In re Be. W.

2025 IL App (4th) 250543-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 4-25-0543
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (4th) 250543-U

NOS. 4-25-0543, 4-25-0544, 4-25-0545 cons. FILED NOTICE October 15, 2025 This Order was filed under IN THE APPELLATE COURT Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed OF ILLINOIS Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). FOURTH DISTRICT

In re Be. W, Bry. W., and Bra. W., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Peoria County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 20JA446 v. ) 20JA447 Bryan W., ) 20JA448 Respondent-Appellant). ) ) Honorable ) David A. Brown, ) Judge Presiding

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed, concluding that no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal.

¶2 In May 2024, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent

Bryan W. as to his minor sons, Be. W. (born July 21, 2020), Bry. W. (born December 14, 2018),

and Bra. W. (born January 21, 2015). (The minors’ mother, Brandy R., is not a party to this appeal.)

In May 2025, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights and changed the children’s

permanency goal to adoption.

¶3 Respondent filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court appointed counsel to

represent him. Appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that respondent’s appeal presents no potentially meritorious issues for review. Respondent was notified of his opportunity to respond to the motion. Respondent did not

file a response. We grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the court’s judgment.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In September 2020, the State filed a petition to adjudicate Be. W. neglected under

section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)

(West 2020)). The State alleged Be. W.’s environment was injurious to his welfare because

(1) when he was born, a blood sample taken from his umbilical cord tested positive for

methamphetamine, a controlled substance (see 720 ILCS 570/206(d)(2) (West 2020)), (count I)

and (2) respondent had substance abuse issues (count II). The State also petitioned to adjudicate

Bry. W. and Bra W. neglected based solely on count II. Following a shelter care hearing, the

Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) was given temporary custody of the

three children.

¶6 From September 2020 to May 2024, respondent failed to make reasonable progress

toward reunification. Although he was compliant with DCFS’s recommendations in the beginning

of this period, that changed when respondent, among other things, was ticketed for driving while

under the influence of alcohol, missed random drug testing, tested positive for illegal drug use,

and failed to communicate with DCFS.

¶7 As a result, the children were adjudicated neglected in February 2021. The State

subsequently petitioned to terminate respondent’s parental rights, alleging that respondent failed

to make reasonable progress toward reunification from July 7, 2023, to April 7, 2024 (750 ILCS

50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024)).

¶8 Permanency reports filed in the trial court revealed respondent was ordered to

complete four drug tests per month from July 7, 2023, to April 7, 2024. From April 2023 to

-2- December 2024, respondent tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and/or

methamphetamine 10 times, failed to appear 36 times, and was denied testing 3 times. Before July

7, 2023, respondent tested positive for illegal drug use twice. After April 7, 2024, respondent tested

positive for illegal drug use 5 times, failed to appear 24 times, and was denied testing 3 times.

During the relevant nine-month period, respondent tested positive for illegal drug use 3 times and

failed to appear 12 times.

¶9 A report prepared by Trillium Place, an addiction recovery center, revealed that

prior to September 2023, respondent used methamphetamine two to three times per week.

Respondent reported that he relapsed after September 2023 and started using methamphetamine

again because of increased stress and mild depression.

¶ 10 A. Fitness Hearing

¶ 11 1. Evidence

¶ 12 The fitness hearing took place in May 2025. At the hearing, the trial court, without

objection, took judicial notice of “the auxillary cases[,] including prior orders, pleadings, and

motions.”

¶ 13 Mindy Fischer, the DCFS caseworker, testified that from July 7, 2023, to April 7,

2024, respondent was required to (1) cooperate with DCFS and all service providers, (2) attend

domestic violence classes, (3) undergo a substance abuse assessment, (4) follow all

recommendations of the substance abuse assessment, (5) complete four random drug tests per

month, and (5) visit the children regularly. Fischer stated that respondent failed to complete

domestic violence classes. However, she explained that that could have been attributable to the

fact the referral did not go through. Fischer also asserted respondent failed to complete a substance

abuse assessment and tested positive for THC and methamphetamine. Because respondent’s job

-3- made it difficult to complete drug tests, he was afforded the opportunity to submit hair follicles for

testing, which did not require respondent to go to a specified location.

¶ 14 Further, although respondent visited the children consistently, had stable

employment, and lived in a suitable home, Fischer was skeptical that he would be able to care for

his sons, as he was frequently out of town for work. Respondent told Fischer he had family who

would help, but she was never able to meet them. Respondent also advised Fischer that if the

children were returned to his care, he would quit his job and find full-time employment in Decatur,

Illinois. However, as Decatur was a distance away from his home in Peoria, Illinois, Fischer

asserted respondent would still need help raising the children.

¶ 15 2. The Trial Court’s Ruling

¶ 16 The trial court found respondent unfit. In so finding, the court did not give any

weight to respondent’s failure to attend domestic violence classes. However, the court did consider

that, during the relevant nine-month period, respondent tested positive for methamphetamine and

THC, confirmed he had a relapse, and admitted to using drugs two to three times per week.

Moreover, the court observed respondent was referred to drug treatment, which he failed to

complete.

