In re Atherton Street

18 Pa. D. & C. 340, 1932 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 360
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Centre County
DecidedJuly 17, 1932
DocketNo. 197
StatusPublished

This text of 18 Pa. D. & C. 340 (In re Atherton Street) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Centre County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Atherton Street, 18 Pa. D. & C. 340, 1932 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).

Opinion

Fleming, P. J.,

This matter is before us upon a petition to quash the ordinance passed by the borough council of State College Borough on March 21, 1932, providing for the grading, curbing, guttering and paving with concrete that portion of Atherton Street in said borough Which lies between College Avenue on the north and Prospect Avenue on the south. This ordinance was vetoed by the burgess, but passed over such veto, in the manner prescribed by law.

When this matter was previously before us, we expressed certain jurisdictional doubts in a preliminary opinion filed and directed that further testimony be taken to enable us to intelligently dispose of the matter.

The original petition recites that it is presented “under and by virtue of the Act of May 4, 1927, P. L. 519> article XVII, section 1708.” This was reiterated by counsel for the petitioners at the time testimony was taken. The ordinance in question is attached to the petition filed, is in evidence and is for our interpretation.

The objections to our jurisdiction, made by counsel for the municipality, require our first consideration to be directed to the ordinance in question and to the legislation of the Commonwealth empowering boroughs to act in the manner desired, as shown by such ordinance.

Municipal improvements are regulated entirely by statute to which the rule of strict construction applies; MeAndrew v. Dunmore Borough, 245 Pa. 101. The present power of boroughs to grade and pave streets exists by virtue of The General Borough Act of May 4, 1927, P. L. 519, Sec. 1701, which provides as follows: “Boroughs may lay out, establish, or change the grades of, and may pave and curb, streets, roads, lanes, or alleys, as [and] parts thereof.”

[341]*341This authority originally existed by virtue of the Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 312, Chap. 6, Art. vu, Sec. 1, amended by the Act of May 17, 1921, P. L. 859, Sec. 1, now repealed, and was derived from parts of section one of the Act of June 5, 1913, P. L. 411, now repealed, and section one of the Act of April 28, 1899, P. L. 100.

Such powers may be exercised by a borough either (1) with petition of property owners or (2) without such petition. Paving with petition only is regulated by The General Borough Act of May 4, 1927, P. L. 519, Sec. 1705, which provides as follows:

“Upon the petition of a majority of property owners in interest and number, abutting on the line of any proposed improvement, to be verified by the affidavit of at least one of the petitioners, a majority in interest of owners of undivided interests in any piece of property to be treated as one person, a borough may grade, curb, pave, or macadamize, or otherwise improve, any street or alley, or part thereof, or which may be, in whole or in part, boundaries thereof, and provide for the necessary drainage thereof; and may also provide for the improvement of any street, road, lane, or alley, and any sections or parts thereof, in length, in the space between the curb, gutter, or actual carriageway line and the property line, either by an original work or improvement thereon, or by a change, repair, renewal, or alteration in the said highway, curb, parking spaces, or shade trees, or by changing, altering, renewing, replanting, pruning, or otherwise improving the same, in any or all of said particulars.”

Paving with or without a petition of property owners may be had by the provisions of The General Borough Act of May 4, 1927, P. L. 519, Sec. 1712, as amended by the Act of May 8,1929, P. L. 1636, Sec. 10, providing as follows:

“Boroughs, with petition or without petition, may grade, curb, gutter, pave, macadamize, or otherwise improve, streets, lanes, and alleys, or parts or a particular width or additional widths, thereof, with or without the assistance or contribution of the State, county, or a corporation occupying the thoroughfare, and, where the petition for the improvement is signed by petitioners representing a majority in the number of feet of assessable properties abutting on the proposed improvement, may assess and collect the whole cost thereof, or the whole cost not thus aided or contributed, or any part thereof, from the owners of real estate abutting on the improvement, by an equal assessment on the foot-front, including the expenses of the necessary drainage, but, in all other cases, not more than two-thirds of the whole cost thereof, or two-thirds of the whole cost not thus aided or contributed may be assessed and collected from the abutting owners on the foot-front rule, the remainder to be paid by the borough. The council may make equitable adjustments for corner lots, or lots of irregular shape, where an assessment for full frontage would be unjust. Property not otherwise assessable shall become assessable by the petition of the owner or the owner’s representative. In all cases where the whole width of the highway is being paved, without State or county aid, and more than two-thirds of the total cost is proposed to be assessed on abutters, the borough shall, for this purpose, be considered as owner of non-assessable property, of street and alley intersections, and of the deducted frontage on equitable adjustments. On petition of owners representing two-thirds of the number of feet of assessable properties abutting on the proposed improvement, the total cost of the improvement, or a lesser amount if the borough desires, may be assessed on the assessable properties abutting, without any deduction for non-assessable property, or street and alley intersections, or for the equitable adjustments aforesaid: Provided, That the petition states that the total cost may be assessed on the abutters.”

[342]*342A comparison of the requirements of section 1705, supra, and section 1712, supra, is not only interesting but necessary for the ultimate determination, as a matter of law, of the procedure reflected by the ordinance in question. Firstly, a petition of property owners must be had to proceed under the former section. Under the latter section it is merely optional and procedure may be had without such petition. Secondly, the petition under the former section requires such to be signed by a majority of property owners in interest and number. Under the latter section, if a petition is elected to be filed, in order to compel payment of the whole cost of the improvement by the property owners the petition must be signed by petitioners representing a majority in the number of feet of assessable properties abutting on the proposed improvement. Thus for example, if the number of property owners along a given improvement was ten, to proceed under the former section six would be required, said six to represent a majority in interest as well as in number. Under the latter section two would be sufficient provided a majority of the number of feet of assessable property was represented by them. It is furthermore to be noted that such majority in number of feet of assessable property is required only to enable the borough to collect the whole cost of the improvement. A lesser number does not affect the validity of the procedure. It only restricts the right of collection to a two-thirds part. Thirdly, the former section makes no provision whatever for a procedure when some agency other than the borough is to pay a part of the cost of such improvement, while the latter section specifically provides for the same. Fourthly, the former section makes no provision for nonassessable properties, street intersections, or for equitable adjustments of any nature whatever. The latter section clearly and unmistakably provides for these things.

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Related

McAndrew v. Dunmore Borough
91 A. 237 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1914)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 Pa. D. & C. 340, 1932 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 360, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-atherton-street-pactcomplcentre-1932.