In re A.S.

2026 Ohio 244

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 28, 2026
• Docket: L-25-00202, L-25-00203
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re A.S., 2026-Ohio-244.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY

In re A.S. Court of Appeals No. L-25-00202 L-25-00203 Trial Court No. JC 243000091

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Decided: January 28, 2026

*****

Jana Waltz, for appellee.

Melody Wilhelm, for appellant father.

Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant mother.

MAYLE, J.

{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, appellants, O.S. (“mother”) and A.V. (“father”),

appeal the August 18, 2025 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas,

Juvenile Division, terminating their parental rights and granting permanent custody of

their child, A.S. (“child”), to appellee, Lucas County Children Services (“LCCS”). For

the following reasons, we affirm. I. Background and Facts

A. Pretrial

{¶ 2} On May 22, 2024, LCCS filed a complaint alleging that child was

dependent. The complaint claimed that the agency received a referral about child

because mother had a significant history of mental health concerns, had lost custody of

another child because of her mental health issues, was not engaged in any mental health

treatment, was under investigation by adult protective services for killing a woman, and

had a history of perpetrating domestic violence against the father of her older child.

Mother was ordered to complete parenting and mental health services in the court case

involving her older child, but she failed to do so over an 18-month period. Additionally,

mother had a history with a Pennsylvania children services agency. The caseworker in

that case said that he had concerns about mother’s mental health and violent behavior.

Further, mother was reportedly violent with her ex-husband, father, and father’s mother,

with the last incident happening approximately six weeks before LCCS filed the

complaint. When the caseworker in this case discussed the referral with mother, mother

said that her mental health was stable, she was not engaged in any mental health services,

and she did not try to hurt her older child.

{¶ 3} At the shelter care hearing, the trial court granted LCCS interim temporary

custody of child.

2. {¶ 4} At the adjudication and disposition hearing, mother and father agreed to a

dependency finding. The magistrate found that child was dependent, and the trial court

adopted the magistrate’s decision.

{¶ 5} Following the adjudication and disposition hearing, Audrey Sweeney,

child’s guardian ad litem, asked the magistrate at a review hearing to appoint guardians

ad litem for mother and father “to assess their abilities and their mental capacity and their

ability to understand what is going on in this case.” She based her request on information

she had learned since the adjudication and disposition hearing but did not specify on the

record what that information was. Neither LCCS’s nor the parents’ attorneys objected to

Sweeney’s motion, and the magistrate granted the motion. The trial court adopted the

magistrate’s decision.

{¶ 6} In March 2025, LCCS moved for permanent custody of child. In its motion,

the agency alleged that child was removed from mother’s care because of concerns about

mother’s mental health and mother’s prior involvement with child welfare agencies.

{¶ 7} Regarding mother, LCCS offered her case plan services including a dual-

diagnostic assessment, parenting, and domestic violence batterers services. She

completed her assessment, which recommended therapy, anger management, and

medication management. She was engaged in therapy and medication management and

had completed three of 13 anger management classes. Mother had not been referred to

parenting or domestic violence services because of lack of progress with her mental

health services.

3. {¶ 8} As to father, his case plan services included a dual-diagnostic assessment.

He completed the assessment, which recommended therapy and anger management.

Father attended three therapy sessions, the last of which was in November 2024. Father

had recently resumed visits with child.

{¶ 9} LCCS had not identified any appropriate relatives to place child with.

{¶ 10} The agency asked the court to award it permanent custody because (1)

mother and father failed to complete case plan services to remedy the issues causing child

to be placed outside of the home, (2) mother had a long history of mental health concerns

that remained, (3) there were concerns about mother’s cognitive ability and her ability to

independently parent child, (4) father failed to consistently visit child, (5) father

abandoned child, (6) child was doing well in foster care, and (7) child needed a legally

secure, permanent placement.

{¶ 11} After the agency filed its motion but before the permanent-custody hearing,

Robin Fuller, father’s GAL, filed a motion for a psychiatric or psychological assessment

of father because she believed that it would be in father’s best interest. She did not

provide any specifics about why she believed it would be in father’s best interest but did

say that father “agrees to this assessment and feels it is necessary as well. [Father]

further stated he understands what his rights are and states he is aware of what LCCS is

asking for in its permanent custody motion.” LCCS objected to the motion because

father had completed a dual-diagnostic assessment that did not recommend further

psychiatric testing or diagnose him with anything indicating a need for further testing.

4. Beyond that, Fuller did not provide a “meaningful reason” for requesting the testing or

claim that an evaluation would assist father in remedying the issues LCCS had identified

with his ability to independently parent.

{¶ 12} The trial court denied Fuller’s motion because father was scheduled for a

second dual-diagnostic assessment, and if the assessor thought that further testing was

necessary, they would include that recommendation in their report. In that case, the court

would reconsider the motion.

B. Permanent custody hearing

{¶ 13} At the permanent custody hearing, LCCS presented the testimony of LCCS

caseworker, Andrew English, and child’s GAL, Sweeney. Mother and father each

testified in their own behalf.

1. LCCS’s case

{¶ 14} English, the family’s ongoing caseworker, testified that LCCS became

involved with the family at child’s birth when it received a call alleging concerns about

mother’s mental health issues and, given her loss of custody in other counties, concerns

about her ability to appropriately parent child. In response, the agency filed a

dependency complaint. At the time, the agency’s concerns included mother’s “history of

aggression” because “she had previous 911 reports alleging her aggression[,]” her mental

health, and her ability to care and provide for child.