¶ 17 B. Best Interest Hearing

¶ 18 The best interest hearing was held immediately after the fitness hearing. Before

hearing testimony, the trial court observed it “ha[d] received and reviewed some best interest

reports prepared or filed by [DCFS].”

¶ 19 1. Evidence Concerning Bra. W.’s Best Interest

¶ 20 Bra. W. enjoyed spending time with respondent, loved him, and pleaded with him

at one point to stop using drugs and do what “they” wanted. Bra. W., who was in residential

-4- treatment, was scheduled to be released from treatment in one to three months. He told Fischer

that, when he was released, he would like to return to the care of his foster mother, Susan W. Susan

visited Bra. W. numerous times while he had been in treatment, lived in an appropriate home, and

had a room in her house for Bra. W. When Bra. W. spoke about Susan’s home, he referred to it as

his own.

¶ 21 Susan testified she has three other foster children living in her house, one of whom

was around Bra. W.’s age. The children, who have had contact with Bra. W., acted like siblings.

Susan stated Bra. W. was on his school’s football team and enjoyed extended family gatherings.

Susan had worked with Bra. W. on his anger issues, helping him to calm down and remove himself

from upsetting situations. She also facilitated Bra. W. going to mental health counseling. When

asked, Susan asserted she “[m]ost definitely” would take Bra. W. in, and she and her husband

wanted to adopt him.

¶ 22 2. Evidence Concerning Bry. W.’s Best Interest

¶ 23 Fischer testified that Bry. W. had been in his current foster home for three months.

The foster home had an appropriate place for Bry. W. to sleep and provided him with adequate

food and clothing. Bry. W. had become close to his foster parents, especially his foster mother,

Jennifer H. After being placed in the foster home, Bry. W.’s behavioral problems improved, which

included his behavior at school. To help address Bry. W.’s behavioral problems, he was removed

from visitation with respondent, as he suffered severe behavioral issues after visiting him and

Brandy R.

¶ 24 Jennifer testified that three children lived in her home. One child, a five-year-old

girl, was her foster daughter, and the other child was her stepson, who spent half of his time in her

home. Jennifer stated the children acted like siblings, with Bry. W. choosing to share a room with

-5- her stepson. Although Bry. W. acted out at first when he moved into the home, that

“[t]remendously” improved. He learned to calm himself at home and in school, followed daily

routines, and complied with the rules of the house. Although Bry. W. initially felt insecure when

he first moved in, fearing he would be sent to another home if he misbehaved, those fears had been

allayed. Bry. W. played T-ball, wanted to play football on a junior team that Jennifer’s husband

coached, built community ties, enjoyed extended family gatherings, and had adjusted “[v]ery well”

to living in the family’s house. Henry testified she and her husband, with whom Bry. W. was also

close, wanted to adopt Bry. W. and would “[a]bsolutely” help him maintain ties with his biological

brothers.

¶ 25 3. Evidence Concerning Be. W.’s Best Interest

¶ 26 Fischer stated Be. W. was a kindergartner and had been in his current foster home

for eight months. He was not very verbal, but his foster family was working on improving his

verbal skills.

¶ 27 Chad B., Be. W.’s foster father, testified Be. W. was the only child in their home.

Be. W. called his foster parents “mom and dad,” was used to his foster parents’ rules and routines,

and was doing “very well in school.” Be. W. received therapy at school, and his speech therapy

would continue over the summer, with Chad and his wife working with Be. W. on his speech at

home. Be. W. very much enjoyed activities with the extended family and talked about his

biological brothers on occasion. Chad asserted he and his wife “100 percent” wished to adopt

Be. W. and would “[a]bsolutely” help him maintain a bond with his biological brothers.

¶ 28 4. Respondent’s Testimony

¶ 29 Respondent testified that although he used to drive to Tennessee for work, he had

started working within driving distance of Peoria within the last three months. At his new job, he

-6- made less money and worked 8 to 10 hours per day. Respondent recognized these hours would

interfere with him taking care of the children daily, but he indicated his brother and sister would

be able to help him. Respondent explained that his siblings could work it out so that one of them

would be at home with the children when he was unable to care for them. Respondent admitted he

had not told Fischer about his new employment, but he could do so. Respondent stated his current

employment made it difficult for him to complete drug tests, but it was not as difficult as it was

when he was working at his old job. He asserted that sometimes when he went to his drug tests, he

was denied services because he was not on the schedule. (Fischer, when recalled, testified

respondent only contacted her once about being denied services, and she admitted his omission

from the schedule was most likely her fault.) Respondent stated he was not currently using any

illegal substances, had not done so within the last year, and was not engaged in substance abuse

treatment.

¶ 30 5. The Trial Court’s Ruling

¶ 31 After considering the best interest factors, the trial court terminated respondent’s

parental rights and changed the permanency goal for the children to adoption. The court observed

the children had been removed from their parents’ care for 4 ½ years, and, as a result, their identity

lay “with the foster care system,” which the court noted was terrible for children. In their current

placements, the children were starting to form a sense of permanence, belonging, and attachment

with stable adults who could be there for them the rest of their lives. The court noted that although

respondent attempted to do a couple drug tests within the last few months in an effort to get the

children back, that was “pretty late in the game.”

