In Re Baseline Energy Services, LP and Baseline Services, LLC v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 5, 2025
• Docket: 13-25-00001-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-25-00001-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE BASELINE ENERGY SERVICES, LP AND BASELINE SERVICES, LLC

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina1

By petition for writ of mandamus, relators Baseline Energy Services, LP and

Baseline Services LLC contend that the trial court2 abused its discretion by denying their

motion to transfer venue of an employment dispute from Hidalgo County, Texas, to Tarrant

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions). 2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number CL-24-1417-J in the County Court

at Law No. 10 of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Armando J. Marroquin. See id. R. 52.2. County, Texas, based on mandatory venue provisions concerning injunctions and claims

for libel.3 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.017, 65.023. We conditionally

grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 1, 2024, Billy Tom Martin filed an original petition against relators in

Hidalgo County. Martin alleged that he was employed by Baseline Energy Services, LP

as an inventory coordinator; however, he suffered a work-related back injury and filed a

workers’ compensation claim. He alleged that he thereafter requested accommodation to

work from home temporarily, but relators summarily terminated his employment. Martin

asserted that:

This action arises from the [relators’] violations of the Texas Labor Code, specifically relating to unlawful employment practices including age discrimination, sex discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation against [Martin]. Despite [Martin’s] faithful performance of his duties as an [i]nventory [c]oordinator, he was subjected to discriminatory treatment based on his age, sex, and disability, and experienced retaliation that culminated in his wrongful termination.

Martin pleaded causes of action for disability discrimination and workers compensation

retaliation. He asserted that venue was proper in Hidalgo County because “[a]ll or a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [his] claims occurred” there. See

id. § 15.002(a)(1). Martin asserted that his “employment with [relators], the alleged

3 The trial court’s order of November 13, 2024, denying relators’ motion to transfer venue also

denied relators’ motion to dismiss the lawsuit filed against them under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(12). Relators have filed a separate interlocutory appeal of the November 13, 2024 order challenging the denial of their motion to dismiss in our appellate cause number 13-24-00564-CV.

2 discriminatory actions, and the ultimate termination of the [his] employment—all central

to the claims of this lawsuit—transpired within the jurisdiction of Hidalgo County.”

On June 5, 2024, relators filed a motion to transfer venue to Tarrant County. They

specifically denied Martin’s venue facts and asserted that venue was proper in Tarrant

County because “the alleged actions took place, if at all,” in Tarrant County, where their

principal offices were located, or in La Salle County, where Martin worked at one of their

facilities. See id.4

On August 16, 2024, Martin filed his first amended petition against relators. In this

pleading, Martin again alleged that venue was proper in Hidalgo County because all or a

substantial part of the events giving rise to his claims occurred there. Martin’s first

amended petition reiterated his claims for disability discrimination and workers

compensation retaliation and added new causes of action for retaliation under the labor

code and libel. In terms of his libel claim, Martin alleged that relators “falsely claimed both

internally . . . and externally, notably during proceedings related to [his] claim for

unemployment benefits, that [he] had abandoned his job.” Martin requested actual

damages and equitable and injunctive relief.

That same day, Martin also filed an objection to relators’ motion to transfer venue.

He reiterated his assertion that venue was proper in Hidalgo County on grounds that the

relevant events occurred there. However, he further asserted that venue was mandatory

4 In the underlying proceedings, relators and Martin also asserted that venue was proper in their

chosen counties in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(b). The trial court’s order denying relators’ motion to transfer venue was not premised on that rationale. We do not address it here. See id. § 15.002(c).

3 in Hidalgo County because he resided there, and his amended petition included a claim

for defamation. See id. § 15.017. Martin did not support this pleading with an affidavit or

other evidence in support of his allegations regarding venue.

