J-A12019-19
2019 PA Super 218
IN RE: SHELDON ARRINGTON : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: SHELDON ARRINGTON : : : : : : No. 831 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 10, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-MD-0001985-2018
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2019
Appellant, Sheldon Arrington, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence
that the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas entered after the court
issued an Order finding him in Contempt of Court. Appellant challenges the
sufficiency of evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After
careful review, we affirm.
We glean the following factual and procedural history from the certified
record. The use of cellphones in courtrooms of the Allegheny County
Courthouse is prohibited by Order of the Court. Notice of this prohibition is
on numerous signs at the Courthouse.
On April 13, 2018, Appellant, an Allegheny County juvenile court
probation officer with a 19-year tenure, was sitting in the front row of the
general seating area of the courtroom, waiting to testify as a witness in a
hearing to transfer a matter to juvenile court. After the trial judge took the J-A12019-19
bench, the court crier called the case and the sheriff left the courtroom to
escort the defendant into the hearing. While waiting for the sheriff to return,
the judge observed Appellant texting on his cellphone and asked Appellant to
put his cellphone away. Appellant looked around the courtroom, responded,
“there’s nothing going on in here,” stated that he had an “emergency,” and
continued to use his cellphone. The trial court then ordered Appellant to leave
the courtroom. Appellant left not only the courtroom but also the courthouse.
The defendant’s counsel was then unable to contact Appellant to return
to the courtroom to testify on the defendant’s behalf. Concerned that
Appellant’s conduct might impact the court’s determination of Appellant’s
credibility, the defendant’s counsel requested that the judge recuse himself
from the matter. The judge recused himself. The court then sent the case to
the court administrator for reassignment.1
The trial court then issued a Rule to Show Cause upon Appellant to show
cause why the court should not hold him in contempt of court. At the hearing,
Appellant apologized for his conduct. He did not present any other evidence.
The trial court found Appellant guilty of criminal contempt for using his
cellphone in the courtroom and imposed a sentence of ten days of
____________________________________________
1 The juvenile defendant and his co-defendant were to be tried jointly, unless the defendant’s case was sent to juvenile court. The court administrator, thus, reassigned both cases.
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incarceration. After Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, the trial court
modified the sentence to a term of five to ten days of incarceration.2
Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support the lower court’s finding of contempt, specifically, did the evidence support a finding that Appellant intended to disrupt the proceedings?
2. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of incarceration upon Appellant for using a cellphone in court when no active proceedings were ongoing and then offering a verbal protest to the court which was not loud, violent or belligerent, and was such a sentence inappropriate under the facts of the case?
Appellant’s Br. at 3.
Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of evidence. Appellant argues
that the evidence did not establish that he possessed the intent to disrupt the
proceedings because his conduct lacked “flagrant defian[ce]” as it was “not
loud, angry[,] or belligerent.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. Appellant notes that
2 We note that the trial court erroneously issued the contempt order pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 4137(a)(1). See Amended Order of Sentence, filed 5/21/18. Section 4137 relates to the contempt powers of magisterial courts and not the Court of Common Pleas. However, “[t]he power to punish for contempt . . . is a right inherent in courts and is incidental to the grant of judicial power under . . . our Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Marcone, 410 A.2d 759, 763 (Pa. 1980). Accordingly, the trial court had the authority to find Appellant in contempt of court pursuant to common law.
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when he used his cellphone, there were no “‘active’ [judicial] proceeding[s].”
Id. at 19.
In reviewing an appeal from a contempt order, “we place great reliance
on the discretion of the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 753 A.2d
856, 861 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). We review the record to
determine if the facts support the trial court’s decision and will reverse the
trial court only if there is a “plain abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).
“The ability to issue a criminal contempt [sanction] empowers a trial
judge with the ability to maintain command over his or her courtroom.” Id.
“If we . . . carve away at this power, the sanctity and balance of the courtroom
may be in jeopardy.” Id. (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132.
Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction of contempt where there is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of (1) misconduct, (2) in the presence of the
court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) that
obstructs the administration of justice. Commonwealth v. Moody, 125 A.3d
1, 5 n.4 (Pa. 2015).
We start by addressing the first element of contempt. Misconduct is
behavior that is inappropriate to the role of the actor. Commonwealth v.
Falana, 696 A.2d 126, 129 (Pa. 1997) (citation omitted). There is no dispute
in this case that Appellant used his cellphone in the courtroom in violation of
the courthouse prohibition against the use of cellphones. To make matters
worse, Appellant not only argued with the trial judge when the trial judge told
Appellant to put away his cellphone, but also continued to use his cellphone.
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It is Appellant’s use of the cellphone and defiance of the trial judge’s directive
to put away Appellant’s cellphone that constitutes misconduct.
The second element is that the defendant engages in the misconduct in
the presence of the court. In this case, it is also undisputed that it was in the
presence of the court that Appellant used his cellphone and then defied the
court’s directive to put away the cellphone.
