In Re Beatty

210 S.E.2d 193, 286 N.C. 226, 1974 N.C. LEXIS 1220
Supreme Court of North Carolina·Decided December 11, 1974·No. 104·Published·Cited by 9 cases

Opinion

BRANCH, Justice.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether claimants, by adhering to the contractual obligations of the Guaranteed Annual Income agreement, met the availability requirement of G.S. 96-13 (3).

*229 G.S. 96-13(3), in relevant part, provides:

“An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the Commission finds that—
(3) He is . . . available for work. . . .”

The phrase “available for work” is not susceptible of precise definition, and whether a person is available for work differs according to the facts of each individual case. In re Wat son, 273 N.C. 629, 161 S.E. 2d 1; In re Miller, 243 N.C. 509, 91 S.E. 2d 241. We recognize that the General Assembly “intended to provide a wide field of usefulness for this agency [the Employment Security Commission] for social security and for mitigating the economic evils of unemployment.” Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Willis, 219 N.C. 709, 15 S.E. 2d 4. In creating the statutory framework for the attainment of this laudable objective, however, the General Assembly required, inter alia, that a claimant for benefits under the statute remain available for suitable employment.

The key to decision of this appeal lies in our interpretation of the statutory phrase “available for work.” More specifically, the question is whether claimants, by their adherence to the terms of the guaranteed annual income provisions of their collective bargaining agreement, have placed themselves in a position which, for all practical purposes, eliminated their availability for work.

It is fundamental that the intent of the General Assembly controls judicial interpretation of a statute. In re Watson, supra; In re Abernathy, 259 N.C. 190, 130 S.E. 2d 292; Shue v. Scheidt, 252 N.C. 561, 114 S.E. 2d 237. In this respect, we find assistance in the legislative declaration of public policy set forth in G.S. 96-2, which, in part, provides:

“As a guide to the interpretation and application of this chapter, the public policy of this State is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this State. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so. often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his *230 family. . . . The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.” (Emphasis supplied.)

This availability requirement has generally been viewed as an indication of a claimant’s attachment to the labor force and is designed to test each claimant’s attachment to the labor market. 34 N.C. L.Rev. 591. See generally 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 203. One writer has attempted to explain the availability requirement in the following manner:

“The availability requirement is said to be satisfied when an individual is willing, able, and ready to accept suitable work which he does not have good cause to refuse, that is, when he is genuinely attached to the labor market. Since, under unemployment compensation laws, it is the availability of an individual that is required to be tested, the labor market must be described in terms of the' individual. ...”

Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 Yale L.J., 123, 124.

There are, of course, limits to the availability requirement because carrying the concept too far would result in the unwarranted disqualification of otherwise qualified workers and thwart the legislatively declared objectives of the Act. Id. at 126. . The problem is . . . whether or not the restrictions [which the claimant places on his employment] serve to limit the work which a claimant can accept to such a degree that he is no longer genuinely attached to the labor force. It is essentially a matter of degree to ascertain to what extent a claimant can impose restrictions and on what these restrictions must be based.” Note, 34 N.C. L.Rev. 591, 604.

In a lead article by Lee G. Williams, entitled Eligibility for Benefits, 8 Vand. L.Rev. 286, 292, we find the following pertinent statement:

“Obviously, the whole inquiry as to whether á particular claimant for benefits is available for work is an inquiry designed to find out whether the claimant'actually *231 wants to work and lohether he is so situated that he can work. Every fact which is to be ascertained must be a fact which is evidence of this attitude and this condition. ‘The availability requirement is a test to discover whether claimants would, in actuality, now be working, were it not for their inability to obtain work that is appropriate for them.’ ” (Emphasis ours.)

The recent advent of supplemental unemployment benefit plans and guaranteed annual income plans has introduced a new dimension into the field of unemployment compensation. Although the question here presented seems to be one of first impression, we find guidance in analogous cases dealing with the effect of collective bargaining agreements on eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits, when the claimants refused proffered employment.

In Lybarger Unemployment Compensation Caso, 203 Pa. Super. 336, 201 A. 2d 310, the claimant was a union member working under a collective bargaining agreement which provided, inter alia, that to facilitate an adjustment of personnel, the employer would retain by seniority the number of chain machine operators necessary to maintain production at the normal forty-hour-per-week level. When the senior group of employees had earned, from January 1 of the calendar year, gross earnings of $5,000, plus or minus $50, those workers would go on lay-off status for the remainder of the year or until all younger workers were recalled and additional senior workers were required in seniority order. This cycle of work and lay-off continued throughout the duration of the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff had earned the maximum amount by October. Under the terms of the agreement, he would have remained in non-working status until the subsequent January 1. Claimant filed for state unemployment compensation. In denying benefits, the Court stated:

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In Re Beatty, 210 S.E.2d 193, 286 N.C. 226, 1974 N.C. LEXIS 1220 (N.C. 1974).

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