On August 26, 2024, relators filed an amended motion to transfer venue to Tarrant

County. Relators denied Martin’s alleged venue facts and asserted that Martin resided in

Rio Grande City, in Starr County, “where he is even running for public office.” According

to relators, Martin was a candidate for Starr County Constable, Precinct Four, an elected

position that requires a candidate to reside in that territory for six months before filing an

application to appear on the ballot. Relators further asserted that Martin identified a Starr

County address as his residence in filings regarding his candidacy for office. Relators

asserted that because Martin had alleged a cause of action against them for defamation,

§ 15.017 required Martin to file his suit in the county in which he resided when his cause

of action accrued, yet Martin did not reside in Hidalgo County, thus, § 15.017 required his

suit to be brought in the county of “the domicile of any corporate defendant.” See id.

Relators also asserted that because Martin sought injunctive relief, § 65.023 provided that

mandatory venue fell in Tarrant County because relators were domiciled there. See id.

§ 65.023. Relators supported their amended motion to transfer venue with an affidavit

and attachments.

Relators’ amended motion to transfer venue was set for a hearing to be held on

October 22, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. That morning at 8:15 a.m., relators filed a verified motion

for continuance of the hearing on grounds that their counsel’s flight to Hidalgo County for

the hearing was delayed, then cancelled, due to “severe weather that impacted air travel.”

4 However, the hearing on relators’ amended motion to transfer venue commenced as

scheduled, and relators’ counsel did not make an appearance. Martin’s counsel advised

the court that, “since they’re not here I’m going to be asking that the motion to

transfer . . . be denied.” The clerk informed the trial court that relators had filed a motion

for continuance on grounds that there was “severe weather,” and they were unable to

appear. The trial court stated that, “nobody is here to urge that so at this time that’ll be

denied[,] and I’ll grant your motion[,] counsel.” On November 13, 2024, the trial court

signed an order stating, in relevant part:

On this day, the Court considered [Relators’] Motion to Transfer Venue . . . and Motion for Continuance. After reviewing the motions, the responses filed by [Martin], and noting the absence of [relators] or their legal representatives at the hearing, the Court makes the following findings and orders:

FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. [Martin] filed claims against [relators] including but not limited to disability discrimination, workers’ compensation retaliation, general retaliation, and libel, with substantial actions occurring in Hidalgo County.

2. [Relators] filed a Motion to Transfer Venue to Tarrant County . . . .

3. [Relators] also filed a Motion for Continuance on the day of the scheduled hearing, which they failed to attend, providing no representation to argue their motion.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

1. Venue is proper in Hidalgo County under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code [§] 15.002(a)(1) and [§] 15.017 due to substantial connections to the events giving rise to the claims and [Martin’s] residence at the time of the accrual of the cause of action.

....

5 3. [Relators’] Motion for Continuance was improperly managed and not supported by appropriate representation at the hearing, rendering it unable to be urged.

The trial court thus denied both relators’ verified motion for continuance of the hearing

and their amended motion to transfer venue.

This original proceeding ensued. Relators present three issues asserting that the

trial court abused its discretion: (1) by denying their amended motion to transfer venue

and determining that venue is proper in Hidalgo County under § 15.017 regarding

mandatory venue for libel; (2) by denying their amended motion to transfer venue under

§ 65.023 regarding mandatory venue for injunctive relief; and (3) by alternatively

determining that venue is proper in Hidalgo County under § 15.002, the general venue

statute. See id. §§ 15.002(b), 15.017, 65.023. This Court requested and received a

response to the petition for writ of mandamus from Martin and received a reply thereto

from relators. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4, 52.5, 52.8.

II. MANDAMUS

Mandamus is intended for use in circumstances “involving manifest and urgent

necessity.” Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., Inc. v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure

Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628, 641 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,

840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)). Generally, a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary

remedy available only when the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the party

seeking relief lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826,

834 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding).

6 III. VENUE

Venue may be proper in many different counties. In re Fox River Real Est.

Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding). “The initial choice of

venue is left to the plaintiff, who first decides venue by filing an original petition.”

