In re A.W.

2024 IL App (1st) 221700-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 17, 2024
• Docket: 1-22-1700
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 221700-U No. 1-22-1700 Third Division January 17, 2024

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

) Appeal from the Circuit Court In re A.W., Zya.T., Zah.T., and Zay.S., Minors ) of Cook County. ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Nos. 18 JA 00881 Petitioner-Appellee, ) 18 JA 00882 ) 18 JA 00883 v. ) 18 JA 00884 ) S.T., ) The Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Andrea M. Buford, ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lampkin and Van Tine concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The juvenile court’s adjudication orders are affirmed, where the evidence demonstrated that the minors were abused and neglected, and any evidentiary error was harmless. At the request of the parties, the cause is remanded for the limited purpose of correcting a scrivener’s error contained in the adjudication orders.

¶2 After a hearing, minors A.W., Zya.T., Zah.T., and Zay.S. were adjudicated wards of the

court due to abuse and neglect by their mother, respondent S.T. (respondent). On appeal,

respondent challenges only the adjudication findings as to her older two children, A.W. and

Zya.T., claiming that the juvenile court’s adjudication order relied on improperly-admitted No. 1-22-1700

evidence and that, absent such evidence, the State did not establish that the children were

abused or neglected. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the juvenile court’s adjudication

order but, as requested by the parties, remand the cause for the limited purpose of correcting a

scrivener’s error in its adjudication orders.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Respondent is the mother of four children: a daughter, A.W., who was nearly eight years

old at the time of the incident giving rise to the instant proceedings; and three sons, five-year-

old Zya.T., four-year-old Zah.T., and two-year-old Zay.S. Respondent was in a relationship

with J.S., the father of her youngest son, at the time; the fathers of the other children were listed

as “unknown” on the adjudication petitions and neither J.S. nor the fathers of her other children

are parties to this appeal.

¶5 On September 11, 2018, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship asking for

each minor to be adjudicated a ward of the court; the State also filed motions for temporary

custody of each minor on the same day. In the adjudication petitions, the State alleged that

each minor was neglected due to an injurious environment under section 2-3(1)(b) of the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)) and

was abused with a substantial risk of physical injury under section 2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile

Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 2016)). With respect to Zah.T. and Zay.S., the two

youngest children, the State also alleged that each minor was neglected under section 2-3(1)(d)

of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(d) (West 2016)), as he was a minor under age

14 whose parent left him without supervision for an unreasonable period of time.

¶6 The facts underlying all claims were the same. According to the petitions, respondent had

two prior indicated reports for “cuts, welts and bruises” and “inadequate supervision.”

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Respondent had also admitted to recent incidents of domestic violence with J.S. while the

children were present and, on June 24, 2018, the two youngest children were found home alone

following an incident of domestic violence. While J.S. denied domestic violence, he admitted

to breaking respondent’s telephone. Following an initial investigation in February 2018, intact

family services were offered, but respondent failed to participate in and/or complete the

services, which included mental health treatment and domestic violence counseling.

¶7 On the same day, based on the allegations contained in the adjudication petitions, the

juvenile court found probable cause that the minors were neglected, abused, and dependent

and that immediate and urgent necessity existed to support their removal from the home. The

court granted temporary custody of all four minors to the Department of Children and Family

Services (DCFS) guardianship administrator.

¶8 The parties appeared before the juvenile court for an adjudication hearing on February 19,

2021. Telanee Smith, a DCFS investigator, testified that she was assigned to investigate a “C

Sequence” allegation of inadequate supervision on June 25, 2018. In the course of her

investigation, she learned that respondent had a prior indicated report for cuts, welts, and

bruises and abrasions. Smith spoke with respondent in the presence of an intact worker on the

day she was assigned the case, and respondent reported to Smith that J.S. had been present

inside respondent’s home and grew “upset” when she asked him to leave. The two had “a little

tussel [sic],” and J.S. took her phone. Respondent left the home to stay with her sister. While

she denied leaving the younger children—then ages two and four—home alone, respondent

informed Smith that J.S. also left the home after the altercation, believing respondent had

contacted the police. Respondent denied any history of domestic violence between her and J.S.,

but told Smith that J.S. had “kicked down her door” three months earlier.

