Filed 5/4/26 In re B.K. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re B.K. et. al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT E087199 OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2000001) Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION v.
N.K. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun,
Judge. Affirmed.
Michelle D. Pena, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, N.K.
Michelle Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, D.K.
1 Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Assistant County Counsel, and
Catherine E. Rupp, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
N.K. (Mother) and D.K. (Father) appeal from an order terminating their parental
rights with respect to three children: B.K., K.K., and E.K. The only argument asserted
on appeal is that the juvenile court erred by failing to properly consider and apply the
statutory parental benefit exception, which generally prohibits the termination of parental
rights where the juvenile court “finds a compelling reason for determining that
termination would be detrimental to the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) For the reasons set
forth below, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the order.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Procedural History
Father and Mother are the parents of B.K., K.K., and E.K. In November 2020,
B.K. and K.K. were detained by the San Bernardino Department of Children and Family
Services (CFS) following reports of parental drug use and domestic violence in the home.
In February 2021, the juvenile court declared B.K. and K.K. dependents pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j); formally removed the children from the
parents’ custody; and granted the parents reunification services. E.K. was born during the
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 course of the dependency proceedings but was also declared a dependent of the juvenile
court and removed from the parents’ custody in March 2022.
In October 2022, the juvenile court found that efforts at reunification had been
unsuccessful and terminated reunification services to both parents. However, the juvenile
court found a compelling reason not to set the matter for hearing under section 366.26
and instead placed the children in the home of a maternal aunt under a permanent plan of
legal guardianship. Under the plan of legal guardianship, the parents were granted
weekly supervised visitation.
In March 2023, CFS discovered that the maternal aunt had been permitting
unsupervised contact between the parents and the children. As a result, CFS filed a
supplemental petition pursuant to section 387, alleging that the previous disposition had
been ineffective. The juvenile court sustained the allegations of the section 387 petition,
and the children were removed from the home of the maternal aunt.
In June 2024, the juvenile court granted a motion to transfer the case to the
Riverside County Superior Court.
B. Section 388 Petitions2
In March 2025, Father and Mother filed petitions pursuant to section 388. Their
petitions sought family maintenance services or, in the alternative, reunification services
2 The record shows that the parents filed multiple section 388 petitions throughout the course of the dependency proceedings. However, the parents appeal only from the order terminating parental rights. As such, we summarize only the petitions actually considered at the section 366.26 hearing to the extent that the information provided in these petitions are relevant to the order terminating parental rights.
3 with authorization to liberalize visitation and pursue a goal of family maintenance. With
respect to changed circumstances, both parents alleged they had completed the case plan
originally set by CFS prior to the termination of reunification services. With respect to
best interests, Father asserted that he is a “loving father,” spends quality time with his
children during visits, and the “children want to visit their father and he believes that his
children want to return home to him.” Mother asserted that the children would benefit
from retaining their cultural heritage, look forward to seeing parents during visits, and are
“visibly disappointed when they are kept from visiting with their parents.” The juvenile
court set a contested evidentiary hearing on the parents’ section 388 petitions.
C. Section 388 and 366.26 Hearing
In October 2025, the juvenile court held a combined hearing to consider the
parents’ section 388 petitions and the selection of a permanent plan pursuant to section
366.26. DPSS submitted the following documentary evidence at the hearing: (1) a report
filed May 19, 2025; (2) a report filed May 23, 2025; (3) an addendum report filed in
August 2025; (4) a report filed October 7, 2025; and (5) an addendum report filed
October 15, 2025. Father and Mother did not present any additional testimony or
evidence at the time of hearing.
1. May 19, 2025 Report
DPSS submitted a single report addressing issues related to the parents’ section
388 petitions, the section 366.26 hearing, and its obligation to update the juvenile court
4 regarding the status of the children pursuant to section 366.3.3 DPSS reported that all
three children had been placed together in a prospective adoptive home for approximately
five months. A summary of each child’s educational, developmental, medical and
mental/emotional wellbeing did not flag any issues that could not be adequately
addressed with future services in their current placement.
DPSS provided a summary of visitation between November 2024 and March
2025. While it noted some difficulties with scheduling visits, visitation occurred
regularly and the interaction between the parents and the children were positive. DPSS
reported one incident in December 2024 in which B.K. and K.K. expressed sadness when
the parents did not appear for a visit but noted that the visitation eventually ended
positively because the siblings provided each other with emotional support. In January
2025, K.K.’s caregiver reported that K.K. displayed emotional regression following
visits.
