An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-133
Filed 15 October 2025
Rockingham County, No. 23JT000091-780
IN THE MATTER OF: B.L.G.D.
Appeal by Respondent from order entered 21 October 2024 by Judge James A.
Grogan in Rockingham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30
September 2025.
Parent Defender Annick Lenoir-Peek, by Senior Assistant Parent Defender J. Lee Gilliam, for Respondent-Appellant Mother.
No brief filed for Petitioner-Appellee Rockingham County Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Social Services.
Michelle F. Lynch for Petitioner-Appellee Guardian ad litem.
PER CURIAM.
Brittney Dickens (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her
parental rights to her minor child, Ben.1 For the following reasons, we affirm the trial
court’s termination order.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
1 In accordance with North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), we refer to the minor
child by a pseudonym to protect his identity. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). IN RE: B.L.G.D.
Opinion of the Court
Ben was born to Mother in January 2020. Shortly after his first birthday,
Mother entered a consent order that granted Ben’s maternal grandmother
(Grandmother) legal and physical custody of him. In September 2021, Ben moved into
the home of Grandmother’s first cousin for three months, after which he returned to
Grandmother’s home, where Mother also lived.
On 27 March 2023, Rockingham County Department of Health and Human
Services, Division of Social Services (DSS) received a neglect report for Ben alleging
injurious environment and improper care. The report alleged that Mother,
Grandmother, and Mother’s boyfriend were found with ten ounces of
methamphetamine in a vehicle during a traffic stop. Grandmother denied that the
methamphetamine belonged to her but admitted that her “personal amount of meth”
was in a jewelry box in her bedroom. When officers subsequently searched the home,
they could not find Grandmother’s methamphetamine due to the home’s condition.
The officers observed junk throughout, insects on the bed, and feces on the floor.
A DSS social worker visited the home later that same day and noted that
Mother did not appear to understand the danger of using fentanyl while caring for a
child. Mother admitted to using fentanyl while caring for Ben and stated that “lots of
other substances can be mixed in with fentanyl.” Grandmother denied her statement
to the officers that methamphetamine was stored in her jewelry box and any
knowledge of the drugs found in the vehicle. Considering the allegations and the
home’s condition, the social worker discussed the option of a voluntary temporary
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placement for Ben. Grandmother identified a family friend as a potential placement,
in whose care Ben was later placed.
On 18 April 2023, the social worker spoke with Grandmother’s cousin, who
shared concerns about Ben returning to Grandmother’s care due to ongoing drug use.
She also opined that Grandmother’s greater concern was for obtaining money for
Ben’s care than for Ben’s well-being. On 24 April 2023, Grandmother’s cousin filed a
motion for emergency custody of Ben, which was granted. Ben was placed in her care
the following day. Shortly after, she took Ben to the doctor and learned he had missed
the last five checkups over a period of nearly two years.
On 1 May 2023, DSS conducted a home visit at the cousin’s residence and
observed several safety concerns, including plywood covering a large hole in the
kitchen floor, a broken back bedroom window patched with plastic, and a living-room
window with a broken upper interior panel. The cousin was also facing eviction at the
time of the visit. DSS was concerned about the cousin’s history with child protective
services involving her two children. For these reasons, DSS determined that she was
not an appropriate caretaker for Ben.
On 2 May 2023, DSS filed a petition alleging Ben was a neglected juvenile
based on his exposure to an injurious environment. The petition identified Mother,
Grandmother, Grandmother’s cousin, and a putative father as respondents and
stated that Grandmother was not an appropriate caregiver due to concerns regarding
her drug use and her decision to allow Mother, who also struggled with substance
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abuse, to care for Ben. The petition further stated that Grandmother tested positive
for illicit substances. Additionally, DSS found text messages in which Grandmother
offered to bring fentanyl to Mother and methamphetamine to someone else. That
same day, the trial court granted DSS nonsecure custody of Ben.
On 15 May 2023, both Mother and Grandmother entered into DSS case plans.
Mother’s case plan identified areas of concern, including parenting skills, substance
abuse, and the need for a social support system. Under the plan, Mother agreed to
maintain safe and stable housing, obtain and maintain stable employment, attend all
scheduled visits and demonstrate appropriate parenting during those visits, complete
parenting classes, undergo a mental health and substance abuse assessment and
follow any resulting recommendations, complete a parenting psychological
evaluation, and comply with requested drug screens.