The third element of contempt requires evidence that the “contemnor
knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” Williams,
753 A.2d at 862 (citation omitted). The intent element of contempt focuses
on whether the contemnor knew or should have known the conduct was
wrongful, not whether the contemnor knew or should have known the conduct
would obstruct the proceedings. See id.
Additionally, when an appellant has appeared before the court on
several prior occasions, an appellant should be aware of the seriousness of
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J-A12019-19
2019 PA Super 218
IN RE: SHELDON ARRINGTON : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: SHELDON ARRINGTON : : : : : : No. 831 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 10, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-MD-0001985-2018
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2019
Appellant, Sheldon Arrington, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence
that the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas entered after the court
issued an Order finding him in Contempt of Court. Appellant challenges the
sufficiency of evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After
careful review, we affirm.
We glean the following factual and procedural history from the certified
record. The use of cellphones in courtrooms of the Allegheny County
Courthouse is prohibited by Order of the Court. Notice of this prohibition is
on numerous signs at the Courthouse.
On April 13, 2018, Appellant, an Allegheny County juvenile court
probation officer with a 19-year tenure, was sitting in the front row of the
general seating area of the courtroom, waiting to testify as a witness in a
hearing to transfer a matter to juvenile court. After the trial judge took the J-A12019-19
bench, the court crier called the case and the sheriff left the courtroom to
escort the defendant into the hearing. While waiting for the sheriff to return,
the judge observed Appellant texting on his cellphone and asked Appellant to
put his cellphone away. Appellant looked around the courtroom, responded,
“there’s nothing going on in here,” stated that he had an “emergency,” and
continued to use his cellphone. The trial court then ordered Appellant to leave
the courtroom. Appellant left not only the courtroom but also the courthouse.
The defendant’s counsel was then unable to contact Appellant to return
to the courtroom to testify on the defendant’s behalf. Concerned that
Appellant’s conduct might impact the court’s determination of Appellant’s
credibility, the defendant’s counsel requested that the judge recuse himself
from the matter. The judge recused himself. The court then sent the case to
the court administrator for reassignment.1
The trial court then issued a Rule to Show Cause upon Appellant to show
cause why the court should not hold him in contempt of court. At the hearing,
Appellant apologized for his conduct. He did not present any other evidence.
The trial court found Appellant guilty of criminal contempt for using his
cellphone in the courtroom and imposed a sentence of ten days of
____________________________________________
1 The juvenile defendant and his co-defendant were to be tried jointly, unless the defendant’s case was sent to juvenile court. The court administrator, thus, reassigned both cases.
-2- J-A12019-19
incarceration. After Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, the trial court
modified the sentence to a term of five to ten days of incarceration.2
Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support the lower court’s finding of contempt, specifically, did the evidence support a finding that Appellant intended to disrupt the proceedings?
2. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of incarceration upon Appellant for using a cellphone in court when no active proceedings were ongoing and then offering a verbal protest to the court which was not loud, violent or belligerent, and was such a sentence inappropriate under the facts of the case?
Appellant’s Br. at 3.
Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of evidence. Appellant argues
that the evidence did not establish that he possessed the intent to disrupt the
proceedings because his conduct lacked “flagrant defian[ce]” as it was “not
loud, angry[,] or belligerent.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. Appellant notes that
2 We note that the trial court erroneously issued the contempt order pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 4137(a)(1). See Amended Order of Sentence, filed 5/21/18. Section 4137 relates to the contempt powers of magisterial courts and not the Court of Common Pleas. However, “[t]he power to punish for contempt . . . is a right inherent in courts and is incidental to the grant of judicial power under . . . our Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Marcone, 410 A.2d 759, 763 (Pa. 1980). Accordingly, the trial court had the authority to find Appellant in contempt of court pursuant to common law.
-3- J-A12019-19
when he used his cellphone, there were no “‘active’ [judicial] proceeding[s].”
Id. at 19.
In reviewing an appeal from a contempt order, “we place great reliance
on the discretion of the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 753 A.2d
856, 861 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). We review the record to
determine if the facts support the trial court’s decision and will reverse the
trial court only if there is a “plain abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).
“The ability to issue a criminal contempt [sanction] empowers a trial
judge with the ability to maintain command over his or her courtroom.” Id.
“If we . . . carve away at this power, the sanctity and balance of the courtroom
may be in jeopardy.” Id. (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132.
Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction of contempt where there is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of (1) misconduct, (2) in the presence of the
court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) that
obstructs the administration of justice. Commonwealth v. Moody, 125 A.3d
1, 5 n.4 (Pa. 2015).
We start by addressing the first element of contempt. Misconduct is
behavior that is inappropriate to the role of the actor. Commonwealth v.
Falana, 696 A.2d 126, 129 (Pa. 1997) (citation omitted). There is no dispute
in this case that Appellant used his cellphone in the courtroom in violation of
the courthouse prohibition against the use of cellphones. To make matters
worse, Appellant not only argued with the trial judge when the trial judge told
Appellant to put away his cellphone, but also continued to use his cellphone.
