[J-100-2025] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.
IN RE: APPOINTMENT TO FILL A : No. 51 MAP 2025 VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF COUNTY : COMMISSIONER : Appeal from the July 18, 2025, order : of the Commonwealth Court at Nos. : 653 and 697 CD 2025 affirming the APPEAL OF: LACKAWANNA COUNTY : order of the Lackawanna County AND WILLIAM GAUGHAN : Court of Common Pleas at No. : 2025-CV-2692. : : SUBMITTED: September 23, 2025
OPINION
JUSTICE McCAFFERY DECIDED: October 20, 2025 The Lackawanna County Home Rule Charter directs the Lackawanna County
Court of Common Pleas to temporarily fill a vacancy in any elected County office. See
Lackawanna County Home Rule Charter, § 1-2.206. The Home Rule Charter further
directs the court to choose from a pool of three candidates supplied by the executive
committee of the party of the vacating official. See id. Today, we are asked to determine
whether Pa.R.J.A. 1908 overrides the second of these two Charter directives. 1 We
1 Rule 1908 provides:
When a court of common pleas is filling a vacancy to an elected office under a statutory duty, the following procedures shall apply:
(a) The Court shall receive applications from any interested candidates for the position pursuant to a deadline established by the court.
(continued…) conclude Section 1-2.206 does not conflict with Rule 1908. And even if Section 1-2.206
conflicted with Rule 1908, it would not impermissibly intrude on this Court’s prerogatives
in supervising the operation of the Pennsylvania judiciary. Accordingly, we affirm the
Commonwealth Court’s decision.
On March 5, 2025, the Lackawanna County Board of Commissioners accepted the
resignation of Democratic Commissioner Matt McGloin. The next day, then-President
Judge of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas Patricia Corbett accepted the
resignation and entered an order indicating the court would follow the procedures set forth
in the Lackawanna County Home Rule Charter for filling the vacancy left by McGloin’s
resignation. 2 The order required the Lackawanna County Democratic Committee (LCDC)
to submit three names for consideration by March 11. The LCDC timely submitted the
required list.
(b) The names of all candidates under consideration and any written application materials submitted by any candidate are public information and shall be made available to any member of the public upon request. The following items included in any written application materials shall not be publicly released: the candidate's Social Security number; the candidate's home address, personal telephone number, and personal email address; and information pertaining to the name, home address, or date of birth of children under 17 years of age.
(c) Selection shall be by a vote of the commissioned judges of the court, including the president judge. In the event of a tie vote, the president judge will cast the deciding vote.
Pa.R.J.A. 1908. 2 Judge James Gibbons was sworn in as President Judge of the Lackawanna County
Court of Common Peas on March 17, 2025.
[J-100-2025] - 2 Six days later, one of the two remaining Lackawanna County Commissioners,
William Gaughan, filed a petition objecting to the process chosen by the court. 3 Instead,
Gaughan requested that the court consider “any interested candidate” pursuant to Rule
1908, asserting that Rule 1908 overrode the County’s Home Rule Charter. Shortly
thereafter, President Judge James Gibbons assigned Gaughan’s petition to a three-
Judge panel of Senior Judges (the trial court).
The trial court issued a split decision on May 22, 2025, with the majority concluding
that Commissioner Gaughan’s “reading of Pa.R.J.A. 1908 simply defies logic and means
every time the [Supreme Court] issues a new rule, be it administrative or procedural,
[Home Rule Charter] communities better hold their breath lest their constitutionally
guaranteed right to self-rule be consumed … by a pac-man like anonymous rule making
committee unanswerable to any public input.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/2025, at 32. The
majority therefore concluded that the Lackawanna County Home Rule Charter’s
provisions controlled.
One Judge dissented, concluding that Rule 1908 represented a rule of state-wide
application, which therefore overrode any local provisions to the contrary. Trial Court
Opinion, 5/22/2025, at 39 (Mazzoni, J., dissenting). As such, the dissenting Judge would
have granted Commissioner Gaughan’s petition.
Commissioner Gaughan appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which issued its
decision affirming the trial court on July 18, 2025. The Commonwealth Court began its
3 Commissioner Gaughan, with the assistance of the County Solicitor, also claimed to be
acting on behalf of Lackawanna County. The Commonwealth Court ultimately ruled that the Board of Commissioners had not authorized either Commissioner Gaughan or the County Solicitor to act on the County’s behalf. See In re Appointment to Fill a Vacancy in Off. Of Cnty. Comm’r, 653 & 697 C.D. 2025, *4 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Jul. 18, 2025) (unreported). We did not accept review of this specific ruling, and thus, for ease of reading, will refer to Gaughan’s filings as being only on his own behalf. We also omit any reference to designated Appellee’s, the Lackawanna County Democratic Committee’s appeals or arguments regarding the County’s standing.
