In re A.S.

2025 Ohio 1724

Opinion

[Cite as In re A.S., 2025-Ohio-1724.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: A.S. : APPEAL NOS. C-250045 C-250060 : TRIAL NO. F/20/593 X

: JUDGMENT ENTRY :

This cause was heard upon the appeals, the record, and the briefs. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for these appeals, allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 5/14/2025 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as In re A.S., 2025-Ohio-1724.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: A.S. : APPEAL NOS. C-250045 C-250060 : TRIAL NO. F/20/593 X

: OPINION :

Appeals From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 14, 2025

Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Marin Cofrancesco, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Kimberly A. Helfrich, Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant Guardian Ad Litem,

Kimberly V. Thomas, for Appellee Mother,

Dain Monroe, for Appellee Father,

John R. Sinclair, Guardian Ad Litem for Mother. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

ZAYAS, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} In this case, the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family

Services (“JFS”) and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) appeal from the juvenile court’s

judgment denying JFS’s motion for permanent custody under R.C. 2151.413(A) and

remanding custody of A.S. to mother. In denying JFS’s motion, the juvenile court first

found that permanent custody was not mandatory under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) as A.S.

could be returned to mother’s care where mother remedied the initial concerns that

caused A.S.’s removal. The juvenile court further found that a discretionary finding of

permanent custody was not warranted as a remand of custody to mother was in A.S.’s

best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). JFS and the GAL challenge the remand of

custody to mother, in essence taking issue with the juvenile court’s determination that

mother remedied the initial concerns that caused A.S.’s removal. For the reasons set

forth below, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

I. History of the Case

{¶2} On June 15, 2020, JFS filed a complaint for temporary custody of A.S.,

asserting that A.S. was neglected and dependent. The basis for the complaint was

allegedly mother’s unsupervised contact with father due to ongoing domestic violence

between the parties and father’s criminal history. It was alleged that mother did not

understand or appreciate the threat that ongoing domestic violence posed to A.S. At

the time, mother was living in housing provided by the Hamilton County Department

of Disability Services (“DDS”), and her continued contact with father also put her at

risk of losing her housing with DDS. Additionally, the complaint alleged that, during

the assessment, “it became clear that [mother] is delayed in her understanding of

parenting, her role in parenting, and how to keep [A.S.] safe and protected.” Further,

the “assigned DDS worker” also allegedly expressed concern for mother’s “parenting OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

ability and overall functioning.” JFS moved for interim custody of A.S. that same day,

based on the facts alleged in the complaint. Interim custody was granted to JFS the

following day.

{¶3} Ultimately, after a two-day trial, A.S. was adjudicated dependent on

February 26, 2021.1 The juvenile court then granted temporary custody of A.S. to JFS

by agreement of the parties on March 29, 2021, and approved the most recently filed

case plan.

{¶4} The specific concerns listed for mother in the case plan included being

a victim of domestic violence with father as the perpetrator, not being able to

independently care for the child due to her mental health, having a DDS worker and

receiving DDS services, and visiting father against safety-plan directives. The case

plan provided that, to remedy the concerns, mother would engage in all recommended

services being offered by DDS and additional services suggested by JFS such as an

assessment by Family Access to Integrated Recovery (“FAIR”), parenting-enrichment

classes, and individual therapy and med-somatic services.

{¶5} On April 16, 2021, JFS filed its first motion to extend temporary

custody, which was granted by the juvenile court on May 13, 2021. Temporary custody

was extended to December 15, 2021.

{¶6} On November 8, 2021, JFS filed a motion to modify temporary custody

to permanent custody under R.C. 2151.413(A). The grounds for the motion were that

A.S. had been in the temporary custody of the agency for 12 or more months of a

consecutive 22-month period and that permanent custody to the agency was in A.S.’s

best interest. The motion also asserted that father had abandoned A.S. under R.C.

1 The allegation of neglect was dismissed.

4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2151.414(E)(10).

{¶7} The hearing on the motion for permanent custody occurred on

September 22 and September 25, 2023, and February 13, April 26, and May 2, 2024.2

JFS presented 21 exhibits and the testimony of a DDS supervisor, a JFS kinship

coordinator, one of A.S.’s foster parents, a JFS caseworker, and father. Mother

testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of her therapist at Talbert

House and two visitation facilitators from the Family Nurturing Center (“FNC”).

Father also testified on his own behalf.