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¶9 On the same day, Smith spoke with J.S., who admitted that he had been arguing with

respondent and had taken, and broken, her phone; according to J.S., they were arguing about

respondent’s failure to engage in services. J.S. further admitted to leaving the home after their

argument, but Smith testified that both J.S. and respondent stated that the other was still in the

home when they left. J.S. also denied a history of domestic violence between him and

respondent.

¶ 10 The parties also stipulated to the testimony of Officer Emily Campbell, who would testify

that she responded to a call at respondent’s home on or about June 22, 2018. When she arrived

at the home, she discovered the two youngest children 1 unattended inside the residence.

¶ 11 As the final portion of its case in chief, the State sought to admit two exhibits into evidence.

People’s Exhibit 1 was a sentencing order and criminal disposition sheet in a prior

misdemeanor case against respondent. Respondent’s counsel objected to the admission of the

exhibit, arguing that the documents were hearsay and did not fall within any exception to the

hearsay rule, as the conviction was only for a misdemeanor. People’s Exhibit 2 consisted of

the respondent’s records from One Hope United, the agency which provided intact family

services. Respondent’s counsel again objected, contending that the documents contained an

“improper delegation,” as they were not signed by the head of the agency but instead were

signed by the head of “Intact Family Services.” The juvenile court overruled both objections

and admitted the exhibits into evidence.

1 As discussed further below, there are several places in the record, including in Officer Campbell’s stipulation and in the adjudication orders, in which the children at the home are identified as Zay.S. and Zya.T. The parties all agree, however, that it was Zay.S. and Zah.T., the two youngest children, who were discovered at home alone. 4 No. 1-22-1700

¶ 12 As noted, People’s Exhibit 1 was a sentencing order and criminal disposition sheet, which

established that, in September 2018, respondent had been sentenced to 24 months of probation

for endangering the life or health of a child, pursuant to section 12C-5(a) of the Criminal Code

of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/12C-5(a) (West 2016)), as well as being ordered to attend anger

management and parenting classes.

¶ 13 People’s Exhibit 2, the records from One Hope United, established that respondent’s case

first came to the attention of DCFS in February 2018, when police responded to a call reporting

a “ ‘commotion’ ” and expressing concern for a child. Zya.T., who was five years old at the

time, was found to have “marks and welts” on his abdomen and back, which he reported were

the result of respondent “hitting” him. Respondent was taken into custody, while Zya.T. was

taken to the hospital to be evaluated; the other children did not have any visible marks or

injuries. Zya.T.’s injuries were consistent with being struck with an object. In an interview

with a DCFS worker, A.W. reported that Zya.T. had been “running around and fighting with

their younger brother”; A.W. informed respondent of the misbehavior, as she had previously

been punished for “not telling” when she remained silent. A.W. observed respondent strike

Zya.T. with an extension cord, then respondent ordered Zah.T. to retrieve a belt and struck

Zya.T. with the belt, as well. A.W. reported that respondent had struck her and her brothers in

the past. In his interview with the DCFS worker, Zya.T. confirmed A.W.’s account, stating

that he had been fighting with his brother when respondent became angry with him and began

striking him with an extension cord and a belt. Zya.T. further reported that respondent had

struck him and his siblings with a belt in the past.

¶ 14 Respondent did not present any evidence and, after hearing arguments from the parties, the

juvenile court found that the State had met its burden of proving neglect due to an injurious

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environment with respect to all four minors, neglect due to being left home alone with respect

to the two youngest minors, and abuse due to a substantial risk of physical injury with respect

to all four minors. The juvenile court found that at the time of the incident, there was an open

intact case and respondent had a prior indicated report. The juvenile court further found that

respondent and J.S. had a history of domestic violence, although both denied it, and that both

left the home after a dispute, leaving a two-year-old and a four-year-old child home alone.