{¶ 15} In the family’s case plan, a dual-diagnostic assessment, parenting classes,

and domestic violence services were identified for mother. In August 2024, mother

5. completed the assessment, which recommended counseling, case management, anger

management, and medication management. She was diagnosed with borderline

personality disorder, PTSD, anxiety and depression. At first, mother did not consistently

participate in counseling, anger management, or medication management; although she

was referred for services in August 2024, the mental health agency did not mark her as

compliant and making progress until May, June, and July of 2025. It concerned English

that mother took more than nine months to become consistent with her mental health

services. The most recent update English had from the service provider was that mother

had completed anger management a few weeks before the permanent custody hearing and

was compliant with counseling and medication management.

{¶ 16} Despite that, LCCS still had concerns about mother’s mental health.

English believed that it contributed toward mother’s aggression, and he noted that

“[t]here were incidents of 911 and police involvement in the last six months.” In one

particular incident, father called 911 because mother was chasing him with a knife and

threatening to hurt him. Mother was arrested and charged with domestic violence and

assault, but the charges were later dropped at father’s request. There were not any

incidents that English knew of in the three to four weeks before the hearing.

{¶ 17} Mother has a history of domestic violence in her relationship with her ex-

husband, with her sister, and in her foster placement when she was growing up. Mother

and father reported “past instances where they get into arguments to the point of at least

6. raising their voices[,]” which “raises [the agency’s] concern for domestic violence around

them.”

{¶ 18} Mother was never referred to domestic violence services because LCCS

wanted her to finish anger management first. Similarly, it did not refer her to parenting

classes because it “wanted to make sure that she had her mental health fully addressed”

before doing so. “Fully addressed” would mean that mother was “stable for a significant

period of time and [could] show her stability.” The agency also had concerns about

whether mother “has the capacity to gain from that parenting [class] and whether or not

that will fully address her ability to parent a child.” Reports from mother’s mental health

providers mention their belief that mother has a cognitive delay, but she had never been

diagnosed with one. English and prior caseworkers also thought that mother was “not at

full mental capacity. And then due to those delays she would struggle to live

independently or struggle to parent the child independently.”

{¶ 19} There were also concerns about mother being able to care for herself, given

her mental health challenges. English was concerned that mother had told him that she

cannot live on her own because of memory issues, medical conditions, and her mental

health. That is, mother said that she must live with someone else “to help her.” One of

the problems mother noted was trouble remembering to take her medicine when she had

memory issues.

{¶ 20} Mother has an older child who is in the legal custody of a grandparent. The

older child ended up with the grandparent after an allegation that mother tried to smother

7. it while she was feeding it. Mother told English that she lost custody “due to the child

being cold because she fed the child cold milk and then tried to warm that child. And

then . . . someone thought she was smothering the child.” When English asked about that

situation, mother “blamed the hospital saying that the hospital didn’t teach her or tell her

that the child couldn’t have cold milk, or she just wasn’t taught how to warm a child or

address those concerns.” The court in that case asked mother to complete a mental health

assessment and parenting classes, but mother did not. Mother did not have any contact

with her older child because the child was afraid of her.

{¶ 21} At the time of the hearing, mother was pregnant with a third child. Either

father or a man named Jason, whom mother identified as her fiancé, was the father of the

baby. LCCS had concerns about Jason. Mother and father lived with Jason, who had

some mental health issues. Both reported Jason’s “outbursts and aggressions.” Jason

would not meet with English when he went to the home. While English was there, he

heard mother and Jason arguing about whether he would meet with English or engage

with the agency. Mother told English that Jason “could be appropriate even though she

was telling [English] about his aggression and his mental health concerns, but that he

wasn’t willing to be involved with the case or he wasn’t willing to be involved with her

child.”

{¶ 22} Mother did not have independent, stable housing at the time of the hearing.

She was living with father and Jason in an apartment leased by Jason. As far as English

knew, they were several months behind on rent, and their landlord was refusing to fix

8. their broken air conditioner because of that. Nor did mother have a car because someone

had totaled their car and they were “working on the finances to repair that car. And they

were still dependent on Jason for assistance with financing that.” English had concerns

about the cleanliness of the home and the number of animals in the home but said that

there were “no direct visible hazards to the structure.” He did not see any provisions

specifically for child, not all of the utilities were working, and the parents reported

financial strain, but English did see food in the home.

{¶ 23} For father, the agency recommended a dual-diagnostic assessment. It also

discussed parenting and domestic violence or anger management services, but those were

never added to the case plan for him. As it had with mother, LCCS wanted father to

address his mental health issues before he attended any other services. Additionally,

father was previously referred to those services, but he left the state, which led to the

agency removing him from the case plan. Once he was put back on the case plan, it

“took a while to even start his mental health services.” His assessment diagnosed him

with PTSD and recommended therapy and medication management. Father did his first

assessment in October 2024. He went to two therapy sessions between then and

December 2024. He did not engage in any mental health treatment between December

2024 and his second dual-diagnostic assessment in June 2025. He attended two therapy

sessions after his second assessment. Although father was not formally diagnosed with

any cognitive delays, the assessor who completed his second assessment noted that father

9. was “‘observed to have some cognitive and speech impairment which did affect his

ability to complete [the] dual assessment.’”

{¶ 24} LCCS did not refer father for any additional services, despite father’s

request for referrals, because he “had just started engaging with his mental health services

and this pending trial.”

{¶ 25} At the time of trial, LCCS had ongoing concerns about father’s mental

health. Specifically, “with that diagnosis of PTSD and those cognitive delays [it had]

concerns that he would not be able to successfully parent independently given his mental

health and his delays.” There were also concerns about the “large outbursts and

arguments” mother, father, and Jason would have. Additionally, father did not have

independent housing; he was living with mother and Jason. He also lacked stable

employment.