{¶8} After the parties filed written closing arguments, the magistrate entered

an order granting permanent custody of A.S. to JFS on August 20, 2024. First, the

magistrate found that A.S. had been in the temporary custody of the agency for 14

consecutive months under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). The magistrate also found that R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(b) and 2151.414(E)(13) were applicable to father. Then, the magistrate

determined that permanent custody to JFS was in A.S.’s best interest under R.C.

2151.414(D)(1). Of note, the magistrate found that mother could not provide a “safe

or permanent placement” for A.S., despite her engagement in services, as she had not

remedied the conditions that caused A.S.’s removal.

{¶9} Mother objected to the magistrate’s decision, arguing that the decision

was against the manifest weight of the evidence as it was in A.S.’s best interest to be

2 We note that, under former—and current—R.C. 2151.414(A)(2), a court is required to issue an

order that grants, denies, or otherwise disposes of a motion for permanent custody no later than 200 days after the agency filed the motion. However, this section also provides that the failure of the court to issue an order within this time period “does not affect the authority of the court to issue any order” or “provide any basis for attacking the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of any order of the court.” R.C. 2151.414(A)(2). Thus, the failure to abide by this timeline does not result in reversible error. See, e.g., In re M.C., 2016-Ohio-8294, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.). Consequently, even though the hearings on the motion did not conclude until over two years after the motion for permanent custody was filed (for various reasons and through no fault entirely attributable to any one party or the court), the excess time that it took to resolve the motion does not constitute error that would ultimately impact the juvenile court’s determination.

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

remanded to her custody. Most notably, she asserted that, contrary to the magistrate’s

decision, she remedied the conditions that initially caused A.S.’s removal from her

care.

{¶10} After responsive briefing, the juvenile court entered an order sustaining

mother’s objections on January 21, 2025, after finding that the magistrate did not

properly determine the factual issues and appropriately apply the law.3 The juvenile

court said that, although the magistrate was able to view the demeanor of the witnesses

and judge the credibility of the testimony, the decision was not supported by the

evidence and not in accordance with the law. The juvenile court appeared to agree

with the magistrate’s decision under the first prong of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), finding that

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) (the 12-of-22 provision) was met as A.S. had been in the

temporary custody of the agency for 14 consecutive months, and that R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(b) (the abandonment provision) was met as to father. Where the court

disagreed with the magistrate was under the best-interest prong of R.C.

2151.414(B)(1).

{¶11} First, the court determined that permanent custody was not mandatory

under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) as A.S. could be returned to mother’s home. The court said,

[T]he court believes that Mother has demonstrated that she has

remedied the initial concerns and that the child can and should be

returned to her custody. Since the beginning of the case, Mother has

completed parenting and domestic violence classes. She is also engaged

in individual therapy through the Talbert House and is compliant with

her medication. Mother was also previously engaged with [DDS] as

3 On January 29, 2025, the juvenile court entered an order staying the judgment pending appeal.

6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

asked by the case plan, until she voluntarily disenrolled. Her

disenrollment from []DDS was raised as a concern by []JFS but the

Court notes that . . . an SSA supervisor with []DDS testified that Mother

voluntarily disenrolled from []DDS and then []DDS later closed her

case, which she had [a] right to appeal.

{¶12} The juvenile court also specifically rejected the arguments of JFS and

the GAL that mother had not demonstrated a sufficient behavioral change to warrant

a finding that she has remedied the initial concerns. The court said, “The Court

disagrees with HCJFS and the GAL regarding the characterization of Mother’s

behavioral changes.” In doing so, the court rejected arguments concerning:

intermittently arriving late to visits, no longer engaging with DDS, displaying

concerning behavior within her interactions with the placement provider for the child,

concerns regarding housing and employment, and concerns regarding the relationship

with mother and father.

{¶13} Next, the juvenile court determined that a discretionary finding of

permanent custody was not warranted under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) as permanent

custody to the agency was not in A.S.’s best interest. After addressing the best-interest

factors and finding that both the foster placement and mother had positive

relationships with A.S. and could provide A.S. with a legally secure placement, the

juvenile court said,

Ultimately, the Court finds that denying the Motion to Modify

Temporary Custody to Permanent Custody of the child and remanding

the child to Mother’s custody is in his best interest. The Court does not

believe that clear and convincing evidence supports an award of

Permanent Custody of the child to []JFS as Mother has substantially

7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

remedied the concerns and is able to provide a legally secure placement

for the child. Thus, for the foregoing reasons and after careful

consideration of the aforementioned factors, the Court finds that a grant

of Permanent Custody of the child to []JFS is not in the child’s best

interest and subsequently remands custody of the child to Mother.