Accordingly, the juvenile court entered adjudication orders finding each minor neglected due

to an injurious environment under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act and abused due

to a substantial risk of physical injury under section 2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act, as

“parents were involved in a dispute and left the home, leaving minors [Zah.T.] and [Zay.S.]

alone. Mother has prior indicated report for cuts/welts/bruises.” The adjudication orders for

Zya.T. and Zay.S. also included findings that each minor was neglected due to being a minor

under age 14 who was left without supervision for an unreasonable period of time under section

2-3(1)(d) of the Juvenile Court Act.

¶ 15 On September 28, 2022, after a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court entered

dispositional order finding it in each minor’s best interest to make him or her a ward of the

court and finding respondent unwilling and unable for some reason other than financial

circumstances alone to care for, protect, train, and discipline the minors.2 We granted

respondent leave to file a late notice of appeal, and this appeal follows.

2 The court also found the minors’ fathers unwilling and unable for some reason other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train, or discipline them. 6 No. 1-22-1700

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 Prior to discussing respondent’s claims on appeal, we briefly address the timeliness of our

decision. This case is designated as “accelerated” pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311

(eff. July 1, 2018), and we are required to issue our decision within 150 days after the filing of

the notice of appeal in such cases, except where good cause is shown. In this case, while the

notice of appeal was filed in November 2022, multiple extensions of time were requested by

the parties. Accordingly, we find good cause for issuing our decision after the 150-day

deadline. See In re J.S., 2020 IL App (1st) 191119, ¶ 36 (finding good cause for issuing

decision after deadline where there were extensions of time requested by the parties); In re

Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971, ¶ 69 (finding good cause for issuing decision after

deadline where there were multiple extensions of time requested by the parties, among other

procedural delays).

¶ 18 Turning to the merits of her appeal, respondent challenges only the adjudication findings

as to her older two children, A.W. and Zya.T.; she does not challenge the findings as to the

younger children, nor does she challenge the court’s dispositional order. “A proceeding for

adjudication of wardship ‘represents a significant intrusion into the sanctity of the family which

should not be undertaken lightly.’ ” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 463 (2004) (quoting In re

Harpman, 134 Ill. App. 3d 393, 396-97 (1985)). It is the State’s burden to prove allegations of

neglect or abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17.

¶ 19 Generally, a reviewing court will reverse the juvenile court’s determination only if the

factual findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the court abused its

discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order. In re Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d

785, 795 (2006); see also In re Malik B.-N., 2012 IL App (1st) 121706, ¶ 56; In re J.C., 396

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Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1060 (2009); In re Gabriel E., 372 Ill. App. 3d 817, 828 (2007). As the

juvenile court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the

evidence, we will not overturn its findings “merely because the reviewing court may have

reached a different decision.” In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 245, 257 (2001) (citing In re

Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 994 (1998)).

¶ 20 In this case, respondent contends that the juvenile court erred in admitting the State’s

exhibits into evidence at the adjudication hearing and that, without these exhibits, the evidence

presented at the adjudication hearing was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings

with respect to A.W. and Zya.T. The rules of evidence applicable to civil proceedings are

applicable to proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2016).

Here, respondent claims that both of the State’s exhibits constitute inadmissible hearsay and,

therefore, the juvenile court erred in admitting them into evidence.

¶ 21 Hearsay is an out-of-court statement made by a declarant that is offered to prove the truth

of the matter asserted. Ill. R. Evid. 801(c) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). Hearsay evidence is generally

inadmissible in adjudicatory proceedings, unless an exception applies. In re Chance H., 2019

IL App (1st) 180053, ¶ 49; In re Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971, ¶ 88.

