In Re Arizona Dairy Products Litigation
This text of 627 F. Supp. 233 (In Re Arizona Dairy Products Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In re ARIZONA DAIRY PRODUCTS LITIGATION.
This Document Relates To:
STATE OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff,
v.
SHAMROCK FOODS COMPANY, an Arizona corporation; et al., Defendants.
Darryll J. WALTON, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
SHAMROCK FOODS COMPANY, an Arizona corporation; et al., Defendants.
United States District Court, D. Arizona.
*234 David L. White and Don G. Kessler, Jennings Strouss & Salmon, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendants.
Timothy J. Burke, Fennemore Craig Vonammon & Udall, Phoenix, Ariz., for Beatrice Food Co.
Steven D. Copple, Black Robertshaw Copple & Pozgay, Phoenix, Ariz., for Food Giant Super Markets, Inc.
J. Michael Hennigan, Greenberg Hennigan & Mercer, Beverly Hills, Cal., for plaintiffs.
MUECKE, District Judge.
Having received and considered Defendant Shamrock Foods Company's Motion to Dismiss, filed September 24, 1985; Defendant Beatrice Companies' Joinder in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed October 9, 1985; Defendant A.J. Bayless Markets, Inc.'s Joinder in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Joinder in Defendant Beatrice Companies' Joinder in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed October 22, 1985; Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed November 8, 1985; Reply Memorandum of Beatrice Companies In Support of Motion to Dismiss Claims for Purchases from Non-Defendant Retailers, filed November 15, 1985; Shamrock Defendants' Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed November 15, 1985; and having heard oral argument by counsel, this Court finds and concludes as follows:
By these motions, defendants seek to dismiss the portion of the plaintiffs' complaints seeking damages sought in connection with direct purchases from other than alleged participants in a retail-level conspiracy who are presently named defendants. In their complaints, plaintiffs allege:
Various corporations, firms and individuals both named and not named as defendants in this complaint participated as co-conspirators in the violations alleged and performed acts and made statements in furtherance thereof.
¶ 10 of Consumer Class Fourth Amended Complaint, filed April 8, 1985; ¶ 10 of State of Arizona Fifth Amended Complaint, filed April 8, 1985.
Plaintiffs have alleged a conspiracy between "virtually every [milk] retailer in the *235 state" of Arizona, as well as various wholesale vendors, to fix the retail prices of milk. This conspiracy is alleged to have occurred on a retail level only, although plaintiffs had previously alleged a wholesale level conspiracy. Although the allegations in the complaints include claims against many participants in the alleged conspiracy, plaintiffs have named only a portion of them as defendants.
In essence, defendants request that this Court dismiss all damage claims against them based upon sales made by non-conspirator competitors and un-named conspirators. They argue that such claims are speculative and amount to an "umbrella" theory of relief, which has been previously rejected by other courts. They rely upon several authorities for their contentions, including Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d 573 (3rd Cir. 1979) ("Mid-West"); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings In Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 691 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir.1982) ("Petroleum"), and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977).
First, in regard to the claims related to sales made by non-conspirators (i.e. retail competitors who were not participants in the alleged conspiracy), defendants argue that Mid-West and Petroleum bar these allegations of an "umbrella" theory of relief. They argue that the "umbrella" concept presented here is much like the claim in Petroleum, supra, 691 F.2d, at 1338-39:
Plaintiffs contend that defendants' successful price-fixing conspiracy created a "price umbrella" under which non-conspiring competitors of the defendants raised their gasoline prices to an artificial level at or near the fixed price. Since defendants are allegedly responsible for creating a market situation where conduct of this nature is possible, plaintiffs argue that defendants should be held responsible for damages resulting from their competitors' higher prices.
The conspiracy at issue has been alleged to have involved price-fixing on a retail level only. On a previous appeal in this matter, the Ninth Circuit noted the following:
Whether allegations of a retail price-fixing conspiracy such as the one alleged by the consumers would avoid the bar of Illinois Brick was expressly reserved by this circuit in In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 691 F.2d 1335, 1341 n. 9 (9th Cir.1982).
Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Company, 729 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir.1984). This Court has not been directed to a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit addressing this issue. While there is no controlling authority in this circuit, defendants rely upon the reasoning of Mid-West, claiming it to be dispositive of the claims presented. There, the Third Circuit was faced with a contention similar to that considered herein:
Murray [plaintiff] advances the theory that it may sue for treble damages because of injuries it suffered as a direct purchaser of consumer bags from competitors of the defendants, who allegedly were able to charge artificially inflated prices as a consequence of defendants' price-fixing.
Id., 596 F.2d, at 580. The Court went on to point out:
The question whether Murray's injury should be legally attributable to the defendants depends in some measure on whether and how accurately Murray's alleged injury is economically traceable to the defendants. That issue in turn parallels the pass-on issue raised in Illinois Brick because in both situations the plaintiff seeks to recover for higher prices set by, and paid by it to, parties other than the defendants. And the rationale underlying Illinois Brickthat it would be almost impossible, and at the very least unwieldy, to attempt to trace the incidence of the anticompetitive effect of defendants' conductbears even greater truth in the context of a purchaser from a competitor of the defendants.
Id., at 584.
The Court found that the purchaser had no standing to sue the defendants under § 4 *236 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15, for damages arising sales by the competitors.
A district court in this circuit has found to the contrary. In State of Washington v. American Pipe and Construction Co., 280 F.Supp. 802 (W.D.Wash.1968), the court was presented with the following situation:
Plaintiffs are also seeking compensation from American for allegedly excessive payments made on purchases from non-conspiratorial manufacturers.
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