2. May 23, 2025 Report
DPSS submitted a second report intended to provide a formal response to the
parents’ section 388 petitions and additional information relevant to a section 366.26
hearing. With respect to the parents’ section 388 petitions, DPSS noted that both parents
had refused to participate in any investigation related to the allegations asserted in their
petitions. This included declining to participate in renewed drug testing and declining to
3 Generally, section 366.3 requires periodic reviews related to dependent children in cases in which parental rights have not been terminated, but the implementation of a permanent plan has not yet been completed. (§ 366.3, subds. (a), (d).)
5 give permission for DPSS to conduct an evaluation of their current home.
With respect to visitation, DPSS reported that the parents had continued to
participate in visitation with the children and that the visitations were generally positive.
It also noted that the children’s caregiver reported that the children often displayed a
period of increased defiance and difficulty processing emotions following visits.
Finally, a social worker interviewed the children regarding their understanding of
the status of the case. B.K. expressed his understanding that the prospect of adoption
would mean separation from his birth parents, acknowledged that the idea made him feel
sad, but also expressed happiness at the idea of living together with his siblings in the
prospective adoptive parents’ home. K.K. also expressed his understanding that the
prospect of adoption would sever his connection with his birth parents, acknowledged
that the idea made him feel nervous and sad, but also expressed happiness at the prospect
of living together with his siblings. E.K. was noted as being too young to discuss
adoption in detail.
3. August 2025 Addendum Report
In an addendum report, DPSS documented three subsequent attempts to request
that the parents participate in drug testing to permit DPSS to investigate the allegations of
changed circumstances in support of the JV-180 hearing. On each occasion, the parents
declined to participate. As a result, the social worker concluded that “DPS[S] was unable
to assess any sustained benefit” from the prior services received through CFS and “was
unable to complete a comprehensive assessment of [the parents’] current capacity to care
for their children safely.”
6 4. October 7, 2025 Report
DPSS submitted a single report providing updated information related to the
parents’ section 388 petitions, the section 366.26 hearing, and periodic review under
section 366.3. Mother and Father continued to decline to participate in efforts by social
workers to investigate their current home environment in response to the pending section
388 petitions. DPSS again provided a summary of each child’s educational,
developmental, medical, and mental/emotional wellbeing and did not flag any issues that
could not be adequately addressed with future services in their current placement. DPSS
reported that visitation between the parents and the children remained consistent and
pleasant but also noted that, during most visits, the children appeared to entertain
themselves without much direct parental interaction.
DPSS confirmed that the children had been placed together in a prospective
adoptive home for approximately 10 months; the children had been developing as a
family unit with their prospective adoptive caregivers; and Mother and Father had
struggled with directly engaging with the children during visits. As a result, DPSS
recommended termination of parental rights with adoption as a permanent plan for the
children.
5. October 15, 2025 Addendum Report
DPSS submitted an addendum report documenting the events of a recent visit
between the parents and the children. According to the report, social workers had to
adjust the location of a scheduled visit at a park due to inclement weather. Mother and
Father were notified in advance but began to express their frustration and openly argue
7 with the social worker in front of the children when they arrived at the new visit location.
The parents ignored the social worker’s request to refrain from discussing the case in
front of the children and to continue any discussion regarding coordinating visits at a later
time. When the social worker ended the visit, Mother and Father physically pushed the
children away from the social worker and attempted to prevent the children from leaving
with their caregivers. During the episode, B.K. and K.K. appeared confused, and E.K.
elected to run to the caregiver for support. The Riverside County Sheriff’s Office was
called to intervene, and a sheriff’s deputy had to physically separate the parents from the
children to end the visit.
6. Findings and Orders
After hearing argument from all parties, the juvenile court denied Mother’s and
Father’s section 388 petitions. The juvenile court then proceeded to conduct the section
366.26 hearing. With respect to the section 366.26 hearing, Mother and Father requested
the juvenile court consider selecting a permanent plan of legal guardianship based upon
the bond between the parents and children. In support of this request, Mother and Father
merely requested that the juvenile court consider the arguments made by counsel in
relation to the section 388 petitions. Neither parent offered any additional evidence or
testimony for the juvenile court’s consideration, and neither parent requested the juvenile
court consider any additional reports beyond those submitted by DPSS at the beginning
of the hearing.
