In Re Atlantic Fin. Mgt., Inc. SEC. Litigation

658 F. Supp. 380
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedNovember 12, 1986
DocketMDL No. 584, Civ. A. No. 86-75-S
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 658 F. Supp. 380 (In Re Atlantic Fin. Mgt., Inc. SEC. Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Atlantic Fin. Mgt., Inc. SEC. Litigation, 658 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1986).

Opinion

658 F.Supp. 380 (1986)

In re ATLANTIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION.
STEWART A. SMITH CORP. PROFIT SHARING TRUST, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
PAINE, WEBBER, JACKSON & CURTIS, et al., Defendants.

MDL No. 584, Civ. A. No. 86-75-S.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

November 12, 1986.

R. Joseph O'Rourke, Ryan, Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, Vt., for plaintiffs.

Thomas D. Edwards, Casner, Edwards & Rosemand, Craig Stewart, Palmer & Dodge, Boston, Mass., for defendants.

Jeffrey B. Rudman, Patrick Reagan, Hale and Dorr, Boston, Mass., for Edward H. Tuton.

Joan Channick, Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, Boston, Mass., for Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis.

*381 Charles R. Parrott, Sharon R. Burger, Nutter, McClennen & Fish, Boston, Mass., for Steven S. Draizin.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT PAINE, WEBBER, JACKSON & CURTIS' MOTION TO DISMISS

SKINNER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs in this securities fraud action seek to recover money lost investing in AZL Resources, Inc. ("AZL"). This action is now before me on defendant PaineWebber's motion to dismiss.

The basic allegations in the complaint are that the individual defendants, as officers and directors of Atlantic Financial Management ("AFM"), (1) fraudulently induced plaintiffs to enter into an agreement by which plaintiffs hired AFM to act as their investment advisor, (2) caused plaintiffs to invest in AZL, a speculative energy resources exploration firm, in spite of the agreements' recognition that plaintiffs sought to conserve their capital, and (3) manipulated the price of AZL to plaintiffs' disadvantage by buying AZL shares for plaintiffs' accounts while selling AZL shares from their own accounts.

Count VIII — Securities Exchange Act Claims.

The allegations against PaineWebber are much simpler. PaineWebber executed most of trades in AZL for plaintiffs' accounts. Plaintiffs allege that PaineWebber had a duty to inform the plaintiffs that AZL was an unsuitable investment for them. Plaintiffs further allege that PaineWebber was aware that the individual defendants were trading in AZL for their own accounts, and, in particular, that the individual defendants were on the other side of some of the transactions PaineWebber executed for plaintiffs' accounts. Plaintiffs claim that PaineWebber's failure to communicate this information to plaintiffs was an omission of a material fact under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. This omission to state a material fact is alleged to have aided and abetted the violations by the individual defendants.

The complaint is completely devoid of any allegation that PaineWebber gave plaintiffs any investment advice or recommended the individual defendants to the plaintiffs, or had any contact with the plaintiffs whatsoever.

The complaint only states a claim if it meets the First Circuit test for determining aider and abettor liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Plaintiff must prove:

(1) the commission of a violation of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 by the primary party; (2) the defendant's general awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper; and (3) knowing and substantial assistance of the primary violation by the defendant.

Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir.1983).

In addition, the level of scienter required by the second part of the test varies according to the duty of disclosure imposed on the defendant.

[I]n the absence of a duty of disclosure, a defendant should be held liable as an aider and abettor only if the plaintiff proves that the defendant had actual knowledge of the improper activity of the primary violator and of his role in that activity [citations omitted]. Where the defendant has a duty to disclose the primary violations, however, courts have been willing to impose liability on the basis of a recklessness standard, [citation omitted] or on a lesser showing of actual awareness than is otherwise required, ...

Id., (citation omitted).

A clearing broker normally has no disclosure duty, if the clearing function was the only role performed by the broker. Edwards & Hanley v. Wells Fargo Securities Clearance Corporation, 602 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.1979); Ross v. Bolton, 639 F.Supp. 323, [Current Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92,879 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1986). In this case, plaintiffs allege that they were defrauded by their investment advisors when those investment advisors sold their own *382 shares in AZL at the same time they were instructing PaineWebber to buy AZL shares for plaintiffs' accounts. Even where, as here, a clearing broker executes trades for both investment advisors and defrauded plaintiffs, I will not impose a general investigative duty on clearing brokers to discover such fraud.

However, plaintiffs do not allege that PaineWebber should have known that the individual defendants were on the other side of the trades that PaineWebber executed for plaintiffs. While the complaint is not completely clear on this point, if construed favorably to plaintiffs it alleges that PaineWebber in fact did know that the individual defendants were on the other side of the transactions. Paragraph 57 states that because PaineWebber cleared the individual defendants' transactions, it "therefore knew of the apparent and actual conflict of interest created with respect to the Plains' account for which it was at the same time clearing transactions in the same securities." As I stated earlier, this, by itself, would not state a claim. Brokers have no duty to cross-index the thousands or millions of trades that they execute for their thousands or millions of customers in order to discover any such conflicts. However, under the complaint when read in its entirety, and in particular paragraphs 56 and 57, plaintiffs could prove that PaineWebber knew that the individual defendants had a conflict of interest with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that PaineWebber had a close working relationship with the individual defendants. In addition, given the nature of the market for AZL stock, it is possible that the same PaineWebber employee cleared transactions for both plaintiffs and individual defendants. If so, PaineWebber would have had a duty to disclose such an obvious conflict of interest on the part of plaintiffs' investment advisors. The complaint therefore states a claim against PaineWebber.

Count IV — Common Law Fiduciary Duty.

Count IV attempts to establish the existence of a fiduciary duty between PaineWebber and plaintiffs in two ways. The first is that

[b]y reason of the representation of Tuton and DiIanni ..., the Defendants caused the Plans to retain Atlantic as investment advisor and investment manager and to repose trust and confidence in Tuton, DiIanni, Atlantic, and PaineWebber to select, purchase and maintain investments that would be appropriate and beneficial to the Plans.

Complaint, ¶ 35.

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658 F. Supp. 380, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-atlantic-fin-mgt-inc-sec-litigation-mad-1986.