On 26 June 2023, the trial court held an initial adjudication and dispositional
hearing. At the adjudication hearing, the trial court removed Grandmother’s cousin
as a party to the case, incorporated the juvenile petition by reference, adopted its
allegations as findings of fact, and adjudicated Ben as a neglected juvenile. At the
dispositional hearing, the trial court found that Mother and Grandmother were
visiting Ben weekly and that the visits were going well. The trial court also
determined that the DSS case plans were appropriate and directed Mother and
Grandmother to comply with the requirements. The trial court found that Mother
had not secured housing or employment though she informed the court that she
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intended to do so, she had not completed a mental health or substance abuse
assessment, and she had not complied with the required drug screenings.
On 9 November 2023, the trial court conducted a permanency planning
hearing. Mother’s weekly visits remained supervised and limited to one hour. The
social worker reported no concerns regarding these visits. Although Mother had
obtained housing, she remained unemployed and had not completed mental health or
substance abuse assessments. She had started parenting classes but needed to make
up three of those classes; she had also been the subject of behavioral concerns
reported by the class instructor. Mother submitted to a drug screen on 11 August
2023, which tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl. The
trial court ordered Ben’s primary plan to be reunification with Grandmother, with a
concurrent plan of adoption.
On 28 March 2024, the trial court held another permanency planning hearing.
Mother continued to attend weekly supervised visits with Ben but missed one visit
and was frequently late. She remained unemployed and had yet to complete two
remaining parenting classes. She submitted to a drug screen on 5 March 2024, which
tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. The trial court found that
Mother was not making adequate progress and changed Ben’s primary plan to
adoption, eliminating reunification. The trial court reduced Mother’s visitation to one
hour per month, on the condition that the visit would be canceled if she failed to arrive
on time. The trial court also removed Grandmother as a party to the case, following
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DSS’s request to proceed with termination of Mother’s parental rights.
On 13 June 2024, DSS filed a motion to terminate Mother’s parental rights
(termination motion). DSS alleged grounds for termination based on neglect, willfully
leaving Ben in foster care for more than twelve months without making reasonable
progress, and dependency. See N.C.G.S § 7B-1111(a)(1)-(2), (6).
On 14 October 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the termination motion.
Mother was not present at the hearing but was represented by counsel. Her counsel
moved for a continuance at the start of the hearing, which the trial court denied. The
trial court received testimony from the assigned social worker and the adoption social
worker. The trial court also took judicial notice of the initial adjudication order from
the 26 June 2023 hearing.
By order entered 21 October 2024, the trial court found three grounds for
termination of Mother’s parental rights: neglect, willfully leaving Ben in foster care
for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress, and dependency.
The trial court also concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in
Ben’s best interest. Mother timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001 to hear Mother’s appeal
from an “order that terminates [her] parental rights.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(7)
(2023).
III. Analysis
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Mother challenges several of the trial court’s adjudicatory findings as
unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. She further challenges all three
grounds for termination as unsupported by the remaining unchallenged findings.
Alternatively, Mother argues she received ineffective assistance of counsel during the
termination hearing.
We review a termination of parental rights to determine “whether the findings
of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these
findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law.” In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 146
(2008) (quotation omitted). The trial court’s “[f]indings of fact supported by competent
evidence are binding on appeal even though there may be evidence to the contrary.”
In re S.R.G., 195 N.C. App. 79, 83 (2009). All unchallenged findings of fact are
“binding on appeal.” In re G.B., 377 N.C. 106, 111 (2021). We review the trial court’s
conclusions of law de novo. See In re D.T.L., 219 N.C. App. 219, 221 (2012).
A. Challenged Findings of Fact
Mother challenges the trial court’s Findings of Fact 28–44 and 46–49 as
unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. She contends that no testimony or
exhibits were presented at the hearing to support these findings. Each of the
contested findings concerns Mother’s case plan and her progress toward fulfilling its
requirements. The adjudication hearing lasted approximately fourteen minutes,
beginning with DSS’s direct examination of the assigned social worker. She testified
that she was the movant on the termination motion and affirmed its allegations as
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true and accurate to the best of her knowledge. She testified that between the
termination motion’s filing on 13 June 2024 and the conclusion of her involvement at
the end of the month, Mother failed to attend her scheduled visit and was unable to
complete a drug screen. No other parties questioned the social worker following DSS’s
direct examination.
DSS next called the adoption social worker, who testified that, since her
assignment to Ben in August 2024, Mother had not missed any visits. However, she
noted that Mother declined drug screens in both September and October because she
stated the results would be positive. She also testified that Mother had not completed
any case plan requirements besides obtaining housing, Mother’s drug screens were
consistently positive, and the underlying conditions that led to Ben’s placement in
DSS custody were still present. Subsequently, the trial court took judicial notice of
the initial adjudication order, and the hearing concluded.