{¶14} JFS and the GAL now appeal, collectively raising three assignments of

error for this court’s review.

II. Standard of Review

{¶15} The Ohio Supreme Court has said that “the sufficiency-of-the-evidence

and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards of review are the proper appellate

standards of review of a juvenile court’s permanent-custody determination, as

appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments that are presented by the

parties.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 11.

{¶16} “Sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence are

distinct concepts and are ‘“both quantitatively and qualitatively different.”’” Id. at ¶

13, quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 10. Sufficiency depends on the

adequacy of the evidence, while weight depends on the effect of the evidence in

inducing belief. Id., citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). When

applying a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review, an appellate court should

affirm a trial court’s judgment if the evidence is legally sufficient as a matter of law.

Id. When applying a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review, an appellate

court “must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility

of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the

finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that

the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. at ¶ 14.

8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

{¶17} Accordingly, in permanent-custody cases, “[a]n examination into the

sufficiency of the evidence requires a reviewing court to determine whether the

juvenile court had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the clear-and-convincing

standard.” In re C.C., 2024-Ohio-5013, ¶ 5 (1st Dist.), citing In re C & M Children,

2020-Ohio-4206, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.), and In re R.M.S., 2019-Ohio-4281, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.).

Whereas a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence requires a reviewing court

to “review the record to determine whether the juvenile court clearly lost its way and

committed such a manifest miscarriage of justice that its judgment must be reversed.”

Id., citing C & M Children at ¶ 23, and In re R.M.S. at ¶ 27.

{¶18} “‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof

which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of

such certainty as it required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which

will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts

sought to be established.’” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 7, quoting Cross v.

Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

III. Law and Analysis

{¶19} In its sole assignment of error, JFS disputes the juvenile court’s best-

interest determination and argues that decision was not supported by sufficient

evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶20} In the GAL’s first assignment of error, the GAL disputes the juvenile

court’s best-interest determination and argues that a remand of custody was not in

A.S.’s best interest. In the GAL’s second assignment of error, the GAL disputes the

juvenile court’s finding that permanent custody was not mandated under R.C.

2151.414(D)(2).

9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

A. The Applicable Statutory Requirements

{¶21} As an initial matter, “R.C. 2151.414, the applicable statute, was amended

effective April 3, 2023.” In re C.W., 2024-Ohio-4987, ¶ 43 (1st Dist.). “Only minor

changes were made in this amendment.” Id., citing In re P., 2024-Ohio-2794, ¶ 17 (1st

Dist.). “We must apply the version of this statute that was in effect at the time that the

motion for permanent custody was filed.” Id., citing In re P. at ¶ 17. Accordingly, we

will apply the former version of the statute that was in effect on November 8, 2021.

{¶22} “Pursuant to former R.C. 2151.414(B), a trial court may grant permanent

custody of a child to a children services agency if the court determines that a grant of

permanent custody is in the best interest of the child and that one of the five conditions

set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies.” Id. at ¶ 44, citing In re A.Y.C. and E.Y.C.,

2023-Ohio-4494, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.).

{¶23} “With respect to a finding that permanent custody is in the best interest

of a child, that finding can be either discretionary or mandatory.” Id. at ¶ 45, citing

former R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and (2). “As we have explained, former R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)

and 2151.414(D)(2) were alternative means for reaching the best-interest

determination.” (Cleaned up.) Id., citing In re P. at ¶ 19. “Former R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)

set forth a list of circumstances that, if all were found to exist, mandated a finding that

permanent custody was in the best interest of the child.” Id., citing In re P. at ¶ 20.

“In contrast, under former R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court was required to

weigh multiple factors ‘to decide whether granting an agency permanent custody of a

child is in that child’s best interest.’” Id., citing In re J.P., 2019-Ohio-1619, ¶ 39 (1st

Dist.).

{¶24} As to a mandatory finding, former R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) stated,

If all of the following apply, permanent custody is in the best

10 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

interest of the child, and the court shall commit the child to the

permanent custody of a public children services agency or private child

placing agency:

(a) The court determines by clear and convincing evidence that

one or more of the factors in division (E) of this section exist

and the child cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either

parent.