¶ 22 The first exhibit challenged by respondent, People’s Exhibit 1, consisted of a sentencing

order and criminal disposition sheet, which established that, in September 2018, respondent

had been sentenced to 24 months of probation for endangering the life or health of a child, as

well as being ordered to attend anger management and parenting classes. While certain

judgments of conviction are admissible as hearsay exceptions, such judgments are limited to

judgments “adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in

excess of one year.” Ill. R. Evid. 803(22) (eff. Sept. 28, 2018). The crime of endangering the

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life or health of a child is a misdemeanor and so does not fall within this exception, as the State

acknowledges in its brief. See 720 ILCS 5/12C-5(d) (West 2016). Consequently, People’s

Exhibit 1 was erroneously admitted by the juvenile court. As explained below, however, the

admission of such evidence was harmless, as there was no prejudice to respondent where the

juvenile court did not rely on this document and there was sufficient evidence in the record to

support the court’s findings even without the exhibit. See In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227, 237

(1999) (even where juvenile court erroneously allowed certain witness testimony, such error

did not prejudice the respondent where the evidence was sufficient to establish at least one

ground of parental unfitness).

¶ 23 The second exhibit, People’s Exhibit 2, consisted of records from One Hope United, the

agency providing intact services to respondent’s family. Section 2-18(4)(a) of the Juvenile

Court Act provides that such documents are admissible in adjudicatory proceedings, so long

as the juvenile court finds that the document was made in the regular course of business at the

time of the events at issue, or within a reasonable time thereafter. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a)

(West 2016). Section 2-18(4)(a) further provides:

“A certification by the head or responsible employee of the hospital or agency that the

writing, record, photograph or x-ray is the full and complete record of the condition,

act, transaction, occurrence or event and that it satisfied the conditions of this paragraph

shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained in such certification. A certification

by someone other than the head of the hospital or agency shall be accompanied by a

photocopy of a delegation of authority signed by both the head of the hospital or agency

and by such other employee. All other circumstances of the making of the

memorandum, record, photograph or x-ray, including lack of personal knowledge of

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the maker, may be proved to affect the weight to be accorded such evidence, but shall

not affect its admissibility.” Id.

In this case, respondent contends that People’s Exhibit 2 was inadmissible, as it did not contain

an appropriate delegation of authority.

¶ 24 The certification contained in the record on appeal is signed by an individual identified as

“Case Manager Assistant.” As the certification was signed by “someone other than the head of

the hospital or agency,” it required a delegation of authority. Id. The delegation of authority

form contained in the record on appeal is signed by an individual occupying the role of senior

supervisor for the northern region of One Hope United, who is identified as the “head of intact

family services,” and the case manager assistant signed an acceptance of the delegation of

authority at the bottom of the page. Respondent claims that this delegation was insufficient, as

the “head of intact family services” is not the “head of the hospital or agency” (id.) as required

by section 2-18(4)(a). We do not find this argument persuasive.

¶ 25 As both the State and the minors’ counsel note, section 2-18(4)(a) does not define either

the term “head” or “agency.” An “ ‘[a]gency’ ” is, however, defined in section 1-3 of the

Juvenile Court Act as “a public or private child care facility legally authorized or licensed by

this State for placement or institutional care or for both placement and institutional care.” 705

ILCS 405/1-3(3) (West 2016). There is no dispute that One Hope United is considered an

“agency” under the Juvenile Court Act. The question at issue, then, is whether the “head” of

the relevant division of the larger organization may be considered the “head of the *** agency”

(id. § 2-18(4)(a)) for purposes of section 2-18(4)(a). We believe it can.

¶ 26 Section 1-2 of the Juvenile Court Act instructs that, in all proceedings, “the court may

direct the course thereof so as promptly to ascertain the jurisdictional facts and fully to gather

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information bearing upon the current condition and future welfare of persons subject to this

[Juvenile Court] Act.” 705 ILCS 405/1-2(2) (West 2016). Accordingly, the Juvenile Court Act

“shall be liberally construed to carry out the foregoing purpose and policy.” Id. § 1-2(4). Here,

the delegation of authority was signed by the person responsible for intact family services for

the northern region of One Hope United, and it is records for such services which were

admitted into evidence at the hearing. We therefore can find no error in the juvenile court’s

admission of these records pursuant to section 2-18(4)(a).