Fortenberry v. Great Divide Ins., 664 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. 2023); see Wilson v. Tex.

Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 886 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1994). The defendant may challenge

the plaintiff’s venue choice through a motion to transfer venue. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 86(1);

see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.063(1) (“The court, on motion filed and

served concurrently with or before the filing of the answer, shall transfer an action to

another county of proper venue if . . . the county in which the action is pending is not a

proper county as provided by this chapter.”). If the defendant challenges venue, the

plaintiff bears the burden to present prima facie proof that venue is maintainable in the

county of suit, while the defendant bears the burden to prove venue is maintainable in the

county to which transfer is sought. Fortenberry, 664 S.W.3d at 811; Wilson, 886 S.W.2d

at 260 & n.1; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(2)(a).

“All venue facts, when properly pleaded, shall be taken as true unless specifically

denied by the adverse party.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); see Livingston v. Gregurek, 650

S.W.3d 721, 725 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). “When a venue fact is

specifically denied, the party pleading the venue fact must make prima facie proof of that

venue fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); see In re Signature Care Emergency Ctr., 665 S.W.3d

150, 162–63 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2023, orig. proceeding). “Prima facie

proof is made when the venue facts are properly pleaded and an affidavit, and any duly

7 proved attachments to the affidavit, are filed fully and specifically setting forth the facts

supporting such pleading.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a). In determining the propriety of venue,

permissive and general venue statutes always yield to mandatory venue statutes. In re

Fox River Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d at 762–63; Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six

Cap. Partners, Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 110, 130 (Tex. 2018).

IV. ANALYSIS

Relators contend that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their amended

motion to transfer venue because they specifically denied Martin’s venue allegations and

venue was mandatory in Tarrant County based on Martin’s request for injunctive relief or

his defamation claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.017, 65.023. In

response, Martin contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

transfer because relators failed to appear at the venue hearing and thus waived or

abandoned their motion; relators failed to specifically deny his venue facts; and relators’

proof of venue was insufficient and conclusory. Martin further asserts that relators

possess an adequate remedy by appeal, thus mandamus relief is unavailable.

A. Failure to Appear

In his response to the petition for writ of mandamus, Martin contends that

mandamus relief is unwarranted because the trial court acted within its discretion when it

denied relators’ motion after they failed to appear at the venue hearing to urge it. Martin

further argues that relators’ “untimely motion for continuance—filed on the day of the

hearing without adequate justification—was properly denied.” He contends that relators

thus abandoned or waived their motion to transfer venue. Relators urge, in contrast, that

8 their failure to appear at the hearing did not relieve Martin of his venue burdens, and thus,

the denial of their verified motion for continuance was moot.

It is abundantly clear that a party seeking to transfer venue must comply with

various procedural and substantive requirements to obtain relief. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV.

P. 86(1) (concerning the timing for filing a motion to transfer); 86(3) (delineating the

requirements for a motion to transfer venue); 87(1) (providing that the movant has the

duty to request a hearing on a motion to transfer venue). Martin relies on Rule 87 to argue

that relators’ burden encompassed the duty to appear at the venue hearing; however, we

do not find that requirement in the rule, nor do we find authority in support of that

proposition. See generally id. R. 87.

Moreover, in most cases, 5 the hearing on a motion to transfer venue is for

argument only and evidence is not received. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 15.064 (“The court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits.”);

TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(b) (“The court shall determine the motion to transfer venue on the

basis of the pleadings, any stipulations made by and between the parties and such

affidavits and attachments as may be filed . . . .”); Eddins v. Parker, 63 S.W.3d 15, 18

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, pet. denied). (“The hearing on a motion to transfer venue is

non-jury, for argument only, and no evidence may be received.”); see also Jack B. Anglin

Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 269 n.4 (Tex. 1992). In short, relator’s counsel’s

5 “[T]he trial court has discretion to allow a broader range of proof in making a [§] 15.003(a) joinder

determination than it would in a venue hearing. Specifically, a trial court may allow the parties to offer testimony, if the trial court believes it would be useful to its determination.” Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex. 1999); see Sustainable Tex. Oyster Res. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Hannah Reef, Inc., 491 S.W.3d 96, 107 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). denied). Joinder under § 15.003(a) is not at issue in this case.