(b) The child has been in an agency’s custody for two years or

longer, and no longer qualifies for temporary custody

pursuant to division (D) of section 2151.415 of the Revised

Code.

(c) The child does not meet the requirements for a planned

permanent living arrangement pursuant to division (A)(5) of

section 2151.353 of the Revised Code.

(d) Prior to the dispositional hearing, no relative or other

interested person has filed, or has been identified in, a

motion for legal custody of the child.

{¶25} As to a discretionary finding, former R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) stated,

In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held

pursuant to division (A) of this section . . ., the court shall consider all

relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the

child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-

of-home providers, and any other person who may

11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

significantly affect the child;

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or

through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the

maturity of the child;

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child

has been in the temporary custody of one or more public

children services agencies or private child placing agencies

for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-

month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody

of one or more public children services agencies or private

child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a

consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in

division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the

child was previously in the temporary custody of an

equivalent agency in another state;

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement

and whether that type of placement can be achieved without

a grant of permanent custody to the agency;

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this

section apply in relation to the parents and child.

B. The Juvenile Court’s Determination Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)

{¶26} The GAL’s first assignment of error and JFS’s sole assignment of error

challenge the trial court’s determination that a remand of custody to mother was in

12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

A.S.’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).4 In doing so, they argue that, contrary

to the juvenile court’s decision, mother failed to remedy the concerns related to stable

housing, her relationship with father, and her behavior. In other words, both parties—

in essence—dispute the juvenile court’s finding that mother could provide a legally

secure placement for A.S. under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d).

{¶27} “A legally secure placement refers to more than just a roof over one’s

head, rather, a legally secure placement, ‘encompasses a stable environment where a

child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for the

child’s needs.’” In re E.H., 2022-Ohio-4701, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.), citing In re P. & H., 2019-

Ohio-3637, ¶ 42 (1st Dist.).

a. Mother’s Housing

{¶28} The GAL and JFS first dispute the juvenile court’s determination that

mother had remedied the initial concerns regarding her housing. The juvenile court

specifically rejected this argument below, stating,

The Court also rejects []JFS’ and the GAL’s assertions that

Mother does not have stable employment or housing. In support of

their assertion, []JFS and the GAL note that Mother has had multiple

employers and moved more than once during the pendency of the case.

The Court can certainly understand the concern but is also cognizant

that this case has been pending for more than four years. While it is not

ideal that Mother has changed jobs and housing, it is also clear that

Mother had a home, with a lease, and multiple jobs at the time of the

4 No party challenges the juvenile court’s determinations under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and (d).

Thus, it is only the juvenile court’s determination of best interest that is at issue in this appeal.

13 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

trial. The record also shows that Mother benefits from the assistance of

a payee, which pays the monthly rent using Mother’s funds. This will

likely help Mother ensure her housing is stable.

{¶29} The GAL argues that the juvenile court failed to acknowledge the

evidence and testimony that indicates that mother had not maintained independent

housing for any significant length of time. JFS argues that housing stability “remained

a concern” throughout the case.

{¶30} The ongoing caseworker for JFS testified in September 2023 that she

was able to view mother’s housing that mother had been in since “sometime this year.”

Accordingly, she testified that mother had stable housing at the time. While she did

testify that there was a prior period when she was unable to confirm where mother

was living, the caseworker’s testimony as of this hearing indicates mother had stable

housing. Further, mother testified that she had been in this housing since December

2022, and that the caseworker had been to her apartment twice. She denied that the

caseworker indicated any concerns with the housing.

{¶31} Subsequently, at the April 2024 hearing, the caseworker raised a

concern regarding housing as mother had moved to new housing that she had been in

for “roughly two weeks.” The caseworker was able to view the new housing, and

mother provided her with the new lease. Nevertheless, the caseworker indicated a

concern that there was no furniture in the home and “nothing for the child in the

home.” When asked if that could be because mother was still in the process of moving,

she answered, “I’m not sure.” However, she testified that mother said the furniture

was in the basement as she was waiting on her brother to help her move the furniture.

When asked if there was storage in the basement for tenants, she answered, “I’m not

sure.” When asked if she asked mother to see the basement, she said, “No.”

14 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

{¶32} On cross-examination, the caseworker agreed that mother lived in the

same place for “the entire calendar year of 2023,” and that this residence was

appropriately furnished for mother and A.S. She was then again asked if it was

possible mother was just in the process of moving to the new place, and she said, “I

don’t think so.” Her stated reason for this belief was mother rescheduling

appointments to see the new apartment and trying to “put things together” before the

caseworker’s visit.