{¶ 26} English did not think that father could independently parent child because

of his cognitive abilities, his “instability when it comes to housing and his ability to

provide for his child[,]” his issues with anger management, and English’s “concerns that

given [father’s] mental health and cognitive abilities that anger management [classes]

might not be helpful for him.”

{¶ 27} Regarding child, English said that she had been in the same foster home

since birth. She was doing “very well” there. She was developmentally on target, well

bonded with her foster parents and sibling, growing, and overall doing well. The foster

parents were willing to adopt her.

10. {¶ 28} Mother had supervised visits with child twice a week. There were no

concerns noted with mother’s visits. English observed one of those visits and found

mother’s interactions with child to be appropriate. Father had supervised visits with child

once a week. From December 2024 to March 2025, father did not visit child at all.

When he resumed visits in March 2025, he was “missing visits on and off,” but he had

been consistent with his visits after “a one-hour call ahead” was added to his visits.

There were no concerns noted with father’s visits. English observed father during his

visits, and father was appropriate with child.

{¶ 29} LCCS was requesting termination of mother’s and father’s parental rights

and an award of permanent custody to the agency. English thought that permanent

custody was in child’s best interest because he believed that “neither parent can parent

their child independently.” Mother and father were both living with and financially

dependent on Jason, but “the three of them together would not be safe and appropriate.”

Additionally, mother had told him that she cannot live independently, and if she cannot

live on her own, he did not believe that she could parent independently. The concerns for

mother’s parenting and father’s cognitive ability, mental health, and anger in his

relationship with mother that existed at the beginning of the case still existed at the time

of trial. English did not think that the parents would be able to complete their case plan

services if they were given more time because of their mental health and cognitive

abilities.

11. {¶ 30} On cross-examination, English testified that child was not placed with

father because of concerns about his living arrangements, mental health, and cognitive

abilities, and because father left the state shortly after being added to the case plan.

Father had become consistent with his therapy and medication management in the month

prior to the permanent custody hearing. He asked for referrals to services that LCCS did

not provide. Even if LCCS had referred father to additional services, English doubted

that father would have made enough progress to reunify with child, considering “his

capacities and his behaviors up to this point.”

{¶ 31} Obtaining independent housing and continuing to engage in mental health

treatment would have helped father reunify with child. Father was looking for a job

when English visited him in the month before the permanent custody hearing.

{¶ 32} Although the agency where father completed his second assessment noted

that his cognitive and speech impairments caused some problems with him completing

the assessment, father was able to complete the assessment. Father was diagnosed with

PTSD and generalized anxiety disorder. Those presented in “his interactions with other

people that he’s living with and his—even some aggression that he has shown [and] it

seems to [English] that he would not be able to control himself or provide for his child.”

{¶ 33} LCCS had not done any observations of father parenting child because

those observations are usually done during parenting classes.

{¶ 34} English confirmed that mother had been compliant with her mental health

treatment for the 90 days before the final hearing and had completed her anger

12. management class a few weeks before the hearing. Despite that, she was not referred for

domestic violence or parenting classes because the final hearing was only a couple of

weeks away. Additionally, mother was charged with domestic violence in April 2025 for

threatening father with a knife. This indicated to English that mother was not gaining

anything from her anger management classes.

{¶ 35} Although the agency had some concerns about mother’s mental capacity,

she had not had a psychological evaluation, so it did not know what her cognitive abilities

really were.

{¶ 36} Mother regularly visited with child twice a week throughout this case and

there were no safety concerns with mother’s visits. She asked for additional visitation

time that the agency did not grant.

{¶ 37} Mother and father were residing together but said that they did not intend to

live together long-term. However, they had not asked for resources to help with their

housing issues.

{¶ 38} In her testimony, Sweeney, child’s GAL, said that she had conducted a

thorough investigation and visited with child frequently while this case was pending.

Based on her observations, she had concerns about mother independently parenting child.

Specifically, she was concerned about domestic violence in the home. Neither parent

denied the domestic violence or their need for services, and both acknowledged that they

were not progressing with their services. Sweeney was also concerned that both parents

13. had only recently engaged in mental health treatment and they still needed to complete

other services, like parenting and domestic violence classes.

{¶ 39} Sweeney also thought that mother and father’s home was not suitable for a

child for several reasons. Sweeney had concerns with the home’s cleanliness. There

were three dogs in the home, which caused “an animal smell in the home that was

extremely bad.” Although mother had some things for child at the home, “there wasn’t

really a place for the child to go.” And there was “constant domestic violence” in the

home.

{¶ 40} Sweeney was also troubled by the allegation that mother had tried to

smother her older child. She acknowledged that mother denied the allegation and noted

that mother initially told her a different story about the incident than she did in her

testimony. Mother had explained the incident by saying that “she had given the child

cold milk. The child was cold and she was trying to warm the child. Nothing about

breastfeeding and being left on the chest.”

{¶ 41} Finally, Sweeney was concerned about violence because mother was under

investigation by adult protective services and was “possibly identified as the person that

could have participated in the homicide of an individual . . . .”

{¶ 42} Sweeney did not think that giving the parents more time to complete

services would enable them to reunify with child because

[t]hey’ve had a year up to this point and I’ve got mom just engaging in counseling and I’ve got dad who is just now getting lined up with counseling. You’ve still got domestic violence, you’ve still got parenting, you’ve still got housing. Basically all the concerns that opened this case

14. are still here. I’ve got parents that aren’t properly taking medication. Whether they can get it or not or afford it or not they’re both testifying today that they’ve had lapses in their medication and not able to get it, but then both testifying and stating to me, too, that that medication is crucial to them not to have anger outbursts and be able to control themselves. I can’t put [child] back into that. That’s not stable, and that’s not safe for her.

