In re B.R.

2025 Ohio 599

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 24, 2025
• Docket: 3-24-23; 3-24-24; 3-24-25
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re B.R., 2025-Ohio-599.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT CRAWFORD COUNTY

IN RE: CASE NO. 3-24-23 B.R.,

ADJUDGED DEPENDENT CHILD. OPINION [AMANDA R. - APPELLANT]

IN RE: CASE NO. 3-24-24 J.R.,

ADJUDGED NEGLECTED CHILD. OPINION [AMANDA R. - APPELLANT]

IN RE: CASE NO. 3-24-25 G.D.,

Appeals from Crawford County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court Nos. 2235089, 2235075 and 2235074

Judgments Reversed and Causes Remanded

Date of Decision: February 24, 2025 Case Nos. 3-24-23, 24, 25

APPEARANCES:

Thomas L. Erb for Appellant

Michael J. Wiener for Appellee

ZIMMERMAN, J.

{¶1} Mother-appellant, Amanda R. (“Amanda”), appeals the August 14,

2024 decisions of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division,

granting permanent custody of her minor children, B.R., J.R., and G.D., to appellee,

Crawford County Job and Family Services (the “agency”). For the reasons that

follow, we reverse.

{¶2} The minor children involved in these proceedings are B.R. (born in

2010), child of Amanda and Ernest T. (“Ernest”); J.R. (born in 2017), child of

Amanda and Kelly J. (“Kelly”); and G.D. (born in 2022), child of Amanda and Tyler

D. (“Tyler”).1 The underlying actions commenced on July 28, 2023, with the

agency’s filing of complaints alleging neglect as to J.R. and G.D. On the basis of

its July 28, 2023 complaints, the agency moved the trial court for an order of

emergency temporary custody of J.R. and G.D. The trial court granted the requested

relief.

1 Despite being properly served with notice, neither Ernest nor Kelly participated in the trial court proceedings.

-2- Case Nos. 3-24-23, 24, 25

{¶3} Following a probable cause hearing held on July 31, 2023, the trial court

found probable cause to believe J.R. and G.D. were neglected children and

determined that their best interests were served by remaining in the temporary

custody of the agency.

{¶4} On August 21, 2023, the trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing,

at which time J.R. and G.D. were adjudicated neglected children. Pursuant to this

adjudication, the trial court granted temporary custody to a suitable relative.

Subsequently, following a hearing on October 5, 2023, the trial court modified the

prior order, granting temporary custody to the agency due to the relative’s

notification that they could no longer provide care for the children.

{¶5} On September 20, 2023, the agency filed a separate complaint alleging

dependency as to B.R., who was then in the legal custody of another individual.

Following a hearing on October 5, 2023, B.R. was adjudicated dependent and placed

in the agency’s temporary custody. B.R. was subsequently placed in a qualified

treatment program.

{¶6} On July 28, 2023, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”)

to represent J.R. and G.D. The GAL filed reports on June 10, 2024, recommending

that permanent custody of J.R. and G.D. be granted to the agency due to Amanda’s

lack of participation in recommended services. Throughout the pendency of the

cases, the agency filed case plans and semi-annual reviews with the trial court.

-3- Case Nos. 3-24-23, 24, 25

{¶7} On April 26, 2024, the agency filed motions in the trial court seeking

permanent custody of B.R., J.R., and G.D. In their motions, the agency alleged that

the children had not been in the temporary custody of the agency for 12 or more

months of a consecutive 22-month period and that the children could not or should

not be placed with their parents because their parents failed continuously and

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions necessitating their removal from

the home.

{¶8} Subsequent to a permanent custody hearing held on June 18, 2024, the

agency, in accordance with the trial court’s order, filed a supplemental report in each

respective case on August 1, 2024, documenting additional home visits and

discussions with Amanda regarding efforts to address the identified issues.2

Amanda did not file a response to the supplemental report.

{¶9} On August 14, 2024, in a vacuous entry in which the trial court did not

explicitly state its requisite findings with respect to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) or (D), the

trial court nevertheless granted permanent custody of B.R., J.R., and G.D. to the

agency.3 See In re Sanders Children, 2004-Ohio-5878, ¶ 71 (5th Dist.)

(emphasizing that the better practice remains for a trial court to make an explicit

finding that recites the relevant language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)); In re L.W., 2017-

Ohio-4352, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.) (addressing the trial court’s failure to “specifically address

2 Though properly notified, Tyler did not appear at the permanent-custody hearing. 3 The trial court filed nunc pro tunc judgment entries on August 26, 2024 to correct a clerical error.

-4- Case Nos. 3-24-23, 24, 25

the factors or even indicate that it had specifically considered the factors set forth in

R.C. 2151.414(D)”).

{¶10} On September 10, 2024, Amanda filed her notices of appeal and this

court consolidated the cases for purposes of appeal.4 Amanda raises three

assignments of error for our review. Because it is dispositive, we will begin with

Amanda’s third assignment of error.

Third Assignment of Error

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Evidence Following Permanent Custody Hearing.

{¶11} In her third assignment of error, Amanda argues that the trial court

erred by admitting the agency’s August 1, 2024 supplemental report. Specifically,

Amanda contends that the report’s inclusion of evidence concerning her lack of

securing housing and employment, presented after the permanent custody hearing,

precluded her opportunity to respond and directly affected the outcome of the

proceedings.