{¶33} Mother agreed that she moved to a new apartment in April 2024. She

testified that she brought the furniture from her previous apartment, plus some

additional furniture. However, the furniture was in the basement because the hallway

in the building is narrow, and she was having trouble getting the furniture where it

was supposed to be. When asked how she was going to get the furniture up to her

apartment, she said her brother was going to come with assistance from movers to

help get everything into her apartment. When asked if she would be willing to call the

caseworker and show her when the furniture was moved in, she said, “Yes.”

{¶34} Ultimately, while the record does reflect that mother has moved around

during the long, drawn-out pendency of this case, the most-recent evidence in the

record reflects that mother had stable housing in 2023 and through the final hearing

in 2024. Although mother did move in April 2024, she provided the caseworker with

her new lease and there is no evidence disproving the assertion that mother was still

in the process of moving her furniture into the new place.

{¶35} Accordingly, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that

mother had stable housing at the time of the hearings on the permanent-custody

motion. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court’s determination that

mother had remedied any concerns regarding stable housing was not supported by

15 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

sufficient evidence or against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Z.C., 2023-

Ohio-4703, at ¶ 14, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80

(1984) (“If the evidence is susceptible to more than one construction, the reviewing

court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and

judgment, more favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.”).

b. Mother’s Relationship with Father

{¶36} The GAL and JFS next dispute the juvenile court’s determination that

mother had remedied the concerns surrounding her relationship with father. The

juvenile court also specifically rejected this argument below, stating:

The Court struggled greatly with the concerns about Mother and

Father's relationship and whether domestic violence is still a concern.

It is clear that the relationship between Mother and Father was

tumultuous. Prior to this Court’s involvement, the record shows that

Mother was injured after Father’s cousin shot her with a firearm.

Further, after the initiation of this case, Father and [father’s girlfriend]

broke into Mother’s home, harmed her, and Father was later convicted

of burglary. Since these incidents, the record shows that [father’s

girlfriend] believes that Mother continues to contact and harass [her]

and that Father believes that Mother has continued to attempt to

contact him. The Court does not take these allegations lightly given that

there is a potential of harm to multiple parties. However, despite the

allegations, the record is insufficient to confirm the veracity of the

allegations. Other than [father’s girlfriend] and Father’s testimony, no

other evidence was presented to confirm that Mother was the person

who attempted to contact [father’s girlfriend] or that she did attempt to

16 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

contact Father. Furthermore, Mother and Father both independently

testified that they have not had contact with each other for a prolonged

period of time and that they do not wish to do so in the future. The

Court also believes that Mother understands the ramifications of

domestic violence. She testified regarding her understanding of the

harm that can arise from domestic violence and how it can impact

children. She also clearly elucidated that it is harmful for the children

if they are present and witness the violence. This indicates to the Court

that she understands the nature of domestic violence and the harm it

can inflict on families.

{¶37} The GAL and JFS argue that mother did not display an understanding

of domestic violence or the risk that domestic violences poses. In other words, they

challenge the juvenile court’s determination that mother understands the

ramifications of domestic violence.

{¶38} The agency caseworker did testify as to her belief that mother did not

comprehend domestic violence or display an understanding of the risks that domestic

violences poses. She said that mother “tells [her] she’s able to keep herself safe,” but

also “doesn’t seem [to] really understand[] that keeping herself safe is keeping her

child safe.” However, the caseworker agreed that, although not completed right away,

mother did complete a domestic-violence assessment in 2021 as requested.

{¶39} The domestic-violence assessment, completed in November 2021,

reflects that mother documented a detailed history of her relationship with father, in

which she disclosed experiencing physical, sexual, and emotional abuse, as well as

intimidation, isolation, threats, and manipulation in her relationship with father. The

assessment goes on to provide that mother has “various protective capabilities,” and

17 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

never reported any abuse occurring in front of A.S. The recommendations in the

assessment included engaging in individual therapy as needed, continuing parenting

classes, and following all case-plan recommendations. The assessment also provided

that the assessor would provide support and advocacy for mother “as needed.” The

assessment did not make any recommendations for additional domestic-violence

services, and the caseworker agreed that she never requested that mother complete

another domestic-violence assessment or any other domestic-violence services.