Sweeney said that child was doing well and seemed happy in her foster placement.

All of her needs were being met, and she was bonded with her foster parents and foster

sibling. Her foster parents were willing to adopt her.

{¶ 43} Sweeney recommended that LCCS be awarded permanent custody of child.

She believed that would be in child’s best interest.

{¶ 44} On cross-examination, Sweeney testified that mother could change her

recommendation if she “show[ed] a commitment to change, change of behavior. . . . she

needs to show a commitment to change as in not living with dad, not living with Jason,

having her own independent housing.” When mother’s attorney asked if “things have

been improving lately[,]” Sweeney replied that mother “has tried in a sense.”

{¶ 45} Regarding father, Sweeney said he could change her recommendation if he

“show[ed] a commitment to change. . . . [T]here is no change in behavior without a

behavior change difference, therapy, counseling, consistent medication, housing, staying

away from his abuser who is mom. . . . That’s not yet been demonstrated in over a year.”

2. Mother’s testimony

{¶ 46} Mother testified that she had been living with Jason for about three months,

but she planned to get independent housing. She had “an application for Metro” and was

looking for a two-bedroom home. Mother did not think that her living situation was a

15. concern because Jason was hard of hearing, so she had to use a loud voice when she was

speaking to him, and she and father were looking for other places to live.

{¶ 47} Mother was receiving mental health services, including therapy and

medication appointments. She had been attending appointments for the past three

months. She was taking medications and said that she “noticed less of an impulse issue

that [she was] having and less anger issues.” She completed anger management classes a

few weeks before the permanent custody hearing. She asked “multiple times” to be

referred to other services, but LCCS did not give her the referrals.

{¶ 48} Regarding the domestic violence incidents that happened in March and

April 2025, mother explained, “I was charged with domestic violence because I was in

the fear of safety for my unborn child because [father] would not let me leave the house,

and he was shoving and getting in my face and screaming at me.” Mother pleaded to the

charges from the March incident and was placed on probation, and the charges from the

April incident were dropped.

{¶ 49} Mother was visiting with child, and the visits were going “pretty good.”

Child would get upset at the end of visits, but mother would find ways to soothe her.

{¶ 50} Mother thought that being in her home was in child’s best interest. She

explained, “I do believe I deserve a second chance. Because I was not given the full

chance with my first kid because I got married to the wrong family. And not just that, I

didn’t have the best support at the time.” Mother wanted the trial court to know that “I

actually don’t neglect my kids. I nurture them, I bathe them, I feed them proper meals. I

16. teach them right from wrong. I don’t sit there and push them aside. I make sure that they

have everything. I am willing to be broke to make sure that my kids have everything. I

am willing to put them first over myself.”

{¶ 51} On cross, mother explained that her ex-mother-in-law has custody of her

older child. She claimed that the incident that led to the older child’s grandmother

getting custody was blown out of proportion. She said that she was breastfeeding the

child and the child was breathing. Mother was not visiting with the older child and had a

no-contact order with the grandmother because of arguments she had had with the

grandmother.

{¶ 52} Mother admitted that she did not start attending mental health appointments

regularly until May 2025, despite receiving her referral to those services in July 2024.

She had attended three appointments as of the permanent custody hearing, and had

completed her anger management class.

{¶ 53} Mother denied any ongoing domestic violence issues between her and

father. She claimed, “[w]e haven’t had any physical contact towards ourselves for the

past two months that we’ve been living in the same home. We do have loud arguments,

but that’s because we’re trying to figure out what’s best for [child] and trying to figure

out how to get an apartment, how to get a car. We’re trying to figure everything out.”

Mother admitted that she punched father in the face in both March and April, she was

charged after both incidents, and father was not charged after either incident. The April

charges were dismissed because father did not want to prosecute them.

17. {¶ 54} She and father were no longer in a romantic relationship; they were only

coparenting. Mother believed that their relationship had been safe and healthy for the

past month and a half.

{¶ 55} Although mother admitted to English that her relationship with Jason was

not healthy, she believed that the environment would be safe for child if Jason went into

counseling. He was not yet engaged in counseling, but they were “working on getting

him into that.”

{¶ 56} Mother was living with Jason and father. Jason was the only person on the

lease for the home where they were living. She claimed to be working on getting her

own home but had not yet turned in her housing application. She thought that it would

take “a couple of months” for her to get her own place. She was “basically” living

independently in Jason’s home because she was cleaning, cooking, taking out the trash,

and taking care of the dog. When she has memory problems, she writes things down on a

calendar and sets alarms for her medicine.

3. Father’s testimony

{¶ 57} Father testified that his case plan services initially included a dual-

diagnostic assessment and anger management, but anger management was removed a few

weeks after it was recommended. He asked LCCS for anger management, parenting

classes, and more visits with child, but the agency did not provide any of those services.

Someone told father that he was going to move forward with services and then soon after,

he was told that he was “not being moved forward because of this trial.”

18. {¶ 58} Father did a dual-diagnostic assessment and started mental health services

at an agency in Hancock County, but he stopped when he moved out of state for several

months. He initially left because of a family emergency and was unable to return to Ohio

because the person who was going to give him a ride did not pick him up. Eventually,

mother and Jason picked him up and brought him back to Ohio. When he came back to

Ohio, it took LCCS almost a month to get him back on the case plan.

{¶ 59} In the month before the hearing, father completed a second dual-diagnostic

assessment. He had a therapy appointment and a medication management appointment

scheduled. He was consistently taking his medications when he had them. He had not

taken his medications for about a month as of the trial date.