Standard of Review

{¶12} The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion

of the trial court. In re S.L., 2016-Ohio-5000, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.). See also In re M.G.,

2023-Ohio-1316, ¶ 34 (12th Dist.) (noting that the abuse-of-discretion standard

applies in permanent custody cases). Consequently, an appellate court will not

4 Neither Ernest, Kelly, nor Tyler filed a notice of appeal.

-5- Case Nos. 3-24-23, 24, 25

disturb a trial court’s evidentiary rulings absent a finding that the court abused its

discretion. In re S.L. at ¶ 24. An abuse of discretion is demonstrated when the trial

court’s decision is deemed unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Id., citing

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

{¶13} However, because Amanda did not object to the admission of the

agency’s supplemental report, she has waived all but plain error on appeal. Accord

In re M.G. at ¶ 34. “A finding of plain error is strictly limited, extremely rare, and

occurs only in exceptional circumstances.” Id. See also In re K.R., 2016-Ohio-

2775, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.) (acknowledging that “[t]he plain error doctrine is not favored

in civil cases”). “This is because the plain error doctrine implicates only those errors

‘that are “obvious and prejudicial although neither objected to nor affirmatively

waived which, if permitted, would have a material adverse [e]ffect on the character

and public confidence in judicial proceedings.”’” In re M.G. at ¶ 34, quoting In re

J.M., 2019-Ohio-3716, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.), quoting Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70

Ohio St.2d 207, 209 (1982).

Analysis

{¶14} Having carefully considered the entirety of the record before this

court, we conclude that this case presents an extraordinary set of circumstances that

severely compromise the legitimacy of the underlying judicial proceedings. That

is, based on the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court’s

-6- Case Nos. 3-24-23, 24, 25

admission of the agency’s August 1, 2024 supplemental report constitutes plain

error.

{¶15} Generally, following a permanent custody hearing, the trial court

retains discretion to allow either party to present further evidence, even after the

parties have rested their cases. In re C.P., 2010-Ohio-346, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.). See

also Mills v. Mills, 2003-Ohio-6676, ¶ 48 (11th Dist.) (“‘It is within the discretion

of the trial court to permit either party to introduce evidence after both sides have

rested.”’), quoting Huebner v. Miles, 92 Ohio App.3d 493, 504 (12th Dist. 1993).

This authority derives from the court’s inherent authority to control its docket and

to ensure the fair and efficient administration of justice. In re C.P. at ¶ 20. Judicial

determinations that impact the course of trial proceedings will not be overturned

absent a showing of “a prejudicial abuse of discretion.” Holm v. Smilowitz, 83 Ohio

App.3d 757, 772 (4th Dist. 1992). Again, “[a]n abuse of discretion connotes more

than an error of law or judgment; it implies an unreasonable arbitrary or

unconscionable attitude.” Id.

{¶16} Here, the post-trial submission of the supplemental report severely

prejudiced Amanda’s ability to defend her parental rights. Importantly, the trial

court’s decision permitting the post-trial filing fundamentally undermined the

fairness of the hearing and violated Amanda’s due process rights, particularly

because the court relied on the report in rendering its decision. See In re McLemore,

2004-Ohio-680, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.).

-7- Case Nos. 3-24-23, 24, 25

{¶17} Indeed, in this case, Amanda was denied a meaningful opportunity to

respond to the report’s contents, effectively precluding her from investigating the

report’s findings and challenging the report’s credibility and accuracy. Specifically,

Amanda was unable to thoroughly investigate the report’s findings, including

interviewing witnesses identified within, obtaining expert opinions to counter the

report’s conclusions, and gathering supporting evidence to rebut its allegations.

Likewise, the post-trial submission deprived Amanda of the crucial ability to cross-

examine the individuals who authored or contributed to the report, identify and

address potential biases or errors, and effectively challenge the credibility and

accuracy of the information presented.

{¶18} Moreover, the post-trial submission created an imbalance in the

presentation of evidence. Significantly, the agency had the benefit of presenting its

most recent findings while Amanda was denied the opportunity to adequately

respond and present a counterargument. This imbalance severely prejudiced

Amanda and undermined the fundamental principles of fairness and impartiality that

must underpin all judicial proceedings.

{¶19} Consequently, the agency’s post-trial submission of the supplemental

report not only denied Amanda a fair hearing but also erodes public trust in the

integrity of the judicial process. Thus, the trial court’s post-trial admission of the

supplemental report was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Accordingly,

we conclude that the trial court’s admission of the supplemental report constituted

-8- Case Nos. 3-24-23, 24, 25

a prejudicial abuse of discretion and constitutes plain error. See In re McLemore,

2004-Ohio-680, at ¶ 13 (10th Dist.).

{¶20} For these reasons, Amanda’s third assignment of error is sustained.

First Assignment of Error

The Award of Permanent Custody To The State Of Ohio Was Against The Sufficiency Of The Evidence.

Second Assignment of Error

Mother Received Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel, And But For Counsel’s Actions Or Inactions The Result Of The Permanent Custody Hearing Would Have Been Different.

{¶21} In her first assignment of error, Amanda argues that the trial court

erred by granting permanent custody of B.R., J.R., and G.D. to the agency. She

further asserts in her second assignment of error that her trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of two reports: the

agency’s supplemental report, filed on August 1, 2024, and Dr. David J.

Tennenbaum’s, Ph.D., report, disclosed contemporaneously with the permanent

custody hearing. However, based on our resolution of Amanda’s third assignment

of error, Amanda’s arguments in her first and second assignments of error are

rendered moot and we decline to address them. Accord In re Y.H., 2023-Ohio-2272,

¶ 38 (1st Dist.); In re C.S., 2017-Ohio-4345, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.); App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

-9- Case Nos. 3-24-23, 24, 25

{¶22} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars

assigned and argued in the third assignment of error, we reverse the judgments of

the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WALDICK, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

/hls

-10-