{¶40} Further, Mother testified at the hearing as to her understanding of

domestic violence. She said that, to prevent domestic violence, you must take

precautions. She said this includes avoiding interactions with father, putting A.S. first,

and calling the police to protect herself and prevent future situations that could

endanger her or A.S. She also agreed that she was a victim of father’s domestic

violence. Moreover, mother said several times that she did not want to have any

interaction with father, and that she just wanted it to be her and A.S.

{¶41} While father did testify that mother attempted to contact him while he

was incarcerated in 2022 or early 2023, he also said that it had been over two years

since he talked to mother. Additionally, mother denied attempting to contact father

while he was incarcerated.

{¶42} Beyond that, while the agency caseworker pointed to several domestic-

violence incidents that occurred in previous years that raised concerns for the agency,

no evidence was presented of any current domestic-violence incidents concerning

mother. In fact, the agency caseworker denied any knowledge of domestic-violence

incidents concerning mother in 2023.

{¶43} Based on the record, we cannot determine that the juvenile court’s

determination that mother had remedied the concern of domestic violence was not

18 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

supported by sufficient evidence or against the weight of the evidence. See In re Z.C.,

2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 14, quoting Seasons Coal, 10 Ohio St.3d at 80 (“If the evidence

is susceptible to more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it

that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, more favorable

to sustaining the verdict and judgment.”).

c. Mother’s Behavior

{¶44} The GAL also disputes the juvenile court’s determination regarding

mother’s “erratic” behavior. In support of this assertion, the GAL points to an incident

that the foster mother testified to at the museum when a visit was supposed to occur.

The juvenile court acknowledged this incident but “did not accept” the GAL’s

characterization of this incident as “concerning.” The juvenile court stated,

[Foster parent] testified regarding a third incident between

Mother and herself. [She] testified that she was concerned about

Mother’s actions during a cancelled visit at the Cincinnati Children’s

Museum. At that visit, Mother arrived late to the visit so, in accordance

with the FNC's policy, the FNC facilitator cancelled the visit between

Mother and the child. Accordingly, [foster parent] and the child entered

the Museum. While in the Museum, [foster parent] testified that she

observed Mother arrive at the Museum. [She] testified that she saw

Mother using her phone, pacing, and acting generally agitated. In

response to seeing Mother, [foster parent] testified that she called the

FNC facilitator and reported Mother’s behavior, to which [foster parent]

testified that the FNC facilitator told her to call the police or get security.

[Foster parent] described her concern that Mother might follow her and

the child to [foster parent]’s vehicle. The FNC facilitator later testified

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that she could not recall telling [foster parent] to call the police about

Mother’s behavior. [Foster parent] did not call the police but testified

that she moved the child deeper into the Museum so that he could not

see Mother. When [foster parent] and the child left the Museum, they

did not see or hear Mother in the Museum or at [foster parent]’s vehicle.

{¶45} The juvenile court’s characterization of this incident is spot-on to

testimony in the record. Nevertheless, the GAL appears to argue that this incident is

clear and convincing evidence that mother did not make the requisite behavioral

change in order to provide a legally secure placement for A.S. In support of this

assertion, she points to her own testimony about the incident. The GAL testified that

mother called her during the incident and was “very upset, cursing, yelling, saying that

she didn’t feel it was fair that she was late.” She said, “It was due to the bus was

running late, it took her time to get down to the museum center.” The GAL was then

asked if, based on that conversation with mother, she understood why the foster

parent said she was nervous and didn’t know how to react at the time. The GAL

responded, “Yes.” She also agreed that foster parent’s reaction was “reasonable.”

{¶46} While this testimony could support a finding that mother was upset in

the moment, the GAL fails to set forth any argument as to how the testimony about

this one incident would outweigh all the positive evidence that mother presented as to

her behavioral change. The juvenile court cited favorably to the testimony of mother’s

therapist and the FNC facilitators who had nothing but positive things to say about

mother.

{¶47} More specifically, mother’s therapist testified that she has been

consistently working with mother for two years. Initially, mother was doing weekly

sessions, but they “dispersed” to once every other week after some time. When she

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first started working with mother, mother had “depressive symptoms and anxiety”

that they were working on. As of today, some of mother’s “anxiety symptoms are

moderately present, although not excessively,” but mother’s “depressive symptoms

have been mostly reduced.” The therapist agreed that mother also sees a psychiatrist

through Talbert house and is receiving medication for the established diagnoses. She

testified that there was an initial period when mother was not on medication, but

mother has been consistent with her medication ever since.

