In re Bangs

15 Barb. 264, 1853 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 66
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 6, 1853
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 15 Barb. 264 (In re Bangs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Bangs, 15 Barb. 264, 1853 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 66 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1853).

Opinion

By the Court, T. R. Strong, J.

The receiver is an officer of the court, and subject to its control, in the performance of his duties; and the petitioners have such an interest in, and' sustain siich a relation to, the trust, as entitled them to apply by petition, for relief, in respect to the action of that officer. (2 R. S. 463, § 36. Laws of 1852, p. 67. 2 R. S. pt. 3, art. 3, tit. 4, ch. 8. Edwards on Receivers, 2, 4,125, 126. Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co. of N. Y., 2 Paige, 438. In the matter of Merritt, 5 Id. 125. In the matter of the City Bank of Buffalo, 10 Id. 378. Noe v. Gibson, 7 Id. 513. Vincent v. Parker, Id. 65. Howell v. Ripley, 10 Id. 43. Mann v. Pentz, 3 Comst. 415. Gillet v. Moody, Id. 479. Merritt v. Lyon, 16 Wend. 405.)

It is declared in the order appointing the receiver, that “ he [267]*267shall possess all the powers and authority conferred, and be •subject to all the obligations and duties imposed upon receivers, in and by articles two and three, of title four, of chapter eight, part three, of the revised statutes of'this state, including all the powers arid authority conferred by law upon trustees to whom an assignment of the estate of insolvent debtors may be made, pursuant to the provisions of chapter five, of the second part of the revised statutes.” And by chapter 71, of the laws of 1852, section one, he has all the power and authority, and is subject to'the same obligations and duties as are provided in the said third article. Among the duties of the receivers prescribed by that article, is the following: “ They shall call a general meeting of the creditors of such corporation, within four months from the time of their appointment, when all accounts and demands for and against such corporation, and all its open and subsisting •contracts shall be ascertained and adjusted, as far as may be, and the amount of moneys in the hands of the receiver declared.” The receiver, in this case, was therefore required to call a meeting of creditors for the purpose contemplated by the provision of the revised statutes, both by the order "for his appointment, and by the act of 1852; but it is quite apparent, from the papers on the motion, that no important benefit would now be accomplished by such a meeting. The claims in favor of, and against, the corporation, and its subsisting contracts, have been ascertained and adjusted as far as practicable, without judicial determinations, in respect to some of them.

It is manifest that it would not be practicable for the receiver, while the questions in relation to disputed claims against the corporation remain undetermined, to ascertain the true amount or proportion to be paid upon the respective premium notos; and it does not appear that it could be so nearly ascertained that-it would be proper for the court to direct him to determine the same, and on receiving such amount in any case, to surrender the note. The receiver states in his affidavit, that he is and has been willing and desirous to receive surrenders of policies, on payment of assessments connected therewith; and it is proper that he should be directed, if necessary to do so, on pay[268]*268ment of what is legally payable for assessments. By such surrender, and the acceptance thereof, policy holders would be relieved from liability, in respect to future losses ; and requiring such acceptance by the receiver, upon the condition last mentioned, which is in accordance with their contract, is all they can' properly ask. Their notes should be retained by the receiver, until paid, to the extent of their liability for previous losses.

There does not appear to be any necessity, in order to the protection of the just rights of the petitioners and others similarly situated, that the receiver should he required to give them notice of all applications to the court, which he may make in the execution of his trust; the duty to do so, ought not, therefore, to he imposed upon him.

The more important question presented, relates to the validity of the assessments made by the receiver, under the authority and sanction of the court in June, 1852. It is claimed on the part of the petitioners, that they are illegal, and should, for that reason, be set aside. The papers on the motion show that assessments were made by the directors of the corporation in 1849, 1850 and 1851, to cover previous losses, and that the petitioners and many others paid the sums charged them in those assessments. At the time of the making the assessments by the receiver, over one hundred thousand dollars remained due on those former assessments ; and his assessments were to provide for the whole indebtedness, and claims against, and liabilities of the corporation, and were made upon the notes of the petitioners and others in their situation, and all notes held by the receiver liable for the payment of the losses and liabilities of the corporation. The assessments made by the receiver were, as I understand the papers, to the extent of over one hundred thousand.dollars, for the same indebtedness for which the: assessments of the directors were in part made. The petitioners, therefore, and all persons who were assessed in the former assessments, and paid the sums assessed against them, as their proportions to pay, of the indebtedness provided forjare now required, by the. assessments of the receiver,-to contri-. [269]*269bute a second time a proportionate share for the payment of a large part of that indebtedness.

It is stated in the affidavit of the receiver, in support of his assessments, that, of the sum remaining due upon the assessments of the directors, about fifty thousand dollars is upon notes given for policies on property in Canada, which sum has been declared uncollectable by a decision of the courts in that province; that said policies and notes are void; that about twenty-one thousand dollars is for assessments on notes for policies on property out of this state, and in other states of the union; and that, by reason of the exemption and stay laws of those states, the larger part of it cannot be collected, or the expenses of collection would be equal to that sum, as he believes ; that there remains unpaid upon said assessments in this state, about forty-three thousand dollars, some part of which can probably be collected, but the greater part of which will, in his belief, prove uncollectable; that the assessment made by the directors in 1850, was a ten per cent assessment on all premium notes after a certain date, without reference' to the time for which they were to run, a large portion of the sum remaining unpaid upon which is due from persons in Canada, or upon policies improperly assessed: that the corporation have been beaten in several suits on notes so assessed; and that he is advised and believes the assessment is void.

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Bluebook (online)
15 Barb. 264, 1853 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 66, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-bangs-nysupct-1853.