[J-100-2025] - 3 analysis by summarizing the constitutional and statutory bases for home rule charters.
The Court noted that municipalities have a right to adopt home rule charters under the
Pennsylvania Constitution. See In re Appointment to Fill a Vacancy in Off. Of Cnty.
Comm’r, 653 & 697 C.D. 2025, *6 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Jul. 18, 2025) (unreported) (In re
Appointment). Thus, the Court opined that an exercise of power under a home rule
charter is presumptively valid unless the Constitution, other acts of the legislature, or the
charter itself restricts the contemplated action. See id.
The Commonwealth Court noted that the legislature imposed at least one limit to
the powers available to municipalities under home rule charters: home rule charters may
not grant or limit powers in a manner that contradicts laws 4 of general application.
throughout the Commonwealth. See In re Appointment, 653 & 697 C.D. at *6. The Court
then turned to the question of whether Section 1-2.206 of the Lackawanna County Home
Rule Charter contradicts any law of general statewide application. It noted that the
selection of a replacement Lackawanna County Commissioner is “a matter strictly local
to Lackawanna County, not one of statewide concern.” Id. at *7 (citation omitted). The
Court distinguished its own precedent in In re District Attorney, 756 A.2d 711 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2000), observing that there, the issue was the duration of the temporary appointment, not
the process utilized to select the appointee. See In re Appointment, at *7. Even then,
the court of common pleas in In re District Attorney utilized the procedure set forth in
Section 1-2.206 of the Lackawanna County Home Rule Charter to choose the
replacement. See id. Here, the panel noted that Section 1-2.206(b) does not contradict
4 Statutes, home rule charter provisions, and procedural rules adopted by this Court,
though all technically distinct classes of enactments, are generally treated as “law,” subject to Constitutional constraints such as the separation of powers. We will therefore refer to all three as “law” for readability purposes. Further, home rule charter provisions are generally treated as legislative acts, again subject to Constitutional considerations and laws of state-wide applicability. See In re Addison, 122 A.2d 272, 276 (Pa. 1956). Hence, we will thus refer to Section 1-2.206 as a statute when appropriate.
[J-100-2025] - 4 the terms of Section 12501 of the County Code, which only requires the appointment of
“a member of the same political party as the vacating county commissioner at the time
the vacating county commissioner was elected[.]” Id.; see also 16 Pa.C.S. § 12501(b).
The Commonwealth Court acknowledged that its jurisprudence was not always
consistent in assessing what constitutes a law of general application throughout the
Commonwealth. See In re Appointment, 653 & 697 C.D. at *8. Nonetheless, it concluded
that “a statute that is facially applicable to less than all classes of counties, and also not
facially applicable to home rule charter counties, does not constitute a statute applicable
in every part of the Commonwealth.” See id. (citations omitted).
With this in mind, the Court turned to Rule 1908, noting that the Rule’s application
is triggered when a court of common pleas is acting pursuant to a statutory duty. See In
re Appointment, 653 & 697 C.D. at *8. The Court then rejected Commissioner Gaughan’s
argument that the statutory duty here originated in Section 12501(b) of the County Code.
See id. It explained that under Commonwealth Court precedent, the County Code applies
only to counties without a home rule charter. See id. at *9 (citations omitted). Thus, in
enacting a home rule charter, Lackawanna County removed itself from the provisions of
the County Code and is now governed exclusively by its Home Rule Charter. See id.
(citations omitted). In turn, the Court determined that the statutory duty at issue in this
case emanated from Section 1-2.206 of the Home Rule Charter, not Section 12501(b) of
the County Code. See id. (citations omitted). As a result, the Court concluded that the
terms of Section 1-2.206 controlled in determining the process to select a temporary
replacement to the Board of Commissioners. See id.
Further, the Commonwealth Court opined that Section 1-2.206 of the Lackawanna
County Home Rule Charter does not conflict with Rule 1908. See In re Appointment, 653
& 697 C.D. at *9. While Section 1-2.206 identifies the “universe of candidates” from which
[J-100-2025] - 5 the Court of Common Pleas may choose from, it “does not provide the procedure by which
the [Court of Common Pleas] makes its selection of the replacement candidates.” See
id.
As a final consideration, the Court acknowledged that, generally, a statute cannot
abrogate a procedural rule duly adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See In re
Appointment, 653 & 697 C.D. at *9. Specifically, it stated “[a]ccordingly, … Section 1-
2.206 cannot be deemed to override any aspect of Rule 1908.” Id. However, the Court
concluded that the two provisions do not conflict: Section 1-2.206 provides the manner to
determine the pool of candidates eligible for appointment, while Rule 1908 provides the
procedures for selecting a candidate from that pool. See id., at *10.
