In Re Bowling

64 B.R. 710, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5428
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedAugust 27, 1986
Docket19-40324
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 64 B.R. 710 (In Re Bowling) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Bowling, 64 B.R. 710, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5428 (Mo. 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FRANK W. KOGER, Bankruptcy Judge.

HISTORY

Robert A. Bowling and Gladys M. Bowling filed their joint petition under Chapter 11 in 1984. In 1985 a plan of reorganization was proposed and a hearing seems to have been held on the matter as to confirmation. However, the record is silent as to what occurred. In any event, no confirmation order was ever entered by the Honorable Joel Pelofsky and this Court inherited the case on February 14, 1986.

On or about the first day of May, 1986, debtors applied for permission to participate in the “new” dairy diversion program, hereinafter “dairy termination program”, 7 U.S.C. Section 1446(d)(3)(A)(i). The Court issued an order to the creditors to show cause, if any they had, why the application should not be granted. No cause was shown, and permission was granted. Debtors were selected to participate in said program; branded their cows; sent them to slaughter; and received $13,773.72 as slaughter price on the cattle secured to Boatmen’s Bank. That money was paid to Boatmen’s Bank and has been applied against the secured note.

Pursuant to the dairy termination program, debtors then received $83,707.20 (or 80%) of the total award they are to get and they will receive $5,231.70 each year for four years until they have received the full sum of $104,634.00 to be paid. The funds so far received have been paid into a money market fund and held for order by this Court.

Debtors owned and operated a 57 acre dairy farm. The ground has been operated some ten years by the debtors as a dairy farm and was likewise operated by Mr. Bowling’s father before debtors purchased it from him. The Boatmen’s Bank has three deeds of trust against the real estate, which in addition to the farm, included another six acres with a ‘rent’ house on it Boatmen’s also had a perfected security interest in the farm equipment, and 41 cows, 13 heifers and 4 calves. At a hearing in September of 1985, Judge Pelofsky had determined the following values:

ITEM VALUE
57 acre farm $26,000.00
6 acres and house 18,000.00
farm equipment 2,700.00
cattle secured to bank 28,575.00
undersecured amount owed to Boatmens 28,000.00

As to the dairy termination program, a brief summary may outline the program as to practical results and practical programs. Under a formula set up by the Food Security Act, 7 U.S.C. Section 1446(d)(3)(A)(i) of 1985, selected dairymen were allowed to participate. They were required to slaughter all their dairy cows, cease all dairy operations, both personally and on the real estate where their milk barn had been located. .This ban against personal participation in dairy operations was absolute, except for day labor without interest in the operation, for a period of five years. The prohibition against use of the “milk facility” portion of the real property (or use of any personal property for dairying on the real property) is likewise absolute for a period of five years.

Participation by the farmer in any dairj operation anywhere (other than as a salaried employee without any interest in the *712 operation) or use of the real estate for any type of dairying operation by anyone, within five years, was and is a direct violation of the act. Such acts may result in a forfeiture of all money paid or to be paid under the act. The government may sue the farmer to recover the money already received. It is, therefore, clear that there are two encumbrances on the money paid: first — the labor factor directly attributable to the farmer and controllable by him; second — the use of the real estate by any one and controllable by the farmer only so long as he owns and controls the real estate. The farmer may draw down up to 80% of the funds immediately and 5% per year thereafter or may draw down a smaller immediate payment and a larger payment per year for four years.

The questions presented to the Court for decision are as follows:

1. Are the funds realized by a dairy farmer in Chapter 11 from the dairy termination program property of the estate?

2. If they are property of the estate—
(A) To whom should the slaughter money be paid, the farmer or the lien-holder?
(B) To whom should the initial payment and the annual payments be attributed?
(I) the farmer?
(II) the lienholder on the cattle?
(III) the lienholder on the milking equipment?
(IY) the lienholder on the real estate?

3. Does the Court have the ability to impress (in effect) a covenant running with the land on the real estate if it is sold or foreclosed?

4. What restrictions should the Court apply to the money paid to and received by the debtor-farmer?

DISCUSSION _

The answer to Question 1 above is the easiest to formulate. Property of the estate is defined in Section 541(a)(6) as “proceeds, product, offspring, rents and profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case”. Further, Section 541(a)(7) adds a further definition: “any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case”. Rather clearly the money received from the ASC Dairy Termination Program falls within the quoted sections. Debtors’ counsel, sans citation or development, makes the argument that the funds come from a contract that is a covenant not to compete and that the contract involves the personal services of the debtor. Were such a contention sound, the Court would be faced with a far different problem. Debtor is not required to abstain from working in any dairy operation and he can go to work tomorrow in any phase of dairying as long as he has no ownership interest. Furthermore, the obtaining of the funds also rests upon the slaughter of the herd (which is clearly property of the estate) and not using the real estate or dairy barn (again clearly property of the estate). It is not the personal services of the debtor (or its obverse) that is restrained, merely the ownership interest. U.S. v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 515, tells us that Section 541(a) is to be given a broad reading in determining property of the estate. See also In re Fitzsimmons, 725 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir.1984).

The answer to Questions 2(A) and 2(B)(I) & (II) above is somewhat more difficult. The evidence before the Court at the adequate protection and plan stage (September and November, 1985) indicated a value of $28,575.00 and Judge Pelofsky apparently so ruled.

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Bluebook (online)
64 B.R. 710, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5428, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-bowling-mowb-1986.