{¶48} When asked about mother’s progress on “dealing with emotional

symptoms,” the therapist answered, “She has significant progress both in

understanding and also reducing and developing skills to mitigate symptoms and react

appropriately to them.” She continued, “They have also grown less strong with the

depressive and anxious symptoms.” She testified that mother’s “progress has been

consistent,” and said, “And since she has decreased treatment over time, I anticipate

that by her next assessment we will probably be determining an end date.” She agreed

that mother could continue receiving psychiatry services. She denied that she ever felt

the need to refer mother for any additional support or services. Specific to parenting,

the therapist testified that she talks to mother “about emotional regulation and

expectations for what is healthy for treatment of a child, expectations of the child and

the expectations of the mother.”

{¶49} The visitation facilitator between mother and A.S. for 2023 and early

2024 testified to her observations of mother’s interactions with A.S. She said the visits

began at the facility and “went pretty well.” Mother “was engaging in play, engaging

in conversation and doing educational, like reading and activities with [A.S.].” At

“some point,” the visits moved to “in-home facilitated,” which was out in the

community. FNC allowed visits to be in the community because the staff felt mother

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was able to move up to another level. The criteria for moving the visits from the facility

to the community—which mother met—were no safety concerns, mother being able to

provide a meal option, and mother being able to support A.S. emotionally if needed.

The facilitator denied having any issues with mother’s behavior during the community

visits. She also denied any having any concerns regarding mother’s behavior toward

A.S. during a visit or ever recommending mother for further services to help her with

parenting outside of the services provided by FNC. When asked about mother’s

progress, she said,

I believe that she has grown in the ability to regulate her own

emotions so that it does not affect the visits, affect the visits and [A.S.]

emotionally. She has learned how to help him calm down, his [sic]

learning how to set boundaries better. You know, when she wants [A.S.]

to stop doing a certain something, if he’s having a breakdown she’ll talk

to -- she’ll talk him through it, or she’ll rub his back. She’ll sit with him.

She just -- she has done really well working with him on like

herself setting boundaries and helping him work through his own

emotions if needed.

{¶50} She testified that A.S. responds to mother well and will give her hugs

and kisses. When asked if she felt the visits needed to be in the community, she said,

I don’t believe so. I believe that they would be okay in the home.

I’ve never seen the visits in the home, but how she is out in the

community and keeping him in a safe environment and safe place, and

she, you know, paying attention to him really well, I don’t see there

being a problem at all.

{¶51} When asked to describe mother’s relationship with A.S. based on the

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visits, she said,

It’s playful. It’s when mom needs to set boundaries and needs

him to listen, she’s able to do that. They play around a lot. They have a

good time. They laugh a lot together. She’s very nurturing and loving.

She’s hugging on him, kissing him, and he’s receptive to that. He seems

to have a good time at the visits. His emotions don’t seem -- I don’t see

him like struggling with mom at the visits.

When asked if she finds mother’s interactions age-appropriate with A.S., she said,

“Yes.”

{¶52} The visitation facilitator between mother and A.S. for 2024 also testified

to her observations of mother’s interactions with A.S. She testified, “[Mother] has a

hundred percent attendance. She engages very well with [A.S.], and she demonstrates

what we consider care skills, which are child and adult relationship enhancement

skills.” She discussed one care skill that she was working on improving with mother,

“quashing questions.” She described this as reducing the amount of questions you ask

a child while interacting to reduce overstimulation. When asked if she was saying that

mother was asking A.S. too many questions, she said, “Not consistently. It was just

something we addressed.” She testified that it had been three weeks since she had that

conversation with mother and mother has improved in terms of asking questions.

When asked on cross-examination why the quashing questions conversation wasn’t an

issue, she said,

It’s part of what we teach in care skills. So the asking of questions

isn’t inherently what I would consider a concern, but by improving her

care skills, by discussing how to reduce the amount of questions you ask,

it creates a better bond between parent and child, so it’s just one of the

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skills that we teach.

{¶53} When asked if she ever heard mother ask anything inappropriate, she

said, “Not inappropriate, no.” When asked to describe how A.S. greets mother at visits,

she said, “Typically mom initiates the greeting. She will see [A.S.] and greet him

verbally and then walk up and hug. Typically I see like a hug and a kiss in a greeting,

and [A.S.] will also hug and kiss her back.” When asked what happens at the

conclusion of a visit, she said, “I would say that’s where they demonstrate a strong

bond, because [A.S.] will hug and kiss mom, and often go back to ask for one last hug

and kiss from mom before leaving.” When asked about the community visits, she

testified that the permanent-custody motion was “the only thing” preventing a

discussion of visit expansion for mother.