¶ 27 Moreover, even leaving aside the State’s exhibits, there was sufficient evidence to support

the juvenile court’s findings of abuse and neglect. As noted, both minors were found (1) abused

due to a substantial risk of physical injury under section 2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act

and (2) neglected due to an injurious environment under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court

Act. Under the Juvenile Court Act, an abused minor includes one whose parent or other person

responsible for his welfare “creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such minor by other

than accidental means which would be likely to cause death, disfigurement, impairment of

emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function.” 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West

2016). A neglected minor includes one “whose environment is injurious to his or her welfare.”

Id. § 2-3(1)(b). While this term cannot be defined with particularity, “it includes the breach of

a parent’s duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for his or her children.” In re Z.L., 2021

IL 126931, ¶ 89.

¶ 28 With respect to both of A.W. and Zya.T., the juvenile court found abuse and neglect where

“parents were involved in a dispute and left the home, leaving minors [Zah.T.] and [Zay.S.]

alone. Mother has prior indicated report for cuts/welts/bruises.” Under the theory of

anticipatory neglect, the State seeks to protect “not only children who are the direct victims of

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neglect or abuse, but also those who have a probability to be subject to neglect or abuse because

they reside, or in the future may reside, with an individual who has been found to have

neglected or abused another child.” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468. Accordingly, abuse of

a sibling may be evidence of neglect based on an injurious environment. In re S.S., 313 Ill.

App. 3d 121, 127 (2000); see also 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2016) (“proof of the abuse,

neglect or dependency of one minor shall be admissible evidence of the issue of the abuse,

neglect or dependency of any other minor for whom the respondent is responsible”).

¶ 29 In this case, the abuse and neglect findings with respect to the younger two children may

be used to support similar findings for the older two children. While there is no per se rule that

neglect of one child conclusively establishes the neglect of another child in the same household

(see In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468), here, such a finding is appropriate. All four children

were living in the same home at the time, and respondent’s conduct occurred close in time to

the filing of the petition for adjudication of wardship. Thus, this is not a case in which the

previous abuse or neglect occurred long ago or had no connection with the minor’s current

living situation. See, e.g., In re S.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 128 (past abuse occurred almost two

years before the minor was born); In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d 18, 29-31 (1995) (past

abuse occurred several years earlier, and there was no indication minors were abused or

neglected). Here, respondent and J.S. had an altercation in the presence of young children,

which was sufficiently heated to result in the breaking of a telephone and the calling of police,

and both adults left the home, leaving a two-year-old child and a four-year old child unattended

until they were discovered by police. Respondent also reported to the DCFS investigator that

J.S. had “kicked down her door” three months earlier. Combined with the prior indicated report

of cuts, welts, and bruises, the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the abuse and

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neglect of A.W. and Zya.T., even without the use of the State’s exhibits, and we therefore

affirm the juvenile court’s findings.

¶ 30 As a final matter, as noted, the record on appeal demonstrates that there were inconsistent

references throughout with respect to which children were left at home. The parties all agree

that the children who were discovered unattended at respondent’s home were Zah.T. and

Zay.S., the youngest two children. At times, however, the witnesses and the juvenile court

referred to Zya.T., not Zah.T., as one of those children. Most problematically, this error occurs

in the juvenile court’s adjudication orders. While this scrivener’s error does not prevent us

from considering the merits of respondent’s appeal (see In re Marriage of Crecos, 2015 IL

App (1st) 132756, ¶ 18), at the request of the parties, we nevertheless remand the matter to the

juvenile court for the limited purpose of correcting the adjudication orders nunc pro tunc to

reflect that it was Zah.T. and Zay.S. who were left at home, not Zya.T. and Zay.S.

¶ 31 CONCLUSION

¶ 32 The juvenile court’s adjudication orders finding A.W. and Zya.T. to be abused and

neglected is affirmed, where the evidence was sufficient to establish abuse and neglect and any

evidentiary error was harmless. The cause is remanded to the juvenile court for the limited

purpose of correcting the adjudication orders to properly reflect the correct names of the minors

discovered unattended at respondent’s residence.

¶ 33 Affirmed; cause remanded with instructions.