In re Baby Boy D.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re Baby Boy D.

196 A.D.2d 773, 602 N.Y.S.2d 102

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 28, 1993

StatusPublished

This text of 196 A.D.2d 773 (In re Baby Boy D.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Baby Boy D., 196 A.D.2d 773, 602 N.Y.S.2d 102 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993).

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Opinion

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Gloria Sosa-Lintner, J.), entered December 22, 1992, which, insofar as appealed from, denied petitioner Agency’s application to terminate respondent putative father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Once petitioner had shown no contact between respondent and the child for the six month period immediately preceding commencement of the proceeding, an inference of abandonment arose, rebuttable by proof that respondent was unable to maintain contact or was discouraged from doing so by petitioner (see, Matter of Anthony M., 195 AD2d 315). Although Family Court improperly based its ruling in large part upon petitioner’s failure to show that it attempted to contact respondent (see, Matter of Anonymous, 40 NY2d 96, 102-103), there is ample evidence in the record to find that repeated efforts by respondent to locate the child were thwarted by a confusing bureaucracy, and that he attempted to follow instructions to locate the child’s mother as well. Concur—Carro, J. P., Ellerin, Wallach and Ross, JJ.

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Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Gloria Sosa-Lintner, J.), entered December 22, 1992, which, insofar as appealed from, denied petitioner Agency’s application to terminate respondent putative father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Once petitioner had shown no contact between respondent and the child for the six month period immediately preceding commencement of the proceeding, an inference of abandonment arose, rebuttable by proof that respondent was unable to maintain contact or was discouraged from doing so by petitioner (see, Matter of Anthony M., 195 AD2d 315). Although Family Court improperly based its ruling in large part upon petitioner’s failure to show that it attempted to contact respondent (see, Matter of Anonymous, 40 NY2d 96, 102-103), there is ample evidence in the record to find that repeated efforts by respondent to locate the child were thwarted by a confusing bureaucracy, and that he attempted to follow instructions to locate the child’s mother as well. Concur—Carro, J. P., Ellerin, Wallach and Ross, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

196 A.D.2d 773, 602 N.Y.S.2d 102, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-baby-boy-d-nyappdiv-1993.

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