¶ 32 As to Bra. W., the trial court found he wanted to reside with Susan when he was

released from residential treatment because that was where he felt loved and secure. Although the

-7- other two children were not able to clearly express where they wished to be placed, the court

observed they had started to form a sense of security and familiarity with their foster families.

Lastly, the court noted all the foster families were able to provide for and were committed to the

children.

¶ 33 This timely appeal followed.

¶ 34 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 35 Respondent’s appellate counsel moves to withdraw. Counsel supports her motion

with a memorandum of law providing a statement of facts, a discussion of potential claims, and

arguments as to why those issues lack arguable merit. Notice of counsel’s request to withdraw was

sent to respondent’s last known address. The notice advised respondent he could respond, but no

response was filed.

¶ 36 Counsel submits it would be frivolous to argue that the trial court erred in finding

(1) respondent unfit and (2) it was in the best interest of the minors to terminate respondent’s

parental rights. We agree.

¶ 37 Under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West

2024)), the involuntary termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the State must

prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is “unfit,” as defined in section 1(D) of the

Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)). In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 244 (2006). If

the State proves unfitness, it then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination

of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 363-66 (2004).

¶ 38 A. Unfitness

¶ 39 Counsel first submits it would be frivolous to argue the trial court erred in finding

respondent unfit.

-8- ¶ 40 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility

determinations the trial court is in the best position to make. See In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21

(“[T]he trial court’s opportunity to view and evaluate the parties *** is superior.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.)). A trial court’s finding of parental unfitness will not be reversed unless

it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29. A decision is

against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.

Id.

¶ 41 Here, respondent was found unfit under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act,

which provides that a parent may be found unfit for failing “to make reasonable progress toward

the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of

neglected or abused minor.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024). “Reasonable progress has been

defined as demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1046 (2007). Reasonable progress exists when the

trial court

“can conclude that *** the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child

returned to parental custody. The court will be able to order the child returned to

parental custody in the near future because, at that point, the parent will have fully

complied with the directives previously given to the parent in order to regain

custody of the child.” (Emphases in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461

(1991).

¶ 42 We have emphasized “ ‘reasonable progress’ is an ‘objective standard.’ ” In re

F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88 (quoting L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461). A trial court may

only consider evidence from the relevant time period in determining a parent’s fitness based on

-9- reasonable progress. Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1046 (citing In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 237-38

(2003)).

¶ 43 In this case, the children were removed from respondent’s care because of his

substance abuse issues. During the relevant nine-month period, respondent used illegal drugs

weekly, did not get treatment for his substance abuse, failed to appear at drug testing, and tested

positive for methamphetamine and THC. Although respondent claimed to have rectified his

substance abuse problems, nothing in the record substantiates this claim. Based on the evidence,

the trial court could not conclude it would, in the near future, be able to order the children returned

to respondent’s custody because he would have fully complied with directives in place to correct

the reason for the removal of the children from his care. Thus, the court’s determination respondent

was unfit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 44 B. Best Interest

¶ 45 Counsel next submits it would be frivolous to argue the trial court erred in finding

it was in the children’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 46 After a trial court finds a parent unfit, “the court then determines whether it is in

the best interests of the minor that parental rights be terminated.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 352. “[A]t a

best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield

to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” Id. at 364. The State must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence termination of parental rights is in the minor’s best interest. Id. at

366. In making the best interest determination, the court must consider the factors set forth in

section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024)). These factors

include:

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the

- 10 - child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including familial,

cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love,

security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive

placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes; (6) the child’s community

ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence, including the need for stability

and continuity of relationships with parental figures and siblings; (8) the

uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care;

and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child.” In re

Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071(2009) (citing 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)

(West 2008)).

“The court’s best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to each of these

factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in affirming

its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19.

¶ 47 On review, “[w]e will not disturb a court’s finding that termination is in the [child’s]

best interest unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d

953, 961 (2005). A best interest determination “is against the manifest weight of the evidence only

if the facts clearly demonstrate that the trial court should have reached the opposite result.” Jay H.,

395 Ill. App. 3d at 1071.

¶ 48 Here, although respondent has steady employment and a home suitable for the

children, his living arrangements are not conducive to raising his sons. Respondent is unable to

care for the children when they are out of school and he is at work, and he has no definitive plans

in place to provide care for them when he is not home. Balanced against that is the fact all three

children have strong bonds with their foster parents. The foster parents provide for the children’s

- 11 - physical, emotional, and educational needs; involve them in activities; include them in family

gatherings; wish to provide them with permanence by adopting them; and will work toward

helping the children maintain contact with each other. The trial court considered the evidence

presented at the best interest hearing in relation to the statutory best interest factors and found they

weighed in favor of terminating respondent’s parental rights. We cannot conclude the evidence in

the record clearly demonstrates the court should have reached the opposite result. Accordingly, the

court’s best interest determination is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 49 After examining the record, the motion to withdraw, and the memorandum of law,

we agree with counsel that this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit. Accordingly, we grant

appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 51 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 52 Affirmed.

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