The juvenile court concluded that no exception to termination of parental rights
applied, terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, and selected a permanent plan
8 of adoption for the children.
III. DISCUSSION
The only claim of error asserted on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its
discretion in determining that the parental-benefit exception set forth in section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), did not apply. We conclude that the record does not show an
abuse of discretion and affirm the order.
A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“[T]he goal at the section 366.26 hearing is ‘specifically . . . to select and
implement a permanent plan for the child.’ [Citations.] To guide the court in selecting
the most suitable permanent arrangement, the statute lists plans in order of preference and
provides a detailed procedure for choosing among them.” (In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) “Where possible, adoption is the Legislature’s
preferred permanent plan” because “ ‘ “it gives the child the best chance at [a full]
emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.” ’ ” (In re Andrew M. (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 803, 814 (Andrew M.).)
“However, there are several exceptions to this rule. [Citation.] One such
exception applies if ‘[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that
termination would be detrimental to the child’ because ‘[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.’ ” (In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 206 (L.A.-O.).) “[T]o
establish the parental-benefit exception, a parent must prove three elements: ‘(1) regular
visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the
9 child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.’ ”
(Ibid., italics omitted.)
The juvenile court’s determination regarding the parental-benefit exception is
reviewed under a hybrid standard of review. (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at
p. 815; Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 640-641.) “ ‘The first two elements involve
factual determinations to which the substantial evidence standard of review applies.
[Citation.] The final step, determining whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.’ ” (Andrew M., at p. 815;
L.A.-O., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the
juvenile court makes “ ‘ “ ‘ “an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination,” ’ ” ’ ” (L.A.-O., at p. 207) such that “ ‘ “no reasonable person could agree
with it” ’ ” (Andrew M., at p. 815).
B. The Juvenile Court Was Not Required To Make Detailed Findings
As an initial matter, we disagree with Mother’s argument that the juvenile court
failed to undergo the necessary analysis to determine whether the parental-benefit
exception applied. The juvenile court “is not required to make findings when it
concludes that parental rights termination would not be detrimental” (In re A.L. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156), and “ ‘[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, we
presume that the court “knows and applies the correct statutory and case law” ’ ” (People
v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 616).
Here, the record shows that the juvenile court explicitly stated its conclusion that
no exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1),
10 applied because “[t]ermination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the minors.”
Thus, the record shows that the juvenile court considered the parental- benefit exception
but concluded that it did not apply. And, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
we presume the juvenile court correctly understood and applied the law when reaching
this conclusion.4
B. The Record Does Not Evidence an Abuse of Discretion
Given the juvenile court’s statement on the record, it is unnecessary for us to
address the parties’ arguments related to the first two elements of the parental benefit
exception in detail. Even assuming that substantial evidence in the record supports a
showing of regular visitation and contact as well as a parental relationship with benefits
to the children,5 the juvenile court’s statement makes clear that it found that termination
of parental rights would not be detrimental. The juvenile court’s determination on this
element is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at
p. 815; L.A.-O., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.) And, in our view, the record does not
suggest the juvenile court abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion.
4 For this same reason, we also disagree with Father’s suggestion that the juvenile court relied on improper factors when determining whether the parental-benefit exception applied. In support of this argument on appeal, Father cites to arguments asserted by the children’s counsel at the time of hearing. However, none of the juvenile court’s comments suggest it relied on any specific facts that were improper in reaching its decision. The fact that counsel may have referred to improper matters when making arguments before the court is not evidence that the juvenile court relied on any of those specific improper matters.
5 DPSS concedes that evidence shows consistent visitation between the parents and the children but argues extensively that the evidence failed to support the existence of a substantial positive, emotional attachment between Father and the children.
11 Here, there was no evidence in the record before the juvenile court to suggest that
termination of parental rights would cause the children to suffer the type of detriment that
might outweigh the potential stability of adoption. E.K. was detained and eventually
removed from her parents when she was approximately three months old, suggesting that
any emotional bond she might have with her parents would not be the source of any
significant detriment if severed. (See Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 819
[Affectionate visitation is not sufficient to show a meaningful bond where a child was
very young when initially separated from his parents.].) When B.K. and K.K. were
interviewed about the prospect of adoption, both expressed sadness at the idea, but also
happiness at the prospect of a new stable home. Social workers did not report that either
child expressed any strong objection or resistance to the prospect of adoption.