9 appearance at the hearing would have added nothing for the trial court to consider in

determining the merits of relators’ motion to transfer venue insofar as its ruling was

required to be based on the parties’ pleadings and affidavits. We further note that “[w]aiver

is ‘an intentional relinquishment of a known right or intentional conduct inconsistent with

claiming that right.’” Chalker Energy Partners III, LLC v. Le Norman Operating LLC, 595

S.W.3d 668, 676 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Jernigan v. Langley, 111 S.W.3d 153, 156 (Tex.

2003) (per curiam)). Here, relators filed a verified motion for continuance based on severe

weather prior to the hearing, and the record lacks any indication that the failure to appear

was intentional.

Based on the foregoing, we reject Martin’s contention that relators waived or

abandoned their motion to transfer venue by failing to appear at the hearing.

B. Specific Denial

Martin contends that relators did not specifically deny his venue allegations. A

general or global denial of venue allegations is insufficient to serve as a specific denial of

the pleaded venue facts. In re Hannah, 431 S.W.3d 801, 811 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Shamoun & Norman, LLP v. Yarto Int’l Grp.,

LP, 398 S.W.3d 272, 291 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2012, pet. dism’d).

“‘[S]pecific denial’ of a venue fact requires that the fact itself be denied.” State v. Life

Partners, Inc., 243 S.W.3d 236, 239 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied) (quoting

Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enter. Prod. Co., 833 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied)).

10 We review Martin’s alleged venue facts. In his original and amended petitions,

Martin alleged that venue was proper in Hidalgo County under the general venue rule.

Martin alleged in both pleadings that:

Venue is proper in Hidalgo County, Texas, pursuant to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. All or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the Plaintiff's claims occurred within this county. The Plaintiff's employment with the Defendants, the alleged discriminatory actions, and the ultimate termination of the Plaintiff's employment—all central to the claims of this lawsuit—transpired within the jurisdiction of Hidalgo County.

In his first amended petition, Martin also alleged that relators terminated his employment

while he was physically present in Hidalgo County receiving medical treatment for his

injuries. In his objection to relators’ motion to transfer venue, Martin reiterated that Hidalgo

County was a proper venue because “substantial and critical events” occurred there.

Martin explained that he had filed an amended petition including a claim for defamation,

and § 15.017 “mandates that a defamation case, such as the present one where [he] was

defamed by false statements made in the process of denying unemployment benefits,

can be maintained in Hidalgo County where [he] resided at the time these events

occurred.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.017. Martin further asserted that

relators’ defamatory statements that he had abandoned his job “were made as part of the

process to deny [him] unemployment benefits and were communicated to third parties

involved in the adjudication of those benefits within Hidalgo County.”

Relators’ amended motion to transfer contains the following paragraph:

As an initial matter, Defendants deny each of Plaintiff’s venue allegations in the First Amended Complaint, including that all or a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to the suit arose in Hidalgo County, and that Hidalgo County is proper under the mandatory venue provision for libel, as

11 it is neither Plaintiff’s county of residence nor Defendants’ county of domicile. Specifically, Defendants deny that Plaintiff resides in Hidalgo County, that Plaintiff was employed or injured in Hidalgo County, that Plaintiff resigned in Hidalgo County, that Defendants contested Plaintiff’s request for unemployment benefits in Hidalgo County, that Defendants discussed Plaintiff’s employment in Hidalgo County, or that any alleged discriminatory acts took place in Hidalgo County.