{¶ 60} Father did not have a car but expected to within a week. He planned to

jointly purchase one with Jason.

{¶ 61} Father was living with mother and Jason but was looking for places to live

on his own. He did not plan on living with mother unless she needed his help. He

initially moved in with mother and Jason because his former landlord did not fix safety

issues in his apartment, like broken glass and wiring issues, or install a stove and

refrigerator.

{¶ 62} Regarding the domestic violence incidents, father said that he was the

victim. He thought that mother believed that he was the aggressor because “when [he]

tried to talk to her, she . . . didn’t open up at that time. . . . So she wasn’t really

communicating with [him].” He was also concerned for mother’s safety.

19. {¶ 63} Father was visiting child regularly. He said that visits were going “pretty

good” and child was “a happy, wonderful girl when she sees daddy.” He and child were

well bonded.

{¶ 64} Father thought that he would be able to take care of child if he had custody

of her because his disability income would cover both him and child. He also told the

court, “I know I can take care of my daughter. I do have support as family and friends

standing behind me and that would help me every step of the way if I need it.”

{¶ 65} On cross, father explained that he did his first mental health assessment in

October 2024. He completed four appointments before he left the state. He was

unsuccessfully discharged by his first provider in January 2025. While he was out of

state, he received medication management services from his primary care doctor. After

he returned to Ohio, he received a referral to a new mental health service provider in

April 2025, but they were booked until June 2025.

{¶ 66} While father was out of state, he texted child’s foster mother every other

day to check in. He requested a virtual visit with child, but the former caseworker never

responded to him.

{¶ 67} Father was living with mother and Jason. Father’s name was not on the

lease, but Jason was in the process of talking to the landlord about adding father to the

lease.

{¶ 68} Father agreed that there was conflict in the home. He said that they “do get

in arguments, but it’s no[t] physical.” He downplayed the physical violence between him

20. and mother in March and April 2025 and said that they were addressing the domestic

violence by “communicating more better.”

{¶ 69} Father did not have any concerns about mother parenting child on her own.

He believed that mother could live on her own and would only need help “once in a blue

moon.” He also believed that mother “handles her anger just fine” and that mother’s

violent behavior was in the past.

{¶ 70} Father claimed that he was taking his medicine, despite not having his

refills. He said the same about mother. He also pointed out that mother had been out of

medicine for a week and “hasn’t had one [angry] outburst.”

{¶ 71} Father understood that he would have to progress with his case plan

services to be offered additional services.

C. Trial court’s decision

{¶ 72} At the hearing to announce its decision, the trial court said that “the parents

love their daughter and do want what’s best for her, however, their actions do not reflect

that . . . .” It found that the parents’ “unwillingness to complete or participate in services

and an inability to acknowledge some of the problems that brought them here leaves the

Court with no option but to grant the Agency permanent custody at this time.” It noted

that both parents requested additional services from LCCS, but “they weren’t even

participating in the one that they were initially requested to do in order to move on to

further services so that is concerning to the Court.”

21. {¶ 73} The court found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (2) applied to mother and

(E)(1) and (4) applied to father. It also found that granting permanent custody to the

agency was in child’s best interest and that LCCS had “complied with reasonable

efforts.”

{¶ 74} In its judgment entry, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence

that child could not be placed with the parents within a reasonable time and should not be

placed with the parents and that awarding permanent custody to LCCS was in child’s best

interest.

{¶ 75} The court found under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) that child could not be

placed with either parent within a reasonable time and should not be placed with either

parent.

{¶ 76} In determining that child could not or should not be placed with mother, the

court made findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (2). In determining that child could

not or should not be placed with father, the court made findings under R.C.

2151.414(E)(1) and (4).

{¶ 77} As to (E)(1), the court found that mother and father continuously and

repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the conditions that caused child to be placed

outside of the home, despite reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by LCCS. The

court found that mother and father failed to “meaningfully engage in or complete” case

plan services. Mother had only been consistent with her mental health services for

approximately three months and there were concerns that she was not consistently taking

22. her medication; although she had completed anger management classes, she continued to

have issues with anger and domestic violence; and she had not been referred for parenting

classes because of her lack of progress with other services. Father had only recently

engaged in mental health services and admitted that he was not taking his medication as

prescribed and he admitted to a need for anger management, although he had not been

referred to that service. Both parents minimized the conflict with the other and within

their home. English and Sweeney each testified that they did not believe the parents

would make enough progress to reunify with child even if they were given additional

time to complete case plan services. Sweeney explained that the parents had more than a

year to engage in services but had only done so recently, and that all of the concerns that

existed when the case began still existed at the time of the hearing. Therefore, child

would not be safe or stable.

{¶ 78} As to (E)(2), the court found that mother suffered from such severe chronic

mental illness that she was unable to provide an adequate permanent home for child at the

present time and it was “highly unlikely” that she would be able to remedy her chronic

mental illness within one year after the permanent custody hearing. Mother had a history

of mental health concerns, including diagnoses of borderline personality disorder, PTSD,

anxiety, depression, and possibly schizophrenia. She was referred to mental health

services in an earlier case in Hancock County but failed to engage in those services. She

was again referred to mental health services in this case and had “failed to consistently

engage in services until recently.”

23. {¶ 79} As to (E)(4), the court found that father demonstrated a lack of

commitment toward child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with

child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an

adequate permanent home for child. Father failed to visit child consistently throughout

the case. Specifically, father did not have contact with child from December 2024

through March 2025. Father also failed to meaningfully engage in case plan services and

significantly delayed engaging in services. Additionally, father “fails to recognize his

toxic home environment and minimizes the agency’s concern for domestic violence

within this environment.”