Our Supreme Court addressed a similar evidentiary challenge to findings of
fact in In re Z.G.J., 378 N.C. 500, 507 (2021). There, the adjudication hearing was
brief. DSS called a single witness, no parties conducted cross-examination, and DSS
requested that the termination petition be admitted into evidence. Id. at 506–07. The
respondent argued that the evidence was insufficient because the trial court relied
solely on the termination petition’s allegations as the basis for adjudication evidence.
But the Court held that, although the sole witness’s testimony was brief, the witness
reaffirmed the termination petition’s allegations. Id. at 508. The respondent also had
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the opportunity to cross-examine the witness but declined to do so. Because DSS
presented live testimony and the witness adopted the termination petition’s
allegations, the trial court “did not err by relying on [the witness’s] testimony
adopting the allegations in the termination petition when it entered its adjudication
order.” Id.
Here, the assigned social worker affirmed that the termination motion’s
allegations were true and accurate to the best of her knowledge. Challenged Findings
of Fact 28–40 are taken directly from the termination motion. As in In re Z.G.J.,
because the social worker adopted the termination motion’s allegations during her
testimony, the trial court properly relied on those allegations in entering its order.
Moreover, Mother presented no evidence opposing the termination motion’s
allegations, did not object to the trial court’s judicial notice of the initial adjudication
order, and declined to cross-examine either witness.
The remaining challenged Findings of Fact 41–44 and 46–49 are supported by
prior orders in the record. A trial court may “judicial[ly] notice . . . earlier proceedings
in the same cause” without “either party . . . offer[ing] the[ir] file[s] into evidence.” In
re M.N.C., 176 N.C. App. 114, 120 (2006) (quotation omitted). The trial court in In re
M.N.C. did not explicitly announce that it was taking judicial notice of prior orders,
and this Court acknowledged that, while it is better practice to do so on the record, it
is not required.
Here, a review of the record confirms that the trial court supported its findings
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of fact with prior orders detailing Mother’s lack of case plan progress. Both social
workers’ testimony further supported these findings. Because the challenged findings
are either contained in the termination motion or supported by record evidence, we
conclude the trial court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence.
B. Willful Failure to Make Reasonable Progress
Next, Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental
rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). She contends that the trial court’s findings of
fact are insufficient to support its conclusion that she failed to make reasonable
progress in correcting the conditions that led to Ben’s removal.
Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), a trial court may terminate a respondent’s
parental rights if she “willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside
the home for more than 12 months without showing to the [court’s] satisfaction” that
she made “reasonable progress under the circumstances . . . in correcting those
conditions which led to the [juvenile’s] removal.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2023).
Under this ground, the trial court must determine “whether (1) a child has been
willfully left by the parent in foster care or placement outside the home for over
twelve months, and (2) the parent has not made reasonable progress under the
circumstances to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the child.” In re
K.H., 375 N.C. 610, 613 (2020) (quotation omitted).
When evaluating whether a parent has made reasonable progress, “[p]arental
compliance with a judicially adopted case plan is relevant in determining whether
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grounds for termination exist.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 815 (2020) (quotation
omitted). A trial court evaluates case plan progress “for the duration leading up to
the hearing on the . . . [termination] petition.” Id. The trial court may conclude that
“extremely limited progress” in addressing the conditions that led to removal is
sufficient to support termination. In re M.S., 378 N.C. 30, 37 (2021) (quotation
omitted). On the other hand, this Court has acknowledged that “perfection is not
required to reach the ‘reasonable’ standard.” In re S.D., 243 N.C. App. 65, 73 (2015).
Nevertheless, “[a] respondent’s prolonged inability to improve her situation, despite
some efforts in that direction, . . . will support a finding of lack of progress . . .
sufficient to warrant termination of parental rights” under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).
J.S., 374 N.C. at 815 (third alteration in original; quotation omitted).
Here, Mother does not dispute that Ben was placed outside of her care for more
than twelve months, as he entered DSS custody on 1 May 2023 and the termination
motion was filed on 13 June 2024. Thus, we consider whether Mother made
reasonable progress on her case plan. The trial court detailed the circumstances that
prompted DSS’s removal of Ben from Mother’s care on 1 May 2023 and his subsequent
adjudication. Specifically, DSS received a report concerning the condition of the
home, allegations of Mother’s inadequate care for Ben, and concerns regarding
Mother’s drug use. The trial court also made findings outlining the requirements of
Mother’s case plan, which she entered into on 15 May 2023. The case plan required
Mother to: maintain safe and stable housing, obtain and maintain stable
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employment, attend all scheduled visitations and demonstrate appropriate parenting
during those visits, complete parenting classes, undergo a mental health and
substance abuse assessment and follow any resulting recommendations, complete a
parenting psychological evaluation, and comply with requested drug screens.