Relators supported their motion to transfer venue with the affidavit of Noel Smith, the

Director of Human Resources for Baseline Energy Services, LP. Smith specifically denied

that a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to Martin’s claims occurred in

Hidalgo County. Smith denied that Martin was employed or injured in Hidalgo County, that

he resigned from his employment with relators in Hidalgo County, that relators contested

his request for unemployment benefits in Hidalgo County, that relators discussed his

employment in Hidalgo County, and that any alleged discriminatory acts took place in

Hidalgo County. Smith further specifically denied that Martin “resides in Hidalgo County.”

Although relators’ amended motion to transfer venue contained an insufficient

global or general denial providing that they “deny each of Plaintiff’s venue allegations,” it

also included specific denials of Martin’s alleged venue facts. See In re Hannah, 431

S.W.3d at 811; Shamoun & Norman, LLP, 398 S.W.3d at 291. Therefore, relators have

met their burden to specifically deny the venue facts alleged by Martin. As a result, we do

not take Martin’s alleged venue facts as true. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a).

C. Mandatory Venue under § 65.023(a)

In their second issue, which we take out of order, relators contend that venue is

mandatory in Tarrant County under § 65.023(a), the mandatory venue provision for

injunction suits. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.023(a). This provision states,

12 in relevant part, that “a writ of injunction against a party who is a resident of this state shall

be tried in a district or county court in the county in which the party is domiciled.” Id.

Relators thus contend that mandatory venue lies in Tarrant County as the county of their

domicile.

In general, the venue for lawsuits is governed by Chapter 15 of the Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code. See In re Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 218 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex.

2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). However, § 15.016 provides that “[a]n action

governed by any other statute prescribing mandatory venue shall be brought in the county

required by that statute.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.016; see In re Tex. Dep’t

of Transp., 218 S.W.3d at 76; In re Harding, 563 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2018, orig. proceeding). Therefore, § 65.023, found in the chapter of the civil practice and

remedies code governing injunctions, would prevail over the venue provision regarding

libel, slander, and defamation found in § 15.017. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 15.016; In re Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 218 S.W.3d at 76; In re Adan Volpe Props., Ltd., 306

S.W.3d 369, 375 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, orig. proceeding); In re Dole

Food Co., Inc., 256 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, orig. proceeding) (per

curiam). Accordingly, we address relators’ contention that § 65.023 governs our venue

analysis before addressing relators’ contentions regarding the application of § 15.017.

“[S]ection 65.023(a) is operative only when a plaintiff’s pleadings in the underlying

suit establish the relief sought is ‘purely or primarily injunctive.’” In re Fox River Real Est.

Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d at 765 (quoting In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 736

(Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding)); see In re Hardwick, 426 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. App.—

13 Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding). We employ “a commonsense examination of

the substance” of Martin’s claims for relief to determine if his request for injunctive relief

reflects the dominant purpose or central focus of his lawsuit. In re Fox River Real Est.

Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d at 765. In his first amended petition, Martin sought the

following remedies:

a. Back Pay and Lost Benefits: Compensation for all wages, salary, employment benefits, and other compensation denied or lost to Plaintiff due to Defendants’ unlawful actions, from the date of termination to the present. This includes, but is not limited to, salary, overtime pay, bonuses, stock options, retirement benefits, and health care benefits.

b. Front Pay: In lieu of reinstatement, Plaintiff seeks front pay as compensation for future loss of earnings and benefits from the date of judgment forward, for a period to be determined at trial, considering Plaintiff’s age, employment prospects, and other relevant factors.

c. Compensatory Damages for Emotional Pain and Suffering: Compensation for past and future physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non- pecuniary losses resulting from Defendants’ discriminatory, retaliatory, and wrongful actions.

d. Punitive Damages: Where allowed by law, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Defendants for their malicious, oppressive, and egregious conduct with the intent to deter such conduct in the future and to serve as a warning to others.

e. Interest: Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law on all amounts awarded.

f. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: Plaintiff seeks recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees, court costs, expert witness fees, and other expenses incurred in prosecuting this action, as provided under the Texas Labor Code.

g. Equitable Relief: Plaintiff seeks any equitable relief that the Court deems just and proper, including but not limited to reinstatement to

14 his former position or an equivalent position, with the same seniority, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment.

h. Injunctive Relief: An order enjoining Defendants from engaging in discriminatory, retaliatory, and wrongful employment practices, and requiring Defendants to implement policies and programs that provide equal employment opportunities and prevent future violations of the Texas Labor Code.

