In Re Armstrong

320 B.R. 97, 53 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1393, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 91, 2005 WL 189640
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 18, 2005
Docket19-30723
StatusPublished
Cited by59 cases

This text of 320 B.R. 97 (In Re Armstrong) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Armstrong, 320 B.R. 97, 53 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1393, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 91, 2005 WL 189640 (Tex. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON CONFIRMATION OR DISMISSAL OF CHAPTER 13 CASES ARISING FROM OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS

STEVEN A. FELSENTHAL, Chief Judge, BARBARA J. HOUSER, HARLIN D. HALE, Bankruptcy Judges.

Thomas Powers, the Standing Chapter 13 Trustee, objects to confirmation of several Chapter 13 plans, contending that the debtors have not proposed the plans in good faith. In two of the cases, the Trustee moves to dismiss for failure to confirm a plan. Each of the debtors have filed blanket objections to unsecured claims for “lack of documentation.” The Trustee contends that the debtors do not prosecute plans in good faith when they file blanket objections to all or most unsecured claims. The court conducted evidentiary hearings on May 11, May 20, June 15, June 16 and July 12, 2004. To understand the claims transfer process, the court held an additional evidentiary hearing involving the transfer of claims to eCast Settlement Corporation (“eCast”) on October 29, 2004. *101 The confirmation of Chapter 13 plans and the allowance of claims against bankruptcy estates constitute core matters, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and (L), over which the court has jurisdiction to enter final orders. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151 and 1334. This memorandum opinion constitutes the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Bankruptcy Rules 7052 and 9014.

After consultation with the bankruptcy judges of the Northern District of Texas, this memorandum opinion and order is jointly entered by the bankruptcy judges of the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas in each of the judge’s above-styled cases.

I. Background Facts

The court summarizes the facts of two of the cases. The facts from these cases typify the facts of the contested confirmation and dismissal hearings. For that reason, that court does not state the facts of the other cases.,

In the case of Effie Marjean Edgar, case no. 03-36770-SAF-13, Edgar proposed a Chapter 13 plan that would pay a 16% dividend to her unsecured creditors. Edgar objected to all filed proofs of unsecured claims, contending that the creditors failed to file supporting documentation pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 3001.

Several proofs of claims stated the precise amount of debt scheduled by Edgar. Others stated virtually the same amount of debt as scheduled by Edgar. Edgar held several of the subject credit cards for years. She regularly reviewed her statements. Edgar testified that she did not question the propriety of the proofs of claims for those creditors nor did she instruct her attorney to object to the claims. She testified that she had no reason to question the claims.

Several of her creditors sold their claims to eCast. Edgar had not heard of eCast before filing her bankruptcy petition. Edgar’s creditors did not inform her that they had transferred their claims to eCast. At the time she filed her objection, Edgar argues that eCast did not submit documentation of the transfer of claims nor of its right to assert the claims. eCast has subsequently filed notices of transfer of claims.

eCast purchases credit card portfolios of thousands of credit card accounts. eCast asserts that requiring more documentation than it has provided would pose an unreasonable burden. Edward Benison, a representative from eCast, testified that eCast gets all of its information on the credit card accounts that it purchases in electronic format from the credit card companies, along with some statements and supporting documents in portable document format. As part of the purchase, the seller also agrees to provide eCast additional documents that it has retained on that account, but eCast must pay a fee for retrieval of this information. Further, Benison testified that it would be impossible to attach all account statements to the proofs of claim they file, because records are only kept for five to ten years and then destroyed.

eCast and other credit card creditors argue that they should only be required to provide a short summary of the balance due on the account filed with the proof of claim in each case. Otherwise, they argue, they would then be subjected to searching for, reproducing, compiling, and filing possibly hundreds of pages of attachments to each and every claim, or to making a determination that the documents are no longer available and preparing a separate statement to that effect. They further argue that if this type of documentation was required, it would be cost prohibitive *102 for credit card creditors as a class to file proper proofs of claim in Chapter 13 cases, and this would pose an unfair and oppressive burden on claimants. See S. Andrew Jurs, Unsecured Claims and Rule 3001: How Much “Writing” or Supporting Information is Required?, ABI JOURNAL, Vol. XXIII No. 7, June 2004, at 10 (“Giant consumer lenders merge or purchase the loan portfolios of smaller lenders, and their automated systems are called on to handle a record volume of accounts. At times, the sheer volume and need for standardization as claims are collected creates conflicts with bankruptcy claims practice and procedure.”).

In the case of William Braggs, case no. 03-34189-SAF-13, Braggs proposed a plan that did not project a dividend to general unsecured creditors. The plan committed $42,300 to be paid in 60 monthly payments for curing the home mortgage arrearage, paying the value of the secured vehicle loan, paying child support arrearage and paying the Internal Revenue Service. Nevertheless, Braggs objected to all filed proofs of unsecured claims except for the IRS claim.

National Capital Management LLC filed a proof of claim for “money loaned.” The debtor objected to the claim because the proof of claim did not document that the claimant owned or held a claim and did not document the amounts owed. Braggs did not schedule a claim in the amount on the proof of claim filed by National Capital Management. Sherman Acquisition LP d/b/a Resurgent Acquisition filed a proof of claim for “Private Label Store.” The debtor lodged the same objections to that proof of claim. However, Braggs scheduled two debts in amounts similar to the amount on the proof of claim filed by Sherman Acquisition.

Braggs also objected to proofs of claims filed by Capital One Bank and Dallas County Employees Credit Union for lacking documentation of the amounts owed, the date the debt was incurred, and the total amount claimed due. Although Braggs scheduled a claim owed to Associated Recovery Systems, he testified that he did not know if that represented the debt owed to Capital One Bank. But, if so, Braggs scheduled a greater amount due than the amount claimed on the Capital One proof of claim. No proof of claim was filed by Associated Recovery Systems.

Braggs objected to the proof of claim filed by Midland Mortgage Company. Braggs did not schedule the same arrear-age amount as reflected on the proof of claim. Braggs testified that he did not know the amount he was behind, but agreed with Midland on the number of missed payments.

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Bluebook (online)
320 B.R. 97, 53 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1393, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 91, 2005 WL 189640, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-armstrong-txnb-2005.