In re: Avi Schwalb

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado
DecidedDecember 2, 2025
Docket25-12666
StatusUnknown

This text of In re: Avi Schwalb (In re: Avi Schwalb) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re: Avi Schwalb, (Colo. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Bankruptcy Judge Joseph G. Rosania, Jr.

In re:

AVI SCHWALB, Case No. 25-12666-JGR SSN: xxx-xx-0747, Chapter 11

Debtor.

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal filed by the Debtor Avi Schwalb on November 24, 2025 (Doc. 313) and his Motion for Stay Pending Appeal filed November 25, 2025 (Doc. 314) (collectively referred to as “Motion”) pending the appeal of this Court’s October 30, 2025 Order Converting Case to Chapter 7 (Doc. 269). On December 1, 2025, responses to the Motion were filed by Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services, Inc. (Doc. 319) and the chapter 7 trustee (Doc. 320). Jeffrey Swanson also filed a joinder to the chapter 7 trustee’s objection (Doc. 321). The Court, having reviewed the Motion,

DOES FIND the Motion was filed with the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8007(a) claiming the stay is necessary to preserve the estate and prevent irreversible harm during the pendency of the Debtor’s appeal. The Debtor argues without a stay, the chapter 7 trustee may liquidate assets before the appeal is heard, rendering the appeal moot.

BACKGROUND

The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on May 2, 2025. At the time the case was filed, the Debtor was a named defendant in multiple civil actions arising from real estate transactions, construction projects, and real estate management activities. The Debtor was also indicted by the Attorney General for the State of Colorado on 30 felony counts, including theft and organized crime, which the Debtor vehemently denies. The criminal trial is scheduled for February 2026.

The Debtor claims the bankruptcy case was filed to obtain the automatic stay preven the continuation of the state court litigation and centralize the disputes into one forum.

As the case progressed, the Bankruptcy Court granted relief from stay for certain creditors to continue the state court litigation. The issues involved state law, the Plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial, and the civil actions included non-debtor third party defendants. On September 15, 2025, the Debtor filed a motion to dismiss his chapter 11 bankruptcy case. He alleged there was no longer any purpose served by continuing in bankruptcy as creditors were likely to obtain relief to pursue state court actions and it was doubtful that he would succeed in an adversary proceeding seeking to extend the benefits of the automatic stay to non-debtor entities in which he had an interest.

The Debtor’s motion to dismiss drew objections from the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors; Jeffrey Swanson; Uzi Berger; Fannie Mae; John Doe, Jane Roe; Brianna Tanner, Douglas Tanner; Benjamin Davidson, Karen Davidson; and David Amster-Olszweki, Kirby Lance Jones. In addition, Fannie Mae filed a motion to convert the case to chapter 7.

On October 29, 2025, the Court conducted a preliminary hearing on the motion to dismiss the responses and the motion to convert pursuant to L.B.R. 2081-3(c). The Debtor and the objecting parties made offers of proof as to what the evidence would show at an evidentiary hearing. The Debtor, through counsel, represented to the Court that he did not want the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing because he would likely refuse to answer any questions based upon his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The objecting creditors adamantly opposed dismissal of the chapter 11 case, pointing to numerous discrepancies in the Debtor’s disclosures, listing of assets, and reporting to the Court. The creditors emphasized the need to appoint an independent party to take control, safeguard, and prevent dissipation of the Debtor’s remaining assets. The creditors argued a chapter 7 trustee would serve as a fiduciary for all creditors and investigate: (i) whether there are potential avoidance actions against family members or other insiders of the debtor, including transfers of Debtor’s 100% interest in 27 limited liability companies to a holding company on the eve of bankruptcy; (ii) the value of a significant number of real properties owned directly or indirectly by the Debtor; (iii) the use of funds received by an insider entity, PHS Rent, LLC, in connection with the management of the real properties; and (iv) inconsistencies between the Monthly Operating Reports, Schedules, and Statement of Financial Affairs. In addition, they asserted conversion to a chapter 7 bankruptcy case would allow for a review of claims asserted against the Debtor in an impartial fashion, facilitate the ordinary liquidation of assets, and prevent a chaotic race to the courthouse.

The Debtor filed his motion to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1), which provides that “after notice and a hearing, the court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate . . . .” On October 30, 2025, the Court issued an oral ruling in open court. The Court analyzed the facts to determine whether dismissal or conversion was appropriate in the case and determined that all of the salient factors favored conversion. No creditors expressed support for dismissal, including creditors holding prepetition judgment liens. The Court determined that conversion would avoid a chaotic race to the courthouse and allow for the equitable distribution of the Debtor’s nonexempt assets to his creditors. The allegations raised at the hearing pointed to numerous issues in need of investigation by a fiduciary. Conversion to chapter 7 would centralize the control and administration of estate property. Finally, the Debtor who sought bankruptcy protection was the only party that would benefit from dismissal.

ANALYSIS

The Court considers four factors when analyzing a stay:

(1) a strong likelihood of success on appeal; (2) the threat of irreparable harm if the stay or injunction is not granted; (3) the absence of harm to opposing parties if the stay or injunction is granted; and (4) that the public interest supports a stay.

United States v. Peck, Nos. 23-4000, 23-4038, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 9782, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr. 17, 2023)(citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). "The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of [the court's] discretion." 556 U.S. at 433-34.

Debtor is acting as a pro se litigant and the Court has liberally construed and held the Debtor to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521, 30 L. Ed. 652, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972)

(1) A Strong Likelihood of Success on Appeal

The Debtor argues conversion was not proper under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) asserting there was no cause because: Debtor did not act in bad faith; there was no continuing loss; no gross mismanagement; and multiple secured creditors supported chapter 11. In the Debtor’s second motion, he raises six arguments that the appeal is likely to succeed on the merits.

A.) Citing In re Gateway Access Solutions, 374 B.R. 556 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007), the Debtor argues the Court failed to identify any cause under 11 U.S.C.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
In re: Avi Schwalb, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-avi-schwalb-cob-2025.