Applying a commonsense analysis of the foregoing, we conclude that Martin’s

request for injunctive relief is not the dominant purpose of his lawsuit. See id. Martin’s

request for injunctive relief is at best merely ancillary or incidental to the primary relief

sought, that being the recovery of monetary damages. See id.; In re Adan Volpe Props.,

Ltd., 306 S.W.3d at 375. Accordingly, we overrule relators’ second issue.

D. Mandatory Venue under § 15.017

In their first issue, relators assert that the trial court abused its discretion by denying

their motion to transfer venue based on mandatory venue regarding defamation. See TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.017. Section 15.017 states that:

A suit for damages for libel, slander, or invasion of privacy shall be brought and can only be maintained in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, or in the county in which the defendant resided at the time of filing suit, or in the county of the residence of defendants, or any of them, or the domicile of any corporate defendant, at the election of the plaintiff.

Id. As stated previously, Martin asserts that § 15.017 “mandates that a defamation case,

such as the present one where [he] was defamed by false statements made in the process

of denying unemployment benefits, can be maintained in Hidalgo County where [he]

resided at the time these events occurred.”

15 We agree with the parties that § 15.017 is applicable to this case. In his first

amended petition, Martin alleged a claim for “libel,” stating that relators “falsely claimed

both internally within the organization and externally, notably during proceedings related

to [his] claim for unemployment benefits, that [he] had abandoned his job.” Martin

asserted that relators’ “statements were published to third parties, including but not limited

to employees within Defendants' organization and representatives of the unemployment

benefits office, thereby satisfying the publication element necessary for a libel claim.”

Martin further contends that he established that venue was proper in Hidalgo

County as the county of his residence under § 15.017. He asserts that relators failed to

deny or “rebut” his claim that he resided in Hidalgo County while hospitalized at the time

of his termination, and argues in this regard that he can have two residences for venue

purposes. See GeoChem Tech Corp. v. Verseckes, 962 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex. 1998); see

also In re O'Rourke, No. 03-22-00505-CV, 2022 WL 4349846, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin

Sept. 20, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (Triana, J., dissenting) (discussing whether

this doctrine applies under § 15.017). However, we have already rejected Martin’s

contention that relators failed to specifically deny that he resided in Hidalgo County. In

their amended motion to transfer venue, relators stated that they “deny that [Martin]

resides in Hidalgo County,” and Smith specifically “further den[ied] that [Martin] resides in

Hidalgo County.”

Martin further asserts that relators failed to meet their evidentiary burden to show

that Hidalgo County was an improper venue because Smith’s affidavit was not based on

personal knowledge and is “replete with conclusory statements unsupported by specific

16 facts or evidence, rendering it legally insufficient to rebut [his] prima facie venue facts.”6

The record does not reflect that Martin presented these arguments to the trial court. We

assume without deciding that these contentions are properly before us. In any event,

Martin’s arguments mistake the relative burdens of the parties. As we have previously

stated, relators specifically denied Martin’s alleged venue facts, including Martin’s

allegation that he resided in Hidalgo County. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); State, 243

S.W.3d at 239. Once they did so, Martin was required to “make prima facie proof of that

venue fact” by properly pleading venue facts regarding his residence in Hidalgo County

and filing an affidavit “fully and specifically setting forth the facts supporting such

pleading.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a). However, Martin did not produce an affidavit or

any other evidence regarding his allegation that his residence was in Hidalgo County or

that venue was otherwise proper there. See id.