{¶ 80} Based on these factors, the court determined that LCCS presented clear and

convincing evidence that child had not been abandoned or orphaned, had not been in the

custody of a public children services agency or a private child placing agency for at least

12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, and could not be placed with either parent

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

{¶ 81} Finally, the court determined under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) that it was in

child’s best interest to award LCCS permanent custody. Specifically, the court found

under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) that child was bonded with the caregivers and other child

in her foster home, she was doing well and all of her needs were being met, and Sweeney,

her GAL, believed that it was in her best interest that LCCS receive permanent custody.

It found under (D)(1)(b) that child was too young to make her wishes known, but

Sweeney said that she seemed happy in her foster home. Under (D)(1)(c), the court

24. found that child had been in foster care for her entire life (approximately 14 months at the

time of trial). It found under (D)(1)(d) that the agency could not find any appropriate

relative placements and child’s foster family was willing to adopt her. And it found

under (D)(1)(e) that none of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) applied.

{¶ 82} After considering all of the evidence and making detailed findings, the trial

court awarded permanent custody of child to LCCS and terminated mother’s and father’s

parental rights.

{¶ 83} Mother now appeals, raising three assignments of error:

I. The trial court committed plain error by failing to find, by clear and convincing evidence at a hearing, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(l)(a)-(e).

II. The trial court’s finding pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(l) that mother failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

III. The trial court’s finding pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) that chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness or intellectual disability of mother is so severe that it makes mother unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the children at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year after the court holds the hearing was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Father also appeals, raising two assignments of error:

I. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for psychiatric and/or psychological assessment, filed by Father’s Guardian ad litem

II. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not seek a continuance of the hearing in order for Father to undergo a psychological examination

25. II. Law and Analysis

A. Father’s assignments of error

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying father’s request for a cognitive assessment.

{¶ 84} In his first assignment of error, father argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying his request for a psychological or psychiatric assessment to

determine his level of cognitive functioning. He points out that both Sweeney and Fuller

raised concerns about his capacity to understand and participate in the proceedings, but

the trial court refused to permit an examination of his mental capacity. He contends that

this was an abuse of discretion because there is nothing in the record showing that the

dual-diagnostic assessment that he underwent was an acceptable substitute for a cognitive

assessment, there is no indication that anyone spoke to the assessor to confirm that

further cognitive testing was unwarranted, and permitting the examination would not

have negatively impacted the timing of the case.

{¶ 85} LCCS responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

Fuller’s motion. It points out that the court denied the motion because father was

scheduled to undergo a dual-diagnostic assessment, which had the potential to resolve the

question of father’s mental capacity. The court also said that it would reconsider the

motion if the assessor thought any further cognitive testing was necessary, but there is

nothing in the record indicating that more testing was necessary or that anyone asked to

renew the motion for a cognitive assessment. The agency also points out that father’s

cognitive capacity was not the basis for its permanent-custody motion and that its

26. concerns from the beginning of the case remained.

{¶ 86} Under Juv.R. 32(A), the juvenile court

may order and utilize a social history or physical or mental examination at any time after the filing of a complaint . . . [u]pon the request of the party concerning whom the history or examination is to be made; . . . [w]here a material allegation of a neglect, dependency, or abused child complaint relates to matters that a history or examination may clarify; [or w]here a . . . party’s competence to participate in the proceedings is an issue. . . .”

Juv.R. 32(A)(1), (3), (4). The rule “states that a court ‘may’ order an examination,

placing the decision within the court’s discretion.” In re D.T.L.M., 2015-Ohio-1762, ¶ 19

(12th Dist.). Therefore, we review the juvenile court’s decision regarding an examination

under Juv.R. 32 for an abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion means that the trial

court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Askew v.

Goldhart, 75 Ohio St.3d 608, 610 (1996). Additionally, “[d]ue process requires the

appointment of a psychiatric expert in permanent-custody proceedings where a parent’s

mental or emotional health is the predominant and determinative issue. . . . But where a

parent’s mental health is not at issue, psychiatric expertise would contribute little to the

proceedings and is not required.” In re C.W., 2011-Ohio-4756, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.), citing In

re Brown, 1986 WL 13385 (1st Dist. Nov. 26, 1986); and In re Shaeffer Children, 85

Ohio App.3d 683 (3d Dist. 1993).

{¶ 87} In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying father’s

request for a psychiatric or psychological evaluation. Although child’s GAL raised some

initial concerns about father’s ability to understand the proceedings, when Fuller, father’s

GAL, formally requested the evaluations, she did not provide any reasons for needing the

27. evaluations beyond the evaluations generally being in father’s best interest. She did not

allege that father was incapable of understanding the proceedings and, in fact, told the

court that father “understands what his rights are and states he is aware of what LCCS is

asking for in its permanent custody motion.” Moreover, the court left open the possibility

of reconsidering its decision if the person doing father’s dual-diagnostic assessment

believed that further assessment was necessary, but no one renewed the motion for the

evaluations or asked the court to reconsider its decision.

{¶ 88} Importantly, father’s mental capacity was not a predominant and

determinative issue in the case. The basis for LCCS’s permanent custody motion as to

father was his failure to complete case plan services and his failure to visit child. The

evidence at the hearing showed that father delayed engaging in his mental health services,

did not address the domestic violence between him and mother, and did not have contact

with child for several months when he was able to. In other words, LCCS was not

alleging that father was an unfit parent because of his intellectual functioning. Under

these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion

or that due process required the trial court to grant father’s motion. Father’s first

assignment of error is not well-taken.