Commissioner Gaughan timely sought review in this Court, and we granted review
of a single issue: “Whether home rule charters may supplant the uniform procedure in
Pa.R.J.A. 1908 that applies to courts of common pleas when filling vacancies in public
office?” In re Appointment to Fill a Vacancy in the Office of County Commissioner, 2025
WL 2553824.
On appeal, Commissioner Gaughan presents a two-step argument. First, he
asserts that Section 1-2.206 fundamentally conflicts with Rule 1908. He contends Section
1-2.206 requires the Court of Common Pleas to consider only three candidates chosen
by the appropriate party executive committee, while Rule 1908 requires the Court of
Common Pleas to consider any interested candidate.
Second, he claims that, given this Court’s “power to prescribe general rules
governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts … including … the
administration of all courts and supervision of all officers of the Judicial Branch …,” the
conflicting provisions of Section 1-2.206 must yield to the provisions of Rule 1908.
Appellant’s Brief at 13 (citing PA.CONST. art. 5, § 10(c)).
[J-100-2025] - 6 As the trial court correctly recognized, Commissioner Gaughan’s first argument
raises an issue of statutory interpretation. To determine whether Section 1-2.206 and
Rule 1908 conflict, we must determine what each authority requires. Both authorities
must be construed in a manner consonant with effectuating the intent of the promulgator.
See Commonwealth v. Baker, 690 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. 1997). If there are ambiguities, we
may resort to the rules of statutory construction. See id.
We begin with Section 1-2.206(b):
If a vacancy [in the office of any elected County officer] occurs, the executive committee of the political party of the person elected to the office in question shall submit a list of three persons to the judges of the court [en banc] within five (5) days of the vacancy. The court shall appoint one of the three (3) persons recommended to temporarily fill the vacancy. Lackawanna County Home Rule Charter, § 1-2.206(b). 5 No party or court in this
proceeding has identified any relevant ambiguity in this provision. Nor do we. Section 1-
2.206(b) clearly requires the Court of Common Pleas to select from three candidates
identified by the executive committee of the appropriate political party.
We therefore turn to Rule 1908, which Commissioner Gaughan contends conflicts
with Section 1-2.206(b): “When a court of common pleas is filling a vacancy to an elected
office under a statutory duty, the following procedures shall apply: (a) The Court shall
receive applications from any interested candidates for the position pursuant to a deadline
established by the court.” Pa.R.J.A. 1908(a). Commissioner Gaughan contends that
Rule 1908 requires the Court of Common Pleas to consider any candidate who indicates
an interest in the office. See Appellant’s Brief at 14. We disagree.
5 For purposes of this appeal, Commissioner Gaughan does not challenge the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that Lackawanna County, by dint of enacting its Home Rule Charter, is “removed from the operation of the County Code, which applies in the Commonwealth’s non-home rule counties.” In re Appointment, 653 & 697 C.D. at *9 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we treat Section 1-2.206 as the relevant statutory authority and not the County Code.
[J-100-2025] - 7 Rule 1908 provides procedures for a court of common pleas to follow when filling
a vacancy in an elected office pursuant to a statutory duty. It does not explicitly reference
any specific statute. Rule 1908 is thus a general rule, providing a framework for courts
to follow when any statute directs the court to fill such a vacancy. It is intended to cover
a wide variety of circumstances that may arise under a multitude of statutes that delegate
such a duty to the court of common pleas. For instance, the Rule does not set forth any
specific number of days, or even a justiciable standard such as “reasonable,” for the
deadline to receive applications. See Pa.R.J.A. 1908(a). This reflects deference to the
statute from which the duty to appoint arises.
Similarly, the term “interested candidate” must be construed in accordance with
the statute which triggers the application of Rule 1908. Contrary to Commissioner
Gaughan’s argument, the Rule does not address who may be an interested candidate.
Instead, the language employed is vague since it is meant to apply when triggered by
many different statutes. In other words, the Rule was drafted in a manner that allows
flexibility based on the requirements of the triggering statute.
Commissioner Gaughan tacitly concedes as much. In his Petition for Allowance
of Appeal to this Court, Commissioner Gaughan asserted that “there is no dispute”
between 16 Pa.C.S. § 12501 and Section 1-2.206, in that “both require appointment of a
member of the same political party as the vacating commissioner.” See Petition for
Allowance of Appeal, 420 MAL 2025, at 21 n.9. Left unsaid in either the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal or the Commissioner’s merits brief is whether “interested candidate”
in Rule 1908 is limited to only members of the same political party as the vacating officer.
As further examples, would Commissioner Gaughan’s strict textual reading of Rule 1908
require the court of common pleas to consider the application of a 12-year-old to fill the
vacancy? What about a resident of a different County or State? Commissioner Gaughan
[J-100-2025] - 8 makes no attempt to address the further consequences of his argument. Indeed, the
absurd results counsel against adopting it.
