harris, 491 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam);

In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If the

relator fails to meet both requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus should be

denied. See State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d

207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding).

It is the relator’s burden to properly request and show entitlement to mandamus

relief. See id.; In re Pena, 619 S.W.3d 837, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021,

however, we note that he is identified in the related appeal as “Bradrick” Gerlmaine Tanner. See Tanner v. State, No. 13-22-00099-CR, 2024 WL 193722, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 18, 2024), rev'd, 707 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).

2 orig. proceeding); see also Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“Even a pro se applicant for a writ of

mandamus must show himself entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks.”). This burden

includes providing a sufficient record to establish the right to mandamus relief. In re

Schreck, 642 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, orig. proceeding); In re Pena,

619 S.W.3d at 839; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A) (delineating the required form

and content for a petition in an original proceeding), 52.7(a) (providing that the relator

“must file” a record including specific matters).

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,

is of the opinion that Tanner has not met his burden to obtain relief against the judge of

the trial court. To the extent that Tanner seeks relief against the district clerk, our

mandamus jurisdiction does not extend to the district clerk unless it is necessary to

enforce our jurisdiction, and this case presents no such circumstances. See TEX. GOV’T

CODE ANN. § 22.221(a), (b); In re Shugart, 528 S.W.3d 794, 796 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2017, orig. proceeding); In re Potts, 357 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding); In re Revels, 420 S.W.3d 42, 43 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011,

orig. proceeding). Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus in part as to the

judge of the trial court and dismiss it in part as to the district clerk for lack of jurisdiction.

YSMAEL D. FONSECA Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the 31st day of July, 2025. 3