While DPSS’s reports suggested visits between the children and parents were
mostly pleasant, appropriate, and ended with expressions of love, DPSS also reported that
on many visits, the children largely entertained themselves, and there was little direct
engagement between the children and their parents. There were no reports that the
children experienced any significant emotional outbursts when visitation ended.
Additionally, while the caregivers reported that B.K. and K.K. experienced behavioral
issues and difficulty with emotional regulation following some visits, the reports
suggested these behavioral issues lasted only for a period of time without sustained
impact on the children’s ability to return to their normal behavioral patterns. During the
one visit in which Mother and Father failed to attend, the children expressed initial
sadness but were able to cope quickly and have an otherwise positive sibling visitation.
12 During the one visit in which a conflict erupted, there was no indication that B.K. or K.K.
expressed their desire to continue with the visit, and E.K. turned to her caregiver for
support instead of to Mother and Father. This is simply not the type of record that would
suggest an enduring or serious detriment to the children’s emotional or developmental
wellbeing from severing their relationship with Mother and Father.
At the time of hearing, Mother and Father offered no additional information or
evidence for the juvenile court to consider in support of their arguments that the parental-
benefit exception applied. They did not offer a bonding study; did not offer any opinions
by any licensed professionals who had evaluated or provided care to the children or to the
family during the course of the dependency; and did not offer to testify regarding the
perceived strength of the relationship they had with the children. It was the parents’
burden to show detriment in support of the third element of the parental-benefit exception
to termination of parental rights. Where the record contains no evidence to suggest that
severing the relationship between the parents and children would lead to any lasting harm
to the children, the juvenile court’s conclusion that Mother and Father had not met their
burden cannot be considered arbitrary or capricious, such that it would amount to an
abuse of discretion.
On appeal, Mother and Father argue that showing the existence of a positive
emotional attachment with their children was sufficient to establish detriment.6 However,
even where a parent shows “that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
6 Mother does not assert any independent argument of her own but simply joins in Father’s argument.
13 attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship,” the parent must separately show that “terminating that
attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636;
see In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1161.) That has not been demonstrated in this
case. Here, although very loving, the parents often brought chaos and confusion into
their relationship with the children. In this case, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
juvenile court’s determination that the termination of parental rights would not be
detrimental when balanced against the benefit and stability of a new adoptive home.
“It is only ‘[w]hen the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that
the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, [that] termination
would be “detrimental to the child due to” the child’s beneficial relationship with a
parent.’ ” (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 818.) The mere fact that there may
be some “benefits in continued visits with loving parents to which a child has some
substantial attachment” is insufficient. (Id. at p. 820.) Instead, a parent “must prove
some type of harm beyond the fact that their loving visits would cease.” (Ibid.)7 Thus,
7 Father’s reliance on In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68 is unpersuasive. First, the analysis in E.T. was not conducted with the benefit of our Supreme Court’s more recent clarification of the necessary elements of the parental-benefit exception and applicable standard of review because E.T. predates Caden C. Second, the factual record in E.T. is clearly distinguishable, as the parent offered extensive live testimony regarding the strength of her bond with her children, and the juvenile court expressly found the parent’s testimony credible. (In re E.T., at pp. 73-75.)
14 the fact that Mother and Father point to the existence of ongoing, positive visitation with
the children is not sufficient to show an abuse of discretion by the juvenile court.
Where Mother and Father merely assert the existence of the parental-benefit
exception at the time of a section 366.26 hearing, but the record contains no evidence to
suggest detriment to the children that would result from termination of parental rights, the
juvenile court’s conclusion that Mother and Father failed to show detriment that would
support an exception to termination of parental rights was not arbitrary, capricious, or
outside the bounds of reason. Thus, even assuming that the evidence in the record is
sufficient to show Mother and Father participated in consistent visitation and had a
positive, emotional bond with their children, we conclude that Mother and Father have
failed to establish the juvenile court abused its discretion and reversal is not warranted.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.