2. Father did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

{¶ 89} In his second assignment of error, father argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective because counsel failed to request a continuance so that father could undergo a

psychological or psychiatric examination. He contends that counsel had an “essential

28. duty” to request a continuance for an evaluation because Fuller requested the evaluation,

Sweeney and Fuller each expressed concern about father’s mental capacity, and there is

no evidence in the record that a dual-diagnostic assessment considers factors related to a

person’s mental capacity. LCCS responds that a continuance was unnecessary because

the issue of father’s competency examination was resolved before trial when the dual-

diagnostic assessor determined that he did not have any cognitive delays and father’s

GAL did not renew the motion for an evaluation. Further, it argues that if counsel had

requested a continuance, it is likely that the trial court would have denied the motion

because the court had already ruled that it would reconsider Fuller’s motion if the

assessor recommended further assessments, but the assessor did not do so.

{¶ 90} The standard for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the same in

a juvenile court proceeding as it is in a criminal proceeding. C.L. v. S.M., 2018-Ohio-

5281, ¶ 41 (6th Dist.), citing Jones v. Lucas Cty. Children Servs. Bd., 46 Ohio App.3d 85,

86 (6th Dist. 1988). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must

show “(1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective

standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different.” State v.

Hale, 2008-Ohio-3426, ¶ 204, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688

(1984); and State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. A

reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. State v.

Sanders, 94 Ohio St.3d 150, 151 (2002). Failure to present sufficient evidence on either

29. prong is fatal to an ineffective-assistance claim. State v. Leasure, 2023-Ohio-2710, ¶ 40

(6th Dist.), citing Strickland at 697.

{¶ 91} To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, the appellant must show that

counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that

the trial court cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland at 686.

Properly licensed Ohio lawyers are presumed to be competent, and there are “countless”

ways for an attorney to provide effective assistance in a case. State v. Gondor, 2006-

Ohio-6679, ¶ 62; Bradley at 142. Thus, “‘[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance

must be highly deferential.’” Bradley at 142, quoting Strickland at 689.

{¶ 92} Here, there is nothing in the record that supports a finding that father’s trial

counsel was ineffective. The trial court properly denied father’s request for a

psychological or psychiatric evaluation, so there was no reason for trial counsel to request

a continuance for father to undergo an evaluation that the court had already denied. See

State v. Kochensparger, 2016-Ohio-2870, ¶ 27 (6th Dist.) (“Counsel is not required to do

a futile act.”). Because counsel’s failure to request a continuance was not unreasonable,

father has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore,

father’s second assignment of error is not well-taken.

B. Mother’s assignments of error

1. The law of permanent custody

{¶ 93} Revised Code 2151.414 provides the analysis that a trial court must

undertake when considering whether to terminate parental rights and vest permanent

30. custody in a children services agency. Under that section, the court must first find that

one of the circumstances described in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) exists. As

applicable here, subsection (a) requires the court to find that the child has not been

abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the custody of a public children services agency

or a private child placing agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period,

and cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed

with either parent.

{¶ 94} If the court finds that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies, it must consider both

whether granting permanent custody to the agency is in the child’s best interest and

whether any of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E) are present that would

indicate that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or

should not be placed with either parent. In re B.K., 2010-Ohio-3329, ¶ 42-43 (6th Dist.).

{¶ 95} As relevant here, the court found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (2) were

applicable to mother. The statute provides:

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties.

(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellectual disability, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent

31. home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year after the court holds the [permanent custody] hearing . . . [.]

R.C. 2151.414(E). The court’s finding that any (E) factor exists is sufficient to support

an award of permanent custody to the agency. In re S.J., 2024-Ohio-5137, ¶ 29 (6th

Dist.); In re Carlos R., 2007-Ohio-6358, ¶ 38 (6th Dist.) (“[A] court need only find one

factor under R.C. 2151.414(E) to support a finding that the child cannot be placed with

either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent . . . .”).

{¶ 96} After finding that at least one factor in R.C. 2151.414(E) applies, the court

must then determine whether awarding permanent custody to the agency is in the child’s

best interest by considering the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

{¶ 97} All of the court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414 must be by clear and

convincing evidence. In re J.S., 2025-Ohio-17, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.). “Clear and convincing

evidence” is evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to form a firm conviction or belief

that the essential statutory elements for a termination of parental rights have been

established. Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus;

In re Tashayla S., 2004-Ohio-896, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.).

{¶ 98} The Ohio Supreme Court has clarified the standard of review in permanent

custody cases:

Given that R.C. 2151.414 requires that a juvenile court find by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory requirements are met, . . . the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards of review are the proper appellate standards of review of a juvenile court’s permanent-custody determination, as appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments that are presented by the parties.

In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 11. Notably, the court rejected abuse-of-discretion review

32. in these cases. Id. at ¶ 18.

{¶ 99} “The sufficiency of the evidence [standard] tests the adequacy of the

evidence: a court of appeals should affirm a trial court when the evidence, if believed, is

legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law.” In re C.W., 2025-Ohio-282, ¶

37 (10th Dist.), citing Z.C. at ¶ 13.

{¶ 100} In a manifest weight review, we must weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether

the trier of fact clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the decision must be reversed. Z.C. at ¶ 14, citing

Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. But, while we review the evidence and

consider the witnesses’ credibility, we must be mindful that the trial court, as the trier of

fact, is in the best position to weigh evidence and evaluate testimony. In re P.W., 2012-

Ohio-3556, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one

interpretation, we are bound to interpret it in a way that is consistent with the trial court’s

judgment. Z.C. at ¶ 14, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80,

fn. 3 (1984). The trial court’s determination that an order of permanent custody is in the

best interest of a child “should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the

proceeding and the impact the court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties

concerned.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re C.P., 2009-Ohio-2760, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.).

