In re B.M. CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 11/28/23 In re B.M. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re B.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. E081419 THE PEOPLE, (Super.Ct.No. J279737) Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION v.

B.M.,

Minor and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Charles J. Umeda,

Judge. Affirmed.

Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 In October 2019, B.M. admitted to aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter by

encouraging her girlfriend to kill the girlfriend’s brother. She was committed to the

Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a maximum confinement of 11 years. While in

DJJ’s custody, DJJ reported concerns about B.M.’s continued contact with the co-

participant in her crime, saying she “appeared incapable of separating herself from her

co-part.” Accordingly, “unit staff instructed both youth not to communicate or engage

with each other, given how unhealthy and the toxicity of their relationship [sic] in the

past regarding their roles in the committed offense.” In April 2023 the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Board of Juvenile Hearings recommended

discharging her.

In May 2023 the court held a re-entry disposition hearing where it terminated

DJJ’s jurisdiction and released B.M. as a ward in her own custody. However, it also

imposed DJJ re-entry supervision terms. This included an electronic search condition

requiring her to “[s]ubmit to probation search of cell phone or other electronic devices for

purpose of monitoring communication with co-part[icipant].” B.M. appealed, citing as

grounds for the appeal “unconstitutional probation/parole terms.”

We appointed counsel to represent B.M. on appeal, and counsel has filed a brief

under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v.

California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) setting forth a statement of the case and a

summary of the facts and asking us to conduct an independent review of the record.

2 It is undisputed that when appealing from an order after judgment an adult

criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to independent review under

Anders/Wende if appellate counsel cannot identify any arguable issues. (People v.

Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 227, 231 (Delgadillo).) Nevertheless, the court is to

inform the defendant that they may personally file a supplemental brief, and “[i]f the

defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is

required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written

opinion.” (Id. at p. 232.) “If the defendant does not file a supplemental brief or letter, the

Court of Appeal may dismiss the appeal as abandoned.” (Ibid.)

However, a notice provided defendant may be “suboptimal” if the defendant

“reasonably could have concluded” from it “that the Court of Appeal would conduct an

independent review of the record, even absent a supplemental brief.” (Delgadillo, supra,

14 Cal.5th at pp. 232-233.) As Delgadillo noted, independent review of the record under

Anders/Wende happens automatically after receiving a brief from appointed counsel

under the authority of those cases and “ ‘does not depend on the . . . receipt of a brief

from the defendant personally,’ ” whereas under Delgadillo, “the Court of Appeal may

dismiss the appeal as abandoned” “[i]f the defendant does not file a supplemental brief or

letter.” (Delgadillo, at pp. 232-233.) Thus, when Delgadillo applies, but the notice sent

to the defendant cites only to Anders/Wende, confusion may plausibly result. The notice

in Delgadillo had this flaw (Delgadillo, at p. 233), as did the notice here.

3 Because the notice sent to B.M. was improper, we exercise our discretion to

examine the record to determine whether it contains any arguable issues. We conclude

that it does not. Accordingly, we affirm.

DISPOSITION

We affirm.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAPHAEL J. We concur:

RAMIREZ P. J.

FIELDS J.