In re A.W.

6 Navajo Rptr. 38
CourtNavajo Nation Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 4, 1999
DocketNo. A-CV-19-86
StatusPublished

This text of 6 Navajo Rptr. 38 (In re A.W.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Navajo Nation Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re A.W., 6 Navajo Rptr. 38 (navajo 1999).

Opinion

OPINION

Opinion delivered by

AUSTIN, Associate Justice.

This matter comes before the Supreme Court on appeal from the Chinle Children's Court's order denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The Court must address two issues in this appeal. The first is whether the Navajo Nation denied A.W. his basic rights as set out in the Navajo Children's Code, 9 N.T.C. §§ 1107, 1109, and 1113 (1985 Cumm. Supp.). The second issue is whether the Chinle Children's Court violated A.W.’s right to due process.

I

On February 24, 1986, at 6:14 p.m., the Navajo police stopped A.W. (the 13-year-old appellant child) as he was driving a 1974 blue Pontiac sedan in Chinle, Arizona. The officers noticed that the appellant was driving at a slow rate of speed in a weaving pattern. The officers smelled an odor of alcohol on the appellant's breath and administered a field sobriety test, which the appellant failed to pass. The officers found twenty-one (21) cans of 16 fluid ounce beer inside the vehicle. The officers took the appellant into custody for “Operating [a motor vehicle] Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor” (14 N.T.C. § 456 (1977)), “Driving without a License” (14 N.T.C. § 902 (1977)), and “Possession of Liquor” (17 N.T.C. § 410 (1985 Cumm. Supp.)).1 The Police did not advise the appellant of his right against self-incrimination at the time he was taken into custody.

The police drove the appellant to the Chinle Police Station where the appellant was detained. The police notified the appellant's mother by telephone, at [39]*3910:55 p.m., of her son's detention. The appellant spent the night of February 24, 1986, in a room within the Chinle Police Station, containing only a table and chairs; no bed, blanket or food was provided to the appellant child. The record shows no reason why the appellant's mother failed that night to go to the police station for her son.

On February 25, 1986, at 3:00 p.m., the presenting officer filed four petitions for the finding of a delinquent child against the appellant in the Chinle Children's Court. The same day, at the appellant's preliminary hearing, the Chinle Children’s Court asked the appellant to plead to the charges brought against him.2 The record is unclear as to what rights were explained to the appellant by the children's court judge. Without the assistance of his parent,3 a guardian, or counsel, the appellant pled guilty to all of the offenses. Only the judge, the presenting officer, the probation officer, and the appellant were present at the preliminary hearing. The record does not show that anyone was sworn in. The court did not afford the appellant an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The court accepted the guilty pleas to “Operating [a motor vehicle] Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor,” “Driving without a License” and “Public Intoxication.” The court suspended the charges for driving without a license and public intoxication pending the receipt of an investigative report by the Chinle Social Services Unit. For operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the court ordered that the appellant be detained in the St. Johns Juvenile Detention Facility in St. Johns, Arizona for not more than ten (10) days. The St. Johns facility is located outside the boundaries of the Navajo Nation.

As to the fourth charge, “Possession of Liquor," on February 26, 1986, the court scheduled an April 9, 1986 adjudicatory hearing. On March 4, 1986, the court appointed counsel to represent the appellant at the adjudicatory hearing. On April 9, 1986, appointed counsel filed an entry of appearance and á motion for continuance. The court granted the continuance the same day.

On April 11, 1986, the court rescheduled the adjudicatory hearing for May 13, 1986. At the May 13, 1986 hearing, both the appellant and the appellee brought to the court's attention a mutual “Motioirto Withdraw Pleas of Guilty” (to the other three charges). Both counsels stipulated that all four charges be included in a proposed consent decree. Both counsels agreed that it would be in the best interest of the child if he knew that all pending charges would be dismissed as long as he met the decree's conditions. At the hearing, the court granted the consent decree only for the possession of liquor charge. The court took no action on the other three pending charges. However, at the February 25, 1986 preliminary hearing, the Chinle Children's Court retained jurisdiction [40]*40over the pending causes.

On May 13, 1986, the appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Chinle Children's Court. The petition asked the court to dismiss the three charges not included in the May 13, 1986 consent decree. The court denied the petition on July 5, 1986. On August 8, 1986, the appellant filed this appeal.

II

The Navajo Children's Code states one of its foremost purposes in 9 N.T.C. § 1001(1) (1985 Cumm. Supp.): “To preserve and restore the unity of the family whenever possible; to provide for the care, protection and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of the Children's Code.” The Court is now asked to interpret certain provisions of the Navajo Children's Code and to determine the extent to which due process must be followed in juvenile proceedings.

A

The Navajo Children's Code establishes strict guidelines for the temporary detention of children alleged to be delinquent. 9 N.T.C. § 1109(a) (2), and (3) (1985 Cumm. Supp.) states that:

(a) A person taking a child into temporary custody shall, with all reasonable speed:
(2) In the case of an alleged delinquent or child in need of supervision, release the child to the child's parent, guardian or custodian upon a written promise to bring the child before the court when requested by the court. If the parent, guardian or custodian fails when requested, to bring the child before the court as promised, the court may order the child taken into custody and brought before the court; or
(3) In the case of an alleged delinquent or child in need of supervision, deliver the child to the probation office or to a place of detention designated by the court.

We hold that according to 9 N.T.C. § 1109(a) (2), the police should have first attempted to release the appellant to his parent. If the appellant's parent was not available, the police should have followed 9 N.T.C. § 1109(a) (3) and delivered the appellant “to the probation office or to a place of detention designated by the court."

We find that the appellant's February 24, 1986 detention, in the Chinle Police Station, violated these guidelines. The record does not show that the Chinle Police Station was certified by the children's court, or by any other designated agency, for the detention of juveniles. As such, we hold that the detention denied [41]*41the appellant his right to be held at a facility designated and certified by the children's court. Although the appellant did not argue that his detention was cruel and unusual, we also hold that at the minimum a detained juvenile must be provided with a padded area to lie on, a blanket, and food to eat to comply with the Navajo Bill of Rights section against cruel and unusual punishment. 1 N.T.C. § 9 (1986 amend.).

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In Re GAULT
387 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1967)

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Bluebook (online)
6 Navajo Rptr. 38, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-aw-navajo-1999.