Therefore, we will not find a permanent custody decision against the weight of the

evidence if it is supported by some competent, credible evidence in the record upon

33. which the trial court could have formed a firm belief as to all of the essential permanent

custody findings. In re I.H., 2020-Ohio-4853, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.).

2. The trial court made the necessary R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) finding.

{¶ 101} In her first assignment of error, mother argues that the trial court

committed plain error by failing to state on the record that one of the factors outlined in

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies to child. LCCS responds that the trial court

specifically held in its judgment entry that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies.

{¶ 102} “[A] court speaks only through its journal entries.” Infinite Sec.

Solutions., LLC v. Karam Props., II, LLC, 2015-Ohio-1101, ¶ 29. Thus, what the trial

did—or did not—say at the hearing to announce its decision is immaterial. What matters

is whether the court made the proper findings in its judgment entry. It did. The entry

clearly states that

this Court finds that LCCS has presented clear and convincing evidence that demonstrates that (1) that one or more of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(l)(a) through (e) applies . . . .

...

This Court finds that the child has not been abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the custody of a public children services agency or a private child placing agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, and cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. . . .

This Court’s finds that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent because the following factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E) are present . . .

{¶ 103} Because the trial court made the appropriate (B)(1) finding in its judgment

entry, mother’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.

34. 3. The trial court’s R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) findings are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 104} In her second assignment of error, mother argues that the trial court’s

findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) are not supported by clear and convincing evidence,

so the trial court abused its discretion by granting permanent custody to LCCS. She

contends that the court’s decision was an abuse of discretion because she was attending

therapy and compliant with her medication; she asked to be referred to additional

services, but LCCS refused to give her the referrals; and she had time to complete

domestic violence classes.

{¶ 105} LCCS responds that there is ample evidence to support the court’s (E)(1)

findings. It points out that mother had only been compliant with her mental health

services for three months at the time of the hearing, she was not consistently taking her

medication, and she continued to have angry outbursts after completing anger

management classes. The agency also notes in response to mother’s argument that there

was time for her to complete more case plan services that “permanent custody law does

not contemplate holding the child in custodial limbo for an extended period of time while

a parent attempts to establish they can provide the child with a legally secure permanent

placement.”

{¶ 106} Although mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion, that is

not the correct standard for evaluating a trial court’s permanent custody decision.

Instead, we must consider whether the court’s findings are supported by sufficient clear

and convincing evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Z.C.,

35. 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 11, 18.

{¶ 107} In this case, by the time of the hearing, the case had been open for over

one year, but mother had only been compliant with her mental health treatment for

approximately three months. She was not fully compliant because there was evidence

that she was not consistently taking her medication, which is when she tended to have

angry outbursts. Mother had completed anger management classes, but she admitted that

she continued to have “loud arguments” with father, and she was charged with domestic

violence for assaulting father twice while she was attending the anger management

classes. English admitted that LCCS did not give mother referrals for any other services,

but he explained that it did not refer her to domestic violence classes because it wanted

her to complete anger management first or refer her to parenting classes because it

wanted her to fully address her mental health first. Mother also admitted that she did not

have a healthy relationship with Jason (whom she was living with) and that her home

would be a safe environment for child if Jason went into counseling, which he was not

currently engaged in. Taken together, these facts show that the trial court’s conclusion

under (E)(1) that mother continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the

conditions that resulted in child’s placement outside of the home is supported by

sufficient evidence.

{¶ 108} Further, the trial court’s (E)(1) findings are not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. After weighing the evidence, the trial court found, by clear and

convincing evidence, that LCCS met its burden of showing that mother continuously and

36. repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the conditions that resulted in child’s placement

outside of the home. The trial court was in the best position to evaluate the evidence and

testimony, and we are bound to construe evidence that is susceptible to more than one

interpretation in a manner consistent with the trial court’s decision. Z.C. at ¶ 14. The

trial court’s conclusion is supported by some competent, credible evidence, so it is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, mother’s second assignment of

error is not well-taken.

4. Mother’s third assignment of error is moot.

{¶ 109} In her third assignment of error, mother challenges the trial court’s finding

under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2). A trial court’s finding that one (E) factor applies to a parent

supports an award of permanent custody to a children services agency. S.J., 2024-Ohio-

5137, at ¶ 29 (6th Dist.); Carlos R., 2007-Ohio-6358, at ¶ 38 (6th Dist.). Because we

have determined that the trial court correctly found that (E)(1) applies to mother, her

arguments about the court’s other (E) finding is moot. In re A.W., 2015-Ohio-407, ¶ 40

(6th Dist.); In re A.H., 2020-Ohio-3102, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.). Therefore, mother’s third

III. Conclusion

{¶ 110} We have thoroughly reviewed the record of proceedings in the trial court,

including the trial testimony and exhibits. We find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by denying father’s request for an evaluation, father did not receive ineffective

assistance of counsel, the trial court made the required R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) finding in its

37. judgment entry, and the court’s R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) finding as to mother is supported by

clear and convincing evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Mother’s and father’s assignments of error are without merit.

{¶ 111} Therefore, the August 18, 2025 judgment of the Lucas County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Mother and father are ordered to divide

the costs of this appeal equally under App.R. 24.

Judgement affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. JUDGE

Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE

Charles E. Sulek, J. CONCUR. JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

38.