{¶54} Because the record contains ample evidence to support the juvenile

court’s determination regarding mother’s positive behavioral change, we cannot hold

that the juvenile court’s determination regarding mother’s behavior was not supported

by sufficient evidence or against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Z.C.,

2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 14, quoting Seasons Coal, 10 Ohio St.3d at 80 (“If the evidence

is susceptible to more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it

that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, more favorable

d. Conclusion on Legally Secure Placement

{¶55} Based on mother’s case-plan compliance and behavioral change, the

juvenile court found that mother could provide a legally secure placement for A.S. The

court said,

Since the removal of the child from Mother, it is clear that

Mother has made great progress in completing case plan services,

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making behavioral changes, managing her mental health, and

improving her parenting skills. Mother reportedly brings appropriate

food and clothes for the child at visits, is patient with the child and

manages his behaviors appropriately. She also has obtained and

maintained stable housing and employment. Finally, while []JFS and

the GAL raised concerns about Mother’s mental health and the history

of domestic violence between Mother and Father, clear and convincing

evidence simply does not show that these concerns are still present.

{¶56} A review of the record reveals that these findings are supported by the

record. Most notably, the agency caseworker agreed that mother had completed all

the services requested of her. Mother’s therapist testified to mother’s continuous

engagement with services and positive improvement, and the FNC facilitators had

nothing but positive things to say about mother and her interaction with A.S. during

visits. Additionally, the concerns raised in this case were based on events that

occurred in the past and no evidence was put forth of any current events of domestic

violence that continued the cause for concern.

{¶57} Beyond that, mother consistently testified about her remorse for the

situation and the changes she has made to be a better parent moving forward. When

mother was asked what she wanted the court to know about why coming home with

her would be in A.S.’s best interest, she said,

I feel -- I’m not a perfect parent, but I’m a changed parent, and I

feel that I have really made the sacrifices that I’ve made in my parenting

and in this journey of being in this case I’ve learned a lot, that I’ve taught

myself to never do the things that I’ve done before, and to never do this

again, or go through this again, because it’s not fair to a child. It’s not

25 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

fair to a child to have to go through these things, whether it’s

emotionally, physically, or mentally. I just don’t feel that it’s fair that he

is -- that he is where he is because of my poor decision making from my

past. And that is my fault, and I can’t put that on -- the decisions that

I’ve made, I can’t put that on nobody else but me. I can’t put that on

them, him, you, anybody else. I take responsibility for what I did. But

I know as a parent I’ve grown. I’ve bonded with my child and I feel that

I am more stable and safer than I was before.

{¶58} Based on this court’s thorough review of the evidence in the record, we

hold that the juvenile court’s determination that mother could provide a legally secure

placement for A.S. is supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

e. The Determination of A.S.’s Best Interest

{¶59} Beyond the dispute as to a legally secure placement, neither the GAL nor

JFS set forth any specific challenge to the juvenile court’s findings under the remaining

best-interest factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), and a review of the record reveals that

the juvenile court’s best-interest determinations were supported by sufficient evidence

and not against the weight of the evidence.

C. The Juvenile Court’s Determination Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)

{¶60} Under the GAL’s second assignment of error, the GAL argues that the

record mandated a finding that permanent custody to the agency was in A.S.’s best

interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2). JFS also appears to challenge this determination

as part of its assignment of error, although not setting forth any specific argument as

to this finding. The juvenile court determined that permanent custody was not

mandatory under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(a) as A.S. could be returned to mother’s care.

26 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

{¶61} In support of this assignment of error, the GAL raises the same

challenges already addressed above regarding whether mother remedied the initial

concerns that caused A.S.’s removal. For the same reasons already explained, we hold

that the juvenile court’s determination that mother remedied the initial concerns that

caused A.S.’s removal was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶62} Because mother remedied the initial concerns that caused A.S.’s

removal, we cannot find error in the juvenile court’s determination under R.C.

2151.414(D)(2)(a) that A.S. could be returned to mother’s care. Consequently,

permanent custody was not mandated under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2).

IV. Conclusion

{¶63} For all the foregoing reasons, we over JFS’s assignment of error and the

GAL’s assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE and NESTOR, JJ., concur.