In contrast, relators pleaded and offered prima facie proof that they were domiciled

in Tarrant County. In his affidavit, Smith stated that relators’ principal offices are in Tarrant

County, Texas, and were located there “at all times relevant to the present lawsuit.” Smith

characterized relators as “Fort Worth” companies. According to Smith, relators’

“operations, including the corporate officers and directors, are also located in Tarrant

County.” Martin did not specifically deny these facts or offer any evidence otherwise.

Because Martin failed to meet his burden to present prima facie proof that venue

was proper in Hidalgo County, the right to choose the proper venue passed to the relators.

6 Smith asserted, in relevant part, that he had “personal knowledge of the facts stated” in his

affidavit, the facts were true, and his “personal knowledge was obtained through [his] professional involvement as the Director of Human Resources for Baseline Energy Services, LP.” 17 See In re Mo. Pac. R. Co., 998 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (“[I]f the

plaintiff fails to discharge the burden, the right to choose a proper venue passes to the

defendant, who must then prove that venue is proper in the defendant’s chosen county.”);

In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (“If the plaintiff

fails to establish proper venue, the trial court must transfer venue to the county specified

in the defendant’s motion to transfer, provided that the defendant has requested transfer

to another county of proper venue. . . . On this point, the defendant has the burden to

provide prima facie proof.”); In re Signature Care Emergency Ctr., 665 S.W.3d at 162

(“Because the real parties failed to discharge their burden [to present prima facie proof

that venue was proper in the county of suit], the right to choose a proper venue passed

to the relators.”). Here, it is uncontested that § 15.017 applies, and relators chose Tarrant

County as the county of their domiciles. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.017;

see also In re Fluor Enters., Inc., No. 13-11-00260-CV, 2011 WL 2463004, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 13, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re

Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 13-09-00500-CV, 2010 WL 1138451, at *6 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 22, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Therefore, venue

was mandatory in Tarrant County under § 15.017.

We sustain relators’ first issue. Having done so, we need not address relator’s third

issue regarding permissive venue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4; see also In re Team Rocket,

L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (stating that mandamus review

of permissive venue determinations is appropriate in “extraordinary circumstances”).

18 E. Adequate Remedy

Martin alleges that relators have an adequate remedy by appeal. He further argues

that relators could have sought rehearing in the trial court, but instead sought mandamus

relief “bypassing a straightforward remedy available at the trial court level.” With an

exception that is not applicable here, 7 there are no interlocutory appeals from venue

determinations. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(6);

Fortenberry, 664 S.W.3d at 811. However, mandamus is available to enforce mandatory

venue provisions. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642; Wagner v. Apache

Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277, 288 (Tex. 2021). When the trial court abuses its discretion

regarding the application of a mandatory venue statute, mandamus relief is available

without proof of an inadequate appellate remedy. In re Fox River Real Est. Holdings, Inc.,

596 S.W.3d at 763; In re Mo. Pac. R. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 216. Therefore, relators need

not show that they lack an adequate remedy to secure mandamus relief. See In re Fox

River Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d at 763; In re Mo. Pac. R. Co., 998 S.W.2d at

216; see also Hall v. Dalehite, No. C14-88-00366-CV, 1988 WL 109790, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 20, 1988, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“We note that a motion

for rehearing was not a necessary prerequisite for seeking mandamus.”).

V. CONCLUSION

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,

Martin’s response, and relators’ reply, is of the opinion that relators have met their burden

7 The civil practice and remedies code provides for an interlocutory appeal of certain venue

determinations in cases regarding multiple and intervening plaintiffs. See id. § 15.003(b).

19 to obtain relief. We conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to vacate

its November 13, 2024 order, in part, insofar as the order denies relators’ motion to

transfer venue, and to transfer the suit to Tarrant County. We are confident the trial court

will comply, and our writ will issue only if it fails to act promptly in accord with this

memorandum opinion.

JAIME TIJERINA Chief Justice

Delivered and filed on the 5th day of March, 2025.