Instead, the natural reading of Rule 1908 provides a general framework for courts
of common pleas to follow when they are statutorily tasked with filling a vacancy in elected
office. The Rule does not purport to be exclusive or exhaustive in setting forth the
framework, and this is consistent with a desire that it be sufficiently flexible to
accommodate many different triggering statutes. Far from revealing an intent to override
the provisions of such triggering statutes, Rule 1908 was crafted to accommodate their
various procedures and requirements to the greatest extent possible. We therefore agree
with the Commonwealth Court that Rule 1908 and Section 1-2.206 do not conflict. Since
we conclude that Section 1-2.206 and Rule 1908 do not conflict, we need not address
Commissioner Gaughan’s argument that Section 1-2.206 cannot supersede the
provisions of Rule 1908, which is undeniably a law of state-wide application. The first
step of Commissioner Gaughan’s two-step argument fails.
Turning to the Commissioner’s second argument, we note that even if we did find
Section 1-2.206 and Rule 1908 to be in conflict, we conclude that Section 1-2.206 does
not impermissibly intrude on this Court’s article V, § 10 powers to regulate procedure and
supervise the judiciary. We emphasize that this argument is distinct from the
Commissioner’s assertion that Rule 1908, as a law of state-wide application, overrides
the provisions of Section 1-2.206. As set forth above, we need not answer the question
of whether the power to fill a vacancy in a Lackawanna County elected office is a matter
of state-wide or purely local concern.
In contrast, Commissioner Gaughan’s claim that Section 1-2.206 impermissibly
violates the separation of powers under the Pennsylvania Constitution represents an
independent basis for reversing the decision of the Commonwealth Court. If we were to
[J-100-2025] - 9 conclude that Section 1-2.206 impermissibly intrudes on this Court’s rule making
authority, Section 1-2.206 would be invalid on that ground alone. See Commonwealth v.
Lockridge, 810 A.2d 1191, 1194-1195 (Pa. 2002).
As with all questions concerning the scope of this Court’s powers, we begin with
the Pennsylvania Constitution, which declares that “all vacancies [for County officers]
shall be filled in such a manner as may be provided by law.” PA.CONST. art IX, § 4. The
legislature is empowered to enact such “law,” so long as it does not contradict
Constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. King v. King, 85 Pa. 103, 110-
111 (Pa. 1877) (construing the Act of May 15th 1874, so that it did not violate
Constitutional provisions regarding the filling of vacancies in elected offices “as may be
provided by law.”). In other words, the procedure for filling vacancies in elected County
offices is, at its core, a legislative, not judicial, function. Our Rules of Judicial
Administration are not to be construed in such a way that they violate the separation of
powers under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Pa.R.J.A. 109(d). As such, we decline
to construe Rule 1908 in a manner that would infringe on the legislative prerogative in
defining how a vacancy in elected office is filled.
Indeed, Commissioner Gaughan does not challenge the Home Rule Charter’s
power to delegate the decision to the court of common pleas. His argument implicitly
accepts the premise that the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas is the
appropriate venue for choosing the replacement. But this delegation itself reflects a
legislative choice, not a Constitutional commandment enforceable in a court of law.
Under article IX, § 4, the county’s voters could have chosen another person or institution
to make this decision. Pursuant to the Lackawanna County Home Rule Charter, they
chose to delegate the duty to the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. See
Lackawanna County Home Rule Charter § 1-2.206. It cannot reasonably be argued that
[J-100-2025] - 10 the charter, in delegating the duty to make the decision, nevertheless lacked the power
to direct the manner in which the decision is to be made. 6
As a consequence, we cannot conclude that Section 1-2.206 of the Lackawanna
County Home Rule Charter impermissibly intrudes on this Court’s Constitutional rule-
making prerogatives.
In sum, Rule 1908 does not conflict with the Section 1-2.206 of the Lackawanna
County Home Rule Charter. Instead, the two provisions act in concert to provide the court
of common pleas with a procedure to be followed when acting to fill a vacancy in the
Lackawanna County Board of Commissioners. And even if we were to conclude the
provisions conflict, Section 1-2.206 of the Charter does not impermissibly attempt to
regulate judicial procedure. We therefore affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court.
Justices Donohue, Mundy and Brobson join the opinion.
Chief Justice Todd files a concurring opinion in which Justice Wecht joins.
Justice Dougherty did not participate in the decision of this matter.
6 On the other hand, there is nothing requiring this Court to accept the delegation of power
from the legislative branch to an inferior court under all circumstances. Nonetheless, Rule 1908 represents a general acceptance of the delegation of the power to choose a temporary replacement for a vacancy in an elected office, subject, as always, to this Court’s power to supervise the inferior courts.
[J-100-2025] - 11