In Re Blackwell for the Estate of I.G. Services, Ltd.

267 B.R. 741, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1192, 2001 WL 1159838
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 8, 2001
Docket19-10260
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 267 B.R. 741 (In Re Blackwell for the Estate of I.G. Services, Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Blackwell for the Estate of I.G. Services, Ltd., 267 B.R. 741, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1192, 2001 WL 1159838 (Tex. 2001).

Opinion

*743 Memorandum Denying Investor Enrique Marcos’ Request to Extend the Time to File His Proof of Claim

LEIF M. CLARK, Bankruptcy Judge.

Came on for consideration the Investor Enrique Marcos motion (1) to clarify this court’s Order Fixing Bar Date, and (2) for an order extending the time period to file a proof of claim. After hearing the arguments and taking into consideration the applicable law, the court issued a bench ruling. This memorandum decision memorializes that bench ruling.

Introduction

The beginnings and development of the Inverworld case are key to understanding the issues presented by Marcos’s motion, and the court’s disposition of those issues. The debtors and several affiliated companies (collectively “Inverworld”) were part of an international groups of companies providing investment services to investors, most of whom are located in the Republic of Mexico. In mid-1999 Inverworld encountered serious financial difficulties. 1 As a result, two of the Inverworld entities, I.G. Services, Ltd., (“IGS”) a Cayman Islands entity, and I.W.G. Services, Ltd., (“IWG”) a United Kingdom entity, commenced insolvency proceedings under the respective laws of the countries of their incorporation. PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”) was appointed as liquidators in both cases. PwC promptly sought and obtained ancillary relief in this court pursuant to section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, primarily to halt mounting collection activity by frustrated investors against the two entities. 2 Some investors, anticipating this move, filed their own petitions in this court, seeking to commence involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against IWG and IGS under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (these petitions, by agreement of all parties, have been held in abeyance). About a month afterward, the Securities & Exchange Commission initiated a federal receivership in U.S. District Court. PwC was appointed receiver in those proceedings. By mid-August 1999, there were proceedings involving one or more Inverworld entities in four different courts and three different countries.

Fortunately, the same entity was the responsible fiduciary in all of the proceedings pending. Also (and again, fortunately), the lawyers representing a number of investors (representing, as it turns out, over 70% of the investment claims) organized themselves into an informal committee in order to be able to work in a more coordinated fashion. The committee came to be known as the Ad Hoc Creditors’ Committee (“AHCC”). The AHCC did not formally retain counsel, but did, by agreement, delegate specific functions to different law firms that were participating in the AHCC. These developments allowed PwC to negotiate an overall administrative structure for the entire complex of cases pending in the various jurisdictions and courts. The structure permitted all of the parties to minimize conflicts and unnecessary litigation over jurisdiction, and also allowed the parties to allocate tasks not only amongst parties but amongst courts as well. The structure was negotiated over an extended period of time, commencing in September 1999.

During the course of negotiations between PwC (in its various capacities) and *744 the AHCC (sometimes operating as a unit, sometimes having to resolve internal issues first), 3 all parties concluded that the English proceeding (involving IWG) ought to be terminated. Even though many (perhaps most) of the investor claims were technically in the IWG case, the vast majority of the assets were in the IGS case then pending in the Caymans. IWG simply lacked the assets to support the cost of supporting an administration under the Insolvency Act of 1986 in England. The liquidators explained to the satisfaction of the English High Court that the structure negotiated between PwC and the AHCC would provide investors (most of whom reside in Mexico) with a more convenient and cost-effective forum to adjudicate their rights and claims. On March 7, 2000, the High Court agreed, and terminated the pending administration of IWG. To preserve the assets (and claimant interests) in IWG, the liquidators in the English proceeding were appointed as interim trustees in the parallel involuntary proceeding against IWG pending in this court. For administrative reasons, all parties agreed to hold in abeyance the formal adjudication of IWG.

This termination of the English insolvency proceeding greatly simplified the process of formalizing the structure that PwC and the AHCC had been negotiating over many months. The parties formalized their proposed administrative structure as a Protocol, and sought the approval and concurrence of the remaining three courts then exercising jurisdiction over the Inverworld entities — the court in Grand Caymans, the U.S. District Court, and this court. All three courts signed orders approving the proposed Protocol, 4 in effect agreeing to follow its structure as the “law of the case” that would control jurisdictional issues, assignment of responsibilities, conflicts resolutions, and the like.

The Protocol laid out multiple phases of administration, with Phase II given over to the claims process. It also allocated responsibility for the claims process to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. 5 The parties had already recognized that resolution of the competing interests of investors would *745 prove to be especially nettlesome. Some investors claimed to have proprietary rights in specific assets (such as, for example, stock in publicly traded companies held on account by an Inverworld entity), and wanted to insist on an outright transfer of “their property” back to them (resulting in a 100% recovery on their claims). 6 Other investors had purchased, through Inverworld, so-called “internal products,” 7 notes and other investment instruments originated and owed by one or more Inverworld entities. These investors recognized that the current market value of these products was close to zero, and so preferred that all assets of Inverworld be liquidated, and the proceeds distributed on a pro rata basis. The Protocol assigned resolution of these issues to this court, following such procedures as it might deem appropriate.

In addition, the liquidators faced the same issue that faces any fiduciary in any insolvency proceeding anywhere in the world — determining with precision how much each claimant is actually owed. The liquidators had an Inverworld “Account Statement” in their possession, dated July 2, 1999, which purported to list all of the Inverworld investors, the amount of the investments and whether the investment was for external or internal products (see discussion supra), but the liquidators were understandably reluctant to certify the Account Statement as true and correct. An independent verification of the approximately 1,500 investor accounts would be extraordinarily costly.

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Bluebook (online)
267 B.R. 741, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1192, 2001 WL 1159838, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-blackwell-for-the-estate-of-ig-services-ltd-txwb-2001.