The trial court made further findings regarding Mother’s compliance with her
case plan through the date of the termination hearing. Regarding drug screens,
Mother tested positive on four separate occasions between June 2023 and March
2024. She declined to participate in three drug screens between May to October 2024,
stating on one occasion that she would test positive for illicit substances. Although
Mother informed DSS on several occasions that she intended to enter a rehabilitation
facility for substance abuse treatment, she failed to follow through. Mother’s
visitation with Ben was also inconsistent. She frequently arrived late, resulting in a
reduction of her visits to once a month. Even after the reduction, she often
rescheduled or failed to attend visits altogether. As of the 14 October 2024
termination hearing, Mother had not completed the required parenting classes,
secured consistent employment, or engaged in any mental health or substance abuse
treatment. The trial court acknowledged that Mother had obtained housing but also
found that she did not consistently visit Ben and continued to test positive for illicit
substances. Her primary support system was Grandmother, who also struggled with
substance abuse. For these reasons, the trial court found that Mother had made
minimal to no progress on her case plan.
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We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Mother failed to make
reasonable progress in addressing the conditions that led to Ben’s removal. See J.S.,
374 N.C. at 816 (requiring “a nexus between the [case plan] components . . . with
which [the respondent] failed to comply and the conditions which led to [the child’s]
removal from the parental home.” (third and fourth alterations in original; quotation
omitted)). Because the conditions that led to Ben’s removal remained unresolved at
the time of the hearing and Mother failed to make any progress in the identified areas
of concern, we conclude that her “extremely limited progress” is sufficient to support
termination of her parental rights. M.S., 378 N.C. at 37.
We hold that the trial court properly terminated Mother’s parental rights
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) for willfully leaving Ben in foster care for more than
twelve months without making reasonable progress. Where “an appellate court
determines there is at least one ground to support a [trial court’s] conclusion that
parental rights should be terminated, it is unnecessary to address the remaining
grounds.” In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 8 (2005) (quotation omitted), aff’d per curiam
mem., 360 N.C. 360 (2006). Accordingly, we do not address the remaining grounds for
termination.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Alternatively, Mother argues that she received ineffective assistance of
counsel, citing her counsel’s lack of participation during the termination hearing,
including the failure to object, cross-examine witnesses, or make a closing argument.
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In a termination proceeding, a respondent “has a right to counsel,” In re J.A.A., 175
N.C. App. 66, 74 (2005) (citing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101), which “includes the right to
effective assistance of counsel,” In re S.C.R., 198 N.C. App. 525, 531 (2009). To
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the “respondent must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient and the deficiency was so serious as to deprive
[her] of a fair hearing.” In re B.S., 378 N.C. 1, 5 (2021) (quotation omitted). To
demonstrate deprivation of a fair hearing, the respondent must show “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there would have been a different result in
the proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Assuming arguendo deficient performance by her counsel, Mother has failed to
demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome to the proceeding. As
discussed above, the trial court properly terminated Mother’s parental rights under
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). The trial court supported its findings and conclusions with
the record, which established that Mother made minimal to no progress on her case
plan. Additionally, Mother has not challenged the trial court’s determination that
termination was in Ben’s best interest. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97
(1991) (an unchallenged finding “is presumed to be supported by competent evidence
and is binding on appeal.”).
Moreover, Mother has not identified how the outcome would have changed had
her counsel objected, cross-examined witnesses, or delivered a closing argument. Her
sole contention concerns an alleged error in the termination motion, which stated
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that Ben was residing with a prospective adoptive family in June 2024, even though
that family had informed DSS around the same time that they would not proceed
with adoption. Mother argues that cross-examination would have revealed this
alleged error.
However, by 21 September 2024, Ben had been placed with a new prospective
adoptive family. The trial court found that Ben had adjusted well to his new
placement, appeared bonded with the family, and had a strong likelihood of adoption.
Even if the statement in the termination motion was erroneous, Mother has not
shown any effect on the hearing’s outcome, particularly given the trial court’s
unchallenged assessment of Ben’s best interests. Because the record supported the
trial court’s ground for termination and Mother has not challenged any dispositional
findings or conclusions of law, she cannot show a reasonable probability of a different
result. We therefore deny that she received ineffective assistance of counsel.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, we affirm the trial court’s 21 October 2024 order
terminating Mother’s parental rights to Ben.
AFFIRMED.
Panel consisting of Chief Judge DILLON, and Judges FLOOD and MURRY.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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