-4- J-A12019-19
It is Appellant’s use of the cellphone and defiance of the trial judge’s directive
to put away Appellant’s cellphone that constitutes misconduct.
The second element is that the defendant engages in the misconduct in
the presence of the court. In this case, it is also undisputed that it was in the
presence of the court that Appellant used his cellphone and then defied the
court’s directive to put away the cellphone.
The third element of contempt requires evidence that the “contemnor
knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” Williams,
753 A.2d at 862 (citation omitted). The intent element of contempt focuses
on whether the contemnor knew or should have known the conduct was
wrongful, not whether the contemnor knew or should have known the conduct
would obstruct the proceedings. See id.
Additionally, when an appellant has appeared before the court on
several prior occasions, an appellant should be aware of the seriousness of
the proceedings and the proper decorum. Commonwealth v. Mutzabaugh,
699 A.2d 1289 (Pa. Super. 1997)
In this case, Appellant had been a juvenile probation officer in Allegheny
County for approximately 19 years. The courthouse has numerous signs
prohibiting the use of cellphones. Additionally, the trial court told Appellant
to put away his cellphone and Appellant refused. It is from these facts,
therefore, that the factfinder could reasonably conclude that Appellant “knew
or should have been aware” that the use of a cellphone in the courtroom was
wrongful. It is also reasonable to infer from Appellant’s experience as a
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probation officer who appears in court often that Appellant “knew or should
have been aware” that his defiance of the court’s directive to put away his
cellphone was also wrongful conduct. Accordingly, sufficient evidence
supports the third element.
The fourth element of contempt—obstructing the administration of
justice—requires proof that Appellant’s conduct significantly disrupted judicial
proceedings. Williams, 753 A.2d at 863. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has concluded that a challenge to “the preservation of the court’s authority”
is a “significant disruption in [a] judicial proceeding[]” because it “obstructs
the efficient administration of justice and demeans the court’s authority.”
Commonwealth v. Falana, 696 A.2d 126, 129 (Pa. 1997) (citation omitted)
Williams, 753 A.2d at 863.
We conclude that Appellant’s conduct meets this fourth element. The
disruption at issue was Appellant’s defiance of the court’s directive to stop
using the cellphone in the courtroom. While Appellant’s continued use of his
cellphone did not cause significant delay in the judicial proceedings,
Appellant’s defiance by continuing to use the cellphone in the courtroom was
a challenge to the court’s authority. Falana, 696 A.2d at 129; Williams, 753
A.2d at 863. If the trial judge had not held Appellant in contempt of court,
Appellant’s defiance “[may] have eroded the Court’s authority” and
jeopardized the “sanctity and balance of the courtroom.” Williams, 753 A.2d
at 863. Accordingly, the fourth element was met.
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In sum, we conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s
decision. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
Appellant guilty of criminal contempt. Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency
challenge warrants no relief.
In his second issue, Appellant challenges discretionary aspects of his
sentence. He contends that his sentence was excessive and inappropriate,
asserting that because his actions were neither “belligerent nor openly
defiant,” a punishment of imprisonment was unwarranted. Appellant’s Br. at
23.
A challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not
automatically reviewable as a matter of right. Commonwealth v. Hunter,
768 A.2d 1136, 1144 (Pa. Super. 2001). Prior to reaching the merits of a
discretionary sentencing issue, we must determine: (1) whether appellant has
filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super.
2006).
In the instant case, Appellant met the first three elements by filing a
timely Notice of Appeal, properly preserving the issue in a Motion for
Reconsideration, and including a Statement of Reasons Relied Upon for
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Allowance of Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Thus, we proceed to
address whether Appellant’s sentencing challenge raises a substantial
question for our review.
Whether a substantial question has been raised is determined on a case-
by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super.
2010). “A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a
colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)
inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Id.
(citation and quotation omitted).
A sentence for criminal contempt must be for a determinate term of
imprisonment or a fixed fine. Commonwealth v. Falkenham, 452 A.2d 750,
757 (Pa. Super. 1982). A sentence of imprisonment must comply with the
Sentencing Code, which “mandates that the court impose a maximum
sentence, but also a minimum sentence which shall not exceed one-half of the
maximum.” Williams, 753 A.2d at 865 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756(b)). The
maximum sentence for a summary criminal contempt conviction may not
exceed six months. Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 327 A.2d 86, 89 (Pa.
1974); Falkenham, supra at 758. As noted above, the court sentenced
Appellant to a term of five to ten days of incarceration.
Appellant’s argument is, essentially, that he disagrees with the
imposition of incarceration as a sanction. While he acknowledges that it is
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within the court’s discretion to fashion a sentence, Appellant asserts that he
should not be incarcerated because lesser sanctions were available.
Appellant’s Br. at 21. Appellant fails to present a “colorable argument” that
the judge imposed a sentence inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or
contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. Since
the sentence of five to ten days of incarceration is well within the six month
maximum sentence permitted for summary criminal contempt sanctions,
Appellant has failed to raise a substantial question. Accordingly, this claim
fails.
